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SUMMARY
Letters of credit (LCs) as instruments of payment play an important role in 
international trade, namely, for bankers as trusted mediators to fill the gap between 
buyers/ applicants and sellers/ beneficiaries by arranging payments against 
documents of title (bills of lading). Rules and provisions related to such a system at 
the international level have always been a focus of attention and have fascinated 
legal scholars. The present thesis follows a similar concern; its central theme is the 
present system of law related to LCs at the international level; relevant questions 
addressed are; (1) what is the present system of law related to LCs?; (2) would 
such a system be adequate to provide a uniform law concerning LCs?; and (3) if 
not, what would be a possible replacement for it?
The thesis is based on UCP 500 and common law (English, American 
(particularly Article 5 of the UCC), and Scots law) and considers the relevant 
questions in four Parts (12 Chapters) in the following order:
1. Part One (three Chapters) studies LCs and the current situation; in that 
respect, after an introduction (background, rationale and framework of the present 
research study) a general background about the history and different sources on 
standards and rules of LCs is presented (Chapter I). More details follow concerning 
LCs' structure (definition, function, and operation) and principles operative in such a 
system (principle of strict compliance and doctrine of autonomy) (Chapter II). 
Standby letters of credit (SLCs) and their history, structure, their similarities and 
differences from LCs and bank guarantees (BGs) are considered in Chapter 111. It is 
concluded that the present system of LCs is a mixture of international customary 
(UCP 500) and national laws.
2. Part Two focuses on the international side of the system (UCP 500). Two 
chapters (IV and V) try to establish the level of effectiveness of the existing 
international sources of law regarding the needs of international commercial 
communities, at present. In that respect. Chapter IV is devoted to the UCP, its 
structure and related issues which affect applicants, beneficiaries, and bankers in
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their dealings within the system. A similar approach is followed in Chapter V in a 
comparison between UCP 500 and Article 5 of the UCC in the United States. The 
results make obvious that the UCP did not and does not address many issues 
relevant to LCs.
3. Part Three (Chapters Vi-VIM) considers legal issues related to LCs from 
a common law perspective. In order to achieve this goal bankers’ rights and duties/ 
undertakings in relation to the applicants (the principle of strict compliance, its 
concept and exceptions) and the beneficiaries (doctrine of autonomy, its concept, 
connection with a sale and a carriage contracts, and exceptions (particularly fraud 
and its relevant issues) are discussed (Chapters VI and VII). In the same line the 
bank's right of security under LCs and relevant issues are considered in Chapter 
VIII. It is concluded that many issues related to LCs are left to be decided under 
national rather than international law, and that harms the credibility of the system 
from an international law point of view.
4. Part Four (Chapters IX-XII) mainly deals with the future of the letters of 
credit system. In that regard Chapter IX deals with electronic data interchange 
(EDI) and relevant issues such as definition, related projects, advantages and 
disadvantages compared with paper-based documents, and with such legal issues 
as the role of documents in international trade and their impact on the UCP 500. 
Chapter X, follows a similar purpose by studying UNCITRAL's activities concerning 
a draft convention on SLCs and BGs, in order to establish the effect of that project 
over the present LCs' system. Then, issues connected to the possibility of the 
unification of the law of LCs, namely, current conditions in the world of commerce, 
meaning of unification and its practical interest, methods and techniques for the 
unification of law at the international level and obstacles to it, are considered.
The next issue for consideration is international legislation and issues 
related to such an option as a substitute for international customary law (Section A, 
Chapter XI). In that respect and after considering different available techniques 
(supranational legislation, convention and model law) in a comparison between 
international conventions and international customs, reasons for and against each 
one of them are discussed. In Section B of Chapter XI, another reference is made
x x v i i i
to the UCP, its legal nature and shortcomings as an international source of law 
connected to LCs.
Lastly, Chapter XII deals with conclusions based on the results of points 
presented throughout the thesis. It is concluded that for greater certainty, credibility, 
and reliability on the law of LCs at the international level, the present system (a 
mixture of international customs and national law) should be replaced by a new 
system (a mixture of international convention and national law) in order to respond 
better to the present and future needs of international commercial communities.
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PART ONE
LETTERS OF CREDIT
THE CURRENT SITUATION
CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION AND
GENERAL BACKGROUND
SECTION A: INTRODUCTION
1. BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH
1.1. Importance of documentary letters of credit
Modes of payments have always been a matter of importance in sale 
contracts. Payments are effected in cash, by bills of exchange, promissory notes, 
cheques, and not least by letters of credit (LCs). Documentary LCs^ defined also as 
"the life blood of International commerce"," have played an important role as an 
effective instrument for payment of the purchase price of goods in both international 
and domestic sale contracts. They serve equally as security for performance by 
parties to the contract;" and their use has become more common and convenient 
among businessmen after the Second World War" as a result of improvements in 
the credit system, particularly within the last three decades.^
1.2. Emergence of rules on letters of credit: The current situation 
and issues related to it
The present form of LCs has been in use since the first half of the 19th 
century. While the origins of LCs go back to the 12th century, issues related to them 
(legal as well as customary and practical aspects) have not been discussed for the 
purpose of a possible unification of national rules and standards until 1933.®
In that year the first Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits (UCP) was published by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in
" They are also called ''bankers' commercial letters o f credit".
" Kerr, L.J. in R.D. Harbottle (Mercliantile) L td. v. National Westminster Bank Ltd. [1978] Q.B. 146, p.
155 [emphasis added].
" Standby letters o f credit; see Article 1 o f the UCP 500.
Kozolchyk, Boris, "Le tte r o f C re d it". 9 International Encyclopedia o f Comparative Law, Chapter 5, 1979, 
p. 1 [hereinafter refeiTed to as Kozolchyk].
® See introduction to the UCP 290 (1974), UCP 400 (1983), and UCP 500 (1993).
® For a relevant discussion concerning the history o f LCs see Section B. 1 o f the present chapter below.
Paris? Its provisions, dealing mostly with the customs and practices related to LCs 
in international trade,® and some, but not all, issues of documentary credits,® were 
later revised five times"® ; the revision of the UCP 500, published by the ICC in the 
Spring of 1993, came into effect on January 1, 1994.
Regarding, however, the legal issues concerning LCs,"" there are no uniform 
rules applicable in international trade. Related issues have been treated under 
respective national laws. As a result, at present, a mixture of international 
commercial customs (UCP)"" and national rules apply to the documentary credit 
system in international commercial transactions.
1.2.1. The curren t situation o f the letters o f credit system
Many cases relevant to LCs have been considered by English courts, and 
the situation is no different in the USA, as far as common law is concerned. In 
Europe cases have been examined in the light of civil law systems. In such a state 
of diversity of law a question arises: is the present system satisfactory in 
promoting reliability and legal certainty as well as coping with disputes? If 
yes, why are there so many disputes related to LCs? Are the roots of the problems 
related to the system in general, or is the main reason for the existence of numerous
 ^ The ICC was founded in 1919; Eberth, Rolf, "The Uniform Customs and Practice fo r Documentary 
Credits", (updated by Professor EP Eilinger), (Kee, Ho Peng, "Singapore Conferences on International 
Business Law, Current Problems of International Trade Financing". Butterworths, 1990, 2nd Edition 
[hereinafter referred to as Singapore Conferences 1990], pp. 3-20, p. 5 [hereinafter refeired to as Eberth, 
Singapore Conferences 1990].
® For more details about UCP 500 see Chapter IV  (below); and regarding its position as an international source
o f law see Chapter XI, Section B.
® In that respect look at discussions in Chapter V, Section B.2 and particularly Section B in Chapter V II and 
Chapter V III (below).
"® In 1951, 1962, 1974, 1983, and 1993; Davidson, Paul J., "The UCP and the need fo r amendment in the 
l ight o f technological advances". Singapore Conferences 1990, supra (f.n. 7), pp. 21-36 [hereinafter referred to 
as Davidson, Singapore Conferences 1990].
"" See below Chapters V I-V llI  for legal issues relating to LCs from an English law point o f view.
"" As to the UCP and its nature see below Chapter XI, Section B.
cases to be sought in the law of LCs in a narrow sense, namely, the legal aspects of 
LCs as separate from custom and practice? it may be that the law is not clear for 
contracting parties and for defining mutual rights and obligations.
The practical, issues related to the current system are dealt with by the ICC 
which, to some extent, has succeeded in unifying a part of customary standards 
applicable to LCs in international trade under the UCP. The UCP, however, covers 
some but not all issues related to LCs; as such it leaves certain questions 
unanswered and may lead to uncertainty between the interested parties.
Regarding the merits of the respective national laws of states, the main 
objection to them is that issues of an international character are considered by 
national law while dealing with legal questions attached to an international 
instrument; efforts by states have been based on national rather than international 
interests."" This situation may generate different views about one and the same 
issue related to LCs. It may be hence argued that the cause of uncertainty and the 
lack of clarity may be due to the absence of a "uniform law", that is, in the form of 
an international commercial "legislative" text governing LCs in international trade. If 
the UCP promotes or provides for a common understanding and therewith 
uniformity in business transactions between trading states, as to commercial custom 
and practices affecting LCs, an international commercial "legislative" text may 
provide for needed uniformity as far as the transnational legal issues of LCs are 
concerned.
1.2.2. W hat are the cu rren t transnational legal issues concerning LCs?
Generally speaking, there are three parties in a documentary credit 
operation, namely, (1) the applicant for the credit (the buyer or bank's customer), (2) 
the bank (namely the issuing bank or the intermediary bank), and (3) the beneficiary 
of the credit (the seller)."'' These parties to the credit have different interests, and
"" For further details see below Section B, Chapter X  and Section A.3, Chapter XI.
By including the tenns "on its own b e h a lf in Article 2 o f UCP 500 it seems tlie situation is prepared for a 
"two party" letter o f credit transaction; for further details see Dolan, John F., "Weakening the letters o f crédit
for the protection of their respective interests in practice different principles and 
techniques are used to control the balance of interests and to coordinate them 
within the system. For instance, the "doctrine of autonomy" provides a good 
assurance for the seller as the beneficiary of the credit, namely, if documents 
required under a letter of credit are tendered by the beneficiary, the bank must pay 
to him the amount of the credit; however, in the case of fraud committed by the 
beneficiary or if it is proved that he was aware of such an action committed by a 
third party, the bank is released from such an undertaking?® On the other hand, to 
preserve the right of the applicant for the credit, another principle, namely the 
"principle of strict compliance", is applied. In such a situation, the bank 
undertakes to keep the balance between the parties, namely, the applicant and the 
beneficiary for the credit, by acting as a reasonable and reliable person to prevent 
misunderstanding and possible abuse of the system?® Moreover, for safeguarding 
their interests under the system, banks use different techniques such as taking 
documents as pledge for recovering their money from the applicant for the credit."’ 
These points and others related to them have been the subject of consideration in 
many cases in the U.K.
As issues related to the above points and modes are not normatively clarified 
by legal rules at an international level, reasons for misunderstanding may exist or 
one of the parties to a credit arrangement may be tempted to abuse the system and 
change the balance of interests and claims in his favour. The national law of a state, 
with English or Scots law as an example, may provide some rules about legal issues 
related to LCs, but would it be sufficient to enable a prediction that issues of LCs
product: The new Uniform  Customs and Practice fo r Documentary C red its". International Business Law 
Journal, No. 2, 1994, pp. 149-177 [hereineafter referred to as Dolan]; see also Eilinger, E.P., "The Uniform  
Customs and Practice fo r Documentary Credits- the 1993 Revision". LMCLQ, part 3, August 1994, p. 377 
[hereinafter referred to as Ellinger's article 1994].
"® For more details about the "doctrine o f autonomy" and its exception(s), see below Chapter VII.
"® See below Chapter V I for details relating to the principle o f strict compliance.
" ’  See Chapter V III (below).
shall be treated in the same way at an international level? If the answer is no, what 
could be done to achieve uniformity or at least ban non-uniformity regarding the 
legal aspects of transnational documentary credits? Different legal systems reflect 
similar positions, e.g., with respect to fraud committed by the beneficiary of the 
credit; but also differences between them may exist. For instance, is there any 
limitation to the meaning of fraud committed by the seller as far as the transaction is 
concerned? Does the beneficiary's fraud cover the sale contract or is the fraud only 
related to the credit contract?"®
1.3. What is meant by "Uniform Law"?
A first step to promote the law of LCs towards unification could be in the form 
of international commercial legislation anchored in a convention."® It could cover 
only legal issues related to the documentary credit system. Concerning UCP, its 
contents could be supplemented and integrated as the base of the new uniform 
law (UL); or, alternatively, it could be considered better to leave matters as they are 
as at present. The first method may be preferable if all issues of LCs, either in the 
form of legal rules or customary practice, are codified in one instrument; and with it 
the creditability and reliability of UCP would be increased since its legal position 
would be changed from that of customary standards to a legislative form.^® By 
contrast, it would lose, to some extent, its flexibility; this is an important point which 
should not be ignored.
1.4. The role of English law in developments toward a uniform law 
for LCs
What would or could be the contribution of English law and practice to the 
process of unification? As the legal issues of LCs in the present thesis are 
considered in the light of English law, its impact on promoting new uniform law may
"® In respect o f fraud and its relevant issues see Chapter V II, Section B (below). 
"® See below Chapter XI.
2 0 On this point see below Section A.3, Chapter XI.
be considered. What contributions could English law provide for achieving a 
uniformity for the law of LCs, and what possible obstacles may arise when 
envisaging uniformity? In addition to English law, American and Scots law, if 
relevant, are considered when dealing with points related to the above questions. 
The thesis may refer to arbitrate awards dealing with LCs, but it does not discuss 
them as part of its main contents.
2. RATIONALE OF THE STUDY
The letters of credit system, its rules and standards in international trade, 
legal issues related to them, and the future of the system, as indicated above, are 
issues that the present research study examines. The purpose of the study is simply 
to find whether there is any possibility to have a system more satisfactory than the 
present system? If there is such a possibility, to what extent could a new system 
provide a certain and reliable system for all parties to LCs?
3. THE FRAMEWORK OF RESEARCH
To answer these questions Part one (in three Chapters) sets out a general 
background relating to the history, standards and rules, and mechanism of the 
documentary letters of credit (LCs and SLCs). Moreover, legal as well as other 
issues related to LCs are considered in the second and third Parts of the study 
(Chapters IV-VIII). In that respect, UCP 500 and its differences with Article 5 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the United States of America are the main 
issues considered. In addition, points related to legal issues, in connection with 
principle of strict compliance, doctrine of autonomy, and bank's right of security, are 
further issues while the present thesis considers from the angle of English law.
As to the future of the documentary credits system beside issues connected 
to Automatic Data Processing (ADP) or Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), the main 
subject of discussion is the possibility for having the first international legislative 
instrument in the form of a convention for LCs. These issues and points related to 
them are considered in Part four (Chapters IX-XI). In order to benefit the view of 
experts on the above point a letter was sent to banks located in the UK (Barclay’s
Bank, Lloyd’s Bank, Midland Bank, National Westminister Bank, The Royal Bank of 
Scotland, Bank of Scotland, and Bank Melli Iran (London branch)), international and 
national organisations (UNCITRAL (New York, Vienna and Geneva), UNIDROIT 
(Rome), ICC (Paris and London), Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, The British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, The American Law Institute), legal 
scholars and lawyers (whose residence are in the UK, the USA, France, Italy and 
Canada) in 1995, and received replies are considered in due course. Lastly, in 
Chapter XII of Part four of the present study, the extent to which an international 
legislative instrument, compared with the present mixture system of international 
commercial custom and related national law, could provide better rules and 
standards for all interested parties to a letter of credit arrangement.
As an introduction to the discussion of legal issues related to LCs in more 
detail, what follows below refers to general aspects of the current system.
SEC TIO N  B: G ENER AL BACKGROUND
A brief history of the documentary credit: a general background followed by 
the legal meaning/definition, function, operation, and application of significant 
principles accepted for credit arrangements.
1. HISTORY OF LETTERS OF CREDIT
1.1. From the 12th century to early 20th century
A form of letter of credit dating from 120T" shows that the earliest type of 
credit (namely the open credit)"® was known at least to the English kings,"® princes.
Sanborn, F.R., "O rig ins o f the early English M aritim e and Commercial Law ". New York 1930, p. 374; 
Davis, A.G., "The law relating to commercial letters of c red it". London, 3rd ed., 1963, p. 2 [hereinafler 
refen'ed to as Davis].
The old form o f credit called "open credit" which was different from the new fom i o f letter o f credit which 
is known as "documentary credits"; J. Stoiy in his book, "Commentaries on the Law o f Bills o f Exchange. 
Foreign and Inland as Administered in England and America". 2nd ed., Boston, I860, chapter 13, para. 
459, defines an open letter o f credit in the following terms: "An open letter o f request, whereby one person 
(usually a merchant or banker) requests some other person or persons to advance moneys, or give credit, to a 
third person, named therein, for a certain amount, and promises that he w ill repay the same to the person 
advancing the same, or accept Bills drawn upon himself, for the like amount. It is called a general letter o f 
credit, when it is addressed to all merchants, or other persons in general, requesting such advance to a third
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popes and other rulers in Europe in the 12th century. Whether they were known to 
English traders of the time is "extremely doubtful"."" While Italian merchants used 
open letters of credit in the 14th century there is little evidence that they were well 
known among British traders, even as late as the 16th century."®
In the 17th century the operation of the letter of credit was described in these
terms: "A merchant doth send his friend or servant to buy some commodities or take 
up money for some purpose, and doth deliver unto him an open letter, directed to 
another merchant, requiring him that if his friend [...] the bearer of that letter, have 
occasion to buy commodities or take up moneys that he will procure him the same 
and he will provide him the money or pay him by exchange.""®
A text on letters of credit was published in 17th century."’ There is no doubt
that LCs became popular in the 18th century,"® but it seems that they did not 
present many problems for the courts: there are no reported cases.
Although LCs were considered by Lord Mansfield in several cases,"® no 
principles of law were laid down for them."® The earliest case was decided a
person; and it is called a special letter o f credit, when it is addressed to a particular person by name requesting 
him to make such advances to a third person."; see Davis, ibid., p. 1, f.n. 1; Eilinger, E.P., "Documentary 
Letters o f C redit" [hereinafter referred to as Eilinger], Singapore, 1970, pp. 5-7; Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 4), 
about "letter o f payment" in 12th-13th century, p. 4, f.n. 4.
Eilinger, ibid., p. 24.
"" Eilinger, supra (f.n. 22), pp. 24-25.
"® Eilinger, supra (f.n. 22), pp. 24-25.
Malynes, "Lex M ercatoria ". London, 1622, p. 76 and pp. 104-6; see also Kozolcyk, supra (f.n. 4), about 
the letter o f credit and its definition in 17th centuiy, at p. 4, f.n. 5.
Marius, J., "Advice concerning Bills o f Exchange". London, 4th ed., 1684, pp. 30-31 and p. 36 (the first 
edition was published in 1651); Roberts, R., "The merchants' map o f commerce". London, 1700; Malynes, 
ibid., 3rd ed., 1868; Davis, supra (f.n. 21), pp. 3-4.
"® Jacob, G., "Lex Mercatoria. or the merchant's companion". 2nd ed., London, pp. 39-40; and also from 
the same writer, "A  new law d ic tionary". London, 1729; Eilinger, supra (f.n. 22), p. 25; Davis, supra (f.n. 21), 
pp. 4-5.
Pillans V. Van M ierop (1765)3 Buit. 1663; Mason v. Hunt (1779) 1 Doug. 297; Russel v. Lanstaffe 
(1780)2 Doig. 514.
century later;®" it was then very obvious that credits were common and in general 
use?" It may be then assumed that English merchants have used them for at least 
300 years.
In the USA the first case on LCs was decided earlier than the first case in 
England in 1841.®® There have been some cases at that time, showing that 
American bankers were familiar with credit operations;®'' but 40 years later a court 
stated that it could not find any other authorities dealing with LCs similar in all 
aspects to the case before it.®® Hence, legal issues of open LCs were not yet 
settled by 1886.
1.2. The modern form of documentary letters of credit
Commercial letters of credit are modern instruments.®® There is no accurate 
date to show when the modern practice of documentary credits began. From its 
functions one can assume that the use of letters of credit started from the first half of 
the 19th century; this assumption can be supported by a decision made at that 
time.®’ It is also suggested that the first developments probably took place from the
®® Davis, supra (f.n. 21), pp. 5-8.
®" Re Agra and IVTasterman's Bank (1867)2 Ch. App. 391.
®" Banner v. Johnston (1871)5 HL case 157; Davis, supra (f.n. 21), pp. 8-9.
®® Carnegie v. M orrison (1841), 2 Mete. 381 (Mass.); Davis, supra (f.n. 21), pp. 9-10; see also Professor Karl 
N. Llewellyn's Commentaiy in Henry Harfield, "B ank Credits and Acceptances". 5th ed., 1974, pp. 158-62 
about the histoiy o f the letter o f credit in the United States.
®'' Russell V. Wiggin (1842), 2 Story 213; 21 Fed. Cas. 68; Brickhcad v. Brown. 5 H ill (N.Y.) 634 (1843), 
affirmed 2 Den. (N.Y.) 375 (1845).
®® Lafargue v. Harrison (1886), 70 col. 380; 9 Pac. 259; Davis, supra (f.n. 21), pp. 9-10.
®® Davis, supra (f.n. 21), at p. 10, said: "It is given not to the customer, but to some third person named by the 
customer, with whom the customer has commercial dealing, in order to carry through a particular transaction. In 
effect, the name and reputation o f the banker are substituted for those o f his customer."; McCullough, Burton 
V., "LETTER S OF C R E D IT". Matthew Bender, 1993 [hereinafter refeiTed to as McCullough], pp. 1-18 
(history o f LCs).
®’  Brickhcad &  Carlisle v. Brown, supra (f.n. 34); Eilinger, supra (f.n. 22), pp. 28-35.
middle of the 19th century and later grew in Anglo-American and European trade?® 
For instance, a Finnish importer of Brazilian coffee used commercial LCs as early as 
1840?®
A form of modern LCs can be found in a case decided in the early years of 
the 20th century?® its usage did not become general before the end of the Second 
World War,®" when there was a lack of economic stability, with fluctuations of 
foreign exchange rates. After 1945 international trade accelerated and 
improvements were introduced in the capability of the system as secure for 
payments. Parallel to these developments, there has been a tendency to seek 
greater uniformity throughout the world,
2. SOURCES ON STANDARDS AND RULES OF LETTERS OF 
CREDIT
2.1. The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits
Before 1933 some individual efforts were made by different countries®" to put 
all aspects of the credit in a codified legal framework, but none of them had an 
international scope. In 1933, for the first time, by the efforts of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) at its 7th Congress held in Vienna, the first edition of 
the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credit (UCP) was 
published.®® The ICC Congress was more successful in codifying issues related to
®® Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 4), pp. 3-4.
®® Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 4), at p. 4, f.n. 3.
®® Basse and Solve v. Bank o f Australia (1904) 90 L.T. 618; Eilinger, supra (f.n. 22), pp. 35-6.
®" Davis, supra (f.n. 21), p. 10.
®" In 1920 the USA, 1923 Germany and Greece, 1924 France and Noway, 1925 Italy, Czechoslovakia, and
Sweden, 1926 Argentine, 1928 Denmark, 1930 Netherlands; Eilinger, supra (f.n. 22), p. 37; Eilinger, E.P.,
"The Uniform Customs - their nature and the 1983 Revision". L.M.C.L.Q. 1984, pp. 578-606, at p. 578 
[hereinafter refened to as the Uniform Customs].
®® It was codified by the 7th Congress o f the ICC, Brochure No. 82; it is necessary to mention that there was 
another attempt for international standardisation in 1929 Congress o f the ICC, held in Amsterdam, but it was not
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LCs than in promoting and establishing uniformity, as only certain European 
countries and some American banks accepted it?®
To achieve uniformity, to improve the capability of the UCP with regard to 
developments in methods of transportation and communication, the need to 
recognize appropriate documents, and the need to accept new types of credits such 
as standby letters of credit and deferred payment credits, the ICC revised the UCP 
provisions five times within 60 years between 1933-1993.®®
2.2. English and Scottish law
In the United Kingdom (UK), the UCP, beside court cases relevant to LCs, is 
the only available source related to letters of credit.®® There is no particular Act of 
Parliament regarding LCs.
2.3. American law
In the USA, the rules relating to letters of credit, beside court cases related to 
LCs, were codified in Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).®’ It was
successful; Eilinger, the Uniform Customs, ibid, p. 579; Eberth, Singapore Conferences 1990, supra (f.n. 7), p. 
6 .
®® Eberth, Singapore Conferences 1990, supra (f.n. 7), p. 7; Davidson, Singapore Conferences 1990, supra (f.n.
10), p. 22.
®® See ICCs Publications, Pub. No.l51 (UCP 1951), Pub. No. 222 (UCP 1962), Pub. No. 290 (UCP 1974), 
Pub. No. 400 (UCP 1983), and Pub. No. 500 (UCP 1993); Buckley, Ross P., "The 1993 Revision o f the 
Uniform Customs and Practice fo r Documentary Credits". Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. &  Econ., Vol. 28, 1995, 
pp. 265-313.
®® The UK and Commonwealth banks accepted the UCP in 1962; Eberth, Singapore conferences 1990, supra 
(f.n. 7), p. 7; Davidson, Singapore Conferences 1990, supra (f.n. 10), at p. 22 said: "a revised version was 
adopted by the thirteenth congress o f the ICC in Lisbon in 1951. Although this Revision extended the scope o f 
application o f the UCP in that they were now followed by banks in the USA, they remained limited in their 
application as the U K and Commonwealth banks were still not adherents (primarily because they feitli the UCP 
provided for too much discretion in the banks with regard to the acceptance o f shipping documents not 
expressly mentioned in the letter o f credit). It was not until 11 years later, with a further revision o f the UCP in 
1962, that the British banks were induced to adhere."; Eilinger, EP, "Le tte r o f credit". Horn, Norberth and 
Schmitthoff, CM, "Studies in International Economic Law, The Transactional Law o f International 
Commercial Transactions". Kluwer, 1982, Vol. 2, pp. 241-732 [hereinafter referred to as Ellinger's paper in 
lEL 1982], at pp. 248-49; Editorial, "B ritish  banks accepted the IC C  U niform  Customs for Commercial 
Credits". .IBL, 1963, pp. 99-101; Megrah, Maurice, "A  uniform  code fo r documentary credit practice?". 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 8, January 1959, pp. 41-58, at pp. 52-55 (attitude o f British 
banking) [hereinafter referred to as Megrah's paper 1959].
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accepted by most of the states of the USA, but New York, Alabama, Missouri, and 
Arizona modified UCC before adoption?® In these states UCP 500 has also been 
applied?®
CONCLUSIONS
The documentary letters of credit system and its importance in international 
trade are so obvious as to be undeniable?® It is also clear that international 
provisions concerning the system are mainly customary in nature (UCP 500) and 
issues not covered by the UCP are covered by law (at national level) chosen by 
parties to LCs transactions. Therefore, at present the letters of credit system is a 
mixed system, namely, of international commercial custom and relevant national 
law. Would such a mixed system be adequate to provide a uniform law concerning 
LCs? If not, what would be a possible replacement for the present system?
With reference to the first question above, both parts of the letters of credit 
legal system (namely, UCP 500 and respective national law) have some limitations 
that undermine its efficiency as a sound platform for a movement towards preparing 
a unified and codified law of LCs. UCP 500 is limited to some aspects of LCs,
Other rules relate LCs are Articles 1072 to 1082 o f Yugoslav Federal Code o f Obligations o f 1978 (its name 
might be changed as a result o f recent events in former Yugoslavia) and Articles 367 to 377 o f the new Kuwait 
Commercial Law that came into force on 25 February 1981; Eberth, Singapore Conferences 1990, supra (f.n. 7), 
pp. 5-6.
Those states adopt sub-section 4 o f Article 5-114; therefore, the bracket in the last sentence o f sub-section 1 
o f Article 5-112 o f the UCC should also be included; see also relevant discussion about UCC later; "U n iform  
Commercial Code". The American Institute, National Conference o f Commissioners on Uniform States 
Laws, 1972 Official Text, with comments and appendix showing 1972 changes, pp. 417-43 [hereinafter referred 
to as UCC]; MccuIlough, supra (f.n. 36), at ss 2.05[1], sub-paragraph [e] it is said: "New York, Alabama, 
Arizona, and Missouri have adopted a nonuniform amendment to Article 5. It reads as follows: "Unless 
otherwise agreed, this Article 5 does not apply to a letter o f credit or a credit i f  by its terms or by agreement, 
course o f dealing or usage o f trade such letter o f credit or credit is subject in whole or in part to the Uniform 
Customs and Practice for Commercial Documentaiy Credits fixed by the thirteenth or by subsequent Congress 
o f the International Chamber o f Commerce.""
UCP 1951 was accepted by banks in the USA; Davidson, Singapore Conferences 1990, supra (f.n. 10), p. 
22; for a comparison between Article 5 o f the UCC and UCP 500 see below Chapter V.
®® See discussion concerning history o f LCs under present chapter above. 12
namely, customs and practices; less attention is paid to legal issues, e.g., fraud and 
bank's right of security (reasons for such a policy by the ICC are considered later.)®" 
The ICC has no plans to change its policy regarding the UCP, and the last version 
of its provisions (UCP 500) uphold such a view. Another point concerning the UCP, 
from the angle of international law, is the question of the nature of provisions, 
namely, whether they are customary or contractual in nature. This point assumes 
importance in case of a dispute in the transaction between parties to a letter of 
credit contract where nothing precisely refers to the application of the UCP; if the 
UCP is accepted as an international custom, it automatically governs LCs in the 
absence of any agreement regarding the applicable law of the contract. By contrast, 
if the provisions are contractual in nature, as accepted by the ICC in Article 1 of 
UCP 500,®" a different situation emerges, namely, the UCP is not automatically 
accepted as the applicable law of LCs unless it is precisely agreed upon. This issue 
and other points concerning shortcomings of the UCP (discussed later below), 
generate a serious doubt as to the effective role of its provisions at an international 
level in respect of the question under consideration.
As to the other part of the mixed system concerning LCs, namely, national 
law, several points should be noticed; Firstly, it becomes clear that the only exiting 
codified rule at national level concerning LCs is that of Article 5 of the UCC in the 
USA. Article 5 is not identical to UCP 500 (their differences are considered below 
later).®" It is, however, important that parties to international LCs transactions take 
into consideration that Article 5 of the UCC is applied in most of the states of the 
USA except New York, Alabama, Missouri and Arizona; parties could face, 
therefore, regulations different from UCP 500 if the applicable law of their contract is 
not the law of one of the above mentioned USA states, or nothing is indicated within
51 See Chapter XI, Section B.3.3 (below).
®" See ICC Pub. No. 500 and discussion concerning legal nature o f UCP 500 in Section B.2, Chapter X I 
(below).
®" See Chapter V (below).
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their transaction precisely in respect of the UCP. Secondly, it is obvious that, 
generally speaking, in most cases the national law of one country is not identical 
with the national law of another country with different roots, possibly with different 
national interests. Such a situation can be traced even in countries sharing a 
common legal tradition, e.g., the UK and the USA.^  ^ With such a diversity of 
national laws, it is not surprising that parties to international LCs would possibly 
obtain different results for similar issues in different jurisdictions. Thirdly, as already 
stated above, is it reasonable that the international law of LCs, as an important 
instrument for payment in international trade, has been shaped by national law itself 
engineered for safeguarding national rather than international interests?^^
In conclusion, for reasons pointed out above and e lsewhere , the  law of 
LCs at international level is not unified; the rights and obligations of parties to such 
transactions are far from clarified. This may itself cause confusion and uncertainty 
between parties to international LCs. There is, therefore, marked need and practical 
interest for having an international unified and codified set of standards concerning 
LCs. As to the second question (pointed out earlier), namely, what would be a 
possible replacement for the present system, it is necessary to know more about the 
current system before considering a solution; therefore, questions related to letters 
of credit system (with particular reference to standby letters of credit (SLCs)), UCP 
500, Article 5 of the UCC and legal issues related to LCs (common law perspective) 
are discussed in Chapters ILVIIi.
For examples concerning distinctions between tlie English and American law see relevant discussions in 
Chapter V I and V II (below).
For more details see relevant discussion (international convention v. international customs) in Section A .3, 
Chapter X I (below).
For instance see chapter V, Section B (Comparison between Article 5 and UCP 500) below.
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CHAPTER
LETTERS OF CREDIT
STRUCTURE AND PRINCIPLES
SECTION A: DEFINITION, FUNCTION AND OPERATION
1. DEFINITION
What is an LC as a concept? Is it a type of contract similar to a sale contract 
(with two parties) or a bill of exchange (a three party contract with no rule of 
independence)? Or, is the credit contract as a special type of arrangement with its 
own specific peculiarities, namely, a three party agreement, independent from its 
underlying contract(s)? A general view of the character of points related to credit 
arrangements is given below.
1.1. UCP 500
Regarding the meaning of a credit, UCP 500 provides that "Credit(s), mean 
any arrangement, however named or described, whereby a bank (the "Issuing 
Bank") acting at the request and on the instructions of a customer (the "Applicant") 
or on its own behalf, (i) is to make a payment to or to the order of a third party (the 
"Beneficiary"), or is to accept and pay bills of exchange (Draft(s) drawn by the 
Beneficiary, or (ii) authorises another bank to effect such a payment, or to accept 
and pay such bills of exchange (Draft(s)), or (ïîi) authorises another bank to 
negotiate, against stipulated document(s), provided that the same terms and 
conditions of the Credit are complied with."^ According to this definition a letter of 
credit is a type of agreement belonging to the form of contract usually concluded 
between three parties; however, as pointed out above. Article 2 of UCP 500, by 
including the terms "on its own behalf, prepared the way for two parties LCs.^
’ Article 2 o f UCP 500; for a similar definition see Section 5-103 o f the UCC.
 ^ El linger, E.P., ’T he  U niform  Customs and Practice fo r Documentary Credits- the 1993 Revision", 
LMCLQ, part 3, August 1994, p. 377 [hereinafter referred to as Ellinger's article 1994], at p. 383 says: "[...] 
while the 1983 definition encompassed a letter o f credit only where the bank issued it on behalf o f its 
customer (the "applicant"), the new Article 2 covers credit opened by the issuing bank on its own behalf. 
Such credits are, for instance, used where a bank issues a standby credit in order to back a trasnaction in 
which it participates as principal."; Dolan, John P., "Weakening the letters o f cred it product: The new 
U niform  Customs and Practice fo r Documentary C redits". International Business Law Journal, No. 2, 
1994, pp. 149-177 [hereineafter referred to as Dolan], at p. 168 regarding "two party credit" said: "Bankers 
are properly concerned w ith the development o f new products. That concern is evident in Article 2 o f UCP 
500 where the Uniform Customs for the first time sanction the two party credit, that is, they permit a credit to 
issue when there is no bank customer. This provision enables banks to issue their obligations as letters o f
1 5
Moreover, it is a type of conditional payment, in contrast to a bill of exchange or a 
promissory note, namely, against document(s) which are also included as a 
document of title.
1.2. English law
in English law there is no comprehensive definition of the credit; 
nevertheless, its character has been described through court cases. For example, 
Scrutton, L.J., in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay & Co.^ explained the operation of 
the documentary credit."  ^ Rowlatt, J., in Urquhart Lindsay & Co. Ltd. v. The 
Eastern Bank Ltd.,® tried to give a general definition for the LC. He said; "A credit 
is in general a contract for payment of money against documents of title to goods."®
credit or to enhence their obligations w ith their own credits. The two party credit is, however something o f a 
chimera. It  looks like a letter o f credit but does not operate like one; and the effect o f it is to dilute the 
independence feature o f credits that is so essential to the commercial u tility  o f the letter o f credit device."
 ^ [1918J2KB 623 (CA).
Ibid., at p. 659 it is said:"The enormous volume o f sales o f produce by a vendor in one country to a 
purchaser in another has led to the creation o f an equally great financial system intervening between vendor 
and purchaser and designed to enable commercial transactions to be carried out w ith the greatest money 
convenience to both parties. The vendor, to help the finance o f his business, desires to get his purchase price 
as soon as possible after he has despatched the goods to his purchaser; w ith this object he draws a b ill o f 
exchange for the price, attaches to the draft the documents o f carriage and insurance o f the goods sold, and 
discounts the b ill that is, sells the b ill w ith documents attached to an exchange house. The vendor thus gets 
his money before the purchaser would, in the ordinary course, pay; the exchange house duly presents the b ill 
for acceptance and has, until the b ill is accepted, the security o f a pledge o f the documents attached and the 
goods they represents. The buyer, on the other hand, may not desire to pay the price t i l l  he has resold the 
goods. I f  the draft is drawn on him, the vendor or the exchange house may be w illing  to paid with the 
documents o f title t i l l  the acceptance given by the purchaser is met at maturity. But i f  the purchaser can 
arrange that a bank o f high standing shall accept the draft, the exchange house may be w illing  to part with 
the documents on receiving the acceptance o f the bank. The exchange house w ill then have the promise o f 
the bank to pay, which, i f  in the form o f the b ill o f exchange, is negotiable and can be discounted at once. 
The bank w ill have the documents o f title as security for its liab ility  on acceptance, and tlie purchaser can 
make arrangements to sell and deliver the goods. Before acceptance, the documents o f title are the security, 
and an unaccepted b ill without documents attached is not readily negotiable. A fter acceptance, the credit o f 
the bank is the security."; Gutteridge, H.C., and Megrah, M., "The Law  o f Banker's Commercial C re d it" , 
London, 1984, 7th ed., pp. 2-3 [hereinafter referred to as Gutteridge]; G.A. Penn, A.M . Shea, and A. Arora, 
"The Law  and Practice o f In ternational Banking" . Banking Law, Vol. 2, London, Sweet &  Maxwell, 
1987, pp. 291-92 [hereinafter referred to as International Banking Law (Int.B.L.)].
 ^ (1921)27 Com. Cas. 124.
^ Ibid., p. 128; Megrah, M., "The Uniform  Customs and Practice fo r Documentary Credits, the 1962 
Revision and a fte r" . Gilbert Lectures on Banking 1969, (Printed for K ing’s College by Walter Bargeiy Ltd., 
London, S.E. 1), p. 4 [hereinafter referred to as Megrah]; see also International Banking Law, supra (f.n. 4),
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As a distinction between letters of credit and bills of exchange, it has been 
said: "A bill of exchange must be an unconditional order, and any agreement 
between the parties to it that the order shall be conditional causes the document to 
cease to be a bill of exchange. But a commercial letter of credit may be, and often 
is, a conditional promise. The importation of a condition does not render the 
instrument any less a letter of credit. What is all important is that there shall be a 
promise of reimbursement by the giver of the letter. The terms attached to that 
promise are a matter for agreement between the parties."^
2. FUNCTION
The most important function of the documentary credit system is to facilitate 
payment against a document of title serving as a "constructive delivery" in 
international trade. Lord Wright in T.D. Bailey, Son and Co. v. Ross T. Smyth & 
Co. Ltd.,® described the function of a banker's commercial credits as: "The general 
course of international commerce involves the practice of raising money on the 
documents so as to bridge the period between shipment and the time of obtaining 
payment against documents." Devlin, J., in Midland Bank Ltd. v. Seymour,^ said 
the effect of the letter of credit is that the seller/beneficiary has obtained a guarantee 
from a person who is solvent that, if he carries out his part of contract, he will
p. 290, para. 13.01, in which documentaiy credit was described in terms as follows: "A  commercial letter o f 
credit may be said to be an undertaking by a bank to pay a sum o f money to the person in whose favour the 
credit is issued, or to accept or purchase a b ill o f exchange drawn or held by that person. The bank's 
undertaking is usually conditional on the presentation o f certain specified documents to the bank showing 
that the goods described in the credit have been despatched to the beneficiaiy."; Harfield, H., "B ank Credits 
and Acceptances". 5th ed., 1974 [hereinafter referred to as Harfield], at pp. 3-4 said: "Credit is made up of 
three elements: the acceptance o f a duty by an obligor; the presumed ability o f the obligor to perform that 
duty; and the availability o f social sanctions, in the form o f law, to compel performance or a compensatory 
substitute for performance. The combination o f these elements is credit and it is essential building block 
upon which they be classified by duration, such as short, medium or large term credit; or by function, such 
as commercial, customer, construction, or working capital credit; or by form, such as secured or unsecured 
credit; or by character o f the creditor, such as trade or bank credit."
 ^ Davis, A.G., "The law relating to commercial letters o f c re d it" . London, 3rd ed., 1963 [hereinafter 
referred to as Davis], pp. 13-14.
'  (1940)56 TLR 825, p. 828.
[1955]2L1.L.R. 147, p. 165.
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receive the purchase price. Professor Kozolchyk has described the advantage of a 
letter of credit in worldwide usage not only as a payment Instrument, but also as a 
type of payment against documents of title. He said: "With the increase in 
international trade since the end of the First World War, it is not surprising in the 
light of these advantages, that commercial letter of credit gained worldwide 
acceptance, not only for the financing of international sales, but also as a means of 
payment in non-title passing transactions."^®
3. OPERATION
A letter of credit originates in a sale contract; and the duty of arrangement 
rests on the buyer/applicant for the credit.^  ^ The operation of "opening of the credit", 
"communication to the beneficiary", "presentation of documents", and "acceptance 
and payment" involve several stages.^^ Firstly, the applicant for the credit (usually 
the buyer) makes a formal application (which is called "letter of request")^® to his
Kozolchyk, Boris, "L e tte r o f C re d it" . 9 International Encyclopedia o f Comparative Law, Chapter 5, 
1979 [hereinafter referred to as Kozolchyk], p. 7 (What is the meaning o f "non-title passing transactions"?); 
see also p. 27, sec. 45 o f the same reference, where the same writer said: "The commercial letter o f credit 
owes many o f its characteristics in the C iv il and Common law systems to the development o f documentary 
sale [...]. Documentary sales are "title passing" transactions. Possession o f the documents o f title to the 
merchandise sold even though it is not the equivalent o f absolute and unimpeachable ownership o f the goods, 
is, in the case o f disputes over the right to their immediate possession, decisive [...] however, commercial 
letters o f credit are not used solely for the purpose o f providing the buyer w ith assurance o f the seller's 
compliance with the tenus o f the underlying documentaiy sale."; and also look at p. 25, col. I o f above 
reference, in which it is said: ""Documentaiy" sales are such as CIF, FOB, FAS, and others."
”  Guaranty T rust Co. o f New Y o rk  v. FTannav [1918] 2 KB 623, at p. 659; for further details see "G uide 
to Documentary C red it O perations". ICC Publication No. 415.
Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 10), pp. 7-8; International Banking Law, supra (f.n. 53), p. 291; Ellinger, EP, 
"Docum entary credits and fraudulent documents". (Kee, Ho Peng, "Singapore Conferences on 
International Business Law, C urren t Problems o f International Trade F inanc ing". Butterworths, 1990, 
2nd Edition [hereinafter referred to as Singapore Conferences 1990]), pp. 139-87, at pp. 140-45 [hereinafter 
referred to as Ellinger's paper].
Davis, supra (f.n. 7), at p. 16 describes the contention o f a "letter o f request" by saying that: "In this 
document a buyer w ill request the bankers to issue a letter o f credit in favour o f B. He w ill state what 
documents must be delivered to the bankers before they honour B's drafts. He may request that the opening 
o f the credit be advised through the banker's agents [...]. A fter the terms o f request, A's obligations towards 
the bankers are stated. These are, broadly, an undertaking to reimburse the bankers for all payments they 
may make under the letter o f credit subsequently to be issued, to pay freight and landing charges, to pay the 
bankers' commission, and to allow the bankers to hold the goods, or the documents o f title to them, as 
security for their advances, until such time as A  shall reimburse the bankers what they have paid. There is o f 
course nothing to prevent the bankers from acting upon a verbal request to issue the credit; but any bankers
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bank, usually in his country, to open a letter of credit for him. That letter of request 
contains details of the terms of the credit contract between the bank and the 
applicant and plays an important role if a conflict arises between the parties. When 
the banker accepts the buyer's application, the contract is completed between the 
bank and its client.
As a second step the issuing bank approves the credit directly to the 
beneficiary (usually the seller), or may ask another bank, as an intermediary bank, 
to do this, either advising the beneficiary (as an "advising bank"), or adding its 
confirmation (as a "confirming bank"). At the next stage, upon receipt of the credit 
the beneficiary/ seller is guaranteed that if he carries out his duties under the sale 
contract the payment will be secured and credited to him. By tendering the proper 
documents the seller/ beneficiary is then entitled to obtain the purchase price. 
However, when the payment is made by an intermediary bank, the presented 
documents must be forwarded to the issuing bank to claim reimbursement.
Finally, the issuing bank passes all documents to its client. Nevertheless, if 
the buyer cannot repay his debt, the bank is entitled to exercise its right of sale 
under security measures usually granted by the client. "^^
SECTION B: PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO DOCUMENTARY CREDITS
1. THE PRINCIPLE OF STRICT COMPLIANCE
In a banker's commercial letter of credit operations it is accepted as a general 
rule that contracting parties are concerned with the documents, not with the 
goods.Therefore, documents and their compliance with the terms and conditions
who did so would be acting unwisely, for the letter o f request is the document which sets out in detail the 
terms o f the contract between A  and the bankers, and in the event o f subsequent disputes, it is essential that, 
whatever the interpretation o f the terms themselves should be definite and not a matter o f oral, and probably 
conflicting, evidence see also Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 4), pp. 4-5.
Lloyds Bank L td . v. Bank o f America T rust &  Saving Association [1938J2 KB 147; see also 
discussion related to the bank's right o f security under letters o f credit in Chapter V III.
Harfield, supra (f.n. 6), p. 71 and f.n. 1; see also Article 4 o f UCP 1993 (ICC Publication No. 500); 
Ellinger, EP, "L e tte r o f c red it". Horn, Norberth and Schmitthoff, CM, "Studies in In ternational 
Economic Law. The Transactional Law o f In ternational Commercial Transactions". Kluwer, 1982, 
Vol. 2, pp. 241-273 [hereinafter referred to as Ellinger's paper in lEL 1982], p. 260.
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of the credit or the principal's mandate play an important role in the credit system in 
accordance with the doctrine of strict compliance.
The concept of the doctrine
Article 4 of the UCP 500 provides: "In a Credit operation all parties concerned 
deal with documents, and not with goods, services and/or other performances to 
which the documents may relate." As a result of such a provision bank(s) undertake 
to examine with reasonable care and in due time all documents required under the 
credit agreement and presented by the beneficiary of the credit. If, however, 
documents do not comply with the credit's conditions, then bank(s) must consider, 
on the basis of the documents alone, whether they should be accepted or 
rejected.^®
There are reasons, from the banker's point of view, for accepting and 
applying such a rule to credit transactions. First of all, a banker (the issuing bank or 
the correspondent bank, as the case may be) is a special agent with limited 
authority to act in accordance with the principal’s instructions. If a bank acts outside 
a mandate, it loses its right of recourse against the principal. Moreover, it should be 
noted that a bank is dealing with banking business and finance, not goods. 
Secondly, a bank may not have sufficient knowledge or expertise in the usage and 
practice specific to a trade; even if it is capable of having expertise, it usually does 
not wish to engage in any other (non-banking) areas of transaction and would prefer 
to remain solely in banking.
This doctrine has been approved by English courts. In Equitable Trust 
Company of New York v. Dawson Partners Ltd.,^^ Lord Sumner defined it in the 
following terms: "It is both common ground and common sense that in such a 
transaction the accepting bank can only claim indemnity if the conditions on which it
Articles 13 and 14 o f UCP 500; and also appendix 1 for Sections 5-109 ( l) (c )  &  (2), 5-112 &  112 (l)(a), 
5-113, and 5-114 (1) o f the UCC; Sarna, L., "Letters o f Credit, the law and curren t p ractice", 2nd ed., 
1986, pp. 73-87 [hereinafter referred to as Sarna]; for more details concerning the principle o f strict 
compliance see relevant discussion in Chapter V I (below).
(1927) 27 Ll.L.R. 49; Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 10), p. 71, para. 140 and p. 77, para. 147.1.
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is authorised to accept are in the matter of the accompanying documents strictly 
observed. There Is no room for documents which are almost the same, or 
which will do just as well. Business could not proceed securely on any other 
lines. The bank's branch abroad which knows nothing officially of the details of the 
transaction thus financed, cannot take upon itself to decide what will do well enough 
and what will not. If it does as it is told, it is safe; if it declines to do anything else, it 
is safe; if it departs from the conditions laid down, it acts at its own risk."^ ®
Does the above decision mean that even small and unimportant 
discrepancies may put an end to a credit contract? According to one writer, that is 
not a correct interpretation of the decision. He said:. "It is not intended that any 
discrepancy, however, trifling, would invalidate the promise in the credit."^® Another 
author has pointed out that from a practical point of view it is not possible to apply 
that rule in a strict and literal manner. He said: "Nevertheless there is an economic if 
not a physical limit to the diligence required from a bank when checking formal or 
apparent regularity. As stated by an experienced banker, if an absolutely perfect 
tender were the required standard, very few tenders would qualify."^®
Furthermore, there are articles in the UCP 500 concerning the bank's 
obligation in examining documents, like Article 14.^  ^ There may even be situations
Ibid., p. 52 (emphasis added); M id land Bank L td . v. Seymour [1955] 2 Ll.L.R. 147 (Devlin J.); Kydoti 
Compania Naviera S.A. v. National West m inster Bank L td, fT lie  Lena) [1981] 1 Ll.L.R. 68 (Parker, J., 
at p.75); Gian Singh &  Co. L td. v. Banque de l'Indochine [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1234; Lam born v. Lake 
Shore Banking and T rust Co. 196 App. Div. 504, 188 N.Y. Supp. 162, affirmed 231 N.Y. 616; M iller, J.B., 
"A  casebook on bankers' commercial credits", p. 63 [hereinafter referred to as M ille r]; Soproma S.P.A^ 
V. M arine &  An im al By Products Corp.. [1966] 1 Ll.L.R. 367, at p. 387; as to the other points look at 
Schmitthoff, C.M., "S chm itth o ff s E xport Trade. The law and Practice o f In ternationa l T ra d e ". 8th ed., 
1986 [hereinafter referred to as Schmitthoff], pp. 343-44, particularly f.n. 41 at p. 344 (about difference 
between Soproma and the S.H. Rayner &  Co. v. Hambros Bank L td . [1943] 1 K.B. 37, that stated 
McNair, J., rightly distinguished those cases from each other since the former is the subject o f the UCP, but 
not the latter.
Megrah, M., "R isk Aspects o f the Irrevocable Documentary C red it". Arizona Law Review, Vol. 24, 
No. 2, 1982, pp. 255-66, p. 258.
Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 10), pp. 77-78 and f.n. 430.
See ICC Publication No. 500 (1993).
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in which the bank may seek to obtain the applicant's agreement for a waiver of the 
discrepancy(ies)/^ Similarly, it seems English courts have been reluctant to deal 
with abstract points and have tried to decide on the merits of each case and so have 
interpreted the principle of strict compliance in a more liberal manner. Otherwise, the 
principle may damage the credit operation. In Golodetz & Co. inc. v Czarnikow- 
Rionda Co. Inc, (The "GALATIA"),^® Donaldson, J. unreservedly accepted the 
view stated by Lord Sumner in Hansson v. Hamel & Horely Ltd., "^  ^ and said: "A 
tender of documents, properly read and understood, calls for further inquiry or are 
such as to invite litigation is clearly a bad tender. But the operative words are 
"properly read and understood." I fully accepted that the clause on this bill of 
lading makes it unusual, but properly read and understood it calls for no inquiry and 
it casts no doubt at all upon the fact that the goods were shipped in apparent good 
order and condition or upon protection which anyone is entitled to expect when 
taking up such a document whether as a purchaser or as a lender on the security of 
the bill."^ ®
In Banque de l’ Indochine et Suez v. J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd.,^® 
Donaldson, M.R., accepted the view of Parker, J., on the linkage between presented
Article 14(c) o f UCP 500 provides: " I f  the Issuing Bank determines that the documents appear on their 
face not to be in compliance with the terms and conditions o f the Credit, it may be in its sole judgment 
approach the Applicant for a waiver o f the discrepancy(ies). Kozolchyk, supra (f.n, 10), p. 78 &  f.n. 
431; Ellinger, E.P., "Docum entary letters o f c re d it" . Singapore, 1970 [hereinafter referred to as Ellinger], 
at pp. 281-82 said that in some cases demand for literal compliance, e.g., Dyer, J., in F irs t National Bank of 
Lflcon v. Benslev [2 f. 609, p. 614 (1880)], but general tendency in all important legal systems is to 
avoidance o f a requirement o f literal compliance.
[1979]2 Ll.L.R. 450.
[1922]2 A.C. 36, at p. 46 Lord Sumner stated: "Wlien documents are to be taken up the buyer is entitled to 
documents which substantially confer protective rights throughout. He is not buying a litigation [...] These 
documents have to be handled by banks, they have to be taken or rejected promptly and without any 
opportunity for prolonged inquiry, they have to be such as can be re-tendered to sub-purchasers, and it is 
essential that they should so confomi to the accustomed shipping documents as to be reasonably and readily 
fit to pass current in commerce."; Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 4), p. 123.
The Galatia, supra (f.n. 23), at p. 456(1). [Eemphasis added]
[1983] A ll ER468, [1982]2 Ll.L.R. 476, [1983]1 L.L.R. 228 (CA).
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documents, and after thorough consideration stated: 'There is in my judgment, a 
real distinction between an identification of "the goods", the subject matter of the 
transaction, and a description of the goods. The second sentence of art. 32(c) gives 
latitude in description, but not in identification [...]. But however general the 
description, the identification must, in my judgment be unequivocal. Linkage 
between documents is not, as such, necessary, provided that each directly or 
indirectly refers unequivocally to "the goods". This seems to me to be the proper 
and inevitable construction to place on art. 32(c) if the specified documents are to 
have any value at all."^^
In conclusion, concerning the concept of the principle of strict compliance, 
the beneficiary of a credit should be aware of conditions stipulated in the credit so 
as to be able to tender proper and necessary documents. On the other hand, 
bankers should understand that only those conditions that are actually embodied in 
a credit are considered by the courts in relation to compliance. Nevertheless, the 
question is: what type of discrepancies are important to the law? This question is 
considered below later.
2. DOCTRINE OF AUTONOMY
The doctrine of autonomy is a cornerstone in letters of credit and is defined in 
Article 3 of UCP 500.^® It has been supported in many decided cases;®® for
27 inque tie l ' Indochine et Suez v. J.H. Rayner nVTincing Lane) Ltd.. [1983] 1 Ll.L.R. 228 (CA), p. 
233(1); Article 32(c) o f UCP 290 (1974), referred in case above was similar to Article 41(c) o f UCP 400 
(1983) and Article 37(c) o f UCP 500 (1993).
See Chapter V I for more details about the principle o f strict compliance.
Article 3 o f UCP 500 provides: "a. Credits, by their nature, are separate transactions from the sales or 
other contract(s) on which they may be based and banks are in no way concerned with or bound by such 
contract(s), even i f  any reference whatsoever to such a conü’act(s) is included in the credit. Consequently, the 
undertaking o f a bank to pay, accept and pay Draft(s) or negotiate and/or to fu lf il any other obligation under 
the Credit, is not subject to claims or defences by the Applicant resulting from his relationships with the 
issuing Bank or the Beneficiary.
b. A Beneficiary can in no case avail himself o f the contractual relationships existing between thé 
banks or between the Applicant and the Issuing Bank."; it is similar to Articles 3 and 6 o f UCP 400; see also 
appendix 1 for Section 5-109 (I)(a) and 5-114 (1) o f the UCC.
See Chapter V II; Ellinger’s paper, Singapore Conferences 1990, supra (f.n. 12), p. 151; Schmitthoff, CM, 
"C o n flic t o f laws issues relating to letters o f credit: An English perspective". Singapore Conferences
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instance, in Power Curber International Ltd. v. National Bank of Kuwait,®^
where the plaintiff (an American Co.) brought an action against the defendant (an 
issuing bank placed in Kuwait) for rejecting payment of an irrevocable credit in 
England (since that bank had a registered address in London) the Court of Appeal 
gave support to the plaintiffs' argument. Lord Denning, M.R., in support of the above 
doctrine said: "It is vital that every bank which issues a letter of credit honour Its 
obligations. The bank is in no way concerned with any dispute that the buyer may 
have with the seller. The buyer may say that the goods are not up to contract. 
Nevertheless the bank must honour its obligations. The buyer may say that he has a 
cross-claim in a large amount. Still the bank must honour.its obligations. A letter of 
credit is like a bill of exchange given for the price of the goods. It ranks as cash and 
must be honoured. No set off or counterclaim is allowed to detract from it."®®
There is an exception, however, accepted by English courts as to the 
doctrine of autonomy, namely, if a fraud is committed by the beneficiary or such a 
crime was committed by a third party but the beneficiary is aware of it. The issue of 
fraud and other relevant points related to the doctrine of autonomy are discussed 
later below.®®
1990, supra (f.n. 12), pp. 103-114, at p. 105 (the principle o f autonomy o f the letters o f credit) [hereinafter 
referred to as Schmitthoffs paper].
31 [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1233; Schmitthoff, supra (f.n. 18), p. 341 &  f.n. 25 (for referred cases).
Ibid., p. 1241; the credit arrangement is also independent from the contract between the buyer and the 
issuing bank dealing with furnishing a credit in favour o f the seller/ beneficiary. This view found support in 
N orth American M ainifacturers Export Associates. Inc. v. Chase National Bank o f C ity  o f New Y o rk . 
77 F. Supp. 55 (1948), where the plaintiffs' allegation was that the presented documents, although they did 
not comply with the terms and conditions o f the credit, were in accordance w ith terms which were agreed by 
the buyer and the defendant (the issuing bank) in an amendment o f the credit. Therefore, they should be 
regarded as good presentation under the credit contract. Medina, J., refused to accept that contention and 
held that: " I f  the bank, in the formulation o f the letter o f amendment, failed to fo llow  the instructions o f its 
customer [...] this would not involve the bank in any responsibility to plaintiff. The letter o f credit, either in 
its original form or as amended must control."
See Section B, Chapter V II (below).
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CONCLUSIONS
The letters of credit system offers a method of payment through a mediator 
(bank(s)) and provides a good assurance for both seller/beneficiary and 
buyer/applicant in an international sale transaction. LCs are used in different forms, 
namely, revocable credit, irrevocable credit and irrevocable/confirmed credit; the last 
one is the safest form of credit used in international trade including four parties (the 
applicant for a credit, the issuing bank, the confirming bank, and the beneficiary).®"  ^
Moreover, it is obvious that a letter of credit is a type of conditional payment, 
namely, against document(s) including a document of title (bills of lading) and 
serving as a means of payment in non-title passing transactions.®® This is the most 
important contribution of the documentary credit system in international trade.
Two important principles are operative for LCs, namely the doctrine of 
autonomy and the principle of strict compliance. Most questions about 
documentary credit operations are related to these principles. On the one hand the 
applicant for the credit may try to adopt a narrow interpretation of the rule of 
compliance, inter alia, by raising exceptions to the independent nature of LCs, and 
attempt to stop payment in undesirable circumstances related to the credit 
arrangement.®® The beneficiary of the credit, by contrast, may invoke the doctrine of 
autonomy in order to safeguard his rights within the system.®^ This may in some 
cases develop into an ongoing argument between the parties to the credit contract, 
making it difficult for the bank to decide which argument is correct, particularly where 
the subject for dispute is a legal issue such as fraud.
The importance of the above mentioned principles for providing a reasonable 
balance between the applicant and the beneficiary in a credit transaction and the
See Articles 2 (meaning o f credit), 6-9 (revocable, irrevocable credits) and 9(b) (irrevocable and 
confirmed credit) o f UCP 500, in ICC Pub. No. 500.
See Article 4, and 20-38 concerning the role and different types o f documents used in LCs.
For legal issues related to the principle o f strict compliance see Chapter V I (below).
See below Chapter V IL
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sensitivity of issues related to them (which are legal in nature) are the main reason 
for the present status of law of LCs at international level. The UCP 500 provides 
only some general provisions concerning these principles (Articles 3 and 4), but the 
rest of important issues (such as their real concepts and exceptions) have not been 
codified at the international level and have been left to be decided by courts in 
different jurisdictions. As a result the same issue could be interpreted differently 
under different national laws.
It is true that there would be issues treated similarly in different jurisdictions; 
and, it is also true that providing a set of international standards to cover all details 
relevant to one issue would be impractical. However, this does not justify to 
discourage any attempt towards harmonisation and unification of law of LCs 
internationally. There is a real and practical need, as pointed out elsewhere,®® that 
the law of LCs to be unified and codified, as much as it is possible worldwide; 
parties to an international letter of credit transactions would prefer to face a set of 
international standards rather than different national laws concerning LCs. 
Moreover, recent activities by international organisations like UNCITRAL for 
preparing an international convention concerning SLCs and Bank Guarantees 
(BGs), are examples which confirm such a need for having possibly unified and 
codified international rules concerning the legal as well as practical aspects of 
LCs.®® In that respect, the next chapter of the present study deals with SLCs in 
more detail in order to establish whether a standby letter of credit is a type of LC; 
and if so, the impact of the recent UNClTRAL's activities upon the law of LCs at the 
international level.
For more details see relevant discussion in Section B, Chapter X  (below). 
See Section A .2 .1.3 in Chapter I I I  and Section A.2 in Chapter X  (below).
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CHAPTER III
STANDBY LETTERS OF CREDIT
(SLCs)
SE C TIO N  A: IN T R O D U C T IO N  AN D  G E N E R A L B A C K G R O U N D
1. INTRODUCTION
Standby letters of credit (SLCs) have been used in the USA for many years; 
they have been introduced for the first time under Articles 1 and 2 of the UCP 400 
(1983) by the ICC; a similar policy has been followed in UCP 500 (1993). Since, as 
discussed below, UNCITRAL has begun a study related to SLCs, it is worth to 
consider the background, definition, function, classification, similarities of SLCs with 
and differences from the traditional LCs as well as bank guarantees (BGs) in order 
to find more about SLCs, their importance in international trade, and practical 
difficulties (like fraud) which may arise as a result of using them.
2. HISTORY AND GENERAL BACKGROUND
2.1. Historical background
2.1.1. A ctiv ities  related to SLCs
A standby letter of credit is a new device essentially similar to the traditional 
commercial letter of credit, but it also involves some differences (discussed later). 
This type of credit originated in the USA after the Second World War because of 
the prohibition of the Federal and State Banking Law on national banks acting as 
guarantors or surety for the obligations of third parties, This prohibition concerns 
only domestic banks, but a bank's branches outside the USA are allowed to give 
service as guarantors or sureties.^ In English commercial law a similar
' Schmitthoff, C.M., "S chm ittho ffs  E xport Trade. The law and Practice o f In ternationa l T ra d e ". 8th 
ed,, 1986 [hereinafter referred to as Schmitthoff], p. 364; Naegele, T.D., "Unsound Banking Practices: 
Standby letters o f credit and other bank guarantees". Feb. 14, 1975, o f Senate Comm, on Banking, 
Housing &  Urban Affairs, 94th Congress, 1st Sess., Compendium o f major issues in Bank regulation 647, 
pp. 621-85, at p. 627; UNCITRAL, "B . Stand-by letters o f cred it and guarantees: report o f the 
Secretary-General fA/CN.9/301f [O rig ina l: E ng lish ]". Yearbook o f the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, Vol. X IX , 1988, pp. 46-61 [hereinafter referred to as UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988], at p. 
47, para. 4 pointed out: "Stand-by letters o f credit, which are issued primarily by banks in the United States 
o f America and less frequently in some other countries, thus serve the same purpose as do bonds or 
guarantees used in most countries."; Ellinger, EP, "L e tte r o f c red it". Horn, Norberth and Schmitthoff, CM, 
"Studies in In ternational Economic Law. The Transactional Law  o f In ternationa l Commercial 
T ransactions". Kluwer, 1982, Vol. 2, pp. 241-273 [hereinafter referred to as Ellinger's paper in lE L  1982], 
p. 247.
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mechanism, generally called bonds exists, but in contrast to SLCs, It is said that 
the bond's roots go back to the 14th century. They were used in cases of debt and 
for loans in the 16th century.®
For many years no provision was made for SLCs under UCP. Nevertheless, 
in UCP 400 (1983) reference to such a credit was included in Articles 1 and 2; 
UCP 500 is similar to UCP 400 in this respect. Although there is in the USA no 
reference to SLCs in Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), there 
seems no differentiation between LCs and SLCs was accepted by the draftsmen 
of the code; so Article 5 of UCC applies consequently to both types of credit.®
2.1.2. The IC C  s activities regard ing bank guarantees (BGs)
The ICC Commission on Banking and Commercial Practice worked for 
more than a decade (1965-78) to prepare recommendations for standardizing 
terms and regulations concerning guarantees agreements. The final text of the 
Uniform Rules for Contract Guarantees (URCG) was adopted by the ICC on 20 
June 1978."^  Although the UCRG has prepared a background for uniformity 
concerning the guarantee contract, several shortcomings and disadvantages have 
meant that the URCG has not found popularity among traders.® Noticing it the ICC
 ^ Ventris, P.M., "B anker’s Documentary C red its". Lloyd's o f London press Ltd., 1983, 2nd ed., p. 134 
[hereinafter referred to as Ventris].
 ^ Banks, J.L., "The standby letter o f credit: what it  is and how to use i t " . Montana Law Review, 45 n. 1, 
pp. 71-86, Winter 1984, p. 74, par. 1 [hereinafter referred to as Banks].
*’ ICC Pub. No. 325; the provisions covers three types o f guarantee (namely tender guarantees, repayment 
guarantees, and performance guarantees) which are issued by a seller or supplier o f services; and it is 
applicable i f  adopted by contracting parties in their transaction; see Marshall, Wolfgang Freiherr von, 
"Recent developments in the field o f standby letters o f credit, bank guarantees and performance 
bonds". Chinkin, C.M. and Davidson, P.J., "C u rren t problems o f international trade financinglL 
Singapore Conferences on International Business Law, Malaya Law review and Butterworth &  Co., 1983 
[hereinafter referred to as Singapore Conferences 1983], pp. 261-82, at pp. 261-2 [hereinafter referred to as 
Marshall]; see also paragraph 1 o f Article I o f the URCG which provides that, "The application o f  the Rules 
is voluntary. This means that it must be evidenced by a specific statement in the guarantee document itself, 
that the guarantee is "subject to the Uniform rules for Tender, Performance and repayment Guarantees 
("Contract Guarantees") o f the International Chamber o f Commerce (Publication No. 325)"."
 ^ Those difficulties are as follows: 1. Term inology- Article 1, para. 1 o f the URCG employs a general term, 
"contract guarantees" which includes those guarantees which are subject to the provisions (namely tender, 
performance and repayment guarantees). A  question may arise whether such a term covers the standby letter 
o f credit. It is suggested that the language adopted in the introduction to the rules by emphasizing that "the
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has established a new Working Party to prepare a publication on the standby 
letter oi credit, guarantees, and similar undertakings to pay "on first demand" of a 
beneficiary.®
2.1.3. U N C lT R A L ’s activ ities related to SLCs and BGs
The UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) decided to 
include in its work programme, as a priority, the topic of the standby letters of 
credit at its eleventh session in 1978.^ A similar decision was made in 1982 by the
link between the performance o f the guarantor's undertaking and "default by the principal"" (Article 2, 
Sec.d), it is doutful that there is any room for application o f the URCG to the SLC. It is said: "The principles 
which govern the rights and duties o f the various parties in a commercial letter o f credit would be seriously 
weakened i f  the obligation to pay depended on consideration o f actual default." [See Marshall, ibid., p. 272]; 
another writer supported that argument by saying that the view adopted iii the URCG is "In sharp contrast to 
the United States regulatory policy on standbys and to the UCP principle o f abstraction (as applicable to 
standbys since the 1983 UCP Revision)." [See Kozolchyk, Boris, "B ank guarantees and letters o f credit: 
tim e fo r a return  to the fo ld " . University o f Pennsylvania, Journal o f International Business Law, Vol. 
1 1.1, 1989, pp. 1-79, at pp. 11-12 [hereinafter referred to as Kozolchyk's bank guarantees].
2. Shortcoming as to the simple or firs t demand guarantee- In the introduction to the URCG it 
was said that, "by establishing the principle o f the need to justify a claim under a guarantee [...] it has not 
been found advisable to make provision for so called simple or first demand guarantee, under which claims 
are payable without independent evidence o f their valid ity.” [See ICC Pub. No. 325, pp. 8-9]; the above view 
is illustrated in Article 9 o f the URCG and because o f the importance o f the matter in discussion the Article 
is reproduced below: "A rtic le  9- It has been pointed out in the introduction that the concepts on which these 
Rules ar e based are: a. that a claim should only be made, and honored, i f  the beneficiary has a legal right to 
make the claim based on a failure o f the principal to perform, or correctly to perform the underlying contract; 
b. that the claim should be justified by production o f some form o f "evidence" o f such default by the 
principal. It is reasonable to expect the nature and the form o f such "evidence" to be based in the guarantee. 
The parties to the contract can very well specify the necessaiy documentary evidence ("documentation") in 
the contract, and it can then be stated in the guarantee, for example, a certificate, possibly in a stated form, 
given by a named party such as an accountant, surveyor, arbitrator or other person. (As indicated in 
discussion o f  Article 3 above, it should be o f such a nature as to permit the guarantor himself to verify 
whether or not the documentation submitted is that called for.) If, however, the guarantee is silent- as are 
guarantees payable on first or simple demand- Article 9 speaks and says that documentation as stated therein 
must be submitted. For the purpose o f the beneficiary's declaration "that the principal's tender has been 
accepted" (paragraph (a) o f this Article) the acceptance must, o f course, have been unconditional. Also, the 
"court decision or an arbitral award" referred to in paragraph (b) o f this Article means a decision or an award 
given in proceedings between the beneficiaiy and the principal."; the conditions required by the article 
clearly indicate difficulties which may arise in applying the first demand guarantee under the URCG; and 
because o f that the provisions has not found enough support among traders.
 ^ Marshall, Singapore Conferences 1983, supra (f.n. 4), p. 272; Kozolchyk's bank guarantees, ibid., pp. 12-3 
and for other points concern to the URCG look atthe same reference, pp. 58-69; Arthur Loke, "Standby 
credits and performance bonds: the lesson o f the Iran ian expriencc". Singapore Conferences 1983, supra 
(f.n. 4), pp. 283-96, at pp. 286-7 [hereinafter referred to as Loke].
 ^ UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 48, para. 8 said: ""Stand-by letters o f credit" to be studied in 
conjunction with the International Chamber o f Commerce" (A/33/17, paras. 67(c)(ii)a, 68 and 69)."; Guest, 
AG, "C u rre n t w ork o f the United Nations Commission on In ternational Trade Law ". Singapore
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Commission regarding traditional letters of credit and their legal problems.® As a 
result, the General Secretary of UNCITRAL submitted a preliminary study on 
standby letters of credit (A/CN.9/163), in 1988;® a Working Group (WG) was 
established in 1989 for considering issues related to standby letters of credit 
(SLCs)^° and bank guarantees (BGs)^^ in order to study the needs as well as the 
readiness of international business communities, government and non­
government international organisations for an effort towards a uniform law 
(UL).^® In the same year, the Commission decided that the situation was
conferences 1990, supra (f.n. 4), pp. 90-100, pp. 99-100 (standby credits) [hereinafter referred to as Guest]; 
Bergsten, Eric E., "A  new Regime fo r In ternationa l Independent Guarantees and Stand-bv Letters of 
C redit: The U N C IT R A L  D ra ft Convention on Guaranty Letters". The International Lawyer, Vol. 27, 
No. 4, Winter 1993, pp. 859-879 [hereinafter referred to as Bergsten].
UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 47, para. 1 stated: "The Commission at its fifteenth session in 
1982 decided to request the Secretaiy-General to submit to a future session o f the Commission a study on 
letters o f credit and their operation in order to identify legal problems arising from their use, especially in 
connection with contracts other than those for the sale o f goods (A/37/17, para. 112). The proposal for such a 
study was made on the occasion o f the Commis ion's consideration o f the work o f the international Chamber 
o f Commerce (ICC) then in progress to revise the 1974 version o f the Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documentary Credits(UCP)."; it is pointed out in the same reference that, "This kind o f assistance was 
rendered in connection with ICC's efforts to prepare uniform rules on contract guaratees and its work o f 
preparing the 1974 and 1983 revisions o f UCP." [UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988, supra (f.n. 1), p. 48, para. 9]
UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988, supra (f.n. 1), p. 48, para. 8.
"W hile the traditional documentary credit provides the seller (or similar performing party) w ith a secure 
mechanism for payment by the buyer, the stand-by letter o f credit is a default instrument in that it covers the 
risk o f non-performance or defective performance by a contractor, supplier or other obligor." [UNCITRAL 
Y.B., 1988, supra (f.n. 1), p. 47, para. 3]
"  UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 47, para. 4 said: "Stand-by letters o f credit, which are issued 
primarily by banks in the United States o f America and less frequently in some other countries, thus serve 
the same purpose as do bonds or guaratees used in most countries."; and also at p. 47, para. 5 o f the same 
reference pointed out: "Stand-by letters o f credit and guarantees (or bonds), while functionally equivalent or 
at least similar, d iffer as to their legal treatment for the formal reason that the stand-by letter o f credit is a 
letter o f credit, Thus, the laws and mles governing documentary letters o f credit would generally be 
applicable to stand-by letters o f credit."; regarding the ICC's activities see p. 48, para I I  o f the above 
reference where it is said: "In 1978, ICC adopted and published its "Uniform Rules on Contract Guarantees" 
(ICC Publication No. 325), which do not recognize first demand guarantees."
UNCITRAL, " IV . STAND-BY LETTERS OF C R ED IT  AND GUARANTEES. A. Report o f the 
W ork ing  Group on In ternational Contract Practices on the w ork o f its twelfth  session (Vienna, 21-30 
November 19883 IA/CN.9/316^ [O rig inal: E ng lish ]". Yearbook o f the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, Vol. XX , 1989, pp. 183-200 [hereinafter referred to as UNCITRAL Y.B., 1989], at 
p. 183, para. 1 said: "A t its twenty-first session, the Commision considered the report o f the Secretary- 
General on stand-by letters o f credit and guarantees (A/CN.9/301). Agreeing w ith the conclusion o f the
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sufficiently mature to begin a more detailed study for the preparation of a UL 
affecting SLCs and BGs.^® The Commission's view was confirmed later by the
In the present research study there is no intention to consider details of the 
discussions of the UNCITRAL WG; these discussions lie outside the purpose of 
the present thesis; however, those parts of UNClTRAL's study somehow 
connected to LCs and having a particular impact on the documentary letters of 
credit rules and provisions, are marginally included in the present study, for
report that a greater degree o f certainty and uniform ity was desirable, the Commision noted with approval 
the suggestion in the report that future work could be cairied out in two stages, the first relating to 
contractual rules or model terms and the second pertaining to statutory law."
"  See UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 58, para. 97 said: "[...] since there are some important 
matters that remain subject to mandatory law and may not be regulated by the agreement o f the parties, 
including by uniform rules incorporated into the agreement, it may be desireable to strive for greater 
u n ifo rm ity  at the statutory level. For example, uniform rules may contain provisions consistent with the 
independent nature o f a guarantee, but the final and fu ll recognition o f such independence depends on its 
acceptance by the law."; it is also stated: "Probably the most important topic for a uniform law would be the 
vexing problem for frudu lent or abusive calls and appropriate court measures. The problem, which was 
at the heart o f a previous note o f the secretariat on stand-by letters o f credit (A/CN.9/163), cannot effectively 
be dealt w ith by contractual rules. Without understanding the difficulties o f agreeing on the scope o f the 
fruad exception and o f supportive court measures, it is submitted that at least an attempt in this direction 
m ight be made. Based on suggestions by practitioners, it is further submitted that it would be useful to 
consider whether a unifo rm  law m ight cover not only guarantee and stsnd-by letters o f credit, but also 
trad itiona l letters o f credit. While the extent and the circumstances o f fraud in documentary credits may be 
different, the legal problem is essentially the same and it  can not be solved by contractual mles (i.e. UCP). 
[...] Other topics that could be addressed in any future uniform law are, for example, court ju risd ic tion , 
a rb itra tion  and the applicable law. A  unifonn law could help to overcome the present disparity in matters 
that are goverened by mandatory provisions o f law. It could also come to the aid o f parties who did not settle 
other questions in their guarantee agreement or letter o f credit. Finally, a uniform law could and should 
guarantee the parties’ freedom and give fu ll effect to their agreement, including a reference to UCP or any 
uniform rules on guarantees that might be adopted. I f  the Commission were to pursue the idea o f a uniform 
law, it may wish to request that secretariat to prepare a study, in consultation with ICC, on the possible 
features and the issues that might appropriately be covered. The study might also suggest whether a model 
law or convention would be preferable to a uniform law, or that issue might be deffered to a later time, " 
[UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 58, paras. 98 and 99]
"The Working Group recalled the preliminary deliberations by the Commision as reflected in the report on 
the twenty-first session: "While some doubts were expressed as to the practical need and usefulness o f such a 
uniform law, there was wide support for the view that successful work in this direction was desirable in view 
o f the practical problems that could only be dealt w ith at the statutoiy level. The Commission was aware o f 
the difficulties inherent in such an effort relating to fundamental concepts o f law, such as fraud or similar 
grounds for objections, and touching upon procedural matters. Nevertheless, it was fe lt that, in view o f 
desirability o f legal uniform ity and certainty, a serious effort should be made." [UNCITRAL Y.B., 1989, 
supra (f.n. 12), p. 194-195, para. 122]
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instance, interest devoted to SLCs and their relevant issues and as such accepted 
as a matter for consideration by UNCITRAL/®
2.2. General background
2.2.1. D e fin ition
A standby letter of credit^® is an undertaking by a bank to make payment to 
a third party (the beneficiary of the credit) or to accept bills of exchange drawn by 
him. English law has tried to describe such a device in a series of decided cases. 
It is in general accepted that performance bonds/ guarantees are in principle 
similar to the traditional commercial letter of credit. For instance, Lord Denning, 
M R., in Edward Owen v. Barclays Bank International,^^ expressly said that 
"The performance guarantee stands on a similar footing to a letter of credit."^® 
The autonomous character of a performance guarantee/bond has been also noted 
in another case.^®
In the USA there is no precise definition of the standby letter of credit in 
Article 5 of UCC; but in practice it has also been accepted that Article 5 applies to 
SLCs. However, SLCs are defined by The Federal Reserve Board and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation in the USA in the following terms; "Any letter of
See Section A in Chapter X  for other points related to the UNClTRAL's activities.
This type o f credit was also called "guarantee letter o f credit"; but this title  was quickly changed because it 
was understood that the word "guarantee" was inappropriate term and might bearing in mind the prohibition 
o f issuing guarantee inside the United States o f America; Banks, supra (f.n. 3), p. 74, f.n. 20 and see also 
G.A. Penn, A.M . Shea, and A. Arora, "The Law and Practice o f In ternationa! Banking". Banking Law, 
Vol. 2, London, Sweet &  Maxwell, 1987 [hereinafter referred to as International Banking Law (Int.B.L.)], at 
p. 287, f.n. 77.
[1978] 1 A ll ER 976; [1978] 1 Ll.L.R. 166.
See Lloyd's Report, head note o f the case, col. 2; R.D. H arbottle v. Nat West. [1977] 2 A ll E.R. 862.
Howe Richardson Scale Co. v. Plhnex Corp.. [1981] 1 Ll.L.R. 161, at p. 165, col. 2, Roskill, L.J., said: 
"The bank in principle, is in a position not to identical with very similar to the position o f a bank which has 
opened a confirmed irrevocable letter o f credit. Whether the obligation arises under a letter o f credit or under 
a guarantee, the obligation o f the bank is to perform that which is required to perform by that particular 
contract and that obligation does not in the ordinaiy way depend on the correct resolution o f a dispute as to 
the sufficiency o f performance by the seller to the buyer or by the buyer to the seller as the case may be 
under the sale and purchase contract."
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credit which represents an obligation to the beneficiary on the part of the issuer,
(1) to repay money borrowed by or advanced to or for the account of the account 
party, or (2) to make payment on account of any indebtedness undertaken by the 
account party, or (3) to make payment on account of any default by the account 
party in the performance of an obligation."®® in Article 2 of UCP 500 a standby 
letter of credit is defined in a way similar to that of a letter of credit.®^
2.2.2. C lassification o f standby letters o f cred it
Nowadays there are different types of SLCs or bonds in domestic and 
international trade practice. In one general classification SLCs or bonds are 
divided into "on demand" and "conditional". In another category the contractual 
obligations of the account party differ, for example as to performance bonds, or 
tender or bid bonds (described below).
2.2.2.1. On demand and conditional bonds
1. First demand bonds
This is a type of SLC/bond, also called a "suicide form" among bankers and 
traders; it is noteworthy as the most popular kind of bond among the issuers and 
beneficiaries of issued credits, because the rights and duties of the parties to a 
credit contract are therewith made clear and precise. Although in a first demand 
SLC the burden of proof is on the beneficiary, he has no great difficulty to prove 
the failure of the account party or the bank's customer, since such type of credit is 
payable on the beneficiary’s first demand without any particular document(s) 
required to be presented (as proof for his allegation(s) or conditions for payment). 
Moreover, the bank's duty under such a credit is an absolute obligation and the 
bankers are obliged to honour the amount of the credit on demand by the 
beneficiary.®®
21
Banks, supra (f.n. 3), p. 74, f.n. 21, Regulation H. 12 C.F.R. S.S. 208. 7(d), 32.2(e) 337.2(a), (1983). 
See ICC Publication No. 500.
See H arbottle  case, supra (f.n. 18); Int. B.L., supra (f.n. 16), p. 268; G.A. Penn, "Perform ance Bondi 
A re  bankers free from  the under-lying contract?". L.M.C.L.Q., 1985, pp. 132-35 [hereinafter refened to 
as Penn].
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2. Conditional bonds
in the case of conditional bonds the mechanism is similar to that used for a 
traditional letter of credit, i.e., the beneficiary has to prove the failure of the bank’s 
client according to the terms of contract. In other words the bank must determine 
whether the customer's default is a breach of the contract or not. Of course, in 
most cases bankers are faced with the legal arguments of both parties; so, to 
avoid such a situation, most bankers insist on an arbitration clause being included 
in all conditional bonds.®®
2.2.2.2. Other types o f bonds
There are different sorts of bonds/guarantees which a bank's customer may 
ask for the beneficiary of the credit. They are:
1. Performance bonds
This kind of bond has been used for a long time by beneficiaries to protect 
themselves against default of the other parties in sale or construction contracts.®'^
2. Tender or bid bonds
In order to ensure the customer’s signing of a bid contract, the other party 
to the contract (beneficiary bidder) usually requires tender/bid bonds. 
Unfortunately, fluctuation of market prices means that many customers try to avoid 
their contractual obligations, and the bidders are obliged to include additional 
costs in re-awarding the contract to another party. Therefore, the beneficiary 
bidder usually uses this mechanism, and this type of bond is usually issued for a 
period of 90 days at first instance, but because of lengthy negotiations they are 
nearly always unilaterally extended creating a common problem with this type of 
bonds.®®
See Penn, ibid.; Int. B.L., supra (f.n. 16), pp. 268-70.
According to statistic in construction industiy the number o f failures in completion the contract by 
contractors and number o f insolvencies are veiy high. See for instance Williams, K.P., "Perform ance 
bonds: used and usefulness". L.M.C.L.Q., 1983, pp. 423-39, at p. 423, f.n. 1 [hereinafter refeired to as 
W illiams]; Int. B.L., supra (f.n. 16), pp. 263-65.
Int. B.L., supra (f.n. 16), pp. 262-63; Williams, ibid., p. 423, f.n. 4.
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3. Advanced payment bonds
The employer (buyer) usually pays to the other contracting party, 
particularly in construction contracts, a percentage of the contract price (usually 10 
to 20 per cent) as an advance payment, in order to enable to commence work. 
Sometimes the employee (seller or contractor) fails to carry out his obligation. So, 
to safeguard his position, the employer requires an advanced payment bond.®®
4. Retention money bonds
An employee contractor is usually, under the terms of contract, entitled to 
receive a percentage of the contract price after completion of his duty in each 
stage of the work. So when the contract is completed, the total amount of the 
contract price will have been paid by the employer. To safeguard the employer/ 
buyer's payment during the progress of the contract, a sort of device called a 
"release of retention money bond" is used. Such a bond puts the contractor/seller 
under an undertaking to return any money they have received from the employer/ 
buyer in case of failure to complete a contractual duty at each stage of the work.®^
2.2.3. The mechanism o f standby letters o f cred it
As described above, SLCs or bonds are one type of credit. So, like a 
traditional commercial letter of credit, a standby letter of credit is simply an 
engagement by an issuer, usually a bank, to honour drafts or demands for 
payment by the beneficiary under the terms of the credit contract. Moreover, it is a 
low cost system like the traditional commercial letter of credit.
Differences between SLCs or bonds and LCs arise from different purposes 
and duties included in the contract by both parties, and also from the 
documentation (explained below). As a matter of fact there is a great potential risk
Int. B. L., supra (f.n. 16), p. 265.
Int. B.L., supra (f.n. 16), pp. 265-68; Williams, supra (f.n. 24), p. 423, f.n. 4; there are other types o f 
bonds like labour and material bonds, maintanance period bonds; and also it is suggested that the bonds 
could be classified into "documentary" and "non-documentary" bonds, in order to mitigate the disadvantages 
o f first demand bonds. It is suggested that there could be some cluse in the contract that the beneficiary o f the 
credit is entitled to use the credit when he can show a good cause o f action against the seller/contractor by 
giving documents, in support o f his contention, to the bank; see also Int.B.L., supra (f.n. 16), pp. 270-71.
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for both the issuing bank and its customer with respect to the "on demand" bonds. 
Therefore, there are some suggestions to mitigate the risk and safeguard the 
position of banks and their customers against the beneficiary. They are as follows:
1. "Counter indemnity" by the issuing bank
One solution suggested to support the issuing bank's position in the case of 
"on demand" bonds is "counter indemnities." It is clear that under English law the 
issuing bank is bound to make payment promptly, in the absence of fraud, when 
demand Is made by the beneficiary. It means though, in English law, the issuers 
of the "first demand" bonds (issuing bank) are bound to make payment promptly 
when demand is made by the beneficiary of the credit but they are also entitled to 
obtain the amount of money paid, from their customers under a proper 
"counter-indemnity" clause.
The second method has been particularly devised in recent years for large 
contracts involving always large bonds. Individual banks could not afford such a 
bond and have preferred to syndicate it. Therewith the risk is divided between 
several banks. This method of syndication is said to be no different in structure 
from a syndicate loan agreement, apart from the fact that the former is built on a 
first demand bond.®®
2. Solutions for a bank's customer
Two suggestions may operate to mitigate the risk of on demand bonds and 
try to help the bank's customer (usually a seller or contractor); firstly by using the 
services of private insurance to insure the customer against the risk of losing his 
assets against unreasonable or unjustified demand for bonds; secondly by using 
the services provided by the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) In the 
United Kingdom. The ECGD provides schemes to support users of on demand 
bonds in case of unfair calling of bonds.®®
Int.B.L., supra (f.n. 16), p. 283, f.n. 66.
Int.B.L., supra (f.n. 16), pp. 285-86 &  f.n. 77; Ventris, supra (f.n. 2), p. 135.
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S E C T IO N  B: A  C O M P A R IS O N  B E T W E E N  SLCs A N K  AND  
SECs A N D  P E R FO R M A N C E  BONDS AN D  G U AR AN TEES
1. STANDBY LETTERS OF CREDIT AND LETTERS OF CREDIT
1.1. Similarities
The standby letter of credit is in many ways similar to LCs. The SLCs, more 
importantly, are in principle similar to LCs. In other words, the doctrine of 
autonomy and the principle of strict compliance are also applied to SLCs.^° As to 
the required documents, types and their roles, there is a distinction between SLCs 
and LCs. They are more important in the latter form of credit.
There is a tendency in respect of the autonomous nature of SLCs (both in 
the USA and in the UK) to question whether the rule of independence should be 
broken or not. For instance, it is suggested that as the risk under SLCs is very 
high for the bank's customer, because there is no documentation as in the case of 
traditional LCs, Article 5 of the UCC should be amended to facilitate attacks on the 
problem by breaking the rule of independence and to permit suing the 
beneficiaries for breach of the underlying co n t ra c t . I n  a case^^ Eveleigh, L.J., 
accepted the view that if the underlying agreement is lawfully avoided or there is a 
total failure of consideration on the part of the buyer, he would be prepared to 
grant an injunction and to restrain the bank from payment of the credit to the 
beneficiary.
Although such suggestions try to mitigate the risks imposed upon the 
bank's customer, some disadvantages may emerge, firstly, when in the wake of 
breaking the principle of independence the creditors are forced back to elaborate 
contracts like a guarantee contract; secondly, no intention may exist on the part of
Schmitthoff, supra (f.n. 1), p. 364.
"F raud  in the transaction: Enjoin ing letters o f cred it during the Iran ian  Revolution'*, 93 Harvard 
Law Review, 992 (1980), pp. 1013-15.
Potton Homes L td . v. Coleman Contractors Toverseas) L td .. The Times, 28th Feb. 1984; Int.B.L., 
supra (f.n. 16), pp. 272-3, and look at particularly for cases referred to in fn . 32, at p. 273.
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the parties when negotiating SLCs, since for such a type of credit the 
beneficiaries' position is of great importance.
1.2. Differences
A standby letter of credit and LCs are different from each other as to the 
function of the credit, its beneficiary, and the required documents. A traditional 
letter of credit is a device for payment in a sale contract, so there should be some 
positive performance to entitle the beneficiary to demand the credit; '^^ but in the 
case of SLCs, in contrast to LCs, failure of the applicant for the credit in carrying 
on his contractual obligation entitles the beneficiary to draw a draft or demand for 
the amount of the credit.^^
As to the beneficiary of the credit in SLCs, mostly but not always the buyer 
customer is the beneficiary of the credit and the seller (in case of sale contracts) 
or contractor (in case of construction agreements) are applicants for the credit. Of
Becker, J.D., "S tandby letters o f credit and the Iran ian cases: W ilt the independence o f the credit 
survive?". Uniform commercial Code Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1981, pp. 335-47 [hereinafter referred to as 
Becker]; Penn, supra (f.n. 22), pp. 133-34.
"The value o f the documentary credit, appreciated especially in sales transactions involving carriage o f 
goods by sea, lies in its tw in objectives, namely to raise credit and to secure payment o f the purchase price. 
The credit meets the common interest o f both parties not to tie up funds during the transport o f goods. Even 
more importantly, it safeguards the different interests o f buyer and seller. The buyer is assured that payment 
is made only against document that confer title o f the goods to him or at least provide evidence o f their 
shipment and o f certain qualities (e.g. by certificate o f inspection, examination or origin). The seller when 
parting possession o f the goods is assured o f payment, or honour o f a b ill o f exchange he may wish to 
discount, by a financially strong and reliable third paity, often a confirming bank in his own country. He is 
thus protected against the risk o f the foreign buyer's inability or unwillingness to pay." [UNCITRAL Y.B., 
1988, supra (f.n. 1), p. 49, para. 19]
Banks, supra (f.n. 3), pp. 74-5; G. Weisz and J.I. Blackman, "Standby letters o f credit a fte r Iran ; 
Remedies o f the account p a r ty " . University o f Illinoise law Rev., V o l.l, 1982, pp. 355-84, pp. 358-60 
[hereinafter referred to as Weisz]; "While the traditional documentaiy credit provides the seller (or similar 
performing party) w ith a secure mechanism for payment by the buyer, the stand-by letter o f credit is a default 
instrument in that it covers the risk o f non-performance or defective perfomiance by a contractor, supplier or 
other obligor." [UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988, supra (f.n. 1), p. 47, para. 3]; It  is also stated: "In contrast to the 
documentaiy credit, which secures payment due to the beneficiary for his regular performance o f a 
commercial obligation, the stand-by letter o f credit is designed to provide security or indemnity to the 
beneficiary for the unlik ly contingency, and the need to protect against it, may arise in respect o f a great 
variety o f commercial or financial obligations. Stand-by letters o f credit may thus be used to underwrite 
undertakings in various contexts, as are bank guarantees and bonds." [UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988, supra (f.n. 1), 
p. 50, para. 26]
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course, there are some types of SLCs where the buyer/employer is the applicant 
for the credit; these include the bid credit, or advanced payment bonds.
Lastly, there is an important difference between the documents. In SLCs 
there is no need that a required document(s) has any link with the underlying 
agreement. As a contrast, tendered documents in the traditional form are directly 
related to the underlying contract, e.g. sale contract, carriage contract and so 
on.sG
2, STANDBY LETTERS OF CREDIT, PERFORMANCE BONDS, 
AND BANK GUARANTEES
Standby letters of credit (SLCs), bonds (for instance performance bonds 
(PBs)), and bank guarantees (BGs) are different forms but have a similar 
purpose.^^ However, they also involve mutual distinctions, as follows:
Professor Schmitthoff illustrated such point in following terms: "The difference between these two types 
o f credit is that in the ordinary letter o f credit arrangement the documents which the beneficiary has to 
tender, normally, relate to an underlying sales transaction or a similar contract and usually include a transport 
document, but in a standby letter o f credit the required documents need not include a transport document: a 
document o f any description may be required, e.g. a demand by the beneficiary o f a statement by him that 
the other party is in default. The standby letter o f credit is thus often similar in effect to the bank guarantee." 
[see Schmitthoff, supra (f.n. 1), pp. 363-64]; Int. B.L., supra (f.n. 16), pp. 287-8 &  f.n. 79; Weisz, ibid., p. 
358, par. 3; UNCITRAL, "2. Independent guarantees and stand-by letters o f credit; discussion o f 
fu rthe r issues o f a uniform  law: amendment, transfer, expiry, obligations o f guarantor, lia b ility  and 
exemption: note bv the Secretariat tA/CN.9/WG.IIAVP.681 [O rig ina l: E n g lis lil" . Yearbook o f the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. V o l.XX II, 1991, pp. 330-339 [hereinafter referred 
to as UNCITRAL Y.B., 1991, part b.2] at p. 337, para. 54 said: "In considering whether a rig id or a more 
flexible standard o f compliance would be appropriate, account should be taken o f certain differences 
between the commercial letter o f credit and the guaranty letter. Firstly, the commercial letter o f credit 
provides a secured payment mechanism likely to be utilised in the ordinary course o f the transaction, while 
the guaranty letter is designed to indemnify the beneficiary for the consequences o f a contingency that is 
unlikely to occure. Secondly, the documents tendered under a commercial letter o f credit (e.g. b ill o f lading) 
are likely to be merchantable, while the statements or documents required under a guaranty letter are rarely 
o f such type. Thirdly, the documents required under a commercial letter o f credit tend to be more 
standardised than those required under a guaranty letter, and they are explained and regulated in detail by the 
UCP."
"A  question may arise that for what reason(s) it is in different name and forms in different legal systems. It 
is said that: " It can be answered with certainty only for the use o f standby letters o f credit by American banks 
which had to use the form o f a letter o f credit because it is setteled in the US banking law that ordinaiy 
guarantees are not legitimate banking business w ithin the meaning o f the National Bank Act. The use o f 
standby letters o f credit by banks was expressly recognized by rulings o f the Comptroller o f the Currency 
issued in 1974. The use o f the other two fomis, i.e., o f bonds and o f bank guarantees, can only be explained 
by the general exprience that lawyers always prefer to employ the legal tools w ith which they are familiar 
from their own legal systems. Even international commercial lawyers from continental Europe have
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2.1. Standby letter of credit and performance bond
In the Edward Owen case Lord Denning pointed out that "performance 
guarantees are virtually promissory notes payable on demand."^® However, it has 
been suggested that SLCs are distinguished from PBs on two grounds; firstly, they 
are not issued for an existing debt; secondly, SLCs are not negotiable 
instruments.®®
2.2. Standby letter of credit and bank guarantee
Although SLCs and BGs are similar in function there are several 
distinctions between them:
2.2.1. P rim a i'y  and secondary ob ligation
Under SLCs the responsibility of a party who issues such a credit is a 
primary one; while, by contrast, a guarantor's undertaking is a secondary 
obligation since he promises to pay if the main debtor fails to carry out his duty 
under the credit contract.'^^
2.2.2. D octrine o f autonom y
A standby letter of credit is separate from its underlying transaction, but, on 
the other hand, the guarantee arrangement is not independent from its underlying 
agreement As a result of this distinction a guarantor can use any and all defence
developed the bank guarantee while English lawyers, burdened with the problems o f the doctrine o f 
consideration have used the well known form o f bond for the new purposes. A  growing tendency can now be 
observed to use standby letter o f credit outside the USA, e.g., by banks in England, Australia, India, Japan, 
and South Korea." [Marshall, supra (f.n. 4), at p. 267]
[1978] 1 Ll.L.R. 166, at p. 171 stated: "[...] the performance bond is merely one type o f surety contract. 
As such it is governed by the general principles o f the law o f principal and surety. These contracts do not 
require the use o f bond, but its employment obviates the need for the consideration moving from the creditor 
to the surety."; H.J. van der Vaart, "S tandby letters o f credit and the problem o f bad fa ith  calls". Yale 
Journal o f World Public Order, 1981, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 36-61, at pp. 42-3 [hereinafter referred to as Vaart]; 
Williams, supra (f.n. 24), at p. 425.
Vaait, ibid., p. 43.
Banks, supra (f.n. 3), pp. 75-81; Weisz, supra (f.n. 35), pp. 355-84; Richard J. Driscoll, "The role of 
standby letters o f cred it in international commerce: reflections a fter Ira n " . V irgin ia Journal o f Inter­
national Law, 1980, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 459-504, p. 470 [hereinafter referred to as Driscoll].
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that a primary obligor has against a creditor/^ There are two American decisions 
opposed to one another. In the first case the Federal court took the view that the 
bank is under duty to pay upon the actual existence of facts regarding the 
performance of the underlying agreement, and such requirement is said to be not 
"too far from the basic purpose of letter of credit, namely, providing a means of 
assuring payment cheaply by eliminating the need for the issuer to police the 
underlying contract."'^^ In the second authority it is stated that if the issuer fails to 
require any document for a particular fact, then there is a presumption that there is 
no need for the beneficiary of the credit to present a document to that effect.'^®
Banks, supra (f.n. 3), pp. 75-6 described this point clearly as following: " I t is well established today that 
the standby letter o f credit is not guaranty. [...] An insti ument is a standby letter o f credit i f  "the issuer has 
a primary obligation that is dependent solely upon presentation o f conforming documents [or demands for 
payment] and upon the factual performance or non-performance by the parties to the underlying transaction, 
[...] By contrast, i f  the condition o f compliance are phrased in factual rather than in documentary terms, the 
honouring o f the instrument becomes contingent upon the actual occuiTence or non-occurance o f a factual 
event. Under such conditions, the issuer, rather than examining documents which state that an event has or 
has not occurred, would be required to examine questions o f fact relating to the perfonnance o f the 
underlying contract. These are the charectristics o f a guaranty, not o f a standby letter o f credit."; Vaart, 
supra, p. 41; "As regards guarantees, uncertainty arises from the fact that the autonomy or independent 
nature o f the undertaking is not yet recognised in fu ll and firm ly established in all jurisdictions." 
[UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988, supra (f.n. 1), p. 57, para. 92]
W ichita Eagle &  Beacon Publishing Co. v. Pacific National Bank. 343 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Cal. 1971), 
rev.d. 493 F.2d 1285 9th Cir. 1974), p. 1286; Banks, supra ( fn . 3), p. 77; John F. Battaile III, "G uaranty 
letters o f credit: Problems and posib ilities". Arizona Law Review, 1974, Vol. 16, pp. 822-38, p. 842 
[hereinafter referred to as Battaile]; Henry Harfield, "E n jo in ing  letter o f credit transactions". Banking 
Law Journal, 1978, 95, pp. 596-605 [hereinafter referred to as Harfield's article]; Becker, supra (f.n. 33), p. 
341 (about the problem o f ultra vires); Banks, supra (f.n. 3), p. 77, f.n. 39 it is said that: "Note that requiring 
the conditions to exist is different from requiring a document (such as an affidavit) from the beneficiaiy 
stating that the conditions exist. In the first instance, the burden o f determining facts relating to the 
underlying contract is place upon the bank. In the second instance, the bank's only burden is to examine the 
document to see if, on its face, the document appears to comply with the terms o f the letter o f credit."; 
Banks, supra ( fn . 3), at pp. 77-8 suggested that the above decision was not made under the UCC since at that 
time the state o f California had not adopted such provision. So, under the literal interpretation o f section 
5-112(l)(c) o f the UCC the above court may took opposite view since under the mentioned section "a letter 
o f credit need not required presentation o f a document provided that the letter o f credit conspecuously states 
that it is a letter o f credit or is conspecuously so entitled.
In Bank o f America v. W hitnev-Centrai National Bank 291 F. 929 (5th Circ. 1923), at p. 935 the court 
stated: "A  bank may issue its letter o f credit unconditioinally, and without requiring documents, or it may 
prescribe such conditions and require such documents as it sees fit. [...] It follows that when any particular 
fact is not required to be presented by documents the letter o f credit is unconditional as to such fact, and in 
that event the issuing bank is presumed to rely upon the presentation o f the person in whose favour the credit 
is issued."; Banks, supra (f.n. 3), p. 78.
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2.2.3. Guarantees in  the USA
In the USA banks may not legally guarantee third parties' debts since this is 
ultra vires; but there Is no legal prohibition against issue of a standby letter of
credit/"^
CONCLUSIONS
The importance of the documentary letters of credit system in international 
trade makes clear how significant the recent activities by the UNCITRAL 
concerning SLCs and BGs are and how they are opening up a new dimension 
with respect to the issue under consideration here, namely, the necessity of 
having a uniform law relating to LCs. Although points raised above, confirm that 
SLCs have more similarities with LCs than BGs (similarity in principles, operations, 
and relevant rules and provisions accepted by courts as well as by international 
business bodies like the ICC) UNCITRAL has preferred to study SLCs beside BGs 
for their common operational legal character and functional equivalence"^® and has 
taken the view that SLCs have more differences with LCs than with BGs/® This
Vaart, supra (f.n. 38), p. 42, at f.n. 28 said: Jai-vis suggests that "the main reason why banks issue
standby latters o f  credit is to get around ultra viers problems." Jarvis, "S tandby letters o f c re d it". 10 
U.C.C. L.J. 38, 45 n. 21 (1977); Driscoll, supra (f.n, 40), p. 470; see alse Becker, supra (f.n. 33).
"The view was expressed that the stand-by letter o f credit should be dealt w ith clearly separately from the 
independent guarantee because o f its different functional origin. The prevailing view, however, was in favour 
o f a jo in t treatment in view o f their common operational legal character and functional equivalence." 
[UNCITRAL, " IV . GUARANTEES AND STAND-BY LETTERS O F C R ED IT . A. Report o f d ie  
W ork ing  G roup on In ternationa l Contract Practices on the w ork o f Its th irteenth session (New York, 
8-18 January 1990J fA/CN.9/330J fO rig itia l: Engfish l". Yearbook o f the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, Vol. X X I, 1990, pp. 227-238 [hereinafter refeiTed to as UNCITRAL Y.B., 1990], p. 
229, para. 14]; see also previous notes and UNCITRAL, " I I .  G UARANTEES AN D  STAND-BY 
LETTERS OF C R ED IT. A. Report o f the W orking  Group on In ternationa l C on tract practic£S_iHi_i.h£ 
w ork o f its eighteenth session (Vienna. 30 November- 11 December 1992) (A/CN.9/372) {O rig ina l: 
English)". Yearbook o f the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Vol. X X IV , 1993, pp. 
139-154 [hereinafter referred to as UNCITRAL Y.B. 1993, part a], p. 140, para 13.
"By its function and purpose, the stand-by letter o f credit différés considerably from the traditional 
commercial letter o f credit or documentary credit and is equivalent to independent bank guarantees and 
similar indemnities. [...] As regards stand-by letters o f credit, it is often doubtful whether a given provision o f 
the law on letters o f  credit is applicable, i.e. appropriate in view o f the special nature and purpose o f the 
stand-by letter o f credit, As regards guarantees, uncertainty arises from the fact that the autonomy or
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view is in contradiction to the facts, as admitted even by the ICC Commission, 
namely, that national laws treat SLCs and LCs similarly/^ Therefore, for reasons 
pointed out previously, it is more preferable that rules and provisions related to 
SLCs and LCs should be studied together and one international set of standards 
govern both of them; because, by adopting a different approach (as it is accepted 
by UNCITRAL) a new occasion for conflict of laws would arise between UCP 500 
and a future set of standards provided by UNCITRAL. In other words, the 
international business communities would face two sets of standards for SLCs, 
namely, the first one (UCP published by the ICC) treating them like LCs while 
under the second type (the future UNCITRAL's set of standards) they would be 
treated as being similar to BGs. Although there may be similar provisions about 
SLCs in both sets of the above mentioned standards, there would be also 
distinctions between them in contradiction with the task of UNCITRAL, namely, to 
provide a more unified front regarding an international payments system."*®
In conclusion, for reasons pointed out above, there is a marked need and 
practical interest for having an international unified and codified set of standards 
concerning LCs. However, before considering different aspects of unification/ 
codification of the law of LCs it is necessary to know more about the current 
system; therefore, questions related to UCP 500 and legal issues related to LCs 
(common law perspective) are to be discussed below.
independent nature o f the undertaking is not yet recognised in fu ll and firm ly established in all jurisdictions." 
[UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988, supra (f.n. I), p. 57, paras. 91 and 92]
"Stand-by letters o f credit and guarantees (or bonds), while functionally equivalent or at least similar, 
d iffer as to their legal treatment fo r the formal reason that the stand-by letter o f credit is a letter o f credit. 
Thus, the laws and rules governing documentary letters o f credit would generally be applicable to 
stand-by letters o f credit. [...] For guarantees and bonds, the legal framework is different. As discussed 
below (Part II, B), it is characterized by a varied development o f national laws, in particular case law, 
towards recognizing the independent (non-accessory) legal nature o f the guarantee and by attempts to 
prepare uniform rules." [UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988, supra (f.n. 1), p. 47, para. 5]
As to the question: "W liat would be the final decision by the Commission in order to prevent the emerge 
o f such a problem?, and other points concerning UNCITAL's activities see Chapter X  (below).
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PART TWO
THE UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND
PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY
CREDITS (UCP)
This part of the study will focus on issues related to articles of the UCP 500 
Involving uncertainty. The contents are divided into two chapters (IV and V). Chapter 
IV, discusses the UCP 500, its general structure, and compares it with the previous 
version of the UCP (UCP 400). Moreover, issues which should be considered in a 
future revision of the UCP are also discussed. Chapter V is devoted to a 
comparative study of the UCP 500 (as the only international customary/ contractual 
rules related to LCs) and Article 5 of the UCC in the USA (as a national legislation 
related to LCs). In conclusions, an attempt is made to assess what can be learned 
to improve the current revision of the UCP.
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CHAPTER IV
UCP 500; ITS STRUCTURE
RELATED ISSUES
/
SE C TIO N  A : STRUCTURE O F UCP 500; ITS  D IFFE R E N C E  F R O M  
UCP 400
1. STRUCTURE OF THE UCP 500
The main structure of UCP 500 is, generally speaking, similar to its previous 
version (UCP 400); however, the number of sections has increased from six to 
seven: the last section of UCP 400 has been divided into two different sections in 
the UCP 500, as section F (Transferable credit) and section G (Assignment of 
proceeds). Moreover, each article is distinguished by a sub-title for better access to 
the Articles of the UCP.^
2. UCP 500 AND UCP 400: DIFFERENCES
A comparison between the present and previous versions of UCP makes it 
clear that:
(1) The number of articles in UCP 500 has decreased from 55 to 49 
through the consideration of some articles with due regard to similarities in 
contents. For instance, the text of Articles 6, 13, and 26 of the UCP 400 have 
been replaced by an addition to Articles 3, 5, and 23 of the UCP 500. Moreover, 
Article 47 of present UCP covers three articles of the previous version, namely. 
Articles 51, 52 and 53. For other examples see tables 1.1 and 1.2 (below).^
(2) Of 49 Articles in UCP 500 four articles are identical In both codes, 
namely Articles 22, 38, 41, and 45. in addition, Articles 24 (Non-negotiable Sea
' El linger, E.P., "The  U niform  Customs and Practice 1993; a b rie f review o f the ir salient points", JBL, 
Jan. 1994, p, 28 [hereinafter referred to as El linger, JBL 1994], and from the same writer, "The Uniform  
Customs and Practice fo r Documentary Credits- the 1993 Revision". LMCLQ , part 3, August 1994, p. 
377 [herinafter referred to as Ellinger, LM CLQ 1994]; Rendell, Robert S., "New  IC C  rules impact letters 
o f c re d it" . International Financial Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 11, Nov. 1993, pp. 33-35 [hereinafter referred 
to as Rendell, November 1993], where it is pointed out while the UCP 500 is a comprehensive set o f 
guidlines dealing with all aspects o f letter o f credit practice, it does not address every issue that may arise in 
a letter o f credit transaction; see also Rendell, Robert S., "New IC C  rules impact letters o f cred it (Part 
1 )" , International Financial Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 10, Oct. 1993, pp. 28-30 [hereinafter referred to as 
Rendell, October 1993].
 ^ For more details see ICC, "Docum entar credits: UCP 500 &  UCP 400 compared". ICC Publication No. 
511.
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Waybill), 27 (Air Transport Document), and 28 (Road, Rail or Inland Waterway 
Transport Documents) are new. The rest of the articles have undergone minor 
and/or substantive and stylistic changes.
SECTION B: UCP 500 AND RELATED ISSUES
As a result of the changes, the UCP 500 provides a much better set of 
standards related to LCs than any other previous versions of the UCP;^ however, 
points in the present provisions require more clarification and/ or change of 
approach. They are related (see below) to all parties to a credit transaction.
1. ISSUES RELATED TO THE APPLICANT FOR A CREDIT
Because of banks’ strong bargaining power, the UCP's provisions are 
sometimes in favour of banks; the interests of other parties to the documentary 
credit, particularly these of an applicant for a credit, are not well protected under 
the UCP 500. Examples relevant thereto are considered below.
1.1. The bank's position on transmission of messages
1.1.1. "de lay [...] o ther e rrors a ris in g "
Under Article 16 of the UCP 500"^  all the risks involved in transmitting a 
message are carried by the applicant for a credit. There may be an objection that 
transmission of a credit is one of the issuing bank’s obligations, so in case of 
delay, error, etc., the bank should be held responsible for any failure. It has been 
agreed that "the bank could not avail itself of this Article because it would have 
been negligent, not because of transmission, but because of the failure to verify
 ^ For more details see Ellinger, JBL 1994, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 28 said: "This is not to say that the new 
Revision is o f a revolutionaiy nature. In most regards, it follows the pattern o f its predecessor. It  may be 
fa irly described as an innovative consolidation, which has clarified many o f the points left in doubt under the 
regime o f the 1983 Revision and which breaks new ground by making detailed provisions for transport 
documents used in respect o f the carnage o f goods by air and by land. The Working Group has also 
improved the draftsmenship and, in many regards, has setteled some controversial issues."
^ See ICC Pub. No. 500, where Article 16 provides: "Banks assume no liab ility or responsibility for the 
consequences arising out o f delay and or/loss in transit o f any message(s), letter(s) or document(s), or for 
delay, mutilation or other error(s) arising in the transmission o f any telecommunication. Bank assume no 
liab ility  or responsibility for errors in translation and/or interpretation o f technical terms, and reserve the 
right to transmit Credit terms without translating them."
46
such an important document."^ As far as English law is concerned, a bank would 
not find a good defence where there is negligence by the bank or its agent. For 
instance, in Medley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.,® regarding the 
Issue of duty of care owed by professional people and whether it is limited to 
contractual relationships, Lord Devlin said: "I think therefore, [...] that the 
categories of special relationships which may give rise to a duty to take care in 
words as well as in deed are not limited to contractual relationships or to 
relationships of fiduciary duty, but include also relationships which [...] are 
"equivalent to contract", that is, where there is an assumption of responsibility in 
circumstances in which, but for the absence of consideration, there would be a 
contract [...] I shall therefore content myself with the proposition that wherever 
there is a relationship equivalent to contract, there Is duty of care. Such 
relationship may be either general or particular. Examples of a general 
relationship are those of solicitor and client and of banker and customer."^
 ^ Venlris, P.M., "Bankers’ Documentary C red its ", first suppliment to the second edition, Lloyd's o f 
London Press Ltd. 1985, at p. 21 [hereinafter referred to as Ventris 1985].
[1963] 1 Ll.L.Rep. 485 (HL).
’  Ibid., at p. 515-516; Ventris, P.M., "Bankers’ Documentary Credits” . Lloyd's o f London Press Ltd., 
1983, pp. 186-189 [hereinafter referred to as Ventris], at p. 186 said: "This case is veiy important [...] 
because the thorough discussion in the House o f Lords o f the duty o f care owed by professional people 
enlarged the principle accepted for the first time in Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) A.C. 562 that a duty o f 
care could be owed by one person to another despite there being no lines between them."; and at pp. 164-65 
o f the same reference above concerning Donoghue case it is pointed out; "[...] Lord A tk in  in his speech said 
that the question to be resolved was the most important [,..] in the present case the sole issue to be decided 
was, as a matter o f law, was there any duty owed by the defender to the pursuer to take care? [...] his 
Lordship said that the doctrine appeared to be that a man must take reasonable care to avoid acts or 
ommissions which he can reasonably forsee would be likely to injure those, so closely and directly affected 
by the act, that a man ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when directs his 
mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. His Lordship then continued: "[...] A  
manufacturer puts up an article o f food in a container which he knows w ill be opened by the actual 
consumer. There can be no inspection by any purchaser and no reasonable perliminary inspection by the 
consumer. Negligently, in the course o f prepration, he allows the contents to be mixed w ith poison. It is said 
that the law o f England and Scotland is that the poisoned consumer has no remedy against the negligent 
manufacturer. I f  this were the result o f the authorities I should consider the result a grave defect in the law, 
and so contrary to principle that I should hesitate long before following any decision to that effect which had 
not the authority o f this House. [...] It is a proposition which I venture to say that no one in Scotland or 
England who was not a lawyer would for one moment doubt. It w ill be an advantage to make it clear that the 
law in this matter, as in most others, is in accordance with sound common sense.” ; M c ln c rny  v. Lloyds 
Bank L td ..[1973]2 Ll.L.R. 389, [1974] 1 L.L.R. 246 (CA).
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One may argue that the above authority is not related to the situation 
arising under Article 16 of the UCP since it is agreed by contracting parties (the 
bank and the applicant for a credit) that the bank's customer should accept risk(s) 
involved in the transmission of a message. This may be true in case of 
international transaction but if a letter of credit is not ruled by the UCP or if the 
UCP is silent as to the point in discussion (liability or responsibility of the bank 
concerning the transmission of messages), the result would be different if the 
applicable law of contract is English law. Moreover, it is possible that an English 
court may take the view that contracting parties in a letter of credit are not allowed 
to agree upon something different from the established law and business 
practice(s); and a similar possibility exists between different jurisdictions. This is 
another example how the UCP, as the only existing international set of standards 
concerning LCs, provides something which is the opposite of what common sense 
suggests and would be cause of unjust conclusions in international trade; it should 
be revised.
1.1.2. Technical terms
Article 16 of UCP 500 provides that banks have no liability or responsibility 
in case of error in translation and/or interpretation of technical terms. This is a 
general provision and covers all kinds of technical terms, particularly those used in 
banking.® Can a bank apply the above rule as a good excuse where the applied 
technical terms dealt purely with banking affairs? If no, how would it be possible to 
distinguish between technical terms applied in the banking business and those 
used in other activities (business or non-business) related to LCs? In case of any 
dispute regarding the point under consideration whose point of view should be 
preferred, the bank's, the applicant's for a credit, or that of a third person? Who is 
such a third person?
® Article 13(a) o f UCP 500, which replaces Article 15 o f UCP 400, provides that the compliance o f the 
stipulated documents is to be determined "by international standard banking practice as reflected in these 
articles."
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Another point of concern is whether banks are liable or responsible for their 
error(s) in translation and/or interpretation of non technical terms. There is 
nothing clearly stipulated under Article 16 of UCP 500. One may suggest, by way 
of implication, that banks would be liable and/or responsible for their failure. On 
the other hand, it is possible to argue that silence in the UCP provisions does not 
justify to conclude that banks accept some sort of liability or responsibility for their 
errors in the course of translation or interpretation of non-technical terms. 
Moreover, the last sentence of Article 16, namely, "Banks [...] reserve the right to 
transmit Credit terms without translating them", supports the view that banks are 
not interested in accepting any liability or responsibility concerning the point under 
consideration and words "Credit terms" are wide enough to cover both technical 
and non-technical terms.
It seems, consequently that the last sentence of Article 16 is not clear and 
should be preferably reviewed in a future revision of the UCP.
1.1.3. T ransla tion  o f terras o f c red it
It has been stated that banks have no obligation to translate a credit; their 
duty is only to transmit it. Therefore, to prevent any problems arising from 
translation, the applicant for the credit should as a duty supply the credit's 
translation himself.® Although bankers have such rights under Article 16 of UCP 
500, It seems that by translating a credit they would waive their rights. If they do 
not wish to lose them, then they have to ask their clients to provide the credit's 
translation. If banks choose to translate credit terms before transmitting them they 
should then accept liability or responsibility for any loss caused as a result of their 
failure. One may argue that by transferring any liability or responsibility to the 
banks the applicant for a credit would lose more than gain since banks do not 
aquire to translate credit terms, and it would cause more harm for the banks' 
customer namely accepting the task of translating of credit terms as well as 
liability or responsibility of errors raised in that respect. Although such an
 ^ Ventris 1985, supra (f.n. 5), pp. 21-22,
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argument bears some justification and sense, when Article 16 is compared with 
Section 5-107(4)^® of the UCC, it becomes clear that the latter provides a more 
sensible approach concerning the issue under consideration.^^ For instance, there 
is a possibility for the applicant for a credit to transfer risks of unreasonable 
translation or interpretation to banks whereas such a flexibility is not accepted 
under the UCP. It seems, therefore, the procedure adopted by the ICC provides 
unfair provisions concerning LCs in international trade.
This and other issues (mentioned above) should be reconsidered by the 
ICC in order to provide a more equitable system of provisions.
1.2. Disclaimer for acts of the Issuing bank as an instructed party
Points would arise regarding sub-sections (a) and (b) of Article 18 of UCP
500T
1. Where it is accepted that there is no contractual relationship between the 
applicant for a credit and the other bank(s), as agent(s) of the issuing bank, why 
should the former be liable for the latter's default?^® So, the point is whether the 
issuing bank has some sort of duty against its customer, and whether when a 
bank takes initiatives to choose the other bank(s) services, why must the issuing 
bank not accept the result of its failure? The above cited article clearly 
demonstrate another example for the bargaining power of the issuing bank 
involving an unjustified risk for the applicant for a credit.
Sub-section 4 o f Section 5-107 o f the UCC in the USA provides; "Unless otheiwise specified the customer 
bears as against the issuer all risks o f transmission and reasonable translation or interpretation o f any 
message relating to a credit."
' '  For more details see below Chapter V, Section B .1.3.1.
Article 18 (a) provides; "Banks utilizing the services o f another bank or other banks for the purpose o f 
giving effect to instructions o f the Applicant do so for the account and at the risk o f such Applicant."; and 
paragraph (b) o f the same article provides: "Banks assume no liab ility or responsibility should the 
instructions they transmit not be carried out, even i f  they have themselves taken the initiative in the choice o f 
such other bank(s)." [ICC Publication No. 500]
"  Ventris, supra (f.n. 7), at p. 24 said: "It must be extremely rare that the applicant fo r the "credit" choses the 
advising/confirming bank, unless it is a branch o f the issuing bank, when its choice is automatic. Generally, 
the confirming bank is nominated by the beneficiary or the issuing bank."
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2. Under the common law an agent is responsible to his principal for the 
acts and omissions of appointed sub-agents. So one may suggest that Article 
18(b) is an exception to this general principle; even in such a case the issuing 
bank is not entitled to enjoy this exception where the intermediary bank is carrying 
out its instructions.^"^ In addition, in case of negligence by the intermediary bank 
(as the sub-agent), neither that bank nor the issuing bank (as the agent of the 
applicant for the credit) would be able to invoke Article 18. For instance, the ICC 
Banking Commission was asked to give its opinion on the responsibility of the 
issuing bank towards its customer under Article 12 of the UCP 74 (Article 18 of 
UCP 500); the Commission decided thac; "Article 12 established a principle 
according to which the issuing bank was exonerated from all liability for the errors 
of the advising bank whether this bank had been chosen by the credit applicant 
but this immunity did not apply where the issuing bank had been guilty of 
negligence."^®
It seems, therefore, necessary that points related to Article 18 above should 
be clarified in a next revision of the UCP.
2. ISSUES RELATED TO THE BENEFICIARY OF A CREDIT
2.1. Amendment or cancelation of a revocable credit
Article 6(a) of the UCP 500 provides that a credit may be revocable as 
defined in Article 8(a): "A revocable credit may be amended or cancelled by the
Ventris, supra (f.n. 7), at p. 24 said: "[...] the Court could hold that the agent is only exonorated by this 
Article for the sub-agent not carrying out the agents instructions but he is not exonorated from responsibility 
i f  the sub-agent does something to his instructions. Moreover, i f  sub-agent is guilty o f gross negligence 
(assuming that there can be degree o f negligence) this Article would probably avail neither him nor the 
agent. In the Suisse Atlantique case [1966]! Lloyd's Rep. 529, the House o f Lords thoroughly examined the 
application o f exception clauses in contracts and it is clear that i f  the contract as performed by one party 
bears no resembelance to the contract as agreed between the parties then the guilty party cannot shelter 
behind the exceptions clause. He is deemed to have "stepped out o f the contract". Further, Lee Cooper L td. 
v. C.H. Jeakins &  Sons L td . [1963] 1 A ll E.R. 280 showed that the principal can sue in tort the sub-agent."
ICC Doc. 470/336, 470/342 (meeting on Dec. 1987); "Decisions (1975-1979) o f the IC C  Banking 
Commission" on queries relating to Uniform  Customs and Practice fo r Documentery C red its". ICC
Pub. No. 371 [hereinafter referred to as ICC Pub. No. 371], p. 30.
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Issuing Bank at any moment and without prior notice to the Beneficiary."^® It can 
be understood from this definition that this type of credit does not provide 
sufficient security for the beneficiary of a credit. Nevertheless, it is a cheap type of 
credit and suitable for usage in trade where parties to the contract know each 
other very well or belong to the same company. The revocable credit may be 
applied in situations where also economic or political risks are involved. 
However, legal problems related to such a type of credit exist, as follows.
2.1,1. Time for amendment or cancellation of the revocable credit
The ability of the issuing bank to amend or to cancel a revocable credit 
under paragraph (a) of Article 8 of UCP 500, quoted above, is a right that cannot 
be challenged either by the applicant or by the beneficiary of the credit, even if the 
bank would be tempted to abuse such a right. For supporting the bank's position 
one may argue that both the bank's client and the beneficiary agreed to such a 
right for the bank prior to issuance of a revocable credit under the UCP. However, 
the question is: what is the real meaning of the terms "at any moment" in Article 
8(a) of UCP 500? Does it mean that the bank's right continues even after 
documents are tendered to the bank? It is rightly stated by a writer that when 
documents are presented for examination to the banker, from that moment the 
credit can no longer be cancelled or modified on the basis provided under Article 
8(a) of UCP. He has said; "The situation is different, however, between moment C 
(the moment at which the beneficiary presents his documents to the bank) and 
moment D (the moment at which the bank examines the documents). The 
beneficiary has handed over his documents. He has for his part complied with all 
his obligations under the terms of the documentary credit. Nevertheless, he still
See UCC Sec. 5-103, 1-106(3) and 5-106(4); Schmitthoff, C.M., "S chm itth o ff s Expo rt 
and Practice o f International T ra d e ". 8th ed., 1986 [hereinafter referred to as Schmitthoff], p. 359; 
Gutteridge, H.C. and Megrah, M., "The law o f The Banker's Commercial C re d it" . London, 1984, 7th ed., 
p. 123 [hereinafter referred to as Gutteridge].
Kozolcliyk, B., "Letters o f C re d it" . 9 International Encyclopedia o f Comparative Law, Chapter 5, 1979 
[hereinafter referred to as Kozolcliyk], p. 23 and f.n. 99-101.
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has to wait for a time before the credit can be paid, this being the time required by 
the bank in order to examine the documents. During this period the credit can no 
longer be cancelled, in view of the fact that it has been concluded as far as the 
beneficiary is concerned. [...] by accepting the documents it concludes a specific 
part of the credit and the credit automatically passes to the final stage- that of 
examination- which stage is terminated by the conclusion: "The documents are in 
order" or "the documents are not in order."^® Moreover, in accordance with a 
general principle of contract law, the bank's advice is an offer and it remains open 
until it is cancelled by the offeror (namely the issuing bank); if the offeree makes 
his acceptance in accordance with the terms of the offer then the contract will be 
established. So, if the issuing bank as the offeror does not want to carry on its 
undertaking it must inform the other party to the proposed contract. If the bank 
merely modifies or cancels its offer without giving any notice to the beneficiary, the 
latter may suffer much damage. This argument can also be supported in common 
law.^® So, there is no further justification for that provision in the above cited 
situation.
2.1.2. Notice of modification or cancellation
Under Article 8(a) of UCP 500, an issuing bank is entitled to amend or to 
cancel the revocable credit "w ithout prior notice to the beneficiary".^® Related
De Rooy, P.P., "Docum entary C red it". 1984, pp. 28-29 [hereinafter refeired to as DeRooy].
Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562; Hediey Byrne &  Co. L td . v. Hellers &  Partners L td . [1963]! 
Ll.L.R . 485; Ventris, supra (f.n. 7), at p. 166 pointed out that: "[...] in Cominco L td . v. B ilton [1973]2 
Lloyd's Rep. 261, at p. 273, a case before the Supreme Court o f Canada, M r Justice Spence quoted with 
approval the following passage from "Carver Carnage By Sea, 1963"; "Donoghue v. Stevenson established 
that everyone must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omission which he can reasonably foresee would be 
like ly to injure persons so closely affected by his act that he ought reasonably to have them in contemplation 
when directing his mind to te acts or omissions in question". "Injury" in this sense does not only mean 
personal wounding but any act worsening the position o f another party."
Article 8(a) provides: "A revocable Credit may be amended or cancelled by the Issuing Bank at any 
moment and without prior notice to the Beneficiary." [ICC Pub. No. 500]; There is also a potential trap in the 
UCP 500 for amending irrevocable letters o f credit. In that respect a writer said: "[...] a letter o f credit can be 
amended without your agreement. The reason behind an irrevocable letter o f credit is so it cannot be 
canceled or amended without your agreement. But the new rules allow agreement to be expressed or implied. 
[...] The reason for the new rule is that the most letter o f credit amendments are made by the beneficiaries' 
request, and the beneficiaries simply start complying with them without ever giving anyone their formal
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issues are: (1) Do these terms mean that the bank is under an obligation to give 
notice to the beneficiary? (2) If the answer is positive, does such a notice play an 
essential requirement for amendment or cancellation of the credit? And (3) In what 
period of time should the bank send notice to the beneficiary? Concerning the first 
question, one line of argument is that the bank is under no obligation to give any 
notice to the beneficiary; and if in practice banks rather send a notice to the 
beneficiary it is a voluntary practice. To support this view one may refer to Cape 
Asbestos Co. v. Lloyds Bank,^^ where the seller brought an action against the 
banker on the basis that it was the duty of the bank to give notice of cancellation 
of the credit. Bailhache, J., in the course of his judgment said that although in 
practice bankers gave notice in such case, it was solely dependent on the bank to 
give notice of cancellation to the beneficiary.^^
In contrast, it can be argued that the real meaning of terms "w ithout prior 
notice" is that banks are obliged to send a notice of amendment or cancellation of 
revocable credit to the beneficiary of the credit; acceptance of the opposite view 
would make Article 8(a) of UCP 500 in effect similar to what Article 2 of 1962 UCP 
provided that, "such a credit may be modified or cancelled at any moment w ithout
agreement. [...] So the drafters o f the UCP 500 included a rule stating that "compliance" w ill be deemed to 
mean "acceptance." [...] This is specially troublesome given that the amendment and your documents can 
cross in the mail- you might accept an amendment you did not even know about! Whenever presenting 
documents under a letter o f credit, include an indication o f which amendments you have accepted and which 
you have rejected, then state, "in-action on any amendments not listed is not to be taken as acceptance." 
[Baker, Walter "Buddy", "P reparing yourself fo r the UCP 500". Business Credit, March 1994, p. 16, at p. 
17.]
(1921)3 L.D.B. 314, or [1921] WN 274; Lord Denning, M.R., in W.J. A lan &  Co. L td . v. E l N M r 
Export and Im port Co.. [1972] 2 Q.B. 189, at p. 207; for similar decision in the U.S.A. see United States 
Steel Products Com, v. Irv in g  Bank-Cohimbian T rust Co.. 9 F. 2d. 230 (2nd Cir. 1925).
Ibid., at p. 315 said: "It is to be observed that the notice was given by the bank on the opening o f the credit 
is o f the opening o f a revocable credit and not o f a confirmed credit. That tells the person in whose favour 
the credit is opened that he may find that the credit is revoked at any time. That being the representation 
which is made by the bank to the person in whose favour the credit is opened, the seller in this case, are the 
bank under any legal obligation to him to inform him when the credit is revoked? [...] I have come to the 
conclusion that, however wise and however prudent, and however much in the Interest o f business, such a 
notice may be, there is no legal basis upon which I can found an obligation on the bank to give such a notice 
under such circumstances."; Ellinger, E.P., "Docum entary letter o f c re d it" . Singapore, 1970 [hereinafter 
referred to as Ellinger], pp. 12-13; Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 16), pp. 19-20.
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notice to the beneficiary."^® It seems that by adding the term "prior", draftsmen 
of the UCP have indicated that banks should accept, to some extent, responsibility 
in the situation under discussion. So, the second line of argument is better under 
the present text of Article 8(a).
In respect of the second question above, the preferred approach is that 
giving notice to the beneficiary is not a condition precedent for amendment or 
cancellation of a revocable credit. '^^ Regarding the last query above, nothing has 
been provided under the UCP. For more certainty In the provisions, a reasonable 
period of time (namely one banking day following the day that the issuing bank 
decided to amend or to cancel the revocable credit) should be agreed between 
contracting parties.
2.2. Late negotiation
Here the question is whether an alleged "late negotiation" could ever 
constitute a good reason for rejecting tendered documents and consequently 
refusing payment under the credit by banks. The ICC Banking Commission in 
1985 decided that such questions were meaningless: "The Commission confirmed 
[...] that the beneficiary had the right to have non-confirming documents corrected, 
provided he then represented them within the time limits laid down by the credit.^® 
[...] The Commission also considered that the bank in the present case was 
entitled to assert a claim of non-conforming documents, but was not entitled to rely 
on a claim of "late negotiation"."^®
2.3. Rectifying non-confinining documents
The beneficiary of a credit or a remitting bank is entitled to rectify 
non-confirming documents before the expiry date of a credit. This policy has been
ICC Pub. No. 222.
De Rooy, supra (f.n. 18), p. 27.
See ICC Pub. No. 371, supra (f.n. 15), case R.13, page 25. 
DeRooy, supra (f.n. 18), pp. 15-18.
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approved by the ICC Banking Commission.^^ There is also another procedure 
accepted in practice by banks, namely, rejected documents may be sent to the 
issuing bank for its approval by the paying bank.^® A question may arise: is a 
paying bank liable to pay in a situation where the issuing bank's approval of 
documents was received after the expiry date of the credit? This point was 
decided positively by the ICC Banking Commission: "Where faulty documents 
were submitted by the confirming bank to the issuing bank for approval within the 
framework of the documentary credit transaction, this action was to be regarded in 
effect as a request for amendment of the credit. However, the confirming bank 
remained bound by its obligation to effect payment in the event that documents 
were approved, and was deemed to have implicitly agreed to the date of expiry of 
the credit being extended for a reasonable period so as to allow the issuing bank 
sufficient time to reply unless, at the time of sending the documents to the issuing 
bank for approval, it gave express advice to the contrary."^®
2.4. "Any cause beyond their control"
Under English law it has been held that, according to the operation of the 
"ejusdem generis" rule,®® this does not include shortage of labour;®  ^ it was also
ICC Pub. No. 371, supra (f.n. 15), at p. 25 it is said; "The beneficiary and the remitting bank always had 
the possibility o f putting the documents in order provided this was done before expiry o f the credit, and that 
the documents were then presented within the time allowed in the terms o f Article 41, and provided also that 
the documents still complied w ith the credit terms."
A  similar practice is confirmed by the ICC between the issuing bank and the applicant for a credit in 
Article 14(c) o f UCP 500.
ICC Pub. No. 371, supra (f.n. 15), pp. 25-27; ICC Doc. 470/328, 470/330 (A pril 1987).
Ventris, supra (f.n. 7), at p. 22 said: "This is a rule o f law concerning construction to the effect that general 
words o f indefinite extent must be construed as relating to matters o f the same kind as the specific words 
preceding the general words, i.e., consignor, carrier or insurer. For example, it was held that "strikes, 
lockouts, c iv il commotions, or any causes or accidents beyond the control o f consignees" did not cover a 
shortage o f labour caused by a plague. (Mudie v. S trick (1909) 14 Com. Cas. 135, 227.)"; Bride, Roger, 
"O sborn's concise Law D ic tion a ry ". 7th ed. 1983, at p. 128 said: " [o f the same kind or nature]. The rule 
that where particular words are followed by general words, the general words are limited to the same kind as 
the particular words."
Jenkins v. W alford  0918187 L.J.K.B. 136.
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decided that the control of port appliances by the military is not a matter beyond 
control.®^ So, it is important to know the real meaning of the above phrase. For 
instance, is the government's order to close banks for a certain time, because of 
devaluation of the currency, a matter beyond the bankers' control?®® And if it is 
so, is it covered by Article 17 of UCP 500? It seems such an order is usually 
based on a legislation for emergency situations and banks are obliged to follow 
the rule of law; so this case would possibly be accepted as one cause among "any 
other causes" (stipulated in Article 17) beyond banks' control and would be 
covered by that article. The point above, however, needs clarification in a next 
revision of the UCP.
2.5. Transferable credit
The letter of credit, unlike a bill of exchange or promissory note, is not a 
negotiable instrument and it is usually issued to a specified beneficiary, since the 
buyer/ applicant for credit as a security measure wants to know who is going to 
supply or manufacture the goods or merchandise. So, as a general principle, a 
letter of credit is non-negotiable. Flowever, sometimes for different reasons, e.g. 
where the seller is acting as a middleman, he may be looking for a credit which 
can be negotiated. This problem arose after the Second World War and, as a 
solution, the use of credit in a transferable form has been increased.®'^ A 
transferable credit is defined in Article 48 of UCP 500.®® Under Article 48(a)(1) it is
32 Aktieselskabet F rank v. Namagara Copper Co. (1920)25 Com. Gas. 212.
See Ventris 1985, supra (f.n. 5), at p. 22 pointed out that it is suggested that the point under consideration 
would not be covered by the UCP, but no reason mentioned.
Davis, A.G., "The law relating to commercial letters o f c red it". 3rd ed., 1963 [hereinafter referred to as 
Davis], p. 29; Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 16), at p. 99 said: "The main purpose o f making an irrevocable credit 
transferable to a third party is to enable the beneficiary to acquire and pay for the contract goods which he 
can not supply himself and may therefore have to get from elsewhere. Speaking o f a bank's confirmed credit 
Denning, L.J. said in Trans T rust S.P.R.L. v. Danubian Trading Co, L td . [[1952] 2 Q.B. 297, C.A.; 
[1952]1 Ll.L.R. 348; [1952] 1 A ll E.R. 970]; "It is irrevocable by the banker; and it is [by the buyer] often 
expressly made transferable by the seller. The seller may be relying on it to get the goods himself. I f  it is not 
provided, the seller may be prevented from getting the goods at all."
35 See ICC Pub. No. 500 and appendix 1 for Section 5-116 o f the UCC.
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provided that the beneficiary "may request transfer of the credit". Why is the 
issuing bank's consent for transferring the credit after its issue necessary? The 
reason for it is that "A request for transfer is not a binding unilateral declaration of 
intent but is akin to a credit amendment and, as such, requires the transferring 
bank's acceptance of the beneficiary's transfer request before it becomes 
enforceable."®®
A similar question had been raised in Singapore, in Lariza (Singapore) 
Private Ltd. v. Bank Negara Indonesia 1946.®  ^ The.Privy Council held that the 
issuing bank is not under a duty to accept the seller's instructions in connection 
with a credit's transferability. Lord Brandon said: "Such a consent can not be given 
in blanket form in advance, so as to apply to any request for transfer which may 
subsequently be made, whatever its extent or manner may be. It has to be an 
express consent made after the request and it has to cover both the extent and 
the manner of the transfer requested."®®
The above manner of proceeding is the opposite of what was accepted 
under Article 46(a) of the UCP revision (1974) recognising a right for the
ICC Document No. 470-37/4, p. 37 [The text o f the UCP 400 was under revision by two Working Groups 
(WG) in Commission on Banking Technique and Practice o f the ICC. As result o f such attempt two drafts 
namely Document No. 470-37/4 (dealing w ith Articles 1-24 and 54-5) and Document No. 470-37/5 
(relating to Articles 25-53) were prepared.]; Ellinger, LMCLQ 1994, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 401 said; "One 
interseting verbal change is in definition o f a transferable credit, Article 54(a) defined such a credit as one in 
which the beneficiary had "the right to request" the transferring bank to effect transfer. The new Art. 48(a) 
has replaced the quoted words by the phrase "may request," Wlien read together the cl. (C) under which the 
transferring bank is "under no obligation to effect such transfer except to the extent and in the manner 
expressly consented by such bank", the new provision gives added support to the transfening bank's right to 
refuse to transfer the credit."; McLaughlin, G.T., "Letters o f credit; Basic principles and current 
controversies". Australian Business Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 5, October 1989, p. 302, pp. 309-310,
[1985] 2 M.L.J. 81, Singapore C.A. in [1986] 1 M.L.J. 287; see [1986] J.B.L. 62 and 309; Schmitthoff 
C.M., "The transferable C red it". JBL, Jan. 1988, pp. 49-55 [hereinafter referred as Schmitthoffs article], 
at pp. 52-53.
Schmitthoff, ibid., p. 53; De Rooy, supra (f.n. 18), at p. 42 said: "This provision offers a protection to the 
bank at which the credit is made available. It  is not only in the interest o f the applicant for the credit that the 
beneficiaiy should be reliable, but also in that o f the bank. Transfer o f the credit to another beneficiaiy may 
affect the bank's position and it is therefore logical that such a transfer can not be made without its consent."
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beneficiary to give instruction to his bank to transfer the credit to a third person.®® 
Would the new policy accepted under Article 48 of the UCP 500 be justified? The 
answer depends on the time of request for a transferable credit. It seems sub­
section (a) of Article 48 provides only a solution when the beneficiary, after 
issuance of the credit, looks for its transfer to another person; but, what would be 
the bank's position if the issued credit is in a transferable form? In this situation 
one may suggest that by adopting the view accepted in Article 48, the usefulness 
of the transferable credit would be at risk, since the seller is looking for a 
transferable credit and has said so in his contract with the buyer but later he faces 
a new situation, namely, obtaining the banker's agreement. Moreover, it may well 
be argued that by issuing the credit in a transferable form, the bank "expressly" 
consents to the transfer of such a credit and, therefore, there is no room for any 
later objection. It seems Article 48 (a) of the UCP 500 covers part of the practice; 
therefore, it should be revised as to the above considered point.
3. ISSUES RELATING TO BANKS
3.1. Incorporation of the UCP in the credit
"Credit is issued subject to Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits, 1983 revision, ICC Publication N, 400". These terms were added, for the 
first time, to Article 1 of the UCP 400 (1983). The reason for such change was that 
under previous versions of the UCP (namely 1962 and 1974), banks were only 
required to notify their adherence to the ICC, approach individually or collectively
See ICC, "The uniform  customs and practice fo r documentary c re d it" . ICC Pub. No. 290 (1974 
revision) [hereinafter referred to as ICC Pub. No. 290], for Article 46(a) provided: "A  transferable credit is a 
credit under which the beneficiary has the right to give instructions to the bank called upon to effect payment 
or acceptance or to any bank entitled to effect negotiation to make the credit available in whole or in part to 
one or more third parties (second beneficiaries)."; and the reason for such a change was said to be the ICC 
Banking Commission's decision in which it was agreed that "the advising bank was always fiee to refuse the 
beneficiaiy's transfer instructions on the basis o f the provisions o f Article 46(b)."[ICC Doc. 470/315, 
470/331, 47/342; Whebel, B.S., "UCP 1974/1983 Revisions compaired and explained-Docunientary, 
c red its ". ICC Pub, No. 411 [hereinafter referred to as ICC Pub. No. 411], p. 84; Ellinger, E.P., "The 
U nifo rm  Customs - th ier nature and the 1983 Revision". LM CLQ  1984, pp. 578-606, at p. 603 
[hereinafter referred to as Ellinger 1984]].
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through their national or central bank;'^° but under the UCP 400 it was accepted 
that the above quoted terms were added to the article/^ This is an important point 
particularly in the USA where both UCP and UCC are applied in one state or 
between different states. A similar policy has been followed under UCP 500 
(Article 1).^  ^ So, those who redrafted the UCP apparently tried to remove any 
ambiguity in relating to the application of the UCP in international trade. However, 
there are a few relevant points, as follows.
3.1.1. Method of incorporation of UCP within an issued credit
How is the UCP incorporated into a credit? What is the position under UCP 
500? There are three possibilities: (1) annexing the text of UCP to an issued 
credit: (2) incorporating particular terms, as suggested by Article 1 of UCP 400 
(mentioned above) into the text of the credit; and (3) using any terms to show 
adherence of interested parties to the UCP. The method of incorporation of the 
UCP into the credit under Article 1 of UCP 500 as a result of using the terms "they 
are" may be interpreted as either in the first or second (above cited) situation, 
since these terms would relate both to the main text of the UCP and to those 
terms which are used at the beginning of Article 1 of UCP 500, namely, 'The 
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, 1993 Revision, ICC 
Publication N. 500". As to the above methods 1 and 2, it seems the latter is 
better since it is in line with what has been accepted in banking practice. Referring
UCP 1962 (ICC Pub. No. 222) and UCP Î 974 (ICC Pub. No. 290) were identical as to the point under 
consideration. For instanse, General Provisions and Definition (a) o f UCP 1974 provided: "These provisions 
and definitions and the following articles apply to all documentary credits and are binding upon all parties 
thereto unless otherwise expressly agreed."
ICC Pub. No. 411, supra (f.n. 39), at p. 11 said: "A t the time the 1974 Revision was introduced an ICC 
Banking Commission document (No. 470/251 o f 1975.03.04) "requested banks to arrange for the insertion 
[...] o f a clause reading: "subject to Unifom i Customs and Practice for Documentary credits (1974 Revision), 
ICC Publication No. 290 ", adding that "in order to avoid possible misunderstanding it is requested .that 
banks do not use wording other than that given above,"
Article 1 o f UCP 500 is not identical to Article 1 o f UCP 400 and provides: "The Uniform Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credits, 1993 Revision, ICC Publication N. 500, shall apply to all Documentary 
Credits [...] where they are incorporated into the text o f the Credit,"
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to the point in discussion it seems, therefore, that the text of Article 1 of UCP 400 
was more clear than the text of Article 1 of UCP 500/^
In respect of the above third situation, there are no references relating to it 
either within the present UCP or in its previous version. Therefore, what would be 
a bank's position if parties to a credit contract express their intentions by using 
words different from those laid down in the Article 1 of UCP 500? Generally 
speaking, if there are sufficient reasons to accept that parties to a credit 
agreement are interested in applying the UCP, such an intention should not be 
disregarded because different terms are used in the text of the credit.'’'^
3.1.2. Silence in the letter of credit as to application of the UCP
What would be a bank's position if an issued credit is silent as to the 
incorporation of the UCP into it? Would such a credit be governed by UCP 
provisions? One may argue that, unless there is no other indication to the contrary 
in the credit, the UCP should, as the only international customary law related to 
LCs, be applied to such a credit.'^^ A writer has pointed out, however, that it is 
questionable to draw similar conclusions in case of standby letters of credits 
(SLCs). He has said; "It is, at the same time, to be doubted that the UCP applies 
to a standby credit in which it is not expressly incorporated. The reason for this is
Article 1 o f UCP 400 provided: "These articles apply to all docunientaiy credits [...] They shall be 
incorporated into each documentary credit by wording in the credit indicating that such a credit is issued 
subject to Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, 1983 revision, ICC Publication N. 400."
This view would find support in English law. for instance, in Forestai Mimosa v. O riental C red it [1986] 
1 W LR 631, held that a marginal note incoi-porated into the credit contract was sufficient; it is said: "No 
change w ill be needed in the few cases where banks use forms which states that the credit is "issued subject 
to the ICC Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits currently in force." [ICC Pub. No. 411, 
supra (f.n. 39), p. 10].
El linger, LMCLQ 1994, supra (f.n. I), at pp. 382-83 said: "Article 1 continues to treat the UCP as a set o f 
standard terms and conditions applicable to documentary credits and standby credits by incorporation. 
Notably, though, Gatehouse, J's decision in H arlow  and Jones L td . v. Am erican Express Bank Ltd. 
[1990]2 Ll.L.R. 343, indicates that, in view o f the universal adoption o f the Code by banks all over the 
world, it would, as a matter o f business practice, apply to a documentary credit even i f  it was not expressly 
incorporated therein. It is true that Gatehouse, J's decision related to the Uniform Rules for Collection and 
not the UCP. But, as the UCP has attained a considerable greater degree o f acceptance in international 
banking than the Uniform Rules for Collection, the ruling ought to apply even more decisively to this Code. 
It can, therefore, be assumed that the UCP applies to a documentary credit unless expressly excluded."
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that, in practice, some standby credits are not meant to be governed by the UCP. 
Indeed, if a standby credit provides for payment against a "clean" draft or, in other 
words, against a bill of exchange which is not accompanied by additional 
documents, it falls altogether outside the definition of a documentary credit in Art. 
2
In contrast, it may be suggested that the text of Article 1 of UCP 500 is 
clear enough concerning the above questions, so credits issued in the above 
condition should not be governed by the provisions in question. Generally 
speaking, the latter view is better because it discourages issuing a credit in the 
above condition, provides more certainty and prevents further disputes, 
particularly in circumstances where other rules about LCs (like Section 5 of the 
UCC in the USA) may have existed at the time of transaction. However, in 
situations where there are at the time of contract no other rules about LCs except 
the UCP, or where parties to a credit contract agreed on application of the UCP 
but there is no reference to such a fact in the issued credit, then the first above 
mentioned opinion would be helpful to prevent an unjustified end to the credit 
contract. Consequently, the issue of application of UCP relating to the situations 
discussed above should be reconsidered."^^
Ellinger, LMCLQ 1994, supra (f.n .l), p. 383.
For more details concerning legal nature o f UCP (namely whether it is a customaiy or a contractual 
provisions in nature) see the relevant discussion in Chapter X I; as to conflict between the UCP and tenns o f 
contract see ElHner, JBL 1994, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 32 said: "One interesting decision on documentaiy credits 
is Royal Bank o f Scotland v. Cassa di R isparm io delle Province Lom bard [Unreported, decision o f 
January 21, 1992, CA], Here the Court o f Appeal held that a confirming bank's action for reimbursement 
ought to be instituted in New York, where reimbursement was expressly made due in the credit. Rejecting an 
argument to the effect that the specific term ought not to be considered in isolation but be read together with 
the provisions o f Article 21 o f the UCP [1983 Revision], their lordships considered the general question o f 
inconsistencies between the UCP and an express term o f contract. Mustill L.J. pointed out that the UCP did 
not constitute an independent Code or source o f law but, merely a set o f customs and practice by which 
merchants might wish to be bound. Flis Lordship concluded, on this basis, that where a specific tenn, such as 
the place o f reimbursement, was expressly stated in the credit, there was no need to refer, in addition, to the 
UCP. In such a case, the express teim in question took precedence over the relevant provisions o f the UCP. 
[...] However, according to earlier authority, this principle applies in documentaiy credit case only where the 
letter o f credit manifists a clear intention to exclude the respective provision o f the UCP, Otherwise, the 
clause in question and the relevant provision o f the UCP have to be read together with a view to reconciling 
them i f  possible." [Emphasis added; the referred authority is Forestall Mimosa L td . v. O riental C redit Co.
[1986]] W L R 631]
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3.2. Instructions to issue or amend credits
3.2.1. "Instructions [...] must be complete and precise"
Article 5(a) of UCP 500 provides that instructions for issuance or 
amendment of a credit "must be complete and precise." The issue related to these 
terms is how is it possible to conclude that an instruction is not complete or not 
precise? Would an incomplete or unclear instruction establish any obligation for 
banks? With reference to the first point, that is, instructions "m ust be complete 
and precise", one has to look at the rules and provisions, customs, usage of 
trade, and those measures that a reasonable person would accept on the basis of 
the circumstances of each case. Although this issue may seem to cause no 
difficulty in most cases, there are situations in which a dispute may arise between 
contracting parties. For instance, in a credit contract in connection with markings 
on goods, the credit simply stated: "marking=xyz La Celba via Puerto Cortes 
Honduras CA", and documents which were tendered gave additional information. 
The ICC Banking Commission, when its recommendation was sought, refused to 
accept the view that presented documents are in compliance with the terms and 
conditions of the credit.'*® This decision was reconsidered at the request of the 
Belgian Banking Association on the grounds that in practice it would jeopardize 
payment in numerous documentary credits in modern transport practice; the 
Association suggested that the Commission should express the following opinion: 
"If a credit requests a special marking, this request should be formulated in the 
credit by means of one or the other of the two following phrases: either (1) 
marking is restricted to [...]; or (2) marking should include.""*®
The ICC Banking Commission accepted the above suggestion and 
modified its previous decision by saying: "If a credit stipulated markings it should
ICC, "O pinions o f the IC C  Banking Commission on queries relating to U niform  Customs and 
Practice fo r Documentary Credits 1984-1986". ICC Pub. No. 434 [hereinafter referred to as ICC Pub. No. 
434], pp. 3-4 (ICC Documents 470/451, 470/450).
Ibid., pp. 4-5.
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also clearly state whether only such markings were acceptable. If it did not so 
state, banks would accept documents which included any markings in addition to 
the stipulated markings."®® This point is not particularly mentioned in the UCP 
500. For the sake of having a clarified set of standards in international trade it 
seems necessary that it should be included in a next revision of the UCP.
In respect of the above raised second question (namely would an 
incomplete or unclear instruction establish any obligation for banks?), although 
Article 12 of UCP 500 provides a solution by directing that "the bank requested to 
act on such instructions may give preliminary notification to the beneficiary for 
information only and without responsibility",®^ the procedure in question may itself 
generate some uncertainty. For instance, from what moment does the expiry date 
of a credit start, from the time of issue of the credit or from the time when 
complete and clear instructions have been received? Article 12 of UCP 500 refers 
only to the time of advising, confirming and amending a credit in a situation under 
consideration and provides nothing about the point involved in the above 
question.®^ In contrast. Article 14 of UCP 400 was more clear than Article 12 of 
UCP 500 regarding the point in discussion; since under that Article the time of 
issuance of a credit in case of incomplete or unclear instructions also started from 
the time the necessary information was received and the bank was then ready to 
act on the instructions.®® Article 14 of UCP 400 provided a more just solution in 
the above presented situation because it was clear as to the time of issuance of a 
credit in case of incomplete or unclear instructions and put the matter of issuance
Ibid., p. 5 (ICC Doc. 470/460/, 470/468).
ICC Pub. No. 500.
The relevant part o f Article 12 o f UCP 500 provides: "[...] The Issuing Bank must provide the necessary 
information without delay. The Credit w ill be advised, confirmed or amend, only when complete and clear 
instructions have been received and i f  the Advising Bank is then prepared to act on the instructions."
Article 14 o f UCP 400 provided: " I f  incomplete or unclear instructions are received to issue, confirm, 
advise or amend a credit [...] The credit w ill be issued, confirmed, advised, or amend only when necessary 
information has been received [...]." [Emphasis added; and for the fu ll text o f the article see ICC Pub. No. 
400]
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of a credit and its effect on expiry date of such a credit in the same line as 
accepted for advising, confirming or amending a credit Therefore, Article 12 of 
UCP 500 and paragraph (c) of Article 42®^* should be revised as to the time of 
issuance of credit where instructions are incomplete or unclear.
Moreover, in connection with the procedure stated under Article 12 of UCP 
500, it is suggested that such a practice provides a complicated procedure for the 
advising bank while there is no real benefit to the beneficiary. It is suggested the 
Article 12 should be redrafted as follows: "If incomplete or unclear instructions are 
received to issue, confirm, advise or amend a credit, no action will be taken so to 
do until complete and clear instructions have been received."®®
3.2.2. "Excessive detail"
In Article 5 (a) it is stated, "banks should discourage any attempt: (i) to 
include excessive detail in the Credit or in any amendment thereto." What does 
"excessive detail" mean in commerce? No definition has been suggested, since 
it is difficult for banks to decide which part of their client's instructions is excessive 
and which part of the mandate is essential. For this reason the ICC Banking 
Commission recommended only that banks should educate their customers to 
avoid such difficulties.®® As confusion and misunderstanding may arise between 
banks and their customers concerning the meaning of terms "excessive detail", it 
would be more appropriate to revise Article 5(a)(i) either by defining the terms in
57question or removing them from the provisions in an amended text of the UCP.
Article 42(c) o f UCP 500 provides: " I f  an Issuing Bank states that the Credit is to available "for one 
month", "for six months", or the like, but does not specify the date from which the time is to run, the date of 
Issuance o f the C redit by the Issuing Bank w ill be deemed to be the firs t day from  which such time is to 
ru n . Banks should discourage indication o f the expiry date o f the Credit in this manner." [Emphasis added.]
Ventris, supra (f.n. 7), at p. 14.
ICC Pub. No. 411, supra (f.n. 39), p. 15.
Ellinger, LMCLQ 1994, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 384 stated: "As the meaning o f "Excessive details" is, in any 
event, far from clear, it is to be doubted whether a definite prohibition would have been more useful! than the 
current provision."
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3.3. Legal structure of a second confirmation
There may be situations in which an irrevocable letter of credit is confirmed 
not by one but by two or more banks. A question was raised by a Japanese bank 
as to the legal structure of a second confirmation of a confirmed credit. There is no 
express provision dealing with this point under the UCP, and the ICC Banking 
Commission did not express any opinion in its meeting in April 1985.®®
It seems that the legal and contractual relationship between the confirming 
banks depends on the circumstances of the case: (1) if the second confirming 
bank receives the request for adding its confirmation directly from the issuing 
bank, there is then no privity of contract between that bank and the first confirming 
bank and their positions in relation to the issuing bank and the beneficiary of the 
credit are similar; but (2) if the second confirming bank is asked by the first 
confirming bank to add its confirmation to the credit, then their relationship is as 
principal and agent, and there is no transaction between that bank and the issuing 
bank.
What would be the beneficiary's obligation in such a situation? It seems the 
beneficiary is obliged to look for the second confirming bank for payment in the 
above second situation; in the former circumstances he is entitled to present 
documents to each one of the confirming banks, at his choice, unless otherwise 
accepted under the credit arrangement. It is submitted here that the next revision 
of the UCP should consider the above made suggestion.
3.4. "All credit must clearly indicate and [...] nominate"
Those who redrafted the UCP by using the word "must" have tried to make 
clear the importance of issues concerning the type of credit and the nominated 
bank in sub-sections (a) and (b) of Article 10 of UCP 500. What would be the 
validity of a credit if none of the conditions in question, that is, to indicate and 
nominate clearly exist in the credit? In October 1986 the ICC Banking Commission
58 ICC Pub. No. 434, supra (f.n. 48), pp. 8-10 (ICC Doc. 470/450, 470/452).
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stated: "If a bank has issued a credit and complied documents are presented it 
must pay. If it sets up a system for presentation through a specified bank then 
there is a risk if documents are presented through another bank. It must take 
steps to avoid the problem of two sets of documents being presented."®®
As a result of the above quoted decision there is a possibility that, by 
implication, an issued credit in a situation under discussion is accepted as a valid 
credit; but, the issuing bank puts itself in a risky position by issuing such a 
credit.®®
3.5. Meaning of teletransmission
What is the meaning of "teletransmission" in sub-section (a) of Article 11 of 
UCP 500? In April 1985 the ICC Banking Commission was asked to state its view 
as to the meaning of the term and the Commission agreed that the view 
expressed by the Austrian National Committee about the meaning of the 
"teletransmission" under the UCP provisions was correct.®* The Austrian National 
Committee stated: "The expression "teletransmission" in this Article does not 
include telephone conversation, but does include instructions given by telefax 
(telecopier). As a consequence a letter of credit transmitted by telefax (bearing the 
correct test key) constitutes the operative credit instrument."®^
What would be the validity of a credit if it is transmitted by SWIFT (The 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Teiecomunication)? With regard to the 
effect of using the SWIFT system for establishing a commercial credit, a West 
German Bank drew the attention of the ICC Banking Commission by stating that it
ICC Pub. No. 434, supra (f.n. 48), pp. 13-14.
60 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
ICC Doc. 470/444, 470/452; Ventris 1985, supra (f.n. 5), at p. 12 said: " It w ill be observed from the 
expression to be found in the 1974 Revision "advice sent by cable, telegram or telex" has been replaced by 
that o f "teletransm ission". The latter, however, has not been defined, whereas in view o f the key role it 
plays in documentary credits it should have been. For example, a message can be given by telephone and is 
thus a "tcletransmission". but no one would suggest that it is an acceptable method o f advising or 
■confirming a "credit" as it leaves no trace o f its own." [Emphasis added]
ICC Pub. No. 434, supra (f.n. 48), p. 19.
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is not a good practice to open a credit by SWIFT (type 700), since it is a 
bank-to-bank message and is transferred without any signature on the part of the 
receiving bank. Furthermore, it is a matter of importance whether such a credit 
could be considered a legally binding instrument of the sending bank towards the 
beneficiary of the credit. So, a recommendation by the ICC Banking Commission 
was requested to the effect that, "in the future, commercial letter of credits are 
opened in writing only." The Commission decided that using the SWIFT 
documentary format 700 is good practice.®®
Although there is no direct reference to that system in the UCP, in 
accordance with SWIFT protocol messages sent by that system incorporate UCP 
provisions, unless otherwise expressly excluded.®"* Therefore, the sender bank is 
legally bound to the beneficiary under Article 10 of the UCP 83. As a result, the 
Commission announced that, "the SWIFT procedures offered greater accuracy 
and reliability than telex" although there is no signature of the receiving bank in 
either system.®®
3.6. Insolvency of an advising bank
In sub-section (b) of Article 11 of UCP 500 it is provided that the issuing 
bank must use the services of the same advising bank for advising an amendment 
to the issued credit. It is a useful procedure, to prevent any confusion between 
contracting parties. However, there may be situations where using the services of 
the same advising bank become impossible, namely, when the advising bank 
becomes insolvent. What would be the issuing bank's duty in such a situation? It 
seems there is no other option for the issuing bank than to use the services of
"  Ibid., pp. 19-20.
The ICC Banking Commission gave its consideration to the requirement o f the SWIFT namely whether 
the UCP phrase should be explicitely transmitted in the telecomunications between the banks as the 
following: "The Commission considered that banks advising credits issued through SWIFT should ensure in 
accordance with SWIFT Rules that the appropriate UCP incorporation clause included in the credit advice 
sent to the beneficiaiy." [ICC Pub. No. 434, supra (f.n. 48), p. 21; ICC Doc. 470/ 479, 470/481].
See Chapter IX  for issues related to Electronic Data Interchange (EDI).
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another advising bank, but the bank should carry all precautions to prevent any 
dispute over the issue of amendment of the credit at a later stage.
3.7. Meaning of "similar credit"
Although under sub-section (a)(ii) of Article 5 of UCP 500 banks should 
discourage any attempt "to give instructions to issue, advise or confirm a Credit by 
reference to a Credit previously issued (similar Credit)", it is still possible that a 
bank is faced with such instruction. What is then the meaning of "similar Credit" in 
UCP 500 if a credit previously issued was subject to amendment? Would it be 
possible to follow the procedure which was laid down under Article 13 of UCP 400 
namely, "it shall be understood that the similar credit will not include any such 
amendment(s)"?®® There is an objection to the method suggested by the UCP 400 
to tackle the problem. One writer has pointed out that "it goes to the contrary of 
what a businessman would understand. If one were to ask for a similar credit to be 
opened, one would normally mean the same credit in its final form."®^ This view 
seems to be sound to reflect business practice, and should be taken up by the 
ICC in order to prevent confusion and misunderstanding between banks and their 
customers. An alternative solution is that the ICC takes the view that banks should 
not accept any request refers to terms "similar credit" and prevents such a practice 
totally.
3.8. Assignment of the benefit of a credit
Article 49 of UCP 500 provides that even if the credit does not provide for 
the transferability of the credit, the seller’s right of assignment is not affected and 
he is entitled to use his right "in accordance with the provisions of the applicable 
law." Therefore, as a general principle the beneficiary of the credit is entitled to 
assign his benefit under the credit to a third person without the agreement of the
Article 13 o f UCP 400 provided; "Wlien a bank is instructed to issue, confirm or advise a credit similar in 
terms to one previously issued, confirmed or advised (similar credit) and the previous credit has been the 
subject o f the amendment(s), it shall be understood that the similar credit w ill not include any such 
amendment(s) which is/are to apply to the similar credit.
Ventris 1985, supra (f.n. 5), p. 13.
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applicant/buyer, unless otherwise stipulated in the credit.®® Moreover, the 
assignee's position against the applicant for the credit is similar to the assignor 
(the beneficiary of the credit) and he remains responsible for defences which may 
be available to a debtor against the assignor. However, these are issues related to 
Article 49 of the UCP.
1. Concerning the situation where an issuing bank did not honour its 
undertaking against an assignee in the case of an irrevocable credit, the ICC 
Banking Commission decided that the remedy should be found in transactional 
law and UCP did not cover such situations.®®
2. Another point is that Article 49 of UCP 500 does not cover the decision 
given in Singer and Friedlander Ltd. v. Creditanstalt Bankverein,^® in which it 
was stated that an assignee has to present documents in the name of the first 
beneficiary.^*
CONCLUSIONS
There has been substantial growth over the last fifty years in the use of 
documentary letters of credit as a means of financing international business 
transactions and the law regulating LCs has developed enormously to keep pace 
with this growth. The previous Chapters of the present study made clear that the 
law regulating documentary credits is largely customary/contractual in nature. The
English law supports an assignment o f proceeds since it is a "chose in action", and in accordance with s. 
136(1) o f The Law o f Property Act 1925, a chose in action can be assigned in w riting absolutely to another 
person as tliird party. O f course, an express notice o f an assignment must be given to the debtor; 
Schmitthoffs article, supra, at p. 49 stated: "In English law there are two types o f assignment, legal and 
equitable assignment. Section 136 o f the Law o f Property Act 1925 provides that a legal assignment must be 
"in writing, absolute and not purporting to be by way o f charge only, and that written notice o f assignment 
must be given to the debtor." Under that rule the seller's position is similar to that provided under Article 55 
o f UCP (1983). The equitable assignment on the other hand does not require conditions which are stipulated 
for the legal type o f assignment, in particular there is no need to give a written notice to a debtor."
ICC Pub. No. 371, supra (f.n. 15), p. 96.
[1981] Com.L.R. 69.
Ellinger, supra (f.n. 39), pp. 578-606, p. 604.
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Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) which seek to 
facilitate trade and harmonize commercial procedures provide the most prominent 
set of standards concerning LCs at the international level. Several questions, 
however, should be considered: 1. Are there any grounds for further improvement 
of UCP 500? 2. If yes, what are those possible changes and their impacts on the 
UCP? 3. Did the ICC achieve its goals namely for providing a simplified, 
modernised, justified, codified and unified set of standards concerning LCs at 
international level? 4. If no, what would be a substitute solution for the ICC?
Concerning the first question above, although the latest revision of the UCP 
in 1993 (UCP 500) provides better provisions compared with previous versions of 
the UCP,^^ there are issues, as pointed out under the present and following 
Chapters, which remain unsettled. Therefore, UCP 500 is far from perfect^® and 
still requires further consideration and revision.''"* In respect of possible changes
Ellinger, JBL Î994, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 28 said: "This is not to say that the new Revision is o f a 
revolutionary nature. In most regards, it followes the pattern o f its predecessor. [...] The new Revision 
provides a much neater set o f standard contract terms than any earlier version o f the Code."; the same writer 
also pointed out: "The Working Group's main contribution is in the drafting o f the new rules which govern 
transport documents not covered previously in the Code. Another four areas worth specific mention are, 
respectively, the provisions defining the banks' undertaking in inevocable credits (Art. 9), the definition o f 
negotiation and o f a "Nominated Bank" (Art. 10), the provision rendering non-documentary requirements in 
the credit o f no-effect (Art, 13(c)) and the tyding up o f the provisions on transferable credits (Art. 48)." 
[Ellinger, LM CLQ 1994, supra (f.n. I), p. 402.]
Ellinger, LM CLQ 1994, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 402 said: "There are [...] a number o f areas in which the new 
Revision misses the mark. F irs t and foremost is the provision concerning letters o f credit available by 
negotiation, in which the beneficiary is asked to draw his draft on the applicant. The relevant problems, 
respecting Art. 9(a)(iv), have been discussed in details earlier. Secondly, the meaning o f "value" in Art. 
10(a)(ii) should have been defined so as to avoid confusion. T h ird ly , it is to be doubted i f  a separate 
provision was required for each o f the separate transport documents governed by the Code. As charterparty 
bills o f lading (Art. 25) and non-negotiable sea waybills (Art. 24) are largely governed by the provisions 
applicable to marine bills o f lading, they could, in all probability, have been regulated in clauses tagged on to 
Art. 23." [Emphasis added]; Dolan, John F., "W eakening the letters of credit product: The new Uniform  
Customs and Practice for Documentary C red its ". International Business Law Journal, No. 2, 1994, pp. 
149-177 [hereinafter referred to as Dolan], at p. 149 said: "[...] the latest version o f the Uniform Customs 
may contain misguided attempts to protect banks from problems in the latter o f credit transaction that they 
are better equipped to face. Unfortunately, in the four instences discussed here, the new Uniform Customs 
allocate the costs to commercial parties less able to bear them than the banks themselves."
The UCP is widely accepted in the banking world and has been achieved considerably success towards the 
harmonization o f international banking rules relating to documentaiy letters o f credit. It  has undergone 
neumerous revisions (five times in 1951, 1962, 1974, 1983 and 1993) in an attempt to match the high growth
7 1
and their impact upon the UCP (second query above), generally speaking, they 
concern a wide range and include all parties to LCs transactions (the applicant for 
a credit, the beneficiary, and banks). As pointed out previously, the applicant for a 
credit seems placed in a risky position since the bargaining power of banks can 
lead to some unjustified provisions, namely, under Articles 16 (disclaimer on the 
transmission of messages) and 18 (disclaimer for act of an instructed party) in 
favour of banks.^® As a writer has rightly pointed out, Articles 16 and 18 bring in 
the long term more harm for banks in long term since they weaken LCs reputation 
as banking products.^®
Regarding some issues concerning the beneficiary of a credit, namely, 
points related to "amendment or cancellation of a revocable credit" (Article 8(b)), 
"notice of modification or cancellation" (Article 8(a)), "late negotiation", "rectifying 
non-conforming documents", "any cause beyond their control" (Article 17), and 
"transferable credit" (Article 48(a)), quoted in the present study, it is necessary, for 
reasons pointed out above that the ICC take further steps for having within the 
UCP articles which are simpler and clearer than has been done in the last revision 
of the provisions/^ A similar concern should be expressed about issues related to
in international trade and its new commercial requirements as they have arisen overtime; for more details see 
history o f LCs in Chapter I, Section B .l (above).
See discussions related to "the bank's position on transmission o f messages" and "disclamer for acts o f the 
issuing bank as an instructed party" under the present Chapter, Sections B.1,1 and B.1.2 (above).
Dolan, supra (f.n. 73), pp. 170-72; as to the applicant o f a credit it is said by the same writer; "Applicant 
should beware the unfair rule o f Article 13(c) allowing banks to ignore nondocumentaiy conditions. It w ill 
serve applicants well, especially in the standby credit transaction, to insist that the rule allowing or 
commanding banks to disregard nondocumentary conditions be removed from credit subject to UCP 500." 
[See Dolan, supra (f.n. 73), at p. 172]
For instance, Article 7(c) o f UCP 400, under which such a credit was deemed to be revocable, was 
regarded as out o f date; and under Article 6(c) o f UCP 500, a letter o f credit that gives no indication as to 
whether it is revocable w ill be deemed irrevocable. This change aligns UCP 500 more closely with Section 5 
o f the Uniform Commercial Code in most states in the USA; for more details concerning the UCC see 
Chapter V (below); Herula, Donald and Powell, Robert, "Provisions Lie a head fo r L /C  Transaction", 
Business Credit, July/August 1993, p. 18; Dolan, supra (f.n. 73), at p. 171 said: "Beneficiaries may want to 
eliminate the rule that document checkers are bound not by general banking practices and common sense but 
by the mythical "international standard banking practice." Beneficiaries should also consider the advisability 
o f refusing credit issued by a bank to support it own undertaking."
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banks, such as "incorporation of the UCP in the credit" (Article 1), "instructions to 
issue or amend credits" (Article 5(a)), "legal structure of a second confirmation" 
(Article 9(b)), "all credits must clearly indicate and nominate" (Article 10(a)and 
10(b)), "meaning of teletransmission" (Article 11(a)), "insolvency of advising bank" 
(Article 11(a), "meaning of "similar credit"" (Article 5(a)(ii)), and assignment of the 
benefit of a credit (Article 49).
About the above third question, the worldwide acceptance of the UCP 
shows its popularity in the commercial world. Such a success, however, does not 
mean that UCP 500 is complete or perfect and there is no room for its further 
improvements. Contents of the present Chapter as well as of Chapters that follow 
make clear the shortcomings which exist in UCP provisions, A real need for 
improvements exist, as pointed out above (namely under the third question) and 
the ICC should as always co-ordinate efforts towards another revision of the UCP.
As to the above last mentioned question, generally speaking, LCs issues 
can be classified into two categories: 1. Issues related to banking practices and 
international customs, and 2. Issues concerning legal aspect of LCs. For the first 
type of issues, some of which have been considered in the present Chapter, the 
ICC has sufficient authority to provide better provisions as it has done in the past. 
In respect of the second category above the ICC may not be able to involve itself, 
even if there is a strong desire by the ICC to do so because of a lack of expertise 
in legal subjects and, more importantly by the lack of a mandate for the ICC as a 
non-governmental organisation. As a result a gap concerning laws related to LCs 
at the international level exists. How would it be possible to fill the gap? In other 
words, what would be a substitute solution for the ICC if the UCP reached the end 
of its functional maturity? These questions are considered below later; but it is 
important already to consider issues which should necessarily be noticed with 
respect to any international set of standards concerning the legal aspects of LCs. 
In that regard a comparative study between UCP 500 and Article 5 of the UCC in 
the USA, would help to paint a better picture with regard to other shortcomings in 
the UCP and to draw lessons that would be useful for supporting a view favouring
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the idea of a progressive unification/codification of the law of LCs at an 
international level. Moreover, particular legal details relating to the principle of 
strict compliance, doctrine of autonomy, and banker's right of securities can be 
usefully examined from the common law perspective (mainly English Law) in order 
to find out how English law may play an effective role in shaping the law of LCs at 
an international level.
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CHAPTER V
ARTICLE 5 OF THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC) AND
UCP 500
S E C TIO N  A: G E N E R A L B A C K G R O U N D
1. INTRODUCTION
in the previous section the last version of the Uniform Customs and Practice 
for Documentary Credits (UCP 500) and issues related to it have been considered. 
In the present Chapter the discussion is focused on Article 5 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) of the United States of America; its advantages and 
disadvantages will be compared with those of the UCP 500 since Article 5 of the 
UCC is largely applied in the USA and, like the UCP, deals directly with issues 
related to documentary credits at present.* The reason for doing such a comparative 
study is to point out what lessons may be learnt from Article 5 of the UCC and how 
to use them as a good background for any international set of standards in a 
mandatory form for letters of credits (LCs).
To provide a solid foundation several points should be clarified at the 
beginning.
' Lowenfeld, Andreas F., "In te rna tiona l private trade". Matthew Bender, New York, 1977 [hereinafter 
referred to as Lowenfeld], at p. 113 said: "When the Uniform Commercial Code was being drafted and 
promoted in the various state legislatures in the late 1950's and early 1960's, there were two kinds o f 
objections to including an article on letters o f credit, both primarily within the banking community and their 
counsel. Some thought it was not necessary to have such an article at all, since the Uniform Customs and 
Practice covered the subject adequately and on the worldwide scale; others, led by the New York Clearing 
House Association (a bankers'group), would accept nothing less in authority to opt out o f the Code's 
provisions on letters o f credit in favour o f the UCP."; Rummer, Patricia, "Proposed UCC revisions; 
Restructuring fo r the fu tu re ". Commercial Law Bulleten, Sep/Oct 1991, p. 13 [hereinafter referred to as 
Rummer], at p. 16 said: "The drafting committee at work on a revision o f Article 5 (letters o f credit) have 
two major tasks, says Carlyle Ring, who chairs the committee. I t  must: 1) create rules for the new widely 
used standby letters o f credit, and 2) decide how to blend UCC provisions on letters o f credit w ith 
international law, given the widespread international use o f letters o f credit. "An even more important goal, 
however, is to draft the rules in such a way that they don't get in the way o f future developments in letters o f 
credit" observing Ring."; McLaughlin, G.T., "U C C  A rtic le  5 Symposium: Should deferred payment 
letters o f credit be specifically treated in a revision o f A rtic le  5 ? ". Brookline Law Review, Vol. 56, 
Spring 1990, p. 149; The American Law Institute, "U n ifo rm  Commercial Code Revised A rtic le  5. Letters 
o f C red it (w ith amendments to Articles 1. 2. and 91 Proposed Final D ra ft (A p ril 6, 1995V. submitted by 
the Council to the Members o f the American Law Institute for Discussion at the Seventy-Second Annual 
Meeting on May 16, 17, 18, and 19, 1995 [hereinafter referred to as Proposed Final Draft (PFD)], As o f the 
date o f publication, this draft has not been considered by the members o f the American Law Institute and 
does not represent the position o f the Institute on any o f the issues with which it deals. The action, i f  any, 
taken by the members with respect to this draft may be ascertained by consulting the Annual Proceedings o f 
the Institute, which are published follow ing each Annual meeting. (The Reporter is Professor James J. White 
o f the University o f Michigan); for the text o f PFD see appendix 2 below.
75
2. POINTS CONCERNING UCC IN GENERAL
2.1. National and international standards
National and international interests should be differentiated from one another 
and efforts should be directed towards rules and provisions related to LCs which are 
accepted internationally since documentary credits are applied worldwide. As 
opposed to the UCP which is a set of standards accepted by banks in many 
countries (mostly as customary rules at an international level), Article 5 of the UCC 
is only enforceable in all states in the USA except in the states of New York, 
Alabama, Missouri, and Arizona where UCC in a modified form is applied/ thus, 
issues related to documentary credits are dealt with from a different perspective, 
namely in the light of a national rather than international interest.®
2.2. Mandatory and non-mandatory standards
The issue of mandatory or non-mandatory standards relating to documentary 
credits is also Important as a good system of law is one which provides more 
certainty for the interested parties to a letter of credit located in different countries
 ^ Lowenfeld, ibid., at pp. 113-114; Article 5 o f the UCC has been adopted in a uniform form by most states 
o f the USA, but as an exception the states o f New York, Alabama, Arizona, and Missouri do not apply 
Article 5 without modifying it. A  note under Article 5-112 (1) provides, "The bracket language in the last 
sentence o f sub-section (1) should be included only i f  the optional provisions o f Section 5-114(4) and (5) are 
included." The brackect language in the last sentence o f sub-section 1 o f Article 5-112 states: "[except as 
otherwise provided in sub-section 4 o f Section 5-114 on coditiona! payment.]" And sub-section 4 o f Section 
5-114 provides: "[(4) When a credit provides for payment by the issuer on the receipt o f notice that the 
required documents are in the possession o f a correspondent or other agent o f the issuer (a) any payment 
made on receipt o f such notice is conditional, and (b) the issuer may reject documents which do not comply 
with the credit i f  it does so w ithin three banking days follow ing its receipt o f the documents; and (c) in the 
event o f such rejection, the issuer is entitled by charge back or otherwise to return o f the payment made.] 
Moreover, in sub-section 5 o f Section 5-114 stated: "[(5) In the case covered by sub-section (4) failure to 
reject documents w ithin the time specified in sub-paragraph (b) constitutes acceptance o f the documents and 
makes the payment final in favoure o f the beneficiai-y.] And also, in a note under Section 5-114 it is said; 
"Note: Subsections (4) and (5) are bracketed as optional. I f  they are included the bracketed language in the 
lase sectence o f Section 5-112 (1) should also be included."; for further details see James J. W liite and Robert 
S. Summers, "Handbook o f the law under U C C ". 1972, p. 612 [hereinafter referred to as UCC] and 
disscussion related to the history o f LC in Chapter 1.
 ^ The goals for drafting the new Article 5 o f the UCC were: (1) conforming the Article 5 rulles to current 
customs and practices; (2) accomodating new forms o f letters o f credit, changes in customs and practices, 
and evolving technology, particularly the use o f electronic media; (3) maintaining letters o f credit as an 
inexpensive and efficient instrument facilitating trade; and (4) resolving conflicts among reported decisions. 
[See PFD, supra (f.n. I), at p. xv ii (Prefatory Note)]
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with different legal systems. Consequently, such an element in international legal 
standards leads all parties to an international transaction to a better and similar 
understanding for the system in operation, e.g., (in this case) LCs. By such a policy 
the credibility of the documentary credit system is increased and interested parties 
become aware that the rules of the system are the same worldwide and they are 
treated and interpreted similarly by courts in different system of law.
The UCP provisions are in the form of a "non-mandatory" nature and can 
only be enforced if parties to a credit contract stipulate and refer to the UCP in their 
transaction; in contrast, Article 5 of the UCC is legislative in nature; therefore, banks 
and other interested parties to documentary credits are obliged to follow the rule, 
unless otherwise stipulated in the rule.'* The effect of those distinctions emerges as 
to the rights and duties of contracting parties by adopting a different approach and 
style as to issues related to the letters of credit.
2.3. Issues of conflict of law
The present study shows how issues related to letters of credit are treated 
differently in the USA, since many states in the USA follow Article 5 of the UCC 
whereas in a few states, as mentioned above, parties to a credit transaction are able 
to choose between the UCP and Article 5 of the UCC.® This can also be true where 
the legal residences of parties to a credit contract were located in different countries. 
So, the issue of conflict of law becomes relevant in such a situation. In addition, 
different points of view between English lawyers and their American colleagues, as 
to issues connected to documentary credits, are also to be noted.
For the present study the text of Article 5 of the UCC is accepted as a basis 
for analysis and the UCP 500 is compared with it.®
For instance see Section 5 -103(c) o f the PFD, supra (f.n. 1), suggested that parties to LCs transaction can, 
to some extent, agree upon terms which are different to Article 5. [See appendix 2 for the text o f Section 5- 
103(c)]
 ^ See a note under Section 5-112(1) and sub-sections 4 and 5 under Section 5-114 o f the UCC, supra (f.n. 2); 
it was pointed out that Sections 5-114(4) and (5) were omitted since they were optional. [PFD, supra (f.n. 1), 
p. xxv iii (table o f disposition)]
 ^ See appendix 1 for the text o f Article 5 o f the UCC.
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SECTION B: COMPARISON BETWEEN ARTICLE 5 AND UCP 500 
1. ISSUES CONSIDERED UNDER BOTH UCC AND UCP: DIFFE­
RENCES 
1.1. Issues related to the provisions
1.1.1. The legal nature of Article 5 of the UCC
Trade and banking services are well established in the USA. Letters of credit 
(LCs) have been used for a long time as a commercial instrument for payment as 
well as securing services in domestic and international transactions in the USA/ 
however, the law concerning LCs has mostly been developed through cases, since 
the USA, like the United Kingdom (UK), belongs to the system of common law.®
Article 5 of the UCC provides a legal instrument in the form of national 
legislation, as an independent source of law for the further development of rules 
related to documentary credits. Although Article 5, beside case law, provides a 
better chance for understanding the use of LCs in the USA, some other points 
should be noted. Firstly, Article 5 of the UCC deals with some but not all aspects of 
LCs; this is admitted in sub-section 3 of Section 5-102.® Secondly, the nature of 
Article 5 is national rather than international. This can limit its applicability in other
See discussion related to the history o f LCs under Chapter I, Section B (above).
® Except Section 135 o f the negotiable Instruments Law; for more details see UCC, supra (f.n. 2), Official 
Comment on Section 5-101, p. 417.
^ The text o f sub-section 3 o f Section 5-102 o f Article 5 o f the UCC states: "This Article deals with some but 
not all o f the rules and concepts o f letters o f credit as such rules or concepts have developed prior to this act 
or may hereafter develop. The fact that this Article states a rule does not by itself require, imply or negate 
application o f some or a converse rule to a situation not provided for or to a person not specified by this 
Article."; see also the prefatory note o f the Proposed Final Draft (PFD), supra (f.n. 1), at p. xv concerning 
reasons for revision o f Article 5 o f the UCC said: "When the original Article 5 was drafted 40 years ago, it 
was written for paper transactions and before many innovations in letters o f credit. Now electronic and 
other media are used extensively. Since the 50's, standby letters o f credit have developed and now nearly 
$500 billion standby letters o f credit are issued annually worldwide, o f which $250 billion are issued in the 
United States. The use o f deferred payment letters o f credit has also greatly increased. The customs and 
practices for letters o f credit have evolved and are reflected in the Uniform Customs and Practice (UCP), 
usually incorporated into letters o f credit, particularly international letters o f credit, which have seen four 
revisions since the 1950's; the cuiTent version is effective in 1994 (UCP 500). Lastly, in a number o f areas, 
court decisions have resulted in conflicting rules." [Emphasis added]
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countries that seek different national interests; but, at least, it can set up an example 
concerning the type of issues related to LCs and whether they should be covered by 
a national or international legal instrument. There is no similar legislation regarding 
to LCs in the UK.
In a comparison with the last version of the Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documentary Credit (UCP 500), a crucial distinction between UCC and UCP 
emerges. The latter is not in a legislative form that automatically binds contracting 
parties; it is a code of practice adopted voluntarily by parties to a credit contract.*® 
However, the advantage of the UCP is that the provisions are applied by banks in 
many countries; for this reason it is more international rather than national in 
character. Nevertheless, UCP and its legal nature, as far as Article 1 of the UCP 
500 is concerned, are in the form of a contractual agreement. By some 
concession,** the UCP may be accepted as mostly a source of "customary law" in 
international private law. The legal nature of its provisions, as a set of standards 
which covers in general banking practices in countries where trade and banking 
systems are internationally well established, is far from being mandatory in nature. 
The lack of such an element may potentially cause disputes among parties to a 
letter of credit in international transactions, since different approaches may be 
adopted by courts in different countries with similar as well as different legal 
systems. The issue of the legal nature of the UCP is dealt with elsewhere;*^ 
however, to conclude the present remarks and to draw a lesson from Article 5 of the 
UCC it is not impossible to put forward a set of standards for LCs in the form of a 
"legislative" instrument at an international level addressing mainly international 
interests. Such a task can be partly based on experience gained when preparing
See Article 1 o ftlie  UCP 500; ICC Pub. No. 500 (1993).
‘ ‘ For instance, it is accepted that the UCP reflects the view o f banks and all intersted parties to the credit 
rather than the view o f few strong banks and companies; and also other elements which are necessary for 
establishing an international customs such as duration.
See related discussion under Chapter XI, Section B.2 (below).
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Article 5 of the UCC which provides for uniformity between the different states in the 
USA and partly on results achieved when preparing the UCP and its acceptability 
worldwide.
1.1.2. Scope o f A rtic le  5
As to the issue of the scope of Article 5 of the UCC, generally speaking, both 
UCC and UCP cover those types of LCs which are issued by banks.*® Sub-section 
1 of Section 5-102 of the UCC and Article 2 of the UCP 500 deal with that point*'* 
However, there are distinctions between Article 5 of the UCC and the UCP 
regarding letters of credit issued either by a person other than banks or those 
credits which require no documentary draft or a documentary demand for payment. 
Paragraph (b) of sub-section 1 of Section 5-102 refers to the first type of credit, 
namely, "to a credit issued by a person other than a bank if the credit requires 
that the draft or demand for payment be accompanied by a document of title.";*® 
and paragraph (c) of the same sub-section is related to another type of credit and
Ellinger, E.P., "The U niform  Customs and Practice fo r Documentary Credits- the 1993 Revision",
LMCLQ, Part 3, August 1994, p. 377 [hereinafter referred to as Ellinger, LMCLQ 1994], at p. 383 said; 
"Like the 1983 Revision, the new Code does not define the word "bank". The issue, was apparently, 
considered by the Working Group. [ICC Brochure No. 511, p. 5]."; what is the meaning o f "bank"? Bank 
means,"establishment for keeping money and valuables safely, the money being paid out on the customer's 
order.", Hornby, A.S., "O xfo rd  Advaiicd D ictionary o f C urrent English", p. 61; see also Ellinger, E.P, 
"M odern  Banking L a w ". 1987, pp. 51-74 (for legal definition and previlages o f bank at Common law); it is 
suggested by the same author that, "the common law definition o f a "bank" [...] is based on treating a bank as 
an institution engaged in banking business. The nature o f this type o f business has not been determined by 
Parliament. Its constiuction has accordingly remained in the hands o f the courts," [the above reference, at p. 
51]; Section 2 o f the Bills o f Exchange Act 1882 defined a "banker" in terms that, ""banker" includes a body 
o f persons whether incorporated or not who cany on the business o f banking"; in Commissioners o f the 
State Savings Bank o f V ic to ria  v. Permewaii. W righ t &  Co. L td . [(1915) 19 CLR 457], Isaaca, J., 
described the meaning o f banking business (at p. 471) as: "the collection o f money by receiving deposits 
upon loan, repayable when and as expressly or impliedly agreed upon, and the utilisation o f money so 
collected by lending it again in such sums as are required."; and also in United Dominions T rust v. 
K irkw ood. [1966] 2 QB 431, 447, Lord Denning, M.R., described the main facts o f banking business as 
follows: "There are, therefore, two characteristics usually found in banks today: (i) They accept money from, 
and collect cheques for, their customers and place them to their credit; (ii) They honour cheques or orders 
drawn on them by their customers when presented fo r payment and debit their customers accordingly. These 
two characteristics carry with them also a third, namely: ( iii)  They keep current accounts, or something o f 
that nature, in their books in which the credits and debits are entered."
See ICC Publications No. 500 and appendix 1, for paragraph (a) o f Section 5-102(1) o f the UCC.
Emphasis added; see appendix 2 for Section 5-102(9) o f PFD.
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refers "to a credit issued by a bank or other person if the credit is not within 
paragraphs (a) and (b) but conspicuously states that it is a letter of credit or is 
conspicuously so entitled."
According to what has been said above it becomes clear that both UCP and 
UCC have a common ground in one aspect and a different one in another. This 
leads to a distinction between laws related to the documentary credit system. How 
would it be possible to prevent the emergence of different bodies of rules and 
provisions? In other words, is it a good idea to widen the scope of application of the 
law of LCs to those types of credits issued by non-banking institutions providing 
similar services in international trade? One may argue that the main issuers of LCs 
in world trade market are banks; credits are issued by non-banking institutions but 
not in a large share of the markets; therefore, there is no need to enlarge the scope 
of the only existing provision related to LCs, namely, the UCP 500.*® Moreover, by 
adopting such a policy the documentary credit system would be damaged since 
banks may see such a policy as a threat to their control of events and may withdraw 
such a service from their banking activities.
The following points should also be noted. Firstly, although a large share of 
documentary credits in international trade and business market belongs to banks, it 
does not mean that the law related to LCs should not be wide in its scope. It is not 
an advantage for the law to stick to a narrow rather than wider policy. Secondly, a 
need for enlargement of the law related to LCs seems necessary (see the special 
rules provided under Article 5 of the UCC, discussed above). The USA is a large 
country with many states and strong participation in international trade. So, it is not 
practical to think about an international set of standards regarding LCs without 
referring to the question of its necessity. Thirdly, as to the possible harm which
Ellinger, LMCLQ 1994, supra (f.n. 13), at pp. 383-84 pointed out: "The incoi*poration o f the UCP in a 
letter o f credit issued by an institution which may not, technically, constitute a bank cannot, in itself, cause 
any loss, or be o f a direct disadvantage, to the parties involved. Whether or not an institution such as, for 
instance, a building society should be allowed to issue documentary credits is a question for the 
determination o f the central Bank in that institution's countiy. It is not a matter to be setteled in a set o f 
standard terms drafted by the ICC."
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banks may suffer by widening the scope of law, namely, covering LCs issued by 
non-banking institutions, there may be a set back for banks and they may lose some 
of their interest at the beginning, but in the long term they would benefit more than 
now from such a policy. The reason is that by removing a monopoly from the system 
and allowing competition a better and cheaper service would be available for parties 
to an international sale contract. This would encourage businessmen to look more 
than before to LCs and such an increase in demand may generate a great need for 
documentary credits. As a result, banks that control large shares of LCs' market 
would also benefit. Consequently, it is a sensible policy to work preferably for 
establishing an international set of standards for LCs with a wider scope of rules. 
Moreover, following a similar approach a next revision of the UCP would provide 
more harmony between the provisions in question and Article 6 of the ÜCC.
1.2. issues related to some types of credit
1.2.1. Standby letters of credit (SLCs)
Under Article 5 of the UCC nothing is provided directly in connection with 
standby letters of credit (SLCs), whereas as one of the modifications under UCP 
400 (1983), that type of credit, largely in use in international trade, is precisely 
named in Articles 1 and 2; a similar policy was adopted under UCP 500 (1994).
Is it possible to draw a distinction between UCC and UCP relating to SLCs? 
One may suggest that Article 5 of the UCC does not cover SLCs since, there is no 
reference to such credit under Section 5-103 where "credit" or "letter of credit" are 
defined. Such a suggestion may find some support in sub-sections 2 and 3 of 
Section 5-102. Sub-section 3 (quoted above) and sub-section 2 provide: "Unless the 
engagement meets the requirements of sub-section (1), this Article does not apply 
to engagements to make advances or to honour drafts or demands for payment, to 
authorities to pay or purchase, to guarantees or the general agreements." What are 
the requirements under sub-section 1? There are two requirements under that sub­
section, namely, there must be a "documentary draft" or a "documentary demand" 
for payment by the beneficiary of a credit.
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Is such an interpretation acceptable and does it match with real practice in 
the USA? It seems that an opposite argument is preferable, for reasons that follows. 
Firstly, SLCs have been known as a commercial device for securing payment and 
services by American lawyers for a long time and there have always been 
arguments about their legal nature, namely, whether they are or not guarantees. It 
seems those who wrote Article 5 of the UCC kept this point in mind and tried 
intentionally to avoid confusion. Although there is no direct reference to SLCs in 
Article 5 of the UCC, SLCs are accepted as one type of LCs by courts in the United 
States.*'' Moreover, under sub-section 1 of Section 5-102 one of the requirements 
for the enforceability of Article 5 is that an issued credit requires "documentary 
demand for payment"; this requirement, mostly applied in case of SLCs which 
provide security for advance payment against service(s) of employees by 
employment and usual arrangement, is a "first demand" standby letter of credit. 
Paragraph (b) of Section 5-103(1) supports this view by saying that, "A 
"documentary credit" or a "documentary demand for payment" is one of honour 
of which is conditioned upon the presentation of a document or documents. 
"Document" means any paper including document of title, security, invoice, 
certificate, notice of default and the like."*®
Standby letter o f credit is a device basically similar to LCs with some differences. This type o f credit is 
originated in the USA specially after the Scond World War because o f prohibition o f National Bnaks o f 
Fedearl and State Banking Law from acting as guarantor or securities for obligations o f third parties. This 
prohibition is only for domestic banks., but banks' branches outside the USA are allowed to give service as a 
guarantor or surities. Some o f references related to SLCs are Schmitthoff, C.M., "Schm itthofFs Export 
Trade. The Law and Practice o f In ternational T ra d e ". London, 8th ed. 1986, p. 364; Naegel, T.D., 
"Unsound Banking Practices: Standby letters o f credit and other bank guarantees". Feb. 14, 1975, o f 
Senate Commission on Banking, Housing &  Urban Affairs, 94th Congress, 1st Sess., Compendium o f major 
issues in bank regulation 647, pp. 621-85, at p. 627; Banks, J.L., "The standby letter o f credit: what it  is 
and how to use i t " .  Montana Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1., Winter 1984, pp. 71-86, at p. 74; Penn, G.N., 
Shea, A.M., and Arora, A., "The law and practice of international banking". Banking Law, Vol.2, 
London, 1987, p. 287 [hereinafter referred to as International Banking Law (INT.B.L.)]; Williams, K.P., 
"Perform ance bonds: used and usefullness". LMCLO, 1983, pp. 423-39, at p. 423.
Emphasis added; and for more details see discusssion about "fraud in transaction" in Section B o f Chapter 
V II (below); the point concerning SLCs was also noticed by draftsmen o f PFD and as mentioned previously 
it was one o f the reasons for revision o f Article 5 o f the UCC. [See the Prefatoiy Note o f PFD, supra (f.n. 1), 
at p. xv]
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1.2.2. Silence as to revocability and irrevocability of a credit
Dealing with the issue of revocability and irrevocability of a credit, paragraph
(c) of Article 6 of UCP 500 provides; "In the absence of such indication the credit 
shall be deemed to be irrevocable." This is a new modification and in contrast to 
what was accepted under Article 7(c) of UCP 400.^^
There are two different views on this point. One view suggests that in order to 
make a banker responsible against his customer or the beneficiary of a credit there 
must be a clear and precise instruction by applicant for a credit to that effect. In 
contrast it is said that the main purpose of issuing a credit Is to provide sufficient 
security for the seller and that is the intention of both the seller and the buyer under 
a sale contract. Therefore, if there is no indication in the credit as to its nature it 
should be accepted that the credit is irrevocable, unless otherwise expressly 
agreed.^° The latter view is preferable. However, there is no such indication either 
under Section 5-103 or in any part of Article 5 of the UCC.^^
1.3. Issues concerning bank-customer relationship
1.3.1. Risks of transmission, translation, and interpretation of any mess­
ages related to a credit
Section 5-107(4) of the UCC provides: "Unless otherwise specified the 
customer bears as against the issuer all risks of transmission and reasonable
ICC Publication No. 400 (UCP 1983).
Internatinal Banking Law, supra (f.n. 17), p. 294; Davis, A.G., "The law relating to commercial letters 
o f c red it". 3rd ed., 1963, p. 35 &  f.n. 2 [hereinafter referred to as Davis]; in In ternationa l Banking Corp. 
V. Barclavs Bank, it was held: "On the evidence, a cable credit used in the Far Eastern trade and hence, o f 
necessity, advised by a correspondent bank, was irrevocable unless it appeared on the face o f it that it was 
revocable." [quoted from (1925) Legal decisions affecting bankers, Vol. 5, p. 1]; Gidden_y. Anglo A frican 
Produce Co.. (1923) 14 Ll.L.R. 230; for American authority see Foglino &  Co. v. Webster. 216 N.Y.S. 225 
(1926).
It was offic ia lly  said that the Code itself settles this issue with respect to the sales contract (Section 2-325), 
and also provided that this issue intentionally was left for the court’s decision under Section 1-103, and 
general Provisions o f Code in Article 1 particularly Section 1-205 [look at O fficial Comment (number 1) to 
Sec. 5-103, UCC, supra (f.n. 2), at p. 421, col. 1]; fortunately, the point under consideration was clarified 
under Section 5 -106(a) o f PFD, supra (f.n. I), suggested, "[...] A  letter o f credit is revocable only i f  it is so 
provided."
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translation or interpretation of any message relating to a credit." A similar policy is 
accepted under Article 16 of UCP 500. However, there are differences between 
them, as follows.
1. Under Article 16 of UCP 500 all risks relevant to transmission and 
interpretation of a message relating to a credit are put on the shoulder of the 
applicant for a credit and there is no possibility to transfer such risks to the bank. A 
different approach is accepted under the UCC, since by providing the term "unless 
otherwise specified" there is a possibility for an alternative solution agreed by 
contracting parties, namely, the bank becomes responsible for its failure.
2. Under sub-section 4 of Section 5-107 an applicant becomes responsible if 
the banker proves that he adopted a reasonable procedure for the translation or 
interpretation of a message relating to a credit transaction. This is not the case 
under Article 16 of UCP 500; even more strangely, under the same article banks 
reserve a right to transmit credit terms without translating them. How is it possible to 
support such a view where translation of a message is the only way for 
communication between the bank and the beneficiary of a credit? Why on earth 
banks, instead of accepting some sort of responsibility trying to transfer risks caused 
by their failure to the applicant or by sending an untranslated message, cause 
confusion for the beneficiary of the credit? The point under consideration has been 
discussed e lsew here ,bu t in short, it is accepted in the present study that if banks 
choose to translate or interpret a message relating to a credit, then they should also 
accept any unsatisfactory result caused by their action. If, on the other hand, banks 
are not able or are not interested to translate or interpret a message, then they 
should inform their customers from their decisions in due time, rather than sending 
an untranslated message to the beneficiary.
One may argue that the second sentence of Article 16, firstly, related to 
errors in translation and/or interpretation of "technical terms"; secondly, banks' 
reservation is about translation of terms of credit and not terms of any message
See discussion related to Article 16 o f UCP 500 in Section B.1.1 o f Chapter IV  (above).
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related to the credit. In other words, banks are responsible for their errors in 
translating and/or interpreting terms other than "technical terms" as well as they 
have no right to transmit any message without translating it first. If this argument is 
right, several questions should be considered first in order to give support to such 
an approach. As to the first argument, what is the meaning of "technical terms" 
under Article 16 of UCP 500? And, how can these terms be distinguished from other 
terms used in a credit transaction? Moreover, who is in charge of making the 
decision that a terrn is technical or non-technical? As to the second argument 
(above), is it really possible to make any distinction between terms and conditions of 
a credit transaction and those messages which are related to such a transaction? in 
other words, on what grounds can one justify that terms and conditions which are 
expressed within letters and correspondence messages between contracting parties 
to a letter of credit are less important than those terms and conditions stipulated in 
the letter of credit contract? If it is so, then any messages relating to an amendment 
or cancellation of a credit should not be treated in the same way as the first 
message or letter about the issuance of credit. Certainly, it is not true that in real 
business activities banks as well as other interested parties do invest sufficient care 
in order to prevent any mistakes occurring in that aspect. Consequently, and 
generally speaking, there is no justification to follow the above cited arguments. 
Therefore, it is suggested that the second sentence of Article 16 of UCP 500, for 
reasons considered above, should be revised in a way that banks assume liability or 
responsibility for their errors in translation and/or interpretation of terms of credit and 
any messages relating to it if they choose to carry such a duty. If banks decide 
otherwise, then they should promptly inform their customers about such a decision.
As far as Section 5-107(4) of the UCC is concerned, as discussed previously, 
it provides a more reasonable approach relating to the issue of concern, namely, 
risks of transmission and translation/or interpretation of any message relating to a
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credit. Similar terms could be applied for an international set of standards about 
LCs.“
1.3.2. The issuer's obligation to its customer
Section 5-109(1 )(b) of the UCC provides; "(1) An issuer's obligation to its 
customer [...] unless otherwise agreed does not include liability or responsibility [...] 
(b) for any act of omission of any person other than itself or its own branch or for 
loss or destruction of a draft, demand or document in transit or in the possession of 
o t h e r s . T h e  relevant provisions under UCP 500 are found in paragraph (b) of 
Article 18: "Banks assume no liability or responsibility should the instructions they 
transmit not to be carried out, even if they have themselves taken the initiative in the 
choice of such other bank(s)." Comparing these provisions, it becomes obvious that 
the position of the applicant for a credit is more vulnerable under the UCP than 
under the UCC, since under the latter a bank is responsible for any act or omission 
committed either by itself or by its own branch, whereas In a similar situation under 
the UCP such a bank has no liability or responsibility towards its customer for any 
act or omission of itself as well as for its own branch's failure.
As to the meaning of "its own branch", no distinction is made under Section 
5-109(1 )(b) of the UCC between the branch(es) of the bank located in the same 
country as the principal bank doing its business, and those which are located in 
other country(ies). Therefore, it seems that the principal bank is liable or responsible 
for any act or omission of its own branch(es) without considering the location of 
those branches; but under UCP 500 it seems there is a different accepted view 
regarding the point under consideration, namely, banks are not responsible for the 
failure of their branch(es) located in another country, since the last sentence of 
Article 2 states; "For the purpose of these Articles, branches of a bank in different
The issue under consideration was omitted as inadvisable default rule under PFD; see table 2,1 (below).
Emphasis added; see also appendix 1 for the complete text o f Section 5-109; for a similar issue under PFD 
see Section 5 -108(f)(2) where, as a new provision, it was suggested; "(f) An issuer is not responsible for [...] 
(2) an act or omission o f others."; it is, however, not clear whether term "others" includes the bank's branch, 
or not.
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countries are considered another bank."^^ Then, by implication, it is possible to 
argue that the scope of paragraph (b) of Article 18 of the UCP is not so wide and 
banks assume liability or responsibility for an act or omission of their branches 
located in the same country as the principal bank carrying out its banking activities. 
However, such an argument may be challenged on the ground that the language 
used in Article 18(b) is so general that it can also cover branches not located in 
different countries.
To end such arguments it is of great necessity that rules and provisions 
related to LCs should be as much as possible clear and precise in order to prevent 
confusion and prevent any dispute between parties interested in the credit 
transactions. In addition, the present discussion points out that UCP 500 is not far 
from confusion regarding the banks' obligations to their customers. Therefore, for 
reasons considered above, there is no harmony between UCP 500 and UCC as far 
as the issue is related to banks' liability or responsibility for any act or omission of 
themselves or their own branches located in other country(ies). This is another 
example which points to a need for more harmonization and/or unification of 
standards about LCs in international trade.
1.4. Issues concerning bank-beneficiary relationship
1.4.1. Time allowed for honour or rejection of documents
In paragraph (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 5-112 of the UCC it is provided 
that a bank is entitled to defer honour of a draft, demand, or credit "until the close 
of the third banking day following receipt of the documents". In cases where a 
bank needs more time for checking presented documents, the beneficiary’s consent 
is essential according to paragraph (b) of the same sub-section.^®
The procedure is different under the UCP 500. In Article 13(b) banks are 
obliged to examine presented documents within "a reasonable time, not to
Emphasis added.
See appendix 1 for Section 5-112(1 )(b).
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exceed seven banking days following the day of receipt o f documents.";^^
moreover, in that period of time banks should also determine whether to take up or 
refuse tendered documents as well as to inform the person from whom they 
received documents.^® As to the meaning of the time limitation, it is clarified in the 
ICC's draft for revision of UCP 400 (1983) as follows; "The fact that a bank has up 7 
days to examine the documents does not mean that it is reasonable to take up all 
that time in a purported examination, or to wait until the 6th day before commencing 
the examination."^®
As it is clear, there is no harmony between UCP 500 and UCC regarding the 
period of time for examining documents and deciding whether to take up or refuse 
them by banks.®® Each procedure has its advantage and disadvantage. For
ICC Pub. No. 500; Ellinger, E.P., "The Uniform  Customs and Practice: a b rie f review o f the ir salient 
po in ts". JBL, Jan. 1994, p. 28 [hereinafter referred to as Ellinger, JBL 1994], at pp. 29-30 said: "The new 
Article 13(b) provides for a "reasonable time not to exceed seven banking days follow ing the day o f the 
receipt o f the documents," Such time is granted to the issuing bank, to the confirming bank and to a 
"nominated bank" acting on their behalf. A  related point is covered in Article 14(c), under which the issuing 
bank may "in its sole judgment approach the applicant for a waiver" o f discrepancies discoverred in the 
documents. However, the time spent on such an approach does not extend the period for rejection set out in 
Article 13(b)."
The limitation o f seven days was accepted as a compromise between proposals which for a five days or a 
ten days limitation; Dolan, John P., "W eakening the letters o f credit product: The new U niform  Customs 
and Practice fo r Documentary C red its ". International Business Law Journal, No. 2, 1994, pp. 149-177 
[hereinafter referred to as Dolan], at p. 158 said: "The analogue to Article 16 o f UCP 400 is in Article 13 and 
14 o f UCP 500. While Article 13(b) retains the requirement that the bank examine the documents w ithin a 
reasonable time (not to exceed seven banking days), the article contains no estoppel provision. Thus the 
issuing bank's failure to examine the documents promptly does not invoke the estoppel. Article 14(e) does 
fashion an estoppel, but the estoppel applies only i f  the bank fails to give notice o f defects without delay after 
determining not to honour the beneficiary's draw. The change effectively removes much o f the incentives for 
the bank to examine the documents promptly and, therefore, increases the risk that the beneficiary w ill incur 
loss i f  his documents do not conform."
ICC Documents No. 470-37/4 (a draft suggested by Working Group in Commission on Banking 
Technique and Practice o f the ICC for revision o f UCP 400 (dealing with Articles 1-24 and 54-55)), at p. 25; 
Dolan, ibid., at p. 159 pointed out: "The seven banking day lim it provides little comfort. Any seven banking 
day period w ill include at least one weekend and could include two. [...] The delays can be even longer under 
the role UCP 500 fashions for nominated banks; moreover, letters o f credit subject to this rule o f diminished 
responsibility for banks are a less attractive commercial product than those issued subject to UCP 400, and 
the loss to commerce in general is bound to be significant. The change reduces celerity. It is axiomatic that it 
w ill impel sellers to charge higher prices or to look for commercial alternatives."
Baker, Waller "Buddy", "P reparing Yourself fo r the UCP 500". Business Credit, March 1994, p. 16 
[hereinafter referred to as Baker], at p. 19 said: "A ll banks w ill now be limited to seven banking days to 
examine letter o f credit documents. A t first, this sounds like the old "three-day rule" is being more than
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instance, the UCC's advantage is the speed of procedure but it requires that banks, 
in one or in different countries, should be able to apply a system for communication 
and handling the banking business activities related to each other, e.g. in the USA 
where banks use similar and more advanced technologies in banking activities. On 
the other hand, the procedure accepted under the UCP 500 provides more 
flexibility, namely, banks located in different countries and with different capability 
are able to carry out their undertaken LCs contract; nevertheless, such an 
advantage leads to less speedy banking procedures. Different from the UCC, it is 
understood from the UCP's provisions that the procedure for examining tendered 
documents may take more time in some countries where there are less 
opportunities to benefit from latest technologies in their banking business.
From an international point of view, it seems the UCP has adopted a more 
workable solution for the issue under consideration; but, for improving the provisions 
and provide more harmony between the UCP and the UCC, on the one hand, and 
for providing a better set of standards for LCs internationally on the other, an 
orthodox view can be adopted, namely, banks must examine tendered documents 
and make a decision within three banking days after receiving documents; and if 
there is a need for an extension of the time, then it should be agreed upon by the 
interested party. However, such a time should not exceed more than seven banking 
days following the day of receipt of the documents. This suggestion would provide 
more speed as well as flexibility for the documentary credit operation and provide
doubled, and that it w ill take longer to get documents examined, but the three-day rule is greatly 
misunderstood. The three-day rule is not in the UCP 400, but rather in the Uniform Commercial Code o f the 
United States, and it does not actually lim it the time allowed for examination o f documents. What it says is 
that the issuing or confirming bank is obliged to pay the presentor o f documents under their LC by the end o f 
the third banking day after presentation, i f  the documents comply with the LC. First, this rule makes no 
mention o f what is supposed to happen i f  documents do not comply or how long banks have to decide 
whether they do or do not. Even i f  they comply, the penalty to a bank that takes a couple o f weeks to 
examine documents is that it w ill have to pay interest for the extra time. I f  it takes two weeks to check the 
documents but then finds a discrepancy, there is no penalty, based on the premise that there was never any 
obligation to pay in the first place. Second, the Uniform Commercial Code only applies to letters o f credit 
that are either issued or confirmed by banks in the United States. The three-day rule does not apply to an 
unconfirmed export LC. The UCP on the other hand, has always allowed a "reasonable time"to examine 
documents. Like the three-day rule, the reasonable time rule has only applied to issuing and confirming 
banks. The UCP 500, for the first time, imposes an obligation on a "nominated" bank."
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more harmony between existing rules and provisions related to LCs, namely, Article 
5 of the UCC and UCP 500.^’
Another distinction between the UCP 500 and the UCC concerns the 
beginning of the period of time (discussed above). Under sub-section 1(a) of Section 
5-112 of the UCC it is accepted that the period of 3 banking days starts "following 
the receipt of the documents": but under Article 13(b) of the UCP 500 the period 
of 7 banking days begins from "following the day of receipt o f the documents". 
There can be one day difference in operating the credit system under the UCC and 
the UCP. For instance, if a bank receives documents at 9 a.m., on January 1, 1995, 
under the UCC the bank's time for examining documents and making a decision 
ends at 5 p.m., on January 3, 1995. There is no change in bank's position, even if 
the bank receives documents before closing time of the bank namely 5 p.m., on 
January 1, 1995. So, in practice the bank may lose one day under the UCC. But, 
under the UCP the bank's position is not affected by the time of receiving 
documents, since the period of time for examining documents and taking a decision 
starts from the day following the receipt of the documents; therefore, in the above 
example the bank has time until January 8, 1995 instead of January 7, 1995, if the 
credit is governed by UCC.
In conclusion, it becomes clear that there is no harmony between the UCC 
and the UCP as to the points under consideration. Therefore, any international set 
of standards related to LCs should provide clear provisions relevant to the time of 
examining tendered documents, its beginning and end in a manner that parties to a 
credit transaction may be aware of their positions; in that respect, advantages of the 
UCP and UCC, considered above, are helpful.
1.4.2. Indemnities
The issue of indemnities, this meaning and scope as well as time limitation, is 
clearly considered under Section 5-113 of the UCC.®® Although there is a reference
Section 5 -108(b) o f the PFD supported the view accepted under Article 13(b) o f UCP 500; see appendix 2 
for the text o f Section 5 -108(b).
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to it under the UCP 500 (paragraph (f) of Article 14), there is no provision relating to 
its operation under the UCP 500. Another distinction between the UCC and the UCP 
500 is that the latter, in the same above mentioned paragraph, provides another 
method, namely, "payment under reserve" although there are no details as to its 
procedure.®® In that respect UCP is more advanced than the UCC, since there is no 
indication concerning the issue of payment "under reserve" within the UCC.
Consequently, the UCC, relating to the issue of indemnity, provides better 
and more detailed rules than the UCP, whereas the latter, as far as the matter of 
payment "under reserve" is concerned, provides another alternative for the 
beneficiary of a credit. In that respect the UCP is more flexible than the UCC, 
although no provision is provided concerning the meaning and procedure of 
payment "under reserve" in the UCP. Therefore, any international sets of standards 
relating to LCs should emphasise these points and provide for a more unified 
practice in international trade.®^
1.4.3. The issuer’s privilege to honour the credit
Under the second sentence of Section 5-114(1) of the UCC an issuer of a 
letter of credit may add some conditions to the credit, for his own protection against
See appendix 1; as to the necessity o f the indemnities the official comment to the Section 5-113 said: "A  
draft and accompanying documents may almost comply with the terms o f the credit, but fa il in some 
particular. The issuer is then not obligated to honour the draft, but it may be w illing  to do so i f  properly 
indemnified against the particular defect. Subsection (1) makes clear that it is proper for a bank seeking 
payment, acceptance, negotiation or reinibursemnet under the credit to give such indemnities, and that doing 
so is a proper part o f the business o f banking and therefore not ultra vires." [See UCC, supra (f.n. 2), at p. 
434]
Documents presented by the beneficiary/seller are not always in accordance with the credit's conditions; 
but such distinctions may not important from the bank's point o f view. On the other hand, the bank is not 
interested to lose its customer. Therefore, a practical solution for that situation is that the bank arrange the 
payment in a way called under reserve namely i f  the applicant for the credit or the issuing bank as the case 
may be rejecting tendered documents the beneficiary must give back the amount o f money he received from 
the bank. In other words, the bank has a right o f recourse against the beneficiary for the amount o f the credit 
paid 'under reserve'. The leading authority in English law is Banque de ITndochine Et. Sues v. J.H. 
Rayner (M incing Lane) Ltd.. [1983] 1 A ll E.R. 1137, at p. 1144 (the relevant part o f judgment by Kerr, 
L.J. in the Court o f Appeal).
Unfortunately Section 5-113 o f the UCC was suggested to be omitted under PFD, supra (f.n. 1). This 
position would cause confusion and more distinction between UCC and UCP 500.
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the beneficiary, as a privilege for issuing the credit. It says: 'The issuer is not 
excused from honour of such a draft or demand by reason of additional general 
term that all documents must be satisfactory to the issuer, but an issuer may 
require that specified documents must be satisfactory to it."®® There is nothing 
under the UCP 500 precisely referring to the same matter.
Here several questions may arise: (1) Is such a provision necessary at all?; 
(2) If so, then what is the solution where a conflict of interests arises between the 
issuers of LCs (mostly banks) and their customers? In other words, should the 
bank's satisfaction overrule the applicant's requirements under the credit? (3) If 
there is a justification for having such a rule, why is it accepted in a limited form, 
namely, that banks' requirement must be connected only to specified rather than all 
documents? As to the first query, generally speaking, both banks and their 
customers look at documents as security instruments, namely, as valuable papers 
which replace the amount of money paid under the credit. However, there may be 
differences between the bank's point of view regarding the meaning of a security 
measure and the views of an applicant for a credit; for instance, a bill of lading, an 
insurance policy, an invoice, or any other document required in a particular form by 
the applicant under the credit may be accepted as a good document from the 
applicant's point of view but such a document may not meet the bank's conditions. 
Therefore, it is accepted as a non-satisfactory document by the bank. So, in 
general, it is possible to have a situation where a distinction may arise between the 
bank and its customer relating to the importance of a document.
One additional point should be addressed here before considering other 
questions, namely, whether banks are entitled to ask for document(s) other than 
those required by the applicant in order to match their satisfaction. If the answer Is 
positive then it may be further asked whether banks are able to process such a 
requirement on their own behalf or whether they should bring their request under the 
name of their customers (the applicant for a credit). It is noticeable that in the
Emphasis added; for the text o f the Section 5-114(1) see appendix 1 (below).
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relevant part of Section 5-114(1) of the UCC, quoted above, it is only stated that 
"specified documents must be satisfactory", and there is nothing about the point 
raised above. Does that phrase refer only to documents mentioned by the applicant 
for the credit? Or can the meaning of above phrase also be extended to documents 
asked for directly by banks? The first impression by reading the above phrase is that 
it covers only those documents which are required by the bank's customer 
(applicant for a credit); so, the bank's satisfaction is limited to those documents and 
nothing else. Therefore, there is no chance for banks to require new document(s) in 
their own name. However, it is possible to imply from'the above phrase that if banks 
have any request for new documents, other than asked for by the applicant, such a 
request should accompany the applicant's request. Although such a procedure may 
fit the procedure accepted under Section 5-114(1) of the UCC, namely, documents 
must be specified, it is more appropriate to suggest that banks should also be 
allowed to benefit from a direct requirement, namely, asking for documents similar to 
or separate from those documents required by the applicant for a credit and bring 
their request in their own name.
Regarding the second above question, namely, concerning a conflict of 
interest between the bank and its customer, which one of them should be preferred? 
Nothing is mentioned under the UCC. It seems that in such a dispute the bank's 
satisfaction should be put first since it is the bank that accepts more risks at the 
beginning by paying for documents which may, in a later stage, turn into waste 
paper. Also, the bargaining power of banks should not be forgotten, since in practice 
it is the banker who dictates his points of view to the applicant and if the latter would 
like to enjoy the full benefit of the documentary credit system, it is necessary for him 
to direct his action in a direction that meets also the bank's conditions for issuing the 
credit.
In respect of the above third question, namely, for what reason(s) Is it under 
Section 5-114(1) provided that only "specified" and not "all" documents must be 
satisfactory to the issuer of a letter of credit, one may argue differently. In an official 
comment it has been pointed out that accepting a different view would destroy the
9 4
whole purpose of issuing an irrevocable credit; however, the procedure can be 
different in case of a revocable credit. Because of the importance of the matter, the 
relevant part of the official comment says: "Attempts by the issuer to reserve a right 
to dishonour by including a clause that all documents must be satisfactory to itself 
are declared invalid as essentially repugnant to an irrevocable letter of credit. Such 
a reservation can be made by issuing a revocable credit. See Section 5-106. 
Particular documents, such as bills of lading or inspection or weight certificate can, 
of course, be required to be satisfactory to the issuer."®®
As considered previously, distinctions exist between a revocable and 
irrevocable credit;®  ^ but a connection between the point accepted under Section 5- 
114(1) and differences between them are not clear. Why should the same policy 
accepted under that section (as mentioned above) not be accepted in case of a 
revocable credit? In other words, whether any difference between revocable and 
irrevocable credits is really a matter for distinction as far as the bank's right under 
sub-section 1 of Section 5-114 is concerned.
The main distinction between a revocable and an irrevocable credit is related 
to the bank's undertaking against its customer and the beneficiary. In the case of a 
revocable credit the bank is entitled to modify or cancel the credit without giving any 
notice to its customer or the beneficiary of the credit or asking for their consent 
(Section 5-106(3) of the UCC), whereas under an irrevocable letter of credit the 
procedure is different, namely, after the credit is established it can be modified or 
revoked only by consent of the applicant and the beneficiary of the credit (Section 5- 
106(2) of the UCC). The procedure is similar under the UCP 500, although there are 
distinctions between UCC and UCP as considered earlier (Chapter IV, Section B.2.1 
above). If this is the case, what is then the nature of the bank's right under Section
5-114(1) of the UCC? Is it a type of modification of the credit, which in the case of 
an irrevocable credit requires the consent of other parties; or is it not a modification
See UCC, supra (f.n. 2), p. 436.
See relevant discussions in Secetions B. 1.2.2 (present chapter) and B.2.1 (Chapter IV ) above.
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of the credit, as a part of credit's conditions agreed upon by contracting parties when 
establishing the credit? Even if it is accepted as a modification of the credit, then by 
consent of all the parties to a credit contract such a modification may or may not be 
enforceable. If the answer is positive, which seems to be so, as pointed out above, 
then there is no justification for the policy accepted under sub-section 1 of the 
Section 5-114, namely, that an issuer may require that "specified", not "all", 
documents must be satisfactory to his conditions under the credit.
Another matter which may arise is about the meaning of terms "specified" 
and "all"; one may argue that the former refers to documents stipulated under the 
credit but the latter is more genera! and covers both stipulated as well as non­
stipulated documents, namely, because of trade usage or conditions stated under 
the credit contract the beneficiary should also tender them.®® Therefore, it is not a 
complex issue and the real meaning of term "specified" under Section 5-114(1) 
concerns all documents stipulated in the credit contract; so those documents must 
also be satisfactory from the bank's point of view.
If the above argument is accepted, then the above quoted official comment 
becomes meaningless because the last part of the comment put forward several 
examples of what is a particular document, e.g. bills of lading or inspection or weight 
certificate. Moreover, in most of credit transactions, documents are numbered and 
specified by contracting parties, and situations where the beneficiary is obliged to 
provide further document(s) because of trade usage or other conditions stated in the 
credit imposing further duties upon the beneficiary, are accepted as exceptions to 
the general rule. Therefore, the interpretation of terms specified and aif as 
suggested above would lead to a meaning totally in contradiction with the intention 
of parties to the credit transaction. It is hence appropriate to suggest that the term 
"all documents" refers only to all those documents which are precisely stipulated in
For more details see the relevant discusion about stipulated and non-stipulated documents in Section A  o f 
Chapter V I (below).
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the credit and the term "specified documents" means document(s) which is/are 
selected by banks from those documents stipulated in the credit.
To sum up the present discussion, it seems the last sentence of Section 5- 
114(1) of the UCC needs to be clarified for reasons considered above.®® 
Concerning the UCC and the UCP 500, regarding the point under consideration, it 
seems the policy adopted by the UCC, namely, providing some provisions relating 
to the rights of the bank over documents, is preferable and it is necessary for any 
future attempt for providing an international set of standards about LCs to deal with 
the given issue properly.
1.4.4. Transfer and Assignment of a credit
Transferability and assignability of a letter of credit are matters of importance 
in the documentary credit operation; therefore, both Article 5 of the UCC (Section 5- 
116) and UCP 500 (Articles 48 and 49) address these issues/® There are, 
however, differences between UCC and UCP, as follows.
1.4.4.1. Transferability of the right to draw
Sub-section (1) of Section 5-116 provides: "The right to draw under a credit 
can be transferred or assigned only when the credit is expressly designated as 
transferable or assignable."'^^ Article 48(b) of the UCP 500 relating to the right to 
draw under a credit has pointed out: "A credit can be transferred only if it is 
expressly designated as "transferrable" by the issuing bank.""^ ® There is no 
reference under the UCP 500 to the effect that the right to draw under a credit is 
also assignable in the same way as it stipulated under the UCC. On the contrary,
The point under consideration seems was noticed by draftsmen for revision o f Article 5 o f the UCC and 
Section 5-108(a) o f PFD, supra (f.n. 1), clarified the issuer's position; see appendix 2 for text o f suggested 
section above.
See relevant discussions in Section B o f Chapter IV  (above), and appendix 2 for Sections 5-112, 5-113, 
and 5-114 o f PFD, supra (f.n. 1) below.
Emphasis added; Smith, Michael J., "T ransm itting  the Benefit o f a Letter o f C re d it" . JBL, September 
1991, pp. 447-56; Tettenborn, A.M., "Transferable and negotiable documents o f title - a redefin ition?!!. 
LMCLQ, part 4, Nov. 1991, pp. 538-42.
Emphasis added.
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under Article 48(b) of the UCP it is stated that using the term "assignable" does not 
render a credit transferable and it shall be disregarded/®
Is the right to draw under a credit assignable as pointed out under the UCC? 
Before answering this question it is necessary to clarify the following point: what is 
the right to draw under a credit and what is its distinction from the right to proceed 
under the credit? In other words, would a transferor and an assignor be in the same 
position under a transferable and assignable credit?
1.4.4.2. Right to draw under a credit and assignment o f proceeds
In a credit contract it is the beneficiary of a credit who is entitled to demand 
payment under the credit. This right is a right to draw under a credit, given 
exclusively to the beneficiary and nobody else, unless otherwise expressly agreed 
by contracting parties. The mechanism for passing the right to draw under a credit to 
a third party (transferee) is that of transfer of the credit. In order to transfer a credit, 
the beneficiary of the credit must obtain the issuing bank's prior consent.' '^^
Another beneficiary's right under the credit is a right to proceeds of a letter 
of credit."^ ® It means that the beneficiary, instead of transferring all or a portion of a 
credit, asks the issuing bank to pay some or all of the amount of the credit to others 
by assignment of his right to proceeds. In that respect there is no need for the 
issuing bank's consent.
From the above remarks, it becomes clear that the beneficiary of a credit has 
two different rights under the credit, and for enforcing each of them a special
Article 48(b) o f the UCP 500 states: "A  Credit can be transferred only i f  it is expressly designated as 
"transferable" by the Issing Bank. Terras such as "divisible", "fractionable", "assignable", and "transmissible" 
do not render the Credit transferable. I f  such terms are used they shall be disregarded."
When is the most suitable time for reaching such an agreement? This issue may be a ground for dispute 
between the bank and the beneficiary o f the credit; for more details, see the relevant discussion above under 
present chapter.
McCullough, Burton V., "Letters o f c re d it" . Matthew Bender, USA, 1993 [hereinafter it is referred to as 
McCullough], ss. 4.07[2], p. 4-111, at f.n. 32 stated: "The term "proceeds" means the cash, draft, acceptance, 
or other form o f payment resulting from honour o f a letter o f credit, and should not be interpreted either to 
mean the right to draw under the letter o f credit or to include the beneficiary's draft when drawn, negotiated, 
or presented to the issue o f the credit."
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mechanism should be applied. In other words, the issue of transferring the right to 
draw under a credit should be distinguished from the assignment of proceeds under 
the credit. Why? The following discussion explains the reason for such a distinction.
1.4.4.3, Beneficiary's position under transfer and assignment o f a credit
What distinction exists between a transfer and an assignment, so that the
former requires the issuing bank's consent? There may be reasons why the Issuing 
bank may not be interested to give the beneficiary of the credit the privilege of 
transferring the letter of credit. Firstly, the bank and its customer (the applicant for a 
credit) have a special confidence in the beneficiary and by transferring the right to 
draw under the credit to another person such a trust would be damaged since some 
or all part of the beneficiary's obligations under the credit may be transferred to the 
second beneficiary (the transferee). Secondly, the beneficiary may have a debt to 
the bank or the applicant; therefore, a right to set-off exists only against the 
beneficiary, not the transferee; and lastly, by transferring the credit the procedure of 
letters of credit loses its simplicity. So, for these reasons banks are not primarily 
interested in agreeing to the beneficiary's request to transfer the credit unless an 
adequate security is substituted, namely, that the creditworthiness of the second 
beneficiary (the transferee) is proved and accepted. On the other hand, in the case 
of assignment of proceeds the character of the assignee is not important from the 
bank's point of view, since no title is passed from the beneficiary (assignor) to the 
third party (assignee) and the bank's interests or its customer's position, as the case 
may be, are not at risk. In other words, in the assignment of proceeds, contrary to 
the issue of transferring the right to draw, the assignee is not in the same position 
as the beneficiary of the credit; therefore, his rights and obligations are not the same 
as those of the beneficiary.
1.4.4.4. Concluding remarks
Although it has been officially stated that the meaning of assignment or 
transfer of a credit is uncertain under the law,"^ ® the above discussion helps to clarify
Official Comments related to Section 5-106 o f the UCC, No. 1: "Since, however, there is general 
confusion o f thoughts as to the meaning o f "assignment or transfer o f a credit" the law remains uncertain. I f
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that transferability and assignability of a credit are two separate issues with different 
effects on the relationship of the contracting parties to a credit transaction. This view 
is supported by the approach accepted under Articles 48 and 49 of the UCP 500 as 
well as Section 5-116(2) of the UCC.'^  ^ As experienced bankers have avoided using 
the terms "transferable" and "assignable" interchangeably for many years, the UCC 
should be revised regarding the issue under consideration. As to other issues 
related to the transfer of a credit, the UCP is better drafted and it provides more 
detailed provisions."^® By contrast, the mechanism for executing a right to proceed is 
fully expressed by the UCC under Section 5-116(2).
2. ISSUES CONSIDERED UNDER UCC ONLY 
2.1. Rules concerning letters of credit in general
2.1.1. Meaning of document
Paragraph (b) of sub-section 1 of Section 5-103 provides a clear distinction 
between the meaning of "document" and "document of title". The former has a 
much broader meaning. The importance of such a difference appears when 
Sections 5-102(a) and 9-105(1 )(e) are applied."^ ® There is no such indication under 
UCP 500.
"assignment o f the credit" includes delegation o f perfomiance o f the conditions under the credit llien the 
initiating customer, who in many cases has put his faith in performance or supervision o f performance by a 
beneficiary o f established reputation, may be deprived o f real and intended security."
The relevant part o f the Section 5-116(2) o f the UCC is: "(2) Even though the credit specifically stales that 
it is nontransferable or nonassignable the beneficiary may before performance o f the conditions o f the credit 
assign his right to proceeds."
There are the transferring bank’s obligation (Article 48, paras. (c)&(d)), transferability and fractionability 
o f a transferable credit (Article 48(e)), and rights o f the first beneficiary (Article 48, paras, (f) to (])). It seems 
Section 5-111 o f the UCC deals with those matters, but in a veiy broad language; as pointed out previously 
Sections 5-112, 5-113, and 5-114 in PFD suggested more deailed provisions concerning issues relevant to the 
transferable credit and assignment o f proceeds and in that respect it seems the UCC become closer to what 
has been accepted under the UCP 500; there is, however, a distinction arises between UCC and UCP as to 
issue o f transfer by operation o f law (Section 5-113 o f PFD); see below appendix 2 for text o f mentioned 
sections o f UCC above.
See appendix 1 and UCC, supra (f.n. 2), p. 421, col. 2, par. 2; and also look at appendix 2 for Sections 5- 
102(a)(6) (document) and 5-102(a)(14) (record).
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2.1.2. List of definitions
From paragraph (c) of sub-section 1 of Section 5-103 to the end of the 
section the words dealing with definitions of terms apply under Article 5 of the 
UCC/® There is nothing similar to that under UCP 500, although it gives definitions 
for those terms applied under the UCP, but they are not arranged in one particular 
article as in the UCC. Surely, for the sake of clarity of a set of standards for LCs at 
an international level, the procedure adopted by the UCC is preferable.®^
2.1.3. Formal requirements; signing
Section 5-104 provides that an issued LC must be in "writing" and "signed" 
by the issuer (the issuing bank or a person other than the bank who issues the 
credit).®® Similar requirements must be followed by a confirming bank in case of 
confirmation of a credit, and by the issuer or the confirming bank if the issued credit 
is subject to any modification(s).®® Although there is no such clarification under UCP 
500, one may understand from the whole circumstances that the same 
requirements are also necessary under the UCP in order to have a credit as proved 
to be issued, confirmed, and amended. It is impossible to accept the opposite view it 
causes uncertainty since the letter of credit is not a simple banking practice capable 
to contain all conditions in a non-written form of contract and without any apparent 
authenticity. There are many examples within the text of UCP 500 that support this 
view.
For instance, UCP 500 provides that banks undertake to pay the amount of a 
credit only when "stipulated documents" comply with the "terms and conditions" 
of the credit (Articles 2, 9(a)&(b), and 13(a)). Both expressions require a written form
50
5i
See Section 5-102 o f PFD concerning definitions in appendix 2 (below).
Megrah, Maurice, "A  iiiiifo rm  Code fo r documentary credit p ractice?". International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, Vol. 8, Jan. 1959, p. 41, gave his support to such idea.
For similar point under PFD, supra (f.n. 1), see below appendix 2 for Section 5-104 (formal requirements) 
as well as Sections 5-102(a)(6) and 5-102(a)(14).
See below appendix 1 for the text o f Section 5-104.
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of the credit. Regarding the point that a credit must also be signed by the issuing 
bank under Article 7(a), it is said that the advising bank shall take reasonable care 
and check the "apparent authenticity" of the credit; and if it is not possible to 
establish such authenticity it must inform, without delay, the issuing bank. And if the 
advising bank chooses to act upon such a credit, it must inform the beneficiary of its 
decision (paragraph (b) of Article 7).
However, in order to have a clarified situation under an international set of 
standards related to LCs, it is advisable that this above examined requirements are 
precisely indicated under the new instrument.
2.1.4. Consideration
Section 5-105 of Article 5 of the UCC provides: "No consideration is 
necessary to establish a credit or to enlarge or otherwise modify its terms."®"^  This 
emphasis is important, particularly when dealing with an irrevocable letter of 
credit.®® "Consideration", as a well known principle in the common law legal 
systems, is one of three basic essentials for the creation of a contract.®®
English and American law
Turning to the irrevocable letter of credit, it is said: "In the case of irrevocable 
credit it is difficult to show any consideration given by the seller to the banker prior to 
the tender of documents. Yet courts have expressed the view that an irrevocable
Harfieid, H., "B ank Credits and Acceptance". New York, Ronald Press, 5th. ed., 1974 [hereinafter 
referred to as Harfieid], at p. 55, suggested: "The bank's letter o f credit is a legally enforceable instrument, 
rooted in the law o f merchant and contractual in its nature. There is neither need nor u tility  to employ 
Procrustean Techniques to establish its validity."; for the same issue under PFD, supra (f.n. 1), see appendix 
2 for Section 5-105 (consideration) below,
"A credit may be either revocable or irrevocable." (Section 5-103 (l)(a ) o f the UCC and Article 6 o f UCP 
500)
See "C h itty  on C ontracts". 25th ed., Vol. 1, London, Sweet &  Maxwell, 1983, p. 25, para. 41; the other 
two principles are agreement and contractual intention. What is a consideration? Generally speaking, it has 
been established for a long time under English law that a "promise" is not binding unless it is either made 
under "seal" or supported by "consideration". The essence o f consideration is that in order to make a promise 
enforceable as a contract "something value in the eyes o f the law" must be given by the promisee. Therefore, 
it is traditionally defined as: "Consideration is either a detriment to the promisee (in that he may give value) 
or some benefit to the promissor (in that the may receive value)." [The same reference above, pp. 80-81, 
para. 144 and at p. 81, f.n. 11 o f the same reference (for referred cases).
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credit cannot be revoked after it reaches the hands of the seller, which could be a 
considerable time before the tender of documents."®^ In other words, no 
consideration moves from the beneficiary of the credit (as the promisee) towards the 
issuing bank (as the promisor).®®
The doctrine of consideration is not known to civil law;®® and there is no 
indication similar to Section 6-105 of the UCC under UCP 500.
The issue under discussion causes no problem for those parties to a letter of 
credit whose contracts are governed either by Article 5 of the UCC or UCP 500 but 
concerns the law which governs their contract originated from legal systems other 
than the common law. However, for LCs issued under the UCP and with English law 
as the applicable law of the contract, or the law of any other country with a legal 
system based on common law but with no legislation similar to Article 5 of the UCC, 
there is always a question whether by issuing an irrevocable letter of credit, banks 
undertake responsibility towards the beneficiary even without consideration passed 
from him. For certainty in the documentary credit system, it is important to find a 
solution to this situation. To change a principle of law is not an easy task in any legal 
system; however, business practice and the reality of global trading dictate a 
mandate, namely, relating to international contracts like LCs. An exception to the 
principle of consideration can be accepted on the ground of commercial character
Ellinger, E.P., "Docum entary Letters o f C red it". Singapore, 1970 [hereinafter referred to as Ellinger], 
p. 40; Harfieid, supra (f.n. 54), at p. 53, says: "Although the letter o f credit is a contract between banker and 
beneficiary, the beneficiaiy undertakes no duty o f performance- i f  he chooses not to meet the conditions o f 
the credit, he is not obliged to do so."
For more details about the issue under consideration see Dexters L td. v. Schenker &  Co.. (1923) 14 
LI.L.Rep. 586, at p. 588, where Green, J. Stated that the seller/beneficiary is under no obligation to tender 
documents to anyone before he receives the letter o f credit; E rquhart Lindsay &  Co, v. Eastern Bank. 
[1922] 1 K.B. 318, at pp. 321-22, Rowlatt, J. held that "upon the plaintiffs' acting upon the undertaking 
contained in this letter o f credit", consideration moved from the seller towards the bank; The Law Revision 
Committee in its 6th interim report (Cmnd. 5449, par. 29, 1937) made recommendation, among others, as 
following: "That an agreement should be enforceable i f  the promise or offer had been made in w riting by the 
promisor or his agent. That there a contract by its express terms supports to confer a benefit directly on a 
third party it shall be enforceable by the third party in his own name."
Ventris, F.M, "Bankers' Documentary C red its ". Lloyd’s o f London Press Ltd., 2nd ed., 1983, p. 60 
[hereinafter referred to as Ventris].
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of the contract. Although there is no direct court decision relating to the irrevocable 
credit, the view in question has been accepted by some English courts, in a similar 
situation, in order to tackle the problem. For instance, in The Euromedon,®® where 
a stevedore, who caused damages to the consignee's goods, sought to benefit from 
an exemption clause in the bill of lading, although, there was no direct contractual 
relationship between stevedores and the consignée. Lord Wilberforce found 
consideration between them and said: "If the choice [...] is between a gratutious 
promise, and a promise for consideration [...] there can be little doubt [...] the whole 
contract is of a commercial character, involving services on the one side, rates of 
payment on the other, and qualifying stipulations as to both. The relation of all 
parties to each other are commercial relations entered into for business reasons of 
ultimate profit. To describe one set of promises in this context as gracious or nudum 
pactum seems paradoxical and is prima facie implausible."®^
Consequently, there is no uniformity in standards applied to an irrevocable 
credit regarding to the above discussed point, while in practice a similar attitude has 
been accepted by courts in different legal systems. Therefore, in order to provide a 
code of standards about LCs there is a need for harmonisation and clarification; and 
it is appropriate to make certain in case of an irrevocable letter of credit that banks' 
undertaking connected to their intention as well as their action is based upon such 
decision and there is no need that a counter-promise passes from the beneficiary 
(as the promisee) towards the banks. Consequently, the opening time for the bank's 
offer and its end is another matter, considered in another part of the present section 
(sub-section 2.2.2 below).
[1974] 1 A il E.R. 1015; The New Y o rk  S tar. [1980]3 A ll E.R. 257. 
Ibid., pp. 1019-1020.
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2.1.5. ’ ’N ota tion”  credits
This type of credit is widely used in United States-Japanese t rade.Sect ion
6-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) of America defines such a credit in 
terms as: "(1) A credit which specifies that any person purchasing or buying drafts 
drawn or demands for payment made under it must note the amount of the draft or 
demand on the letter or advice of a credit is a "notation credit."®®
The purpose of this credit is to solve problems which may arise by the 
application of "partial shipments" credits, because under such an arrangement 
banks (the issuing, confirming, or the intermediary bank) must be aware whether the 
total amount of the credit has been utilized and what has been left. Sometimes, 
drafts drawn for portion of the credit, may be sent to more than one intermediary 
bank by mistake. There is no such provision under the UCP 500.
For more precise standards related to LCs it seems a provision similar to 
Section 5-108 of the UCC should be stipulated in any code of standards related to 
LCs; and in that regard, it seems the UCC provides better rules than the UCP 500. 
However, if there is enough evidence that the use of such a type of credit is 
outdated, then for more harmonisation between UCC and UCP 500 it would be 
appropriate to remove such a section from Article 5 of the UCC.®"^
2.2. Rules concerning parties to a credit transaction
2.2.1. Right o f applicant to amendment of a credit
Sub-section 3 of Section 5-106 of the UCC provides: "Unless otherwise 
agreed once an irrevocable credit is established as regards the customer it can be
Kozolchyk, B., "Letters o f C re d it" . 9 International Encyclopedia o f Comprative Law, Chapter 5, 1979 
[hereinafter referred to as Kozolchyk], at p. 36, f.n. 178 said: "Typical notation be noted", rather than "the 
issuer w ill honor on condition that the draft is noted', or "all amounts negotiated should be endorsed on the 
reverse side [...].", which are also found in United States issued notation credits."
There is nothing similar to that provision in UCP 500.
It was suggested by draftsmen o f PFD, supra (f.n. 1), that Section 5-108 o f the UCC should be removed as 
an outdated provision.
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modified or revoked only with the consent of the customer."®® In similar 
circumstances, UCP 500 provides no support for the applicant for a credit and 
paragraph (d)(i) of Article 9 of the UCP says: "an irrevocable Credit can neither be 
amended nor cancelled without the agreement of the Issuing Bank, the Confirming 
Bank, if any, and the Beneficiary."
To compare these provisions it seems the view adopted by the UCC is better, 
since in case of modification of a credit, without consulting the applicant for the 
credit, the bank’s customer may be put in an unwanted situation. One may argue 
that in the situation under discussion, bank(s) as agent(s) of the applicant for the 
credit is(are) responsible to look after the interest of its (their) principal; therefore, if 
there is any lack of judgment or if any failure occurs as a result of a decision made 
by the bank(s), the applicant is entitled to sue the bank(s). Moreover, paragraph
(d)(i) mentioned above, relates to those types of modification which concern the 
banking business and procedure adopted for operation of LCs. In other words, the 
changes in question are operational rather than substantive, involving no harm for 
the applicant (the bank's customer); therefore, there is no need for the applicant's 
agreement in such circumstances and by adopting an opposite policy unnecessary 
delays would occur in the operation of LCs.
To respond to the above arguments, the following points should also be 
considered. Firstly, what is the scope of "amendment” under Article 9(d)(1) of UCP 
500? There is no limitation of the application of the term under the UCP; the only 
exception to the above policy is the first part of the same paragraph from Article 9 of 
the UCP which provides: "Except as otherwise provided by Article 48 [...]."; and 
Article 48 of UCP 500 relates to a "transferable credit", which under paragraphs 
(h) and (i) of that article, is accepted that terms and conditions of the transferable 
credit can be different from the original credit regarding the amount of the credit, any 
unit price stated therein, the expiry date of the credit, the last date for the
“  Similar standing was suggested under PFD, supra (f.n. 1), in Section 5-106(b); for text o f referred section 
see appendix 2.
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presentation of documents in accordance with Article 43, the period of shipment, 
and substitution of the first beneficiary's invoice(s) and draft(s) with those of the 
second beneficiary(ies). Therefore, the scope of "amendment" is quite wide and 
covers all types of amendments, namely, substantive changes (like those 
mentioned above regarding a transferable credit) as well as those which are 
connected to operational aspect(s) of LCs.
Secondly, if the issuing bank (as agent of the applicant) usually consults 
about any changes with its principal, why such an informal procedure should not be 
replaced with a formal consultation, namely, the necessity of the applicant's consent 
in case of any amendment of an irrevocable credit? By adopting such a policy, an 
unnecessary dispute would be prevented between the issuing bank and its 
customer; moreover, a set of standards related to LCs, as far as the point under 
discussion is concerned becomes more predictable, justifiable, and reliable. Also, 
harmonisation would be achieved between UCC and UCP.
Thirdly, in case of cancellation of an irrevocable letter of credit similar 
arguments, with more strength, can be put forward since it is difficult to accept that 
an applicant for a credit has no right under the UCP if an issued irrevocable LG is 
cancelled without his notice and any consultation in advance.
Consequently, it is preferable that the future standards of LCs adopt a different 
policy from what is accepted under UCP 500 regarding the right of the applicant for 
a credit in case of amendment or cancelation of an irrevocable letter of credit.®®
2.2.2. Time of establishment of a credit
Under UCP 500 no provision is made for the time of establishment of a 
credit. By contrast, that point is clarified under Section 5-106 (1) of the UCC which 
provides: "(1) Unless otherwise agreed a credit is established (a) as regards the
See also Ventris, supra (f.n. 59), at p. 10, where he says: "Sub-paragraph (d) [UCP 400] does not mention 
the applicant for the "credit" as having to give his agreement also [...]. The previous Article provided for the 
agreement o f all parties to the credit, so the ommission o f the applicant for the credit is deliberate, but the 
reason for this Is not clear [...] Surely, as the terms and conditions o f the "credit" have to be agreed in the first 
place between the applicant for the "credit" and the beneficiary, it is d ifficu lt to see why their agreement on 
an amendment should not be suffice. What i f  the two main parties agreed and one o f the banks does not?"
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customer as soon as a letter of credit is sent to him or the letter of credit or an 
authorized written advice of its issuance is sent to the beneficiary; and (b) as 
regards the beneficiary when he receives a letter of credit or an authorized written 
advice of its issuance."®^
This is one of the areas which it seems necessary to cover in the future set of 
standards related to LCs. Therefore, considering some of the related issues in detail 
seems necessary, because an important stage of each contract is the point when it 
Is established, since the rights and duties of contracting parties start from that 
moment.
2.2.2.1. Between the buyer and the issuing bank
As mentioned earlier with respect to the operation of LCs (Chapter II), a letter 
of request (based on the application provided by the Issuing bank) is sent to the 
bank by the applicant for a credit. Bankers, after receiving the buyer's request, need 
time to determine whether it complies with the terms of the application. Several 
questions may arise at this stage: Does the contractual relationship between the 
issuing bank and Its client start from the time of sending the application for issuing a 
credit? Or, does the time of the contract begin from the moment of the bank's 
acceptance of the applicant's request either by a letter or by its conduct, namely, 
issuing a credit? If the bank's acceptance is necessary, which seems so, then within 
what period of time the bank Is obliged to give its decision? Except Germany, which 
has adopted a precise attitude, most of the countries like France and states which 
accept the common law choose a procedure by which bankers are obliged to open 
the letter of credit within a "reasonable time".®® However, there is a distinction
67 For similar point under PFD, supra (f.n. 1), see below appendix 2 for Section 5-106(a).
Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 62), p. 43; Ellinger, supra (f.n. 57), at p. 154 staled: "The banker should open the 
credit with reasonable speed can be supported in common law countries as well. [...] When a contract does 
not specify a special time for the performance a reasonable time is to be presumed."; see also Ford v, 
Cotesworth (1868) L.R. 4, Q.B., p. 127, per Blackburn, J., at p. 133 (Q.B.), or (1870) Q.B. 544 (Exch. Ch.); 
About French law it is said, in above references, that its position is similar to what has been accepted by 
common law countries; as to German law it is said that a precise attitute has been adopted by that law. For 
instance, see Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 62), p. 43 it is said: "In Germany commentators do not follow this rule 
and adopt a regid attitute as regards the liab ility o f a bank fails to issue the credit or to notify the customer 
promptly that his application has been rejected."; on the other hand Ellinger, supra (f.n. 57), at p. 154 stated
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between American and English law as to the time of establishing the credit between 
the issuing bank and its customer.
1. American law
Under Section 5-106(1)(a) of the UCC, mentioned above, there are two 
possibilities relating to the time of establishment of the contractual relationship 
between the issuing bank and its client.®® The issue related to the point in 
discussion is how long the issuing bank is entitled to spend time for considering the 
client's application before a credit is issued? No certain time is provided under 
Section 5-106(1 )(a) of the UCC; and by using general terms like as soon as the 
issue of time for acceptance or rejection of a letter of request is left open since 
different banks may adopt different procedures.
2. English law and UCP 500
There is no provision similar to Section 5-106(1 )(a) of the UCC in English 
law,^ ® and the situation is similar under UCP 500. In respect of the second point, 
namely, how long an issuing bank is entitled to determine about its applicant's letter 
of request, English law has taken the view that the issuing bank Is obliged to open 
the letter of credit within a "reasonable time".^^ UCP 500 is also uncertain about this 
issue.
two different view o f German lawyers related to the issue in discussion, e.g., Kerb’s view is that "the banker 
must notify the seller o f the credit not later than the date on which the buyer is obliged to open it under the 
contract o f sale"; the second view is Wiele's opinion which is said: "The banker should act w ith the diligence 
o f a reasonable banker is preferable."
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), in its official comment being provided that; "The primaiy purpose 
o f determining the time o f establishment o f an irrevocable credit is to determine the point at which the issuer 
is no longer free to take unilateral action with respect to the cancellation o f the credit or modification o f i t s  
terms."
™  Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 62), p. 42, eol. 1, and f.n. 207.
Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 62), p. 43; Ellinger, supra (f.n. 57), at p. 154 said: "The banker should open the 
credit with reasonable spead can be supported in coomon law countries as well. [...] When a contract does 
not specify a special time for the performance, a reasonable time is to be presumed"; see also Ford y, 
Cotcsworth. (1868) L.R. 4, Q.B. 127, per Blackburn, J., at p. 133 (QB); (1870) L.R. 5, Q.B. 544 (Exch. 
Ch.).
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Although applying general terms like "as soon as" or "reasonable time" 
provide more flexibility for banks, they are also causes for uncertainty. In order to 
prevent misunderstanding between the issuing bank and its customer, it is 
preferable that a period of time be ascertained. As to the time of establishment of 
credit between the bank and the applicant for the credit, a similar provision to what 
is accepted under Section 5-106(1 )(a) of the UCC is suggested for any international 
set of standards related to LCs.
2.2.2.2. Time of establishing an irrevocable letter of credit contract between 
the issuing bank and the beneficiary of a credit
When does a contractual relationship between an issuing bank and a 
seller/beneficiary begin in an irrevocable letter of credit? Although there are two 
parties and one consideration^^ in an issued irrevocable letter of credit, there is no 
contractual relationship between the banker and the seller under English law, unless 
consideration moves from the offeree (the beneficiary) to the offeror (the issuing 
bank). Some of the questions related to the issue of consideration and its 
application to LCs have been mentioned above, under the present section of the 
study; other related points are discussed here. For instance, is it necessary that a 
consideration pass from a beneficiary to an issuing bank at the time when the credit 
is issued as an offer or should it be passed at some other time? Generally speaking, 
consideration is valid if it is not "past"; it must given in return for a promise and 
whether a consideration is past or not, is a matter of fact.^^ Consideration is one of 
the elements for establishing a contract under English common law; it differs from 
"acceptance". It seems that it always passes at the time of acceptance or after it. 
Therefore, there is no necessity that consideration must move from a promisee (the
It is also called "nudum pactum"; Rann v. Hughes (1778) 7 Term. Rep. 350 n.; see also relevant 
discussion about "consideration" in Section B.2.1.4 o f the present chapter (above).
Eastwood V. Kenyon (1840) 11 A. &  E. 438; ’’C h itty  on contracts” . Sweet &  Maxwell, London, 25th 
ed., Vol. 1, 1983, p. 93, para. 164.
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seller) at the time of the promise/offer made by the offeror (the bank)/"^ So, there is 
always some lapse of time. Then the relevant point is: at what precise moment a 
contract is formed between the issuing bank and the beneficiary of the credit? There 
are several points of time, in the issuing bank-seller contractual relationship, that 
might be taken as the proper time for establishing the credit contract. These are as 
following:
1. Time of issuing the credit by the issuing bank.
2. Time of posting or sending the credit by teletransmision as the final action 
of the corresponding bank.
3. Time of receiving the issuing bank's instructions by the corresponding
bank.
4. Time of informing the seller's bank by the agent of the issuing bank.
5. Time of receiving the credit by the seller.
6. Time when the seller express his acceptance expressly or impliedly to his
bank.
7. Time of presenting proper documents in accordance with the conditions of 
the credit.
1. Position in English law
Situation six (above), namely, the time when the promisee/ beneficiary 
expresses his acceptance expressly or implicitly to his bank, seems the most
De Rooy, P.P., ' ’Pocumeutarv Credits” . Kluwer Law and Taxation publishers, 1984 [hereinafter referred 
to as DeRooy], at p. 92 suggested that, "[...] neither the applicant nor the bank can withdraw the credit once it 
has been issued"; the situation dealing with the coixesponding bank w ill be noticed later; there is a dicta in 
English law that was stated in Dexters. L td. V; Schcnker &  Co. (1923)14 Ll.L.Rep. 586, at p. 588 Greer, J., 
suggested that an irrevocable letter o f credit becomes binding as soon as it reaches the hands o f the seller/ 
beneficiary. That decision seems better than what was decided in U rq u lia rt Lindsay for two reasons; first o f 
all, it is like to the position o f the American, German, and French law, so there w ill be more harmony among 
the different legal systems. Secondly, the test which was laid down by Rowlatt, J., in U rquhart case would 
lead to uncertaintity since it is d ifficu lt for bankers to understand whether the seller starts acting upon the 
offer, or not. In addition from the seller point o f view the rule in Dexters is much more desireable and he 
becomes certain as soon as he recevies the credit; for more detail see Ellinger, supra (f.n. 57), pp. 11-12; it is 
also suggested by Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 62), at p. 106, col. 2, para, 2 that: "From the legal stand point, the 
time o f receipt and acquisition o f possesion o f the credit instrument seems the most consistent w ith the nature 
o f the credit instrument."; that view also found support by Section 5-106(2) o f the Unifonn Commercial 
Code (UCC), and article 9(d)(1) o f UCP 500 seems accepted similar attitude.
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suitable time under English law for establishing the credit contract, regarding the 
issuing bank as well as the beneficiary of the credit, because an express or implied 
acceptance of the issuing bank's offer is given at that time/® Moreover, under the 
same law there are no regulations or decided cases requiring that the 
seller/beneficiary should announce his acceptance in a specified form; and, also a 
good consideration moves from the promisee to the promisor (the issuing bank) at 
that time, since the seller agrees to tender these documents which comply with the 
terms and conditions of the credit to the bank if he wishes to receive the amount of 
the credit. Therefore, there is no requirement that the consideration must move from 
the promisee/seller to the promisor/bank prior to situation six.^ ®
2. Position in American law
Section 5-106 (1)(b) of UCC makes it clear that a credit is established as 
regards the beneficiary from the time of receiving ,a credit or an authorised written 
advice of its issuance (namely situation 5).^  ^ As to the position of the issuing bank, 
there is no reference under the UCC since in practice it is accepted that the issuing 
bank's undertaking under an irrevocable letter of credit starts from the time of 
issuance of the credit.
3. Position in UCP 500
U rq u lia rt I  jndsav &  Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Bank Ltd. [1922] 1 K.B. 318, a dicta which was suggested 
that an offer becomes binding when the offeree acts upon it; Davis, supra (f.n. 20), p. 78; Gutteridge, H.C. 
and Megrah, M., "The Banker's Conimercial C red its ". London, 7th ed., 1984, p. 64 [hereinafter referred 
to as Gutteridge].
It seems that Ellinger in the theory o f "forbearance" accepted this view that prior to that time, i.e. the seller 
receives the credit, it is necessary that a consideration moves from the promisee (the seller) to the promisor 
(the banker).
Section 5-106(1 )(b) o f UCC states: "[A ]s regards the beneficiary when he receives a letter o f credit or an 
authorised written advice o f its issuance."; Ellinger, supra (f.n. 57), p. 11; Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 75), pp. 
26-30, which supports the view that the credit contract is established after documents are presented by the 
seller; however, in Section 5 -106(a) o f FED, supra (f.n. 1), it was suggested that the time o f issuance o f a 
credit is the time that the issuer becomes responsible towards the beneficiary o f a credit; but nothing was 
suggested concerning the point under consideration namely the time o f enforceability o f a credit against the 
beneficiary; see appendix 2 for text o f Section 5-106(a) o f PFD.
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There is no article relating to the point in discussion under UCP 500. 
However, what is clear from the practice is that the issuing bank accepts a definite 
undertaking under an irrevocable letter of credit from the time of Issuing it (namely 
situation 1 above). As to the beneficiary's position, in contrast to the UCC, there is 
nothing under the UCP.
4. Analysis: The importance of the offeror's intention in forming a contract
From the above discussion it becomes clear that different views may be 
suggested under Common law, relating to the time of establishment of an 
irrevocable letter of credit contract regarding the issuing bank as well as the 
bénéficialy of a credit. Therefore, a question of importance may be raised at this 
point: do the revocability and irrevocability of an offer, at common law, depend on 
consideration? If the answer is affirmative, as it seems to be under English law, an 
irrevocable credit would have to be accepted as an exception to the general 
principles of contract law, because of the "commercial character" of LCs there is 
no need for consideration.^® A similar attitude has been adopted in American law 
under Section 5-106(1 )(a) of the UCC.
On the other hand, one may argue that the revocable or irrevocable nature of 
an offer, more than anything else, depends on the intention of the offeror/promisor, 
but, when the contract is established as a result of such an intention, it can then only 
be cancelled or modified by the agreement of all contracting parties. For instance, in 
the case of a revocable credit, the intention of the offeror/promisor (the issuing 
bank) is to impose nothing upon itself and the offeree expresses his agreement 
about such a decision by signing the contract at a later stage. So, the bank reserves 
for itself a right of modification or cancellation of the credit without giving any notice 
to other parties to the credit contract (the applicant for the credit and the 
beneficiary), or without asking for their consent. By contrast, in the case of an 
irrevocable letter of credit it is the offeror's decision to make an obligatory offer and
See Section B.2.1.2 o f the present chapter concerning the doctrine o f consideration and "commercial 
character" o f LCs which is accepted by some English courts as an exception to the general principle o f 
contract law in English law.
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to impose a duty upon himself, namely, to keep his offer open within the period of 
time accepted under the offer. So, when such an offer puts a burden upon the bank 
it becomes responsible from the time of issue of the credit. Such an undertaking 
becomes enforceable when the offeree accepts the bank's offer. As regards the 
offeree, his duties start from the time of his acceptance of the offer; in other words, 
from the time of establishing the contract. From that moment the terms of the 
contract can only be changed or cancelled by agreement of all parties thereto. 
Therefore, it is more appropriate to analyse the revocable or irrevocable nature of 
an offer in general, and the letter of credit in particular, on the basis of the offeror's 
intention rather than of consideration.
Consequently, as to the time of establishment of an irrevocable credit 
contract as regards the issuing bank, from different points of time mentioned 
previously, it seems situation 1 (namely from the time of issuing the credit) is 
preferable for reasons discussed above. This view can find support in English courts 
which have accepted LCs as exceptions to the general principles accepted under 
contract law because of their "commercial character"; and also banks in practice 
have adopted such a view, supported by the ICC. However, there is no reference as 
to the time of establishment of the credit binding the issuing bank under Section 5- 
106 of the UCC.
As to the beneficiary's position, it seems situation 6, namely, the time when 
an offer is accepted expressly or implicitly from the conduct of the offeree, is the 
most appropriate since after receiving a credit the beneficiary may reject it on the 
ground of its discrepancy with terms and conditions of the sale contract. This view 
has been supported under English law for above stated reasons, although it is 
different from the view accepted in American law under Section 5-106 (1)(b) of the 
UCC. There is no reference relevant to this point under UCP 500.
Consequently, for having a more precise and reliable set of standards related 
to LCs in international trade, it would be appropriate to provide provisions about the 
time of establishment of an irrevocable letter of credit transaction affecting all 
interested parties thereto.
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2.2.3. The presenter’s reservation of lien or claim over presented docu­
ments
Sub-section 2 of Section 5-110 of the UCC provides: "Unless otherwise 
specified a person by presenting a documentary draft or demand for payment under 
a credit relinquishes upon its honour all claims to the documents and a person by 
transferring such draft or demand or causing such presentment authorizes such 
relinquishment. An explicit reservation of claim makes the draft or demand non- 
complying."^® It is a reasonable rule and the entire purpose of the documentary 
credit system from the applicant/buyer point of view is preserved by that sub­
section. If the beneficiary/seller would like to keep some control over presented 
documents, such a desire must be specifically agreed upon by contracting parties to 
a letter of credit. There is no provision for emphasis over the applicant's right over 
tendered documents after honouring a draft or demand for payment under the UCP 
500. Therefore, in respect of clarifying the rights and duties of parties to a credit 
transaction, it seems appropriate that a provision similar to the one considered 
above should also be stipulated within any set of standards related to LCs.
2.2.4. Additional warranties on presentment of documents by the benefi­
ciary
Although under the doctrine of strict compliance as one of the pillars of the 
documentary credit system, a beneficiary is to be paid only if the documents he 
presents comply with terms and conditions of the credit contract,®® there is no 
reference under the UCP regarding the beneficiary's warranty to present documents 
which cover all necessary conditions stipulated in the credit. By contrast, such an
79 Section 5-110(2) was omitted in PFD, supra (f.n. 1); see table 2.1 (below).
For instance see Articles 2, 4 ,  and 13 o f UCP 500; and regarding the principle o f strict compliance look at 
relevant discussions in Chapters II (Section B.2.1) above and V I (below).
115
additional warranty is emphasised under sub-section 1 of Section 5-111 of the 
UCC.®'
Is there any benefit in requiring such an additional warranty? One may argue 
that there is no need for confirming such a point since under the credit operation the 
beneficiary is only entitled for payment if he presents those documents which are 
required by the credit contract and comply with terms and conditions of it. In other 
words, an additional warranty by the beneficiary for the same issue adds nothing to 
the fact that if the documents are not satisfactory the beneficiary loses his right of 
payment under the credit and banks are entitled to reject his documents and refuse 
payment. On the other hand, it is possible to say that by emphasising the need for 
such an additional warranty, the beneficiary becomes responsible, in case of a 
dispute between him and the bank as regards the issue in consideration, namely, as 
to who is responsible to prove that tendered documents comply with conditions 
stipulated in the credit. In other words, the burden of proving the matter is on the 
beneficiary rather than on the bank examining the documents. Questions may arise 
as to why the burden for proving the compliance of presented documents with 
credit's conditions should be on the beneficiary rather than on the bank? Why the 
bank should not be responsible for its decision to reject tendered documents? In
See below appendix 1 for the text o f that section. To understand the purpose o f Section 5-111, in an 
official comment said: "The purpose o f this section is to state the peculiar warranty o f performance made by 
the bénéficiai^ and to make clear the intermediaiy character o f the persons moving the documents from the 
beneficiaiy to the customer. The beneficiary's warranty o f compliance with the conditions o f the credit in 
subsection (1) is expressly extended to all interested parties unless agreed to the contrary. So far as the draft 
or the relavant documents are concerened, the beneficiary's warranties are usually those o f an ordinary 
transferor or indorser for value although vaiying circumstances may alter this. The usai warranties o f an 
intermediary, listed in subsection (2), are primarily its own good faith and authority. See also Comment to 
Section 5-114(2)." [ "U n ifo rm  Commercial Code” . The American Law Institute and the National 
Conference o f Commissions on Uniform States Laws, 1972 Official Text, with Comments and Appendix 
showing 1972 changes, p. 431]; In South A frican Reserve Bank v. Samuel. (1931), 39 Ll.L.R. 87, at p. 93, 
Rowlatt, J. decided that it is the first obligation o f the beneficiary to present documents which comply with 
terms and conditions o f the credit and i f  he fails to cany out such undertaking he loses his right(s) under the 
credit. The relevant part o f his judgment is as following: "When one discovered what exactly the letter o f 
credit means, then I think the person acting under it is bound to act under it quite literally, and can not be at 
liberty to say: "In the end it w ill all come out the same", or "I might have thought so and so, and you would 
not have objected i f  I had asked you that in the first instance","; similar provision was suggested in Section 
5-110(a) o f PFD, supra (f.n. 1); look at appendix 2 for text o f the refen ed section.
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other words, it is the bank that should provide sufficient reasons for its decisions for 
refusing payment under the credit.
In connection with the second question, Article 14(d)(ii) of UCP 500 supports 
the idea that it is the bank's duty to state all the reasons for rejecting documents 
presented by the beneficiary in a special notice.®  ^ It says: "Such notice must state 
all discrepancies in respect of which the bank refuses the documents."®® Although 
there is no similar provision under the UCC, as another distinction between the UCC 
and the UCP 500, it is surely the bank's responsibility to provide sufficient reasons 
for rejecting presented documents under the credit transaction.®'^ Regarding the first 
question above one should make a distinction between the bank's undertaking and 
the beneficiary's duty as far as documents are concerned. The bank's responsibility 
to examine tendered documents and their compliance with credits' conditions is a 
duty against its customer (the applicant for a credit); there is no such undertaking for 
banks against the beneficiary of such a credit. As a matter of fact, it is the 
beneficiary who accepts under the credit transaction that banks are only obliged to 
pay the amount of the credit if documents presented by him comply with conditions 
stipulated in the credit. Therefore, it is reasonable that the burden of proving the 
compliance of documents with conditions of the credit should be put upon the 
beneficiary rather than the bank in case of any dispute between them.
The importance of the beneficiary's undertaking as to the point under 
consideration becomes clear when the issue of "right of recourse" arises; are, in
For the procedure o f such a notice see Article 14(d)(1) o f the UCP 500.
Article 16(d) o f the UCP 400 (1983) was drafted differently regarding to the point in discussion and said: 
" I f  the issuing bank decides to refuse the documents, it must give notice to that effect without delay [...] Such 
notice must state the discrepancies in respect o f which the issuing bank refuses the document." The reason 
for such a change o f policy namely the bank must state all discrepencies in its notice seems that draftsmen o f 
the UCP felt that it is better to make the provisions more specific and precise. However, in "The Lena". 
[1981] Ll.L.R. 68, M r. Justice Parker stated that it is the issuing bank's right to check all documents and such 
a bank is not bound to give all reasons for its rejection at once; moreover, there is no provision similar to 
Article 14(d)(ii) o f the UCP 500 under the UCC.
See Section 5-114 (4)(b) o f the UCC that says: "the issuer may reject documents which do not comply 
with the credit itself i f  it does do within three banking days following its receipt o f the documents."
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the case of insolvency of the applicant for a credit, banks entitled to bring an action 
against the beneficiary for the amount paid under the credit, on the ground of 
"breach of warranty" by the beneficiary? In other words, would the beneficiary's 
obligation to present documents required under the credit to some extent affect the 
bank's undertaking, namely, examining tendered documents? This point has been 
considered in more detail elsewhere;®® in brief, if it is accepted that there is a 
reasonable ground to support the view that to some extent the beneficiary agrees 
under the credit transaction to provide documents compliant with credit's conditions, 
there is no justification to free banks from their main duties under the credit contract, 
namely, examining presented documents and deciding to accept or to reject them 
within a period of time agreed by the contracting parties. Supposing that tendered 
documents are not in compliance with the credit's conditions, by accepting them, 
banks waive their rights under the credit transaction. Therefore, it is not reasonable, 
at a later stage, for the same bank to be entitled to bring an action against the 
beneficiary on the ground of "breach of warranty". This argument can be supported 
by Section 5-114(5) of the UCC which provides; "Failure to reject documents within 
the time specified in sub-paragraph (b) constitutes acceptance of documents and 
makes the payment final in favour of the beneficiary."®®
Consequently, points relevant to our discussion are; (1) there is a distinction 
between the UCP 500 and the UCC as to the issue under consideration; (2) the 
UCC, by providing a precise rule, prevents further confusion; in that respect, it is an 
advantage of the UCC, comparing it with the UCP 500, and it is appropriate that any 
international sets of standards relating to LCs should adopt a similar policy, namely, 
to provide a provision which makes the responsibility of both the beneficiary and the 
bank(s) clear within the credit contract relating to required documents and their 
compliance with conditions of the credit.
85 See Chapter V III, Section A.2,2 (discussion related to wrongfull acceptance o f tendered documents).
For similar view see Article 14 (e) o f the UCP 500 that provides: " I f  the Issuing Bank [...] fails to act in 
accordance with the provisions o f this Article [...] the Issuing Bnak [...] shall be precluded from claiming that 
the documents are not in accordance with the terms and conditions o f the Credit."
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2.2.5. Insolvency
In a volatile and unstable international trade market the issue of bankruptcy 
of one of the parties in an international transaction may be a point of factual 
relevance to business activities. This applies also to banker's commercial letters of 
credit, particularly with the increased application of LCs in recent decades. A 
question of importance may arise: would the rights of parties under the LC 
transaction be affected by bankruptcy law (namely, in case of insolvency o f a 
party to a contract would all his creditors be treated similarly)? To consider this 
point, different possibilities exist (discussed below), because insolvency is not an 
issue limited only to one party and under letters of credit all three parties (the 
applicant for a credit, the issuing bank, and the beneficiary) risk losing their 
solvency; but the bank's insolvency is the most important (considered first, below). 
Regarding the relevant international standards, UCP 500 provides no rules; but the 
issue under consideration has received attention under Section 5-117 of the UCC.
2.2.5.1. Bank's insolvency
1. The effect of the issuing bank's insolvency on the beneficiary
The effectiveness of a letter of credit is based on the fact that the obligation 
of the issuing bank to pay the beneficiary is independent of the underlying 
transaction between the beneficiary and the account party. This is known as the 
"independence doctrine" of letters of credit or "doctrine of autonomy".®^ One of the 
matters which would have an impact on the beneficiary's right of payment under 
LCs is insolvency of the issuing bank undertaking to provide payment.®® As a result
For more details about the doctirne o f autonomy see relevant discussions in Chapters II (Section B.2) 
above and V II (below).
Harfield, supra (f.n. 54), pp. 236-57 [about the insolvency o f the issuing bank]; at pp. 236-37 the same 
writer pointed out why the insolvency o f the issuing bank, and not the other banks, is important from the 
beneficiai-y's point o f view. He said: "A  letter o f credit transaction is predicated upon the continuing solvency 
o f the issuing bank. The expectation o f this continuing solvency makes the letter o f credit desireable to the 
beneficiary [...] So long as the issuing bank is solvent, it is relatively immaterial whether or not an advising, 
negotiating, or confirming bank fails. The advising bank is merely a conduit for communication; it 
undertakes no responsibility. [...] Similarly, although a confirming bank does undertake a direct, independent 
responsibility to the beneficiary, the failure o f the confirming bank leaves the beneficiary with his direct 
independent right against the issuing bank. [...] Finally, the failure o f a negotiating bank is a matter o f small
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If there is any loss for the applicant he may recover it under the insurance policy. If 
the seller wishes to pursue his rights against the banker's insolvency, he must carry 
out his side of contract.®  ^ Therefore, the issuing bank's insolvency does not 
automatically end the contract between the bank and the beneficiary and the latter 
is not relieved from fulfilling his part of the contract.
2. Bank's insolvency and its impact on the applicant
Similarly, the applicant for a credit should understand his rights in the event 
his bank becomes insolvent and take precautions to avoid "bank risk". The 
applicant's liability under the contract of reimbursement is to reimburse the amount 
of credit paid by the issuing bank. There is a possibility that the issuing bank after 
accepting a time draft and before maturity of the draft and payment goes into 
bankruptcy: therefore, the bank liquidator takes the position that the applicant for the 
credit is obliged under the contract of reimbursement to put the bank in funds one 
day before the maturity of the draft. What would be a safe procedure for the 
applicant while there is a risk that the funds become a part of the general assets of 
the insolvent bank and the holder of the draft could only receive a pro rata share of 
that assets? A sound practice is that the applicant for the credit makes a special 
agreement with the bank liquidator that the funds paid under the contract of 
reimbursement meet the bank's undertaking under the letter of credit. If such an 
agreement is achieved then the applicant safeguards himself against the risk of 
payment for more than the face amount of the draft. What would be done by the 
applicant if the bank's trustee does not agree with his suggestion, namely, to pay 
the funds received from the applicant for honouring the draft issued under the letter 
of credit transaction? Does the law support the applicant's action if he chooses to 
pay the amount of the draft directly to the holder of the draft? There are some cases
Sales Corporation. 206 N.Y. 499, 184 N.E. 68 (1933 App. Div. 655, 255 N.Y. Supp. 841 (1st Dep't., 1932) 
and UCC Section 5-117; it is likely that a similar decision would be reached in the UK."
Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 75), at. p. 42 pointed out that, "It would seem that insolvency does not 
automatically end the contract between the parties, nor is it breached, and thus it follows that the seller is not 
relieved from fu lfilling  his part o f the contract."; Davis, supra (f.n. 20), pp. 92-5.
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decided in the USA which uphold the applicant's decision in the above mentioned 
circumstances. For instance, in Bank of US v. S e l t z e r , t h e  defendant buyer 
caused the plaintiff to issue a letter of credit in favour of a Japanese seller. The 
sellers' time draft had been accepted by the plaintiff issuing bank, but before 
payment the bank went into bankruptcy. Under the reimbursement contract between 
the issuing bank and its customer (Seltzer), the latter was obliged to put the bank in 
funds one day before the maturity of the draft. The defendant, firstly, offered to 
arrange for payment under one condition, namely, that the liquidator held the funds 
specifically for payment of the draft upon its maturity. Alternatively, the applicant/ 
defendant offered to pay the amount of draft directly to the holder upon condition 
that the bank trustee release him from his liability under the reimbursement contract. 
The liquidator did not accept these suggestions and refused to honour the draft 
upon its maturity date. Then, the defendant paid the draft and so advised the 
liquidator when the latter brought an action against the former according to the 
reimbursement contract. The court held for the defendant on the ground that there 
had been a failure of consideration between the bank and its customer, namely, the 
bank failed to perform its undertaking under the reimbursement contract (paying the 
amount of the draft issued under the letters of credit) as a result of its bankruptcy, 
and having breached its contract there was thus a failure of consideration.®®
It is said that the onus of proof is on the buyer/ applicant to prove that the 
fund was deposited for a special purpose, namely, paying the beneficiary's drafts 
under the letter of credit.®'^  It is also pointed out that if the applicant for a credit put 
the banks in funds but there is no special reference to the purpose of those funds, it
92 233 A.D. 225, 251 N.Y.S. 637 (1931); Harfield, supra (f.n. 54), p. 243.
Similar result was accepted In Greenoiigh v. M un i oe. 46 F. 2d 537 (S.D.Y.N. 1931); for more details 
about the relationship between the bank and its customer in case o f insolvency o f the bank see section 3.05 
o f McCullough, supra (f.n. 45); and Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 75), p. 36; see also Ellinger, supra (f.n. 57), pp. 
143-45 and pp. 173-74 and Davis, supra ( fn . 20), pp. 61-64 [about the question o f the rights o f the applicant 
for the credit who has placed the banker in funds to enable him to meet the beneficiary's draft under the letter 
o f credit and the bank becomes insolvent prior to payment].
Davis, supra ( fn . 20), at p. 62.
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should be used for the banks' undertaking under the credit, the seller beneficiary 
may not be entitled to benefit from such deposit.®®
2.2.5.2. Insolvency of the applicant for a credit
A similar dilemma would arise between the bank and its customer (the 
applicant for the credit or the account party) when the latter becomes a debtor in 
bankruptcy. Then the question is: does the bank honour the beneficiary's draft and 
provide payment under the credit, placed in the same position as other creditors of 
an insolvent account party? In other words, does the bank's security under the letter 
of credit (right of reimbursement) put the bank in a better position than other 
creditors who do not have such a security.®®
In case of commercial letters of credit the insolvency of the applicant for the 
credit causes less harm for the bank since in that type of credits banks usually take 
documents as a security measure; so, in case of insolvency of the applicant they 
use the documents and resell the goods to recover their money paid under the 
credit.®  ^ In case of standby letters of credit (SLCs) banks may face difficulties if they
Davis, supra (f.n. 20), pp. 93-94; the same writer suggested that there is a possibility that the beneficiary 
may benefit from such a fund and that is where the bank and its customer both become insolvent. In such 
sitution it is said that the Rule in Ex parte W aring (1815), 19 Ves. 345 applies. The Rule can be briefly 
stated as follows: "Where the customer has remitted bills or given other securities to his banker to meet 
acceptances and both become insolvent, the securities held by the banker are available to the holders o f the 
acceptances which the securities have been remitted to meet." [for further details about the Rule see pp. 94- 
95 and p. 205 o f the same reference.]
Rodenberg, James A., "Letters o f credit in bankruptcy: Can the independence doctrine survive 
preference attacks?". Commercial Law Journal, Vol. 96, No. 4, Winter 1991, pp. 431-56, at p. 439 said: "A 
survey o f the bankruptcy case law addressing letter o f credit situations in which the account party is the 
debtor reveals a progression from vety basic and general principles to, recently, very technical and specific 
issues. [...] The first issue confronted by the courts when the account party to a letter o f credit was the debtor 
was whether a letter o f credit was property o f the debtor,"; see also Colon, Edgardo E., "Letters o f credit in 
times o f business and bank fa ilu res", Banking Law Journal, Vol. 107, Iss. 1, January/February 1990, pp. 6- 
37 that in the abstract o f the article said: "How to deal with a letter o f credit when the bank customer has 
gone bankrupt has proven to be a d ifficu lt issue for bankruptcy courts. The heart o f the problem seems to be 
how to maintain intact the properties and characteristics o f letters o f credit but, at the same time, respect the 
equity and fairness principles embodied in the Bankruptcy Code. The question o f whether a bankruptcy court 
should estimate letters o f credit as a contingent claim , even though they are contingent on a future event, 
can be answered only through cases and treaties that have dealt w ith similar issues. The establishment o f an 
escrow account in the insolvency or reorganisation plan should persuade a bankruptcy court to obstain from 
estimating letters o f credit." [Emphasis added.]
For more details see discussion relevant to the bank's security in Chapter V III.
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do not arrange for proper security since in such a case, contrary to the use of 
commercial letters of credit, banks do not have control over valuable documents. 
Under SLCs the bank's customer (applicant for the SLCs) has usually defaulted not 
by failing to pay for the amount of the credit when the goods have arrived, but by 
failing to conduct the promise made under the transaction, e.g., building a factory. In 
such a situation, if banks provide no security for their services, they may find 
themselves as unsecured creditors beside other creditors of the insolvent customer.
As to the insolvency of the applicant for the credit and its impact upon the 
beneficiary's right of payment under the credit, it is worth pointing out that the letter's 
benefits under LCs are not affected as a result of the former's bankruptcy, since the 
beneficiary's payment under the credit is not made out of the property of the 
applicant, but out of the bank's own funds. Therefore, if there is any dispute In that 
respect it is between the applicant and his bank.®®
In respect of the time of insolvency of the applicant and its impact upon his 
contractual relationship with the issuing bank, several points of time should be 
differentiated, as follows.
1, Prior to the time of acceptance of the applicant’s application for issuing a 
credit
The applicant submits an application for the issue of a credit, but before his 
application is accepted by the issuing bank the applicant, unknown to the bank, files 
an assignment for a receiving order or is declared bankrupt. If subsequent to the 
effective date of bankruptcy a letter of credit is issued and accepted by the 
beneficiary, would the trustee (appointed to control the applicant's assets) and the 
issuing bank contest the validity of the credit? it is hard to support the idea that in
One o f the first cases in the USA that considered the effect o f the applicant's bankruptcy on LCs is fn re 
M arine D istributors. Inc.. 522 F, 2d. 791 (9th Circuit 1975). In that case the banks' customer (the applicant 
for the credit) became insolvent and the timstee in bankruptcy tried to obtain an injunction against the bank 
restraining the issuer from honouring the letters o f credit. The court held for the bank and the beneficiary o f 
the credit on the ground based upon the "doctrine o f autonomy" namely that the applicant for the credit is not 
a party to a letter o f credit Ixansaction between the bank and the beneficiary; therefore, the bank has an 
independent obligation namely to pay the beneficiary.
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such a situation the beneficiary should be prevented from receiving his payment 
under the credit if he is carrying out his obligations under the credit transaction. The 
main reason in favour of such argument is the doctrine of autonomy.
2. Prior to the Issue of the credit
Prior to the issue of the credit the applicant files an assignment in 
bankruptcy, and before any documents are presented by the beneficiary the issuing 
bank receives a notice from the applicant's trustee advising the bank that any assets 
which belongs to the applicant now form part of the bankrupt estate. As a result of 
such a notice is the issuing bank entitled to stop payment under the credit 
transaction if the beneficiary presented required documents? An author has rightly 
pointed out that the bankruptcy of the applicant has no effect on the right of the 
beneficiary under the letter of credit since, firstly, on the date of contract the 
applicant had full capacity to enter into the contract; and secondly, the letter of credit 
is independent from the underlying contract.®®
3. Following the issue of the credit
There should be no problem in such a situation because the credit 
transaction between the issuing bank and the beneficiary is an independent 
contract.^®®
Sarna, Lazar, "Letters o f credit: Bankruptcy, fraud and identity o f pa rties". The Canadian Bar 
Review, Vol. 65, 1986, pp. 303-27, at p. 312 [hereinafter it is referred to as Sarna].
It is a common case and there are many decided cases related to issue under consideration. For instance in 
a Canadian decision Re M eridian Developments Inc. and Toronto-Dominian Bank. (1984) 11 D.L.R. 
(4th) 576 (Alta. Q.B.) held in favour o f the view that banks's undertaking is independent. On the other hand 
in an American case In Re Tw ist Cap. Inc. v. Southeast Bank. 1 Banker, 284 (Banker D. Fla. 1979), the 
court enjoined the issuing bank from making payment under the letter o f credit fo llow ing the bankruptcy o f 
the applicant under a standby letter o f credit on the ground that the contract was executory, and under section 
365(a) o f the Bankruptcy Code in the USA which provides that the trustee may assume or reject any 
executory contiact or unexpired lease o f the debtor. That decision was severely creticised. [For more details 
about that decision see Baird, Doglas G., "Standby letters of credit in b ankrup tcy". University o f Chicago 
Review, Vol. 49, Part 1, Winter 1982, pp. 130-54]]; and for other relevant matterials see Verkuil, Paul R., 
"B ank solvency and standby letters o f credit: Lessons from  the USNB fa ilu re " . Tulane Law Review, 
Vol. 53, 1979, pp.314-28, Mclaughline, Gerald T., "The impact o f Federal C rim ina l and Bankruptcy 
Laws on letters o f c re d it" . Commercial Lending Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, Winter 1988-89, pp. 28-38, at p. 31 
said: "Recently, however, courts have had to grapple with whether or not standby letters o f credit can be used 
to effect eve-of-bankruptcy preferential transfers to credittors. Since monies paid under a letter o f credit are 
the property o f the issuing bank, not the property o f the bankrupt debtor, the letter o f credit mechanism may
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2.2.5.3. Beneficiary's insolvency
Under letters of credit the insolvency of the bank or its customer (the 
applicant for the credit) is a cause for disputes between interested parties but the 
beneficiary's insolvency has received less attention since it has less impact upon the 
banks' undertaking under the credit, namely, payment against documents which 
comply with terms and conditions of the creditT^ However, there are several 
possibilities: 1) a letter of credit is issued for the beneficiary and before the 
performance under the credit the beneficiary goes into bankruptcy; 2) the 
beneficiary becomes insolvent after the performance under the credit and before 
presenting any document(s) to the bank; 3) the beneficiary becomes bankrupt after 
presenting the documents required under the credit and before their acceptance by 
the bank; and 4) the beneficiary's insolvency comes after his documents are 
accepted by the bank and before payment. In all of the above situations the 
question may arise whether the trustee In bankruptcy can draw on the letter of 
credit.
As pointed out above, payment under the credit is conditional, namely, 
against documents in compliance with the credit's conditions; therefore, in the above 
situations 1 and 2 no documents are presented, so the paying bank is under no duty 
to provide payment under the credit. Even if the trustee in bankruptcy chooses to 
carrying out the beneficiary's obligations and presents required documents under 
the credit, he may face the banks's objection on the ground that documents are not 
issued (e.g. commercial invoice) and presented (e.g. bills of lading, insurance policy 
etc.) by the beneficiary himself as required under the credit transaction.^®^
arguably be able to execute preferential transfers. It s e e m s  clear, however, that the law should not allow a 
debtor to do indirectly what it cannot do directly."
See Articles 2, 4, and 13 o f UCP 500.
The whole structure o f the documentary credits system is based on the faith o f the bank upon the 
beneficiary as far as documents are concerened. So, even i f  documents like b ills o f lading, insurance issued 
by person other than the beneficiary they should be presented by the beneficiary o f the credit and no body 
else and this issue is also confirmed under Article 48(h) o f the UCP 500 namely "the Credit can be 
transferred only on the teims and condition es specified in the original Credit [...]"; and as to the situation that 
the documents must be issued by the beneficiai-y himself see Article 37 (a)(1) which provides that a
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Is such an argument acceptable? To challenge that argument it is possible to 
suggest that the position of a trustee in bankruptcy is different from the position of a 
second beneficiary (in case of transferable credit) requiring the bank's prior 
agreement, since, he is appointed by the law relevant to the bankruptcy in particular 
circumstances and it is obvious that the law overrules any agreement made by 
parties to a private contract in case of conflict between the terms of that contract 
and the law/®® So, in general, the bank’s argument may be rejected by courts on 
the ground explained above; however, it is sounder for the trustee to reach some 
sort of agreement with the bank before starting any performance under the credit.
In respect of situation 3 above (namely, the beneficiary becoming insolvent 
after presenting the required documents and before his documents are accepted by 
the banks) the trustee's position is different from that stated under situation 2. In 
those circumstances if tendered documents are in compliance with the credits' 
conditions, then the bank is obliged to arrange payment under the credit and the 
beneficiary is entitled to assign its right to proceed to the trustee (under Article 49 of 
the UCP 500).^ ®'^  By contrast, if presented documents are rejected by the bank for
commercial invoice "must appear on their face to be issued by the Beneficiary made in the Credit (except as 
provided in Article 48)."
Sarna, supra (f.n. 99), at p. 309 stated: "Even i f  the trustee in bankruptcy find himself in such a position, 
he may find it is unable to enforce the rights o f the bankrupt beneficiary because o f the strict compliance 
rule, [...] in case Sw ift A ir  Lines v. Crocker National Bank. US Bankruptcy Appl. (1983), 30 B.R. 490, 
reported in (1984), 2 I.B.L. 143 the issuer refused to make payment upon being presented a document signed 
by the trustee in bankruptcy o f the corporate bankrupt. Under law the trustee has a fu ll power under the Ic the 
beneficiaiy must sign documents peresenting for the payment [...] fo llow ing the bankruptcy the beneficiary is 
not permitted to act on its own behalf [...] therefore the trustee was prevented from asserting the beneficiary's 
right under the credit."
Here other points may arise namely whether a bankrupt beneficiary is able to apply his right o f proceeds 
under the credit even after he becomes insolvent. It is obvious that after bankruptcy the beneficiary has no 
right to act in his own name; therefore, do the trustee assign the right o f the proceeds to another person (the 
assignee) instead o f the insolvent beneficiaiy? There are nothing relating to those issues under Article 49 o f 
UCP 500 and Section 5-116 o f the UCC; Sarna, supra (f.n. 99), at p. 308 said; "In the event o f bankruptcy o f 
the beneficiary under the letter o f credit one might readily assume that the beneficiary's rights vest in the 
trustee, permitting the trustee to act in stead o f the beneficiary for all purpose, including presentation o f 
documents, execution o f drafts and demand for payment. There are, however, objections to this assumption. 
Those objections relate to certain letters o f credit which on their face are said not to be assignable, or are not 
assignable as a result o f the governing code o f rules. The other basis o f attack is the literal wording o f the 
letter o f credit, which requires the personal intervention o f the beneficiary at the most crucial stages o f the 
letter o f credit transaction, namely, presentation o f documents and demand for payment."; as to the issue o f
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any reason, then the trustee's position should be considered under situation 2 
(discussed above). A conclusion similar to what is discussed with respect to 
situation 3 (namely, the beneficiary going into bankruptcy after presenting 
documents stipulated under the credit and before acceptance but accepted later by 
the bank) would be acceptable for situation 4, namely, where the beneficiary 
becomes bankrupt after his documents are accepted by the bank(s) and before 
payment.
2.2.5.4. Section 5-117 of the UCC
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) addresses, under Section 5-117, bank 
insolvency by requiring that any funds held as collateral by the issuing bank for a 
documentary credit must be used to pay drafts presented under the credit. Any 
excess must be returned to the importer. By contrast, the UCP 500 contains no 
provisions relating to the insolvency of the issuing bank.^ ®®
As to sub-section 1 of Section 5-117 a question may arise; does UCC cover 
only those credits which are issued under paragraphs (a) or (b) of section 5-102(1) 
of the UCC? In other words, what is the solution where an issued credit is not within 
those mentioned in the above paragraphs but falls under paragraph (c) of section 
5-102(1): "but conspicuously stated that letter of a credit or is conspicuously so 
entitled." It has been said that the reason for accepting such a policy is to prevent 
abusing the provision in case of ambiguity.^®® It seems there is a distinction 
between Section 5-117 and Section 5-102(1). if a credit falls into the last category of
assignment the same writer pointed out: "Accordingly, i f  a credit is silent as to the matter, it is presumed to 
be non-transferable; on the other hand, the silence o f the credit does not prevent the beneficiary from 
assigning its rights to proceeds. It is evident that an assginee would have no right to proceeds unless the 
demand mechanism is appropriately triggered by the beneficiary itself presenting the documentation and 
making the appropriate demand for payment." [Sarna, supra (f.n. 99), p. 308]; for more details about the 
right o f assignment o f the proceeds under the credit see relevant discussion under the present section.
Ellinger, JBL 1994, supra (f.n. 27), p. 28; in the Proposal Final Draft (PFD) for revision o f Article 5 o f 
the UCC the omission o f Section 5-117 was suggested; see table 2.1 (below).
In Official Comment to Section 5-117 said: "The section is limited to transactions under Section 5-102(1) 
(a) and (b) to prevent abuse in situations where the commercial purpose o f facilitating the movement o f 
goods, securities or the like may be lacking."
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section 5-102(1), i.e. paragraph(c), and is supported by law, there should be no 
objection that such a credit be confirmed and covered by Section 5-117 too,
2.2.5.5. Concluding remarks
A letter of credit assures payment from one party to another by making 
arrangements for a bank to lend its full faith and credit to the transaction. The 
process assumes that the issuing bank is at least as creditworthy as its customers, 
but this is not always true. The best way that the other parties to a credit transaction 
(applicant for a credit and the beneficiary) can reduce the risk of bank insolvency is 
to consider carefully the financial strength of banks from which they obtain their LCs
107services.
One important issue generated as a result of the bankruptcy of the issuing 
bank is whether the law of bankruptcy has any impact on the "doctrine of 
autonomy" accepted under the documentary credit systems. In other words, 
whether the beneficiary's special right of payment under the credit would be affected 
in such a situation. There are two views regarding this question, but the preferred 
opinion is that the bank's trustee is not entitled to put the beneficiary of a credit in 
the position of other creditors of the bank and treat him similarly. On the other hand, 
it becomes clear that the bank's insolvency does not automatically put an end to the 
credit transaction and if the beneficiary likes to pursue his rights under the credit, he 
must carry out his side of the contract, namely, by presenting documents required 
by the credit contract and compliant with its terms and conditions.
As to the banks's insolvency and its impact upon the applicant for a credit, 
who under the reimbursement contract must reimburse the amount of the credit one 
day before the maturity of the credit, or deposit funds for the purpose of meeting the 
beneficiary's draft(s) drawn under the letter of credit, it Is accepted by courts in the
Locher, Gabriel, "Hedge your bets in L /C  transactions". Business Credit, Vol. 94, Iss. 6, June 1992, 
pp. 28-29 stated: "When reviewing any bank's financial statements, the follow ing points should be 
considered: 1. Is the bank adequately capitalized?; 2. Does the bank's capital position meet or exceed 
regulatoi-y requirements? 3. Is the allowance for loan losses inadequate, given the bank's level o f non­
performing or past due loans?; 4. What is the ratio o f non-performing loans to total loans? Crucial to the 
health o f a financial institution is the state o f its loan portfolio."
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USA and supported by writers that the bank’s trustee is not entitled to prevent the 
applicant from paying the beneficiary directly in case the trustee does not agree to 
treat the beneficiary as a preferred creditor and release the applicant from his duty, 
namely, by paying the full amount of the credit if the beneficiary has fulfilled his side 
of contract under the credit; and the bank's liquidator too is not allowed to deal with 
the applicant's funds deposited for LCs as general assets of the insolvent bank. Of 
course it is for the applicant to provide sufficient proof that the deposited funds are 
for meeting payment under the letter of credit.
In respect of the bankruptcy of the applicant for a credit and its impact upon 
his relationship with the beneficiary as well as the issuing bank, it is concluded that 
because of the "doctrine of autonomy", the applicant's insolvency does not have any 
impact on the right of the beneficiary to receive payment which is secured by the 
issuing bank under the credit transaction; similarly, the time that the applicant 
becomes insolvent (namely prior to the acceptance of the applicants application for 
issuing a credit, prior to the issuance of a credit, and after a credit being issued) has 
no impact on the beneficiary's right of payment under the credit. However, as to the 
effect of the applicant's bankruptcy upon the issuing bank's position, it depends on 
the type of credits and security measures which are agreed by the contracting 
parties, namely, the applicant and the issuing bank under the contract of 
reimbursement. As to banker's commercial letters of credit, the issuing bank faces 
less difficulties since in such a type of credit the bank usually takes the documents 
as security against payment by the applicant; and if the latter fails to provide the 
amount paid by the bank, the issuing bank can refund the money paid under the 
credit by reselling documents; but in the case of SLCs, the issuing bank does not 
have such a security measure and if the bank provides no reliable security it may 
lose its special right under the contract of reimbursement and be treated as one of 
general creditors by the applicant's liquidator.
Regarding the position of a trustee in bankruptcy involving the beneficiary's 
insolvency, and the question whether he is entitled to draw on the letter of credit 
instead of the bankrupt beneficiary, four possibilities are considered in the present
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study: (1) the beneficiary becomes insolvent prior to performance under the credit; 
(2) the beneficiary becomes insolvent after the performance and before presenting 
documents required under the credit to the bank; (3) the beneficiary becomes 
bankrupt prior to the time that his documents are accepted by the bank; and (4) the 
beneficiary's bankruptcy occurs after his documents are accepted by the bank. In 
brief, it is pointed out that under the above possibilities 1 and 2 the bank has no duty 
to pay and if the beneficiary's trustee choose to carry out the beneficiary's side of 
contract (providing required documents under the credit), he may face two 
objections. Firstly, documents presented by the trustee do not comply with credit's 
terms and conditions and therefore they are rejectable under the principle of "strict 
compliance"; secondly, the trustee is not the assignee accepted under Article 49 of 
the UCP 500 (assignment of proceeds), since the procedure is not started by the 
beneficiary and before his bankruptcy; therefore, the trustee is not entitled to 
proceeds under the credit transaction. In response to such objections, it is argued 
that the position of the trustee who is appointed by the law is different from that of 
the ordinary assignee and as a result he is able to proceed under the credit if the 
trustee finds it is appropriate to adopt such action.
In respect of above situations 3 and 4, the trustee's position is less complex 
and if the bank accepts the documents presented by the beneficiary before his 
bankruptcy, then the lawful person to receive the payment under the credit is the 
trustee appointed by the law. If, he rejects tendered documents, then the trustee's 
position is referred back to situation 2 (above namely, the beneficiary becomes 
insolvent after the performance and before presenting required documents under 
the credit to the bank).
Lastly, the existing rules related to the issue of insolvency (Section 5-117 of 
the UCC) are not comprehensive since they cover only some aspect of the bank's 
insolvency in case of LCs, namely, they deal only with the bank's insolvency and 
provide no provisions about the bankruptcy of the applicant for a credit and the 
beneficiary. From an international legal point of view, the present set of standards 
related to LCs (UCP 500) provides no provisions about the issue of insolvency. The
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reasons for adopting such a policy by the ICC are due partly to the legal nature of 
the subject and partly to practical difficulties, for example, concerning a comparative 
study between different legal systems for establishing more harmonious or uniform 
attitudes about the issue of insolvency, lack of expertise, the business interests of 
the banks what would like to have control over the system and lead the system in a 
direction safeguarding primarily their Interests, and expenses; therefore, the ICC 
has deliberately paid no attention to the issue of insolvency, and as a result there is 
no provision stipulated within the UCP even in the last revision of its provisions in 
1993 (UCP 500).
SECTION-' C;„.CONCLUSIONS
1. INTRODUCTION AND COMMON POINTS
In the light of what has been covered in the present Chapter it becomes clear 
that the basic principles governing the letter of credit transaction are widely 
recognised by both UCP 500 and Article 5 of the UCC. They include the notion that 
letters of credit are autonomous transactions or are independent of the underlying 
contracts on which they are based. The issuer is not concerned with or bound by 
underlying contracts; he deals exclusively in documents and not in goods or 
services to which the documents may relate. The issue of the letter of credit and its 
acceptance by the beneficiary entitles the beneficiary to a direct claim against the 
issuer in the event of the issuer's unjustified refusal to pay.
On the other hand, there are distinctions between UCP 500 and UCC, as 
follows.
2. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ARTICLE 5 OF THE UCC AND UCP 
500
2.1. Distinctions as to the general structure of the UCC
2.1.1. Legal nature of the rules
The UCP is not "law" in its specific meaning since it is not the act of any 
legislature or court; but, because it expressly agreed by parties to a letters of
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credit transaction (Article 1 of UCP 500), ttie UCP Is part of a contract/®® By 
contrast, Article 5 of the UCC is a piece of legislation and therefore mandatory in 
nature.
2.1.2. Scope of the rules
2.1.2.1. National and international legal dimention of LCs
Another distinction between UCP and Article 5 of the UCC is that the former 
mostly addresses issues relevant to international documentary letters of credit 
whereas the latter focuses mainly upon providing a more unified law from a national 
perspective. In this respect, distinctions exist between them regarding the scope of 
application of rules and provisions as well as rights and duties of different parties to 
the credit transaction.^®®
2.1.2.2. Letters of credit issued by banks and other financial institutions
A further distinction between the UCC and UCP 500 is that the latter covers 
LCs issued by banks; while Article 5 of the UCC considers those type of credits 
issued by other financial organisations (Section 5~102(1)(b) and (c)).^ ^®
2.2. Distinctions concerning issues of LCs
2.2.1. Issues considered by both the UCC and UCP 500
The UCP is the product of work by bankers. Bank lawyers and traders are 
mostly interested in the practical aspects of LCs rather than in the legal issues 
related to them. This is obvious from different Articles of the UCP 500, particularly,
The opposite view suggested that the UCP based on customs and practices accepted at international level 
by banks; for more details concerning the legal nature o f the UCP see relevant discussion in Chapter XI, 
Section B.2 (below).
Other differences between UCP and UCC are; 1. Court o f appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin honour o f 
draft or demand under the credit transaction (Section 5-114(2)(b)); 2. As to the time o f reimbursement by the 
issuer (Section 5-114(3)) a similar principle is governed by both UCP and UCC; nevertheless, UCC precisely 
provides that such a right should be honoured immediately and provided: "[...] not later than the day before 
maturity o f any acceptance made under the credit."; 3. Conditional payment (Section 5-114(4)(a)- As to that 
issue it is officially stated that the situation was clarified to solve problems arising because o f the currency 
restrictions o f other nations; no similar provision being provided by the UCP; 4. Improper dishonour and 
anticipatory repudiation (Section 5-115)- This subject is another example where no provision is foreseen in 
the UCP.
See discusion concerning scope o f Article 5 o f the UCC in Section B .1.1.2 o f the present chapter (above).
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those related to documents (Articles 24-44). In that respect UCP is much more 
detailed than Article 5 of the UCC; moreover, beside points mentioned above 
(namely legal nature as well as scope of Article 5 of the UCC), it is clear that in 
many instances (as pointed out in Section B(1) of the present Chapter) the UCC has 
taken a more positive view concerning the rights of the applicant for a credit For 
instance, in case of failure in translation or interpretation of any messages related to 
LCs by banks or their agents, the UCC provides some protection for the applicant 
whereas such a relief has been denied under the UCP.^^  ^ A similar flexibility 
appears concerning the bank-beneficiary relationship particularly in case of 
assignment of proceeds.^
On the other hand, UCP 500 is clearer than the UCC as to issues concerning 
SLCs (Section B.1.2.1 above), revocability or irrevocability of a credit where there is 
no indication in the credit as to its type (Section B.1.2.2 above), and transferable 
credit (Section B.1.4.4 above).
2.2.2. Issues considered only under Article 5 of the UCC
In contrast to UCP 500, Article 5 of the UCC covers important issues like 
fraud, bank’s insolvency, indemnities, time of establishment of a credit and many 
other issues/^® The importance of these legal issues leaves no doubt that a set of 
international standards relevant to LCs is not complete unless issues considered out 
above are considered as relevant thereto. Moreover, Article 5 of the UCC provides a 
more equitable rule as far as the applicant for a credit is concerned, namely, 
safeguarding the right of the applicant in case of amendment of the c red i t . ^ In  
addition, as to the time of establishing a letter of credit between bank and other 
parties to the credit transaction, the UCC provides a clear rule whereas the UCP is
For more details see Section B .1.3.1, in the present chapter and Section B .l .1.3, in Chapter IV  (above). 
See the relevant discussion in Section B .l.4.4 o f the present chapter (above).
As to issue o f fraud see Chapter V II, Section B (below) and regarding bank's insolvency, indemnities, and 
time o f establishment o f a credit look at Section B.2 o f the present chapter (above).
See relevant discussion in Section B.2.2.1 o f the present chapter (above).
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silent on the point under cons idera t i onTh is  is true when the UCC considers 
issues like consideration and a necessity for formal requirements and signing of the 
issued credit before it becomes enforceable, or where a list of definitions are 
provided in order to simplify the application of the rules/^^
3. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW
Letters of credit in the USA are governed beside case law, by either the ÜCP 
or Article 5 of the UCC (as the case may be) and it is possible to find credits which 
are governed by bothJ^^ This of course may be a cause for uncertainty because of 
differences existing between them; parties to a credit contract should expressly 
clarify their intentions. It is obvious that in case of conflict, Article 5, because of its 
mandatory nature, would overrule UCP provisions. UCP offers an advantage, 
however, for users of LCs in the USA, namely, issues related to letters of credit are 
better regulated in it. This is not the case under English law and there is not any 
particular Act of Parliament relating to LCs in the UK.
Moreover, concerning the issue of consideration, as pointed out 
previously,^ the position of English law is based on court decisions when 
considering the relationship between banks and the beneficiary of a credit, while 
Article 5 of the UCC (Section 5-105) provides that no consideration is necessaiy to 
establish a relation between banks and the beneficiary.
4. COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS ON UCP 500 AND UCC
UCP 500 codifies some issues related to LCs, but what would be the position  ^
of the ICC concerning issues covered by Article 5 of the UCC? In other words, what 
can be added to the UCP? Different possibilities may be envisaged:
For more details look at Section B.2.2.2 o f the present chapter (above). 
For relevant discussions see above Section B.2.1 o f the present chapter.
1J7 See introduction to Section A  o f the present chapter and sources on standards and rules o f LCs in Section 
B.2 o f Chapter I (above).
See above Section B.2.1.4 o f the present chapter.
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1. The ICC could consider only issues covered by both UCC and UCP. This 
would solve part of the problems but it would leave the greater part of differences 
between those set of standards concerning LCs unresolved.
2. The ICC could consider issues not particularly related to the legal aspect 
of letters of credit transactions such as fraud, insolvency, indemnity as well as 
issues not linked to one particular legal system such as consideration. By adopting 
such an approach to some extent a harmonisation between UCP 500 and the UCC 
could be achieved; but having two sets of standards would still provide a cause for 
confusion between parties to LCs transactions and the law of LCs would remain 
ununified at an international level, and a possible further development would remain 
untouched.
3. The ICC could consider all differences that exist between UCP 500 and 
the UCC in order to provide a uniform international set of standards relating to LCs, 
including legal standards as well as customs and practices relevant to LCs. This 
could be the most suitable approach towards unification of the law of LCs in 
international trade. To be successful in its efforts, the ICC, among other things such 
as having a strong desire, expertise, and strong financial support, could necessarily 
achieve a reasonable balance between the different interests of parties to a letter of 
credit. As it Is pointed out: 'The essence of uniform law revision is to obtain a 
sufficient consensus and balance among the interests of the various participants so 
that universal and uniform enactment by the various states may be achieved."^ 
Would it be possible for the ICC to accept such a challenge? If no, what would be a 
substitute solution?
In the last revision of the UCP (UCP 500) the ICC tried to reduce distinctions 
between UCP provisions and Article 5 of the UCC by changing its attitude in Article 
7(c) of UCP 400 (now Article 6(c) of UCP 500),^^° and to some extent harmonise
‘ See PFD, supra (f.n. 1), at p. xv ii (Prefatory Note).
See discussion concerning the situation when a credit is silent as to type o f credit in Section B. 1.2.2 o f the 
present chapter (above).
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the UCP with UCC. A similar view was shared by draftsmen of the Proposed Final 
Draft (PFD) for revision of Article 5 of the UCC.^^^
Although efforts have been made for harmonising sets of standards related 
to LCs, there exist still a large gap between them; experience from the past shows 
and supports the view that there is a desire to seek a common solution concerning 
issues related to LCs, but such a desire seems to be not sufficiently strong to bridge 
the gap and remove distinctions existing between the UCC and UCP 500. As a 
result, the unification of law of LCs through harmonisation of the UCC and UCP 500, 
as a first step, seems to need considerable time, unless a change of attitude 
emerges on both sides, the ICC or the USA.
As to the second question (what would be a substitute solution for delayed 
harmonisation between UCP 500 and the UCC on the law of LCs?), letters of credit 
remain a major instrument in international trade as well as domestic transactions. To 
facilitate this usefulness and competitiveness, the need is felt that beside custom 
and practice related to LCs the question of unified law should be decided 
worldwide.
A lesson that can be drawn from the experience of preparing Article 5 of the 
UCC is that if a strong desire for and commitment to unification of law of LCs, 
supported by adequate finance and expertise, provide a real opportunity to obtain a 
unified law concerning LCs at an international level between different legal systems, 
this can become possible as it has become possible between different states with 
different jurisdictions in the USA, Moreover, the time is ripe, more than ever, for a
See PFD, supra (f.n. 1), at p. xv ii (Prefatory Note) said: "the goals o f drafting effort were: conforming the 
Article 5 miles to current customs and practices; accomodating new forms o f letters o f credit, changes in 
customs and practices, and evolving technology, particularly the use o f electronic media."; and for an 
example see appendix I for Section 5-112(l)(a) o f the UCC (time allowed for honour or rejection o f 
documents) and appendix 2 for Section 5 -108(b) o f PFD as to the same issue; for relevant discussion see 
Section B. 1.4.1 o f the present chapter (above).
Some other issues which are suggested for revision o f the UCC are: 1. Choice o f law; 2. Subrogation; 3. 
statute o f limitation; 4. Transfer by operation o f law. [See PFD, supra (f.n. 1), pp. xx lii-xxv (Prefatory Note)]
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comparative study between different legal systems concerning LCs under auspices 
of one of the United Nations Organisations (such as UNGITRAL or UNIDROIT).
Regarding the unification/codification of law of LCs at an international level, 
for reasons discussed elsewhere (with respect to the legal nature of the issues and 
practical difficulties affecting the preparing a uniform code of standards, banker's 
business interests, and costs), it is not possible for the ICC to accept the task of 
providing a set of international standards about LCs covering both issues of the 
practical aspects of the current system and legal matters relevant to the 
documentary credit system in international trade; and there is also no justification to 
leave the task of preparing a uniform code of standards totally under the national 
law of each state which otherwise may decide differently. As having uniform 
provisions regarding the practical issues of the documentary credit system is rightly 
important, similar sensitivity should be applied by parties dealing with credit 
transactions, particularly banks and also international organisations working in the 
field of international trade able to promote the idea of a uniform taw dealing also with 
legal issues related to LCs. In such a context, experience in preparing the UCP and 
Article 5 of the UCC can be of great help as well as a source of information, a solid 
foundation and a cornerstone for the further development of the documentary credit 
system in the future.
The need for the unification/codification of the law of LCs at an international 
level, the advantages and disadvantages of a uniform solution, compared with the 
UCP, are considered below in Chapters X and XI; the present chapter confirms our 
previous concern about the UCP as the only existing source of law concerning LCs 
at an international level; but, for reasons submitted above, the UCP does not 
respond to all the needs of the international business community as to LCs. In that 
respect the next few chapters (Chapters VI-VIII) are devoted to legal issues relating 
to LCs from a common law perspective (particularly English law).
For more details concerning the readiness o f the international community and the world o f commerce 
condition see Chapter X, Section B.2 (below).
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PART THREE
LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO
LETTERS OF CREDIT
(COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVE)
In a commercial letter of credit the role of a bank, as a mediator and as one 
of the parties to the credit arrangement, is an important one. To keep the balance 
between the applicant and the beneficiary of the credit, and in order to safeguard its 
interests, a bank is obliged to choose a more cautious approach when dealing with 
tendered documents or where there is an allegation of fraud by the beneficiary or his 
agent. ^ Questions may also arise in circumstances in which the applicant/ buyer, as 
a result of becoming insolvent or for any other reason^ is not able to reimburse the 
bank's money. For such eventualities sufficient security has to be arranged by 
banks.^
Dealing with issues related to the above points is not always an easy task for 
the banks. As a result they have sought to find support for their decisions from 
courts of law in the past. There are good reasons to believe that this situation may 
not be different in the future, unless legal issues related to LCs are clarified by 
appropriate legal texts, in advance, for banks and other parties to credit 
arrangements. Clarification may reduce the probability of disputes. As a result, time 
and costs in law suits and public money could be saved. Moreover, the 
documentary credit system could become more reliable with predictability and 
certainty. The present Part deals with legal issues which in relation to LCs would 
need to be clarified in precise terms anchored in appropriate legislative or other 
(international) instruments, with benefits to all those interested as parties to letters of 
credit in international trade.
' See relevant discussion in Section B, Chapter V II (below).
 ^ For issues related to banks’ security see Chapter V III (below).
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CHAPTER VI
THE BANK'S DUTY TOWARDS
THE APPLICANT FOR A CREDIT
(THE PRINCIPLE OF "STRICT 
COMPLIANCE")
SRCTTON A: LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF 
STRICT COMPLIANCE
There are situations in which the bank must decide to accept tendered 
documents or to refuse payment under the credit.^ The situations in question may 
be as follows.
1. AS TO DOCUMENTS REQUIRED UNDER LETTERS OF CREDIT
1.1. "Stipulated/ not stipulated documents"
Under Article 2 of UCP 500 it is provided that payment is available, "against 
stipulated documents, provided that the terms and conditions of the credit are 
complied with." A question of importance may arise as to what is meant by 
"stipulated documents"? Does it mean that required documents must be 
expressly numbered in the credit itself, or are there situations in which a beneficiary 
of the credit should understand what kind of documents are necessary even if it is 
not specified in the credit? If the answer is positive, what would be the bank's 
obligation under the second paragraph of Article 13(a) of UCP 500 (namely 
"Documents not stipulated in the credit will not be examined by banks. If they 
receive such documents, they shall return them to the presenter or pass them on 
without responsibility.")?"^
1.1.1. In English law
In Banque de I' Indochine et Suez S.A. v. J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) 
Ltd.,^ one of the credit's condition was that the carrying vessel should be a 
"conference line" ship, but there was no call in the credit for any documents relating 
to it. The defendant beneficiary argued that he was not under a duty to prepare 
documents which showed that the goods had been carried by a conference line 
vessel. The argument was rejected by the court of first instance and in the Court of
 ^ As to concept o f principle o f strict compliance see relevant discussion In Section B .l, Chapter II (above).
There was nothing like this point under UCP 400 (1983).
 ^ [1983] A ll ER468; [1983]1 A ll ER 1137 (CA); [1983]! Ll.L.R. 228 (CA).
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Appeal. Donaldson, M.R., stated: "This is an unfortunate condition to include in a 
documentary credit, because it breaks the first rule of such a transaction, namely 
that the parties are dealing in documents, not facts. The condition required a state of 
fact to exist. What the letter of credit should have done was to call for a specific 
document which was acceptable to the buyer and his bank evidencing the fact that 
the vessel was owned by a member of conference. It did not do so and as, 
accordingly, the confirming bank had to be satisfied of the fact, it was entitled to call 
for any evidence establishing that fact."^
What would be the court's point of view now that the LC is subject to UCP 
500? Would it be the same as the above decision of the Court of Appeal? To 
answer these questions, first of all, the position of parties to the credit contract must 
be examined under the UCP, in order to find whether there is any difference 
between UCP 500 and its previous version namely UCP 400.
1.1.2. UCP 500
The related part of Article 2 of UCP 500, mentioned above, is similar to 
Article 2 of UCP 400. But, Article 13, subsection (a) of the present UCP, regarding 
the point in discussion, shows differences with Article 15 of UCP 400. Firstly, terms 
"stipulated in the Credit" is added to the first paragraph; secondly, a new point, 
namely, the second paragraph of Article 13 (a), as mentioned above, is provided. 
Would these changes affect the beneficiary’s position in connection with documents 
which are related to facts of the case? To give an answer to this question it is 
necessary to find what is the correct interpretation "not stipulated in the credit"? 
There are two possibilities:
(1) Wide interpretation- The first argument is that terms "not stipulated in 
the credit" mean all types of documents which are not numbered precisely in the 
credit. This interpretation includes both documents which are not related to facts as
Ibid., p. 1140; similar decision was held in Lebenon in Sta'tni Banka Ceskosloveiiska v. A rab Bank 
L td .. (1972), Partie jurisdiction, 45, Revue Jurisdiciaire Libanaise; Gutteridge, H.C. and Megrah, M, "The 
Law o f The Banker's Commercial C re d it" . London, 1984, 7th ed., pp. 118-19 [hereinafter referred to as 
Gutteridge].
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well as those which are connected to the facts of the case. This is in favour of the 
beneficiary and the bank since the burden is for the applicant for the credit to 
ascertain necessary documents; moreover, this interpretation can also be supported 
by Article 4 of the UCP 500.^ In contrast, the wide interpretation view is the opposite 
to what was decided by the Court of Appeal in Banque de !' Indochine et Suez 
S.A. V. J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd., as mentioned above.
(2) Narrow interpretation- The next argument is that the real interpretation 
of terms "not stipulated in the credit" is that these terms do not cover documents 
which are connected to facts of the case. So, the UCP's position as to the point in 
discussion, either in the previous or present version, has not been changed since 
the second paragraph of section (a) of Article 13 of UCP 500 is only related to those 
types of documents which are not, for any reason, stipulated in the credit and not 
those which are connected to facts of the case. For instance, there may be a 
situation in which the applicant for the credit forgets to call for an insurance policy or 
an invoice and the beneficiary, for any reason, presented such a document.
This view is in favour of the applicant and puts the burden upon the 
beneficiary to present the necessary documents even if they are not stipulated in the 
credit but it is related to the facts of the case. Moreover, this argument is supported 
by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Banque de l ' Indochine case.
However, by accepting the narrow interpretation, banks would face difficulties 
in their relationships with the beneficiary. Since, under Article 13(a) of UCP 500 the 
bank may choose to reject tendered document which it is in the eyes of the 
beneficiaiy a necessary document that must be presented, and vice versa; then, the 
question is: Which interpretation is to be preferred?
It seems the wide interpretation view is a better approach for the point in 
discussion for the following reasons: firstly, to ascertain documents for presentation 
is the applicant's duty so if he, for any reason, does not ask for any particular
 ^ Article 4 o f the UCP 500 provides: "In Credit operations all parties concerned deal with documents, and 
not with goods, services and/or other performances to which the documents may relate."
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document even if it is related to the facts of the case, he should accept the 
responsibility for such a failure; and under the second paragraph of Article 13(a) the 
draftsmen of UCP 500 try to make it clear that the burden is upon the applicant 
rather than the bank. Secondly, it is not always easy for the beneficiary to guess 
which types of documents are important in the eyes of the applicant/ buyer; and, 
even if he can understand the needs of his customer and tries to provide necessary 
documents for him, the beneficiary will face rejection under Article 13(a), so it is a 
futile effort. The beneficiary's position in the present circumstances, therefore, is 
uncertain since there would be a strong possibility that the point under consideration 
(second paragraph of Article 13(a) of UCP 500) would be interpreted differently by 
courts in the UK.
1.1.3. In  Am erican law
As to the situation under consideration (namely non-documentary conditions) 
Article 5 of the UCC provides no rule like Article 13(a) of the UCP 500 quoted 
previously; however, in a draft suggested for revision of Article 5 of the UCC,^ in 
Section 5-108(g) it was suggested: "if an undertaking [...] contains nondocumentary 
conditions, an issuer shall disregard the nondocumentary conditions and treat them 
as if they were not stated."^
1.1.4. Concluding remarks
As a result of above discussion it becomes clear that the point in discussion, 
namely, the meaning of "stipulated/ not stipulated in the credit" is far from clear for 
interested parties to the credit contract. Since, under both situations, namely, the 
wide or narrow interpretation of Article 13(a) of UCP 500 (second paragraph), 
parties to the credit arrangement are not sure what would be their responsibilities 
regarding document(s), particularly where the credit was issued in the United
® The American Law Institute, "U n ifo rm  Commercial Code Revised A rtic le  5. Letters o f C red it (w ith 
ammenclments to Articles 1.2. and 9). Proposed Final D ra ft fA p ril 6. 1995)". Submitted by the Council 
to the Member o f the American Law Institute for Discussion at the Seventy-Second Annual Meeting on May 
16,17,18, and 19, 1995 [hereinafter referred to as PFD (Proposed Final Draft)].
 ^ See below appendix 2 for complete text o f Section 5 -108(g).
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Kingdom. It becomes also clear that there is a difference between UCP 500 and 
UCP 400 as to the point under consideration, namely, the burden of proof and 
relevant risks transferred from the beneficiary to the applicant for a credit; such a 
change of position, however, does not clarify the beneficiary's task of presenting 
necessary documents under LCs since as pointed out above terms such as 
"stipulated/ not stipulated documents" are far from clear and are subject to different 
interpretations. Another matter of concern is that the UCP as a non-mandatory 
provision is open to be changed, namely, parties to LCs are able to contract 
differently from what has been provided under the UCP. Such flexibility of the 
provisions could itself be another cause of uncertainty and banks would be careful 
when dealing with documents. Therefore, the point in discussion would be a ground 
for more disputes and the cause of uncertainty for international users of the letters 
of credit in future.
1.2. Two documents presented in one document
A problem may arise where the beneficiary of a credit presents two or more 
documents in one document. What is the solution under the UCP 500 or English 
law? There is no direct reference to the point in consideration within the present 
UCP. However, one may suggest that the beneficiary's action is not contrary to 
Article 13(a) since he presented all required documents and therefore meets 
conditions stipulated under the article although documents are not separated from 
each other. Further, there is no reference within the UCP which provides that 
required documents must be presented separately. In contrast, it is possible to 
challenge the above argument by literal interpretation of the terms of the credit 
transaction, namely, when a credit calls, e.g., for "two documents", it means two 
documents which are physically separated from each other. As considered below, it 
is vital to safeguard the right of an applicant for a credit in situation under 
consideration.
As far as English law is concerned there is no case regarding the above
point.
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1.2.1. In American law
In American law the point in discussion received attention and it seems the 
beneficiary's action can be supported by that law. In Richard v. Royal Bank of 
C a n a d a ,an invoice and a certificate of weight were stipulated in the documentary 
credit. The beneficiary of the credit only presented the invoice but the weight was 
properly certified on it. It was held that it was a good tender and there is no need for 
a certificate of weight.
Although such a decision may seem attractive, it can put the applicant for the 
credit in a difficult position in circumstances where he would wish to resell the goods 
using separate documents. So, it is not for the banker to deviate from his principal's 
instructions. Moreover, the seller/ beneficiary knows about the documents and if 
there is an undesirable stipulation in the credit he can ask for modification.
What would be the banks' responsibility, on the other hand, if the seller 
instead of one document presents two or more documents to the same effect? It 
seems such a tender does not impose any risk for the applicant buyer and 
beneficiaries' action should be accepted as a good tender .However ,  as 
previously pointed out, banks are entitled under Article 13(a) of UCP 500 to accept 
one of the documents and return the rest of them to the beneficiary.
1.2.2. Concluding remarks
The UCP needs to be clarified relating to the situation when two or more 
documents are presented within one document.
23 F. 2d 430 (1928).
It is said that there are also authorities in French law which supports the beneficiaty's action; for instance 
Paris, 15-7-1942, Rev. Ge'ne’rale de droit Comm., 1943 72. Contrast: T. Com. Marseille, 8-6-1928, Dor Sup. 
vi 379. [See Ellinger, EP, "Documentary letters o f c re d it". Singapore, 1970 [hereinafter referred to as 
El linger], at p. 295 and f.n. 89]
Netherlands Trad ing Society v. Wayne and I la y li t t  C o ., (1952) 36 H.K.L.R. 109.
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2. THE DESCRIPTION OF THE GOODS
The rule of strict compliance has been applied, more than in any other 
situation, to the goods' description in the tendered documents/^ The reason was 
explained by Goddard, L.J., in the Rayner v. Hambros Bank^"  ^ in following terms: 
"It does not matter whether the terms imposed by the person who requires them to 
open the credit are reasonable, or seem to be reasonable, or unreasonable. Of 
course, they may be terms which, as between themselves and the beneficiary, they 
would not be entitled to impose. The bank is not concerned with that. The bank, if it 
accepts the mandate to open the credit, must do exactly what its customer requires 
it to do, and if the customer says: "I require a bill of lading for Coromandel 
groundnuts", the bank is not justified, in my judgment, in paying against a bill of 
lading for anything except Coromandel ground nuts, and it is no answer to say: "You 
know perfectly well machine shelled groundnut kernels are the same as 
Coromandel groundnuts". For all the bank knows, its customer may have a 
particular reason for wanting "Coromandel groundnuts" in the bill of lading. At any 
rate, that is the instruction which the customer has given to the bank, and if the bank 
wants to be reimbursed by the customer, it must show that it has performed its 
mandate [...] The question is: what was the promise which they made to the 
beneficiary under the credit, and has the beneficiary availed himself of that 
promise?"^^
A question of importance may arise as to whether the description of the 
goods must be identical in all documents presented by the beneficiary. In other
The following differences between description o f goods in the letter o f credit (A) and documents tendered 
(B) are as examples held by courts to be bad presentation. Those examples are as followes. 1. (A) Yellow 
Pine Flooring, (B) Yellow Pine Lumber [Brown v. Ambler. 66 M.D. 391 (18887)]; 2. (A) Alicante 
Bouchez Grapes, (B) Grapes [Laudisi v. Amer. Exchange Nat. Bank, 239 N.Y. 234 (1924)]; 3. (A) 
Standard White Granulated, (B) Granulated White Suger, Java Suger No. 24 [National C ity Bank v. Seattle 
Nat. Bank. 121 Wash. 476 (1922)]; 4. (A) Dried Grapes, (B) Raisins [Bank o f Ita ly  y. Merchants Nat 
Bank. 236 N.Y. 106 (1923)]; 5. (A) 100% Acrylic Yarn, (B) Imported A c iy lic  Yarn [Courtaulds N. Amer. 
Inc. v. North Carolina Nat. Bank. 528 F. 2d 802 (1975, 4th Cir.)].
[1942] 2 A ll ER 694 (CA).
Ibid., p. 703.
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words if goods are described by different terms in the invoice and in the bill of 
lading, and if those descriptions together express what is required by the credit, 
does that make it a good tender?
2.1. In English law
For many years the view adopted by the courts was that the description of 
the goods should be in every individual document similar to what had been 
stipulated in the credit.^® But it has been accepted, at least, by English and 
American authorities in recent years that if documents are read together and if they 
give a perfect description of the goods they constitute a proper tender.
However, there are some conditions applying to the rule "reading 
documents together". Firstly, all documents should give a full description of the 
subject matter. Secondly, only those documents which are stipulated in the credit 
can be read together. As to this point a question may arise: what would be the role 
of tendered documents which are not stipulated in the credit transaction if there are 
distinction(s) between them and documents which are required under the credit 
contract? In other words, would description of goods in additional documents treated 
as a good ground for rejection of goods and stop payment under LCs? In Soproma 
S.p.A. v. Marine & Animal By-Products Corporation,^® it was decided negatively; 
it was pointed out, however, that the situation would be different concerning 
particular documents like an invoice which would offer the applicant for a credit a 
well-justified reason for doubting the reliability of the other documents .The third
Bank o f M ontreal v. RecknageL 109 N.Y. 482, 17 N.E. 217 (1888); London &  Foreign Trading 
Corporation v. British and North European Bank (1921) 9 Ll.L.R. 116; Ellinger, supra (f.n. 11), pp. 
307-308.
Landisi v. American Exchange National Bank. 239 N.Y. 234, 146 N.E. 347 (1924), p. 349.
18
19
[1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 367.
Ibid., at pp. 389-90 where it is said: "The sellers' invoice described the goods as "CHILEAN FISH FULL 
M EAL,70% protein". The invoice from the shippers. Empresa Pesquera Eperva. which in error was included 
among the shipping documents, described the goods as "CHILEAN FISMEAL minimum 67% protein". The 
certificate o f quality issued bv Empresa Pesquera Eperva stated that "the analysis or composition o f goods is 
in accordance with the following analysis: Protein 67 per cent, minimum". The analysis certificate signed by 
German Fernandino Salamanca stated that the analysis gave the following results: "Protein 69.7 per cent.".
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limitation is that the descriptions of goods in different documents must not be 
inconsistent with each other. For instance, in Bank Meili Iran v. Barclays Bank,^® 
the goods were described in the invoice as "in a new condition"; whereas a 
certificate described them as "new". It was held that those description were not 
similar with each other since there is a difference between "new" and "in a new 
condi t ion".Which one of approaches above is in harmony with the practice and is 
more preferable? To deal with this point the UCP 500 is considered first.
2.2. UCP 500
In the UCP 500, Article 37(c) adopts a solution similar to the above second 
attitude (reading documents together). It provides: "The description of the goods in 
the commercial invoice must correspond with the description in the Credit. In all 
other documents, the goods may be described in general terms not inconsistent 
with the description of the goods in the Credit." As to the meaning of "correspond" 
two views may be expressed: (1) it means identical; therefore, a difference would be 
emerged between the UCP and the rule "reading documents together" applying to 
the invoice, since in the latter there is the possibility that the description of goods is 
different from the terms of the credit. (2) the term "correspond" does not mean
The Bord o f Appeal made no finding as to the effect o f any o f these inconsistencies since they took the view 
that the only documents which need to be tendered were the invoice and the bills o f lading. So far as the 
tender o f the documents under the letter o f credit is concerned, this view was, in my judgment, eironeous. 
Quite apart from the shippers’ invoice, which probably in law is irrelevant, though it may well have afford 
the buyers with a well-justified reason for doubting the true protein content o f the goods shipped, it is in my 
judgment plain that the two documents relied upon by the buyers in their rejection, namely, the shippers' 
certificate o f quality, and the certificate o f analysis, did not constitute valid shipping documents under the 
letter o f credit as was in fact acknowledged by the sellers, when [...] they instructed the Italian bank to 
withdraw these documents and substituting in their place [...] In my judgment, the documents so tendered 
were not a good tender against the letter o f credit." [Emphasis added]; Ellinger, supra (f.n. I I ) ,  at p. 309 said: 
"Thus, when a credit stipulates for payment against a b ill o f lading and an invoice, only these can be read 
together. The fact that the tender includes an additional documents, which gives a perfect description o f the 
goods, is immaterial. However, i f  an additional document, which contradicts a statement in one o f the 
stipulated documents, is tendered, this may constitute a “ red flag” , and the person to whom the documents 
are tendered may be entitled to doubt the trustfulness o f the other documents."
[1951] 2 Ll.I.R. 367, p. 375.
Similar attitute was expressed in Laudisi v. American Exchange National Bank. 239 N.Y. 234, 146 N.E. 
347 (1924); Ellinger, supra (f.n. 11), p. 309.
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identical and as a result no differences exists between the UCP and the rule 
"reading documents together".
In a question relevant to the point under consideration the ICC Banking 
Commission gave its comment as following: "That "correspond" was not 
synonymous with "identical", but meant that the description in the commercial 
invoice must not be contradictory with the description in the credit; [...] it was 
important to base one's interpretation closely on the wording of the relevant Article 
of the Uniform Customs and Practice; Article 32(c)^^ stated that the descriptions 
had to correspond, but did not require identical wording."^®
It seems the first above view ("correspond" means "identical") is much 
preferable because the description in the invoice is made by the beneficiary of the 
credit himself, so it is more likely to be accurate. Moreover, his view will be preferred 
against other descriptions in other documents made by others. In addition, if the 
opposite view is accepted then there is no reason to differentiate the description of 
goods in a commercial invoice with the description of the same goods in other 
documents; then, Article 37(c) would become meaningless. In contrast, by accepting 
the above first view a difference would emerge between the UCP and the rule 
"reading documents together" regarding the description of goods in the commercial 
invoice; but, it seems the UCP's approach (based on the first above view, namely, 
"correspond" means "identical") for reasons pointed out previously is preferable.
As to the above point, namely, for what reason(s) the rule "reading 
documents together" would be more sensible than the view expressed in the 
Rayner v. Hambros Bank (above), one may rightly argue that the former is more in 
harmony with practice accepted by the banking business. Moreover, if the 
description of goods in a credit transaction includes details, more than what is 
required in the credit, such a description should not be interpreted in a manner that
Article 32(c) (UCP 1974) was equivalent to Article 37(c) in the UCP 500.
ICC, "Decisions H 975-1979) o f the ICC Banking Commission" on queries relating to Uniform  
Customs and Practice fo r Documentary C red its". ICC Publication No. 371 [hereinafter referred to as ICC 
Pub. No. 371], at pp. 35-36 (ICC Document 470/371, 470/373). [Emphasis added]
149
justify the applicant's action or his call to put an end to the letter of credit contract. 
Further, if different descriptions of goods in different documents presented under 
LCs are not contradictory but, in contrast, complete each other, such a difference 
should not be accepted as a good reason for rejecting documents by banks or the 
applicant for a credit.
2.3. Article 5 of the UCC
Sections 5-109(2) and 5-114(1) of the UCC emphasise the point that the 
tendered documents must comply with terms of the credit on their face. '^  ^ A similar 
attitude has been followed in a draft suggested for revision of Article 5 of the UCC.®® 
In comment No.1 to that section it was emphasised that strict compliance 
does not mean "oppressive perfectionism" and the task of interpreting the principle 
of strict compliance lies with court.®®
Section 5-109(2) provides: "An issuer must examine documents with care so to ascertain that on their 
face they appear to comply w ith  the terms o f the credit and Section 5-114(1) : "An issuer must
honour a draft or demand for payment which complies w ith  the terms o f the relevant credit [...]." [Emphasis 
added; for fu ll text o f those sections see appendix 1.]
In Section 5 -108(a) o f PFD, supra (f.n. 8), suggested: "[A ]n  issuer shall honour a presentation [...] appears 
on its face strictly to comply with the terms and conditions o f the letter o f credit." [See appendix 2 for full 
text o f Section 5-108(a)]
Because o f the importance o f the issue the relevant part o f the comment quoted below: "This section 
combines some o f the duties previously included in Sections 5-114 and 5-109. [...] The standard o f strict 
compliance governs the issuer's obligation to the beneficiary and to the applicant. By requiring that a 
"presentation" appear strictly to comply, the section requires not only that the documents themselves appear 
on their face strictly to comply, but also that the other terms o f the letter o f credit such as those dealing with 
the time and place o f the presentation are strictly complied with. [...] Strict compliance does not mean slavish 
conformity to the terms o f the letter o f credit. By adopting standard practice as way o f measuring strict 
compliance, this article indorses the conclusion o f the court in New Braunfels Nat. Bank v. Odiorne. 780 
S.W.2d 313 (Tex.Ct.App. 1989) (beneficiary could collect when draft requested payment on “ Letter o f 
Credit No. 86-122-5”  and letter o f credit specified “ Letter o f Credit No. 86-122-8” holding strict compliance 
does not demand oppresive perfectionism). [...] The section rejects the standard that commentators have 
called "substantial compliance", the standard arguably applied in Banco Espaiioi de Crédite v. State Street 
Bank and Trust Company. 385 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1967) and Flagship Cruises Ltd. v. New England 
Merchants Nat. Bank. 569 F.2d 699 (1st Cir. 1978). Identifying and determining compliance with standard 
practice are matters o f interpretation for the court, not for the jury." [Emphasis added; see PFD, supra (f.n. 
8), pp. 22-23]
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As to the point under consideration, namely, description of goods in 
documents presented under the credit, particularly in a commercial invoice, nothing 
is precisely provided in the UCC.
2.4. Concluding remarks
The issue of description of goods and its connection to the principle of strict 
compliance has received similar treatment under both English law and the UCP 500, 
namely, goods may be described in terms not inconsistent with the description of 
goods in the credit transaction. There is a possibility, however, that a distinction 
would emerge between the UCP's approach under Article 37(c) and the rule of 
"reading documents together" accepted in English law concerning the description of 
goods in a commercial invoice if the term "correspond" is interpreted as "identical". If 
the term "correspond" is interpreted differently, then there would be a harmony 
between the UCP and the view accepted in English law; as a result there would be 
no need for having Article 37(c) if a commercial invoice is supposed to be treated in 
the same way as other types of documents tendered under the credit transaction as 
far as the description of goods is concerned. As a result of such a doubt it is 
suggested in under the present study that Article 37(c) should be clarified 
concerning the term "correspond" and replaced with the term "identical".
It becomes clear that differences still exist between the UCP and the UCC as 
well as the courts’ interpretation of the principle of strict compliance both in the UK 
and in the USA. As a result a uniform approach concerning the principle seems 
necessary more than ever.
3. COMPLIANCE WITH TIME
3.1. No expiry date stipulated in a credit
Article 42 of UCP 500 provides that "all credits must stipulate an expiry date 
[...] for presentation of documents for payment, acceptance, or with the exception of 
freely negotiable Credits." If there is no time mentioned in the credit, how long can it 
be taken as an open credit?
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3.1.1. In English and American law
There is no authority on that point in English law.®^  In an American case it 
was hold that a credit in such circumstances "should be treated as remaining open 
for a reasonable time. In computing the reasonable time the court took into account 
the length of the shipping period."®® Article 5 of the UCC provides no rule 
concerning the point under consideration. In contrast, that point was noticed in PFD 
and under Section 5-106(c) of PFD it is suggested: "If there is no stated expiration 
date or other provision that determines its duration, a letter o f credit expires one 
year after its stated date of issuance or, if none is stated, after the date on 
which it is issued."®^
3.1.2. UCP 500
In the latest revision of the UCP there is nothing on this point, but Article 38 
of the UCP 222 (1962) relating to the revocable letter of credit provided: "The 
validity of a revocable credit, if no date is stipulated, will be considered to have 
expired six months from the date of the notification sent to the beneficiary by the 
bank with which the credit is available." The reason for providing no provision as to 
the point under consideration in the UCP 500 seems partly related to the fact that, at 
present, it is rare for a credit to be issued without any indication as to Its expiry date, 
and partly because of discouraging banks to issue a credit in that condition. 
However, what would be the solution if such a case arises? Would a letter of credit 
issued in the above indicated condition be accepted as a valid credit under UCP 
500? It is possible to give a positive answer to that question, since Article 42 of UCP 
500 is silent as to the point under consideration. In contrast, one may argue that the 
interpretation of Article 42, particularly paragraph (a), is not in the interest of all 
parties to the credit contract because it may lead to confusion and unnecessary
Ellinger, supra (f.n. 11), p. 301.
Lam born v. National Park Bank o f New York. 123, Misc. 211, 204 N.Y.S, 557, p. 559 (1924),
Emphasis added; see appendix 2 for fu ll text o f Section 5-106 particularly sub-section (d) concerning issue 
o f expiry date in a perpetual letter o f credit.
152
disputes between banks and other parties to a credit contract. It is more preferable, 
therefore, to argue that an issued credit without any reference to expiry date can be 
accepted as a void credit unless otherwise agreed by contracting parties (e.g., it is a 
valid credit but it must be amended in a certain and short period of time). The next 
query that may arise is from what moment does the expiry date of the credit start? It 
seems that the time of issue of the credit by the issuing bank, as provided by 
subsection (c) of Article 42 of UCP 500 as well as Section 5-106(c) of PFD above, 
should be accepted as the beginning of the expiry date of the credit unless 
otherwise stipulated in the credit transaction.
3.1.3. Concluding remarks
It becomes clear from the above discussion that banks' responsibility is not 
clear in a situation where an issued credit is silent as to its expiry date. Moreover, if 
the suggestion made for revision of the UCC (Section 5-106(c) of PFD) would be 
accepted for the new version of the UCC, then, a distinction would arise between 
the UCC and the UCP since Article 42(a) of UCP 500 provides nothing about the 
point under consideration; therefore, there is a need for adopting a uniform 
approach in both sets of standards relating to LCs in order to prevent any further 
distinctions between them in the future.
3.2. Ambiguity as to the date of availability of a credit: date of 
acceptance v. date of negotiation
As to the issue of the expiry date of a credit a problem may arise if such a 
date is ambiguous. For instance, in Midland Bank Ltd. v. Seymuor,®® where there 
was an argument whether the date of negotiation of drafts drawn under the credit is 
the final date in which the credit to be available or the date of acceptance of 
negotiated drafts, it was held that the date of negotiation of a draft is not an 
essentia! part of a documentary credit so the date of availability or expiration of 
credit is the date of its acceptance.®^ Devlin, J., concerning the meaning of term
[Î955] 2 Ll.L.R. 147.
Ibid., pp. 164-7; Ellinger, supra (f.n. 11), p. 301.
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"available" said: "I think that "available" means that this credit can be drawn on in 
the manner prescribed. That is how it is made available, and the manner prescribed 
is by presenting the draft and documents to the bank or to the bank's agent, that is, 
the draft that is to be accepted and the shipping documents that are there specified. 
That would be appear to be the prima facie and simple meaning of the word 
"available"."®® What is the solution for the question in discussion under UCP 500?
Article 42 (a) of UCP 500, in contrast with Article 46 (a) of UCP 400 relating 
to a negotiable credit, provides: "All credits must stipulate an expiry and a place for 
presentation of documents for payment, acceptance, or with the exception of freely 
negotiable Credits, a place for presentation of documents for negotiation. An expiry 
date stipulated for payment, acceptance or negotiation will be construed to express 
an expiry date for presentation of documents." But concerning a situation similar to 
the Midland Bank case the UCP is silent and paragraph (c) of Article 42 provides 
only that banks should discourage indications like "the credit is to be available "for 
one month", or "for six months", or the like" since they do not specify the date from 
which the time of availability of a credit starts. Therefore, what would be the solution 
under UCP 500 for a situation similar to the case Midland Bank above? Would it be 
possible to extend the meaning of availability of a credit to the time/place of 
negotiation of a credit? It seems, based on the first sentence of Devlin, J.'s 
statement concerning the meaning of "available" quoted above, "available" means 
that a credit can be drawn on in the manner prescribed and with the new approach 
concerning negotiable credits accepted under Article 42(a) of UCP 500, a credit 
would also be accepted being available at the time of its negotiation. Moreover, by 
widening the meaning of availability of a credit it would also prevent any confusion 
and disputes between parties to a letter of credit transaction.
There is no reference as to the point in consideration under the UCC and the 
proposal draft for its revision.®® Because of the uncertainty as to the meaning of the
Ibid., p. 164.
”  See Section 5-106(c) and (d) o f PFD in appendix 2.
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justifiable? To answer this query it is worth to consider what is the position of UCP 
regarding the point in discussion.
3.3.2. UCP 500
Article 42(b) of the UCP 500 provides that "Except as provided in sub-Article 
44(a), documents must be presented on or before such expiry date." In sub-section 
(a) of Article 44 it is said: "if the expiry date of the credit [...] falls on a day on which 
the bank to which the presentation has to be made is closed for reasons other than 
those referred to in Article 17, the stipulated expiry date [...] shall be extended to the 
first following day on which such bank is open." Article 17 is related to the force 
majeure circumstances and its contents is as follows: "Banks assume no liability or 
responsibility for the consequences arising out of the interruption of their business 
by Acts of God, riots, civil commotions, insurrections, wars or any other caused 
beyond their control, or by any strikes or lockouts. [...]."
As it becomes clear from the above, the UCP is only considering the issue of 
expiry date from the bank's opening hours and it is silent about delay in the post. 
So, one may argue that since there is no direct reference to delay in post within the 
UCP then under Article 42(b) the beneficiary accepts presentation of documents on 
or before the expiry date and if there is any risk of delay he should bear the 
responsibility.®^
In contrast, it is possible to argue that the main reason behind the extension 
of the expiry date of credit in Articles 17 and 44(a) is that of the interruption of the 
bank's business or its closure caused by a reason beyond the bank's control; there 
may be other reasons for bank's closure, like insolvency, but the bank's control over 
its business activities, is the main factor for allowing the extension of expiry date of 
the credit. Because if it is not the case then the bank may face the argument, made 
by its client (the applicant for the credit) that it acts beyond its mandate that 
documents must be tendered within a certain time and not after that. Moreover, a
It is said that there is support for such argument in English, French, and German law [see Ellinger, supra 
(f.n. I I ) ,  pp. 302-303].
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bank may also receive an objection from the beneficiary of the credit regarding 
unnecessary delays for checking presented documents in the above cited 
circumstances.
If banks are exempt rightly from any liability caused by delays beyond their 
control, then why should not a similar principle be accepted for the beneficiary in the 
case of delay in the post (something which is beyond his control), or indeed, in other 
situations mentioned under Article 17 of the UCP.
3.3.3. Concluding remarks
As a result of above discussion it seems that the beneficiary's action 
regarding events which are beyond his control should receive the same treatment 
as is accepted for the banks under the UCP.
3.4. The date of shipment and its connection to the expiry date
Just like the date of expiry, the date of shipment has an important role in a 
documentary credit operation as far as the applicant/buyer is concerned. The 
question may arise whether the extension of one of them automatically extends the 
other one.
3.4.1. UCP 500
Under Article 44(b) of UCP 500 it is accepted that if the expiry date of a credit 
is extended, "the latest date for shipment shall not be extended by reason of 
extension of the expiry date." There may be reasons for the extension of the expiry 
date of the credit, none of which may be related to the shipment of goods, e.g., 
giving extra time for presentation of all documents.®® It is also accepted in that 
article that if there is no time for shipment "the banks will not accept transport 
documents indicating a date of shipment later than the expiry date stipulated in the 
Credit or amendments thereto."
What would be the answer if the date of shipment is extended? Would the 
expiry date of credit be automatically extended? There is nothing to support such a
Jaris rC .l &  Co. v. Banque D 'Atliens 246 Mass. 546, 141 N.E. 576, p. 577 (1923); Ellinger, supra (f.n. 
11), pp. 303-304.
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meaning in UCP 500, but such an attitude had been supported by Article 39 of the 
1962 version of UCP.®®
3.4.2. In English law
It has been said it is reasonable to accept that if the date of shipment is 
extended, the expiry date of the credit is also extended as a result. In a decided 
case it was said: ”[l]n agreeing to pay for shipment by named steamers without any 
stipulation as to the time within which shipments were to be made, the limitation of 
time has already been a b a n d o n e d . A s  a result of this decision English courts 
may take the view that there is a link between the date of shipment and the date of 
expiry date of a credit; so, by extension of the time of shipment the expiry date of a 
credit is automatically extended. Would such an attitude be in harmony with UCP 
500? It seems the reason for removing terms similar to what had been stipulated in 
Article 39 of UCP 22 (1962), namely, "any extension of the stipulated of latest date 
for shipment shall extended for an equal period the validity of the credit" from the 
UCP 500 may be taken as disagreement by draftsmen with an automatic extension 
of the expiry date of the credit as a result of extension of the date of shipment. As a 
result, a distinction would emerge between English law and the UCP.
Regarding a solution for the situation under consideration it is reasonable to 
say that in every case permission of the banker is necessary, unless otherwise 
stipulated in the credit. Nevertheless, this point needs consideration and it should be 
clarified in the next revision of the UCP.
3.5. Time of presentation of documents
As to the time of presentation of required documents by the beneficiary a 
point need to be clarified: whether those documents should be tendered before any 
payment by banks under LCs, or there may be situations in which it is accepted that
Article 39 o f UCP 222 (1962) was provided; "Unless otherwise expressly stated, any extention o f the 
stipulated o f latest date for shipment shall extended for an equal period the validity o f the credit. Where a 
credit stipulates a latest date for shipment, an extension o f the period o f the validity shall not extended the 
period permitted for the shipment unless otherwise expressly stated."
English. Scottish and Australian Bank . L td. v. Bank of South A frica . (1922) 13 Ll.L.R. 21, p. 24.
158
one or some of documents required under LCs is(are) tendered after payment of the 
amount of the credit. For instance, sometimes a business procedure may modify or 
negative the principal's mandate; in Frïedlander v. Bank of A u s t r a l i a , t h e  
appellant buyer asked the respondent banker to issue a credit and among the 
conditions it was instructed that the seller's drafts should be accompanied by an 
insurance policy, bill of lading and certificate of weight. The seller had informed the 
banker before the credit was issued that he sold the goods under a condition that he 
was bound to deliver wheat with separate policies for each 100 tons, and therefore, 
insurance policies could not be issued unless the bill of lading was received by the 
banker. It was accepted by the bank but the appellant/buyer refused to reimburse 
the amount of credit to the banker. The High Court of Australia held for the banker 
on the ground that, "it was not a condition precedent to the contract between the 
bank and the appellant that the drafts should, at the time of presentment for 
acceptance, be accompanied by policies of insurance, and that, if it was, the 
appellant had rendered its performance impossible and so had excused the bank 
from performance of it.""^ ^
(1908-1909) 8 Commonwealth Law Reports (Australia), 85.
Ibid., at p. 86; the relevant part o f Griffith, CJ’s view at p. 95, quoted below: 'This being a contract 
between the parties, the London brokers, as already stated, informed the bank before the actual issue o f tiie 
credit that appellant and Scot Robson had agreed that the insurance should be effected in London. In order, 
therefore, to give effect to this altered state o f things it becomes necessary that the conditions o f the credit 
siiould be correspondingly altered, and that they should be such as bind the bank to accept Scot Robsons's 
drafts coming from Buenos Aires although not aceompanied by the policies, which (by reason o f the change 
o f place o f insurance) would not be there. The credit was accordingly issued in such terms as would give 
effect to the contract as it then stood. Under these circumstances it cannot, in ray opinion, be disputed that 
the appellant before breach waived the (assumed) condition embodied in the contract [.,.] in accordance with 
existing obligations under the contract between the appellant and the respondents as modified by the 
w aiver, and the bank were bound to accept the drafts drawn in accordance with their terms."; concerning the 
meaning o f "condition precedent" G riffith, CJ at p. 96 stated: "The mle for detennining whether a particular 
stipulation in a contract is a condition precedent [...] it is a recognised rule that, in the absence o f expressed 
intention to the contrary, a stipulation which does not go to the substance o f the contract (or, as it has been 
called, the root o f the matter), but merely affects it incidentally, and a breach o f which may be compensated 
for in damages, is not a condition precedent. It is manifest that the stipulation as to the policies was 
introduced for the protection o f the appellant, and that he would be equally well protected whether the 
policies were attached to the drafts at the moment o f presentment or handed to the bank on the following 
day. An there is no expressed intention to the contrary." (concerning the meaning o f condition precedent see 
also O'Connor J.'s remarks at p. 99); in contrast, Issac J. dissenting and at p. 103 he said: "The first question 
argued was whether the bank, by accepting the drafts without the specified policies o f insurance, exceeded 
the authority given to them by the defendant. In my opinion they did. The contrary contention rests upon a
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This is an important decision, particularly from the applicants point of view 
since it endangers his position under the credit operation. Would it be possible to 
support the view accepted in the above case under the UCP and carry it out for 
other situations?
UCP 500
Article 13(a) of UCP 500 provides that, "Banks must examine all documents 
stipulated in the Credit with reasonable care and under Article 14 (d)(ii)
banks must state all discrepancies in a notice of rejection. How is it possible for the 
bank to carry out its duty under the above articles in a situation like the Friedlander 
case mentioned above? Moreover, concerning the point decided in the above case 
under Article 2 of the UCP it is clearly pointed out that a bank's promise of payment 
or of acceptance and payment of the beneficiary's draft(s) is against stipulated 
documents; so the time of presentation of documents should be before the time of 
payment by the bank.
One may argue that the banks' decision in the above case can be justified as 
an example for amendment of the credit allowed under Article 9 (d)(i) of UCP 500: 
"An irrevocable Credit cannot be amended nor cancelled without the agreement of 
the Issuing Bank, the Confirming Bank, if any, and the Beneficiary." If this is the 
case, then the next query is how can the applicant's rights be guaranteed? if the 
banker acts as a special agent for the applicant then he should look after his 
principal's interests by sticking to his mandate; and in case of amendment of the 
credit the first priority should be the protection of the interests of his client. 
Otherwise, the applicant's requirement for particular documents would be 
meaningless. However, if the principal's instruction is not clear or the banks' 
deviation is in the interest of the applicant for the credit, the bank's decision in
foundation which, so far as I can see, has no existence in fact or in law.", and at p. 109 the same judge said: 
"But what was the justification for the bank departing from their explicit instructions? The departure was 
intentional- it could not well be other wise." [Emphasises are added]; Davis, AG, "The law relating to 
commercial letters o f c re d it". London, 3rd ed., 1963 [hereinafter referred to as Davis], p. 134.
Emphasis added.
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particular circumstances, as considered later, can also be supported in English
As a result of the above discussion it becomes obvious that under the UCP 
banks are under a duty to check all required documents before acceptance of the 
beneficiary's draft(s) or payment under the credit; therefore, the position of parties to 
a credit in a situation like the case mentioned above would be different. As to the 
concept of "condition precedent" and its effect upon the relationship of parties to a 
letter of credit, it is vital to remember the importance of the principle of strict 
compliance in LCs' operation; without it the system would collapse, it is also 
necessary to draw attention to the importance of amendment of a credit and how it 
would affect the applicant's rights under the credit. In that respect the applicant's 
instructions should be regarded important and mandatory and banks without 
express intention to the contrary are not entitled to deviate from it and the decision 
of the High Court of Australia should be interpreted under particular circumstances 
of the case, namely, the applicants for the credit (the appellant in the above case) 
waived his right under the credit transaction by accepting insurance documents 
issued in London instead of Buenos Aires (decision taken by majority of judges).'’  ^
As a result of a distinction between the UCP and national law of a relevant 
jurisdiction, different attitudes would be taken concerning the same issue by 
different judges (as it happened in the above case); it is, therefore, vital both for the 
bank and its customer that the point under consideration (the time of presentation of 
documents by the beneficiary) should be clarified in any future set of standards 
concerning LCs at the international level.
See discussions concerning the issue o f amendment o f a credit in Chapter IV  (Section B.2.1) and Chapter 
V  (Section B.2.2.1) and "fair interpretation" in Section B.1.2 of the present Chapter (below).
See f.n. 42 (above) for relevant quotation o f the case.
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SKCTTON B: OTHER ISSUES RELATED TO THE PRINCIPLE
1. EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF STRICT COMPLIANCE
Are there any exceptions relating to the principle of strict compliance? There 
may be situations in which the application of the principle may be like for other rules, 
limited. UCP 500 (Article 14(d)(1)) only refers to one of situation, namely, doctrine of 
waiver (considered later), but nothing is provided regarding other possible limitations 
to the rule of strict compliance; therefore, the banker's responsibility is not clear 
relating to such exceptions to the principle (noticed later), and there would be a 
cause for dispute between a banker and other parties to the contract, as the case 
may be.
The issue of exceptions to the principle of strict compliance has received 
attention in different legal systems; but there may be differences between them. 
Some of the possible exceptions to the principle of strict compliance are as follows.
1.1. De minimis rule
As mentioned above (discussion concerning "the description of goods"), 
there may be insignificant variations between the tendered documents and the 
terms and conditions of the credit. Those documents can be accepted as good 
tender under two conditions. First of all, the deviation is too slight to affect the total 
purpose of compliance.'^® Moreover, such a deviation imposes no detriment upon 
the buyer/ applicant for the credit. To support such a view under English law one 
can refer to McNair, J's view in The Soproma,'^^ where it is pointed out that 
although it is accepted by English law that the de minimis rule does not apply in 
case of LCs, he should be reluctant to accept the strict compliance in situations
See Kozolchyk, B., Letters o f c re d it". International Encyclopedia o f Comparative Law, Vol. 9 ,  Chapter 
5, 1979 [hereinafter referred to as Kozolchyk], p. 83 and f.n. 460, as to commenting on the case Rayner v, 
Ha in h r os Bank. [1942]2 A ll ER 694 (CA), where it is said that that decision is not accepted by the modem 
law, but the decision o f M id land Bank L td . v. Seymour. [1931]2 Ll.L.R. 367, is preferable since all 
documents are read together; for more details concerning the rule "reading documents together" in discussion 
connected to "the description o f the goods" in Section A.2 o f the present Chapter (above),
Soproina S.p.A. v. M arine &  Animal By-products Corporation. [1966]1 Ll.L.R, 367.
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where it is the only reason for rejection of documents presented under LCs/® So, 
on the ground of what is said above and the rule "reading documents together" 
considered previously'^®, there is a possibility that documents tendered by the 
beneficiary would be accepted as complied with terms of credit contract even if 
minor discrepancies exist between them and credit’s conditions.
1.2. Fair interpretation
If the principal's instructions are not clear, then if the person who acts upon it 
interprets that mandate in a fair and honest manner he deserves to benefit from it, 
even though the principal intended another meaning. Such a principle is laid down 
in Ireland v. Livingston,®® where Lord Herschell described the principle and said: 
"If a principal gives an order to an agent in such uncertain terms as be susceptible 
of two different meanings, and the agent bona fide adopts one of them and acts 
upon it, it is not competent to the principal to repudiate the act as unauthorized 
because he meant the order to be read in the other sense of which it is equally 
capable."®  ^ This is one of the ways that the strict compliance application would be 
limited.®^
The relevant part o f McNair, J.'s decision at p. 390 (col. 1-2) quoted below: "Seeing that the de minimis 
rule does not apply to the tender o f documents under a letter o f credit (see M oraliec (London). L td. v. E.D. 
&  F. M an. [(1954]2 Lloyd's Rep. 526), I suppose in strict law I should have effect to this objection, but 1 
confess that I  should be reluctant to do so i f  it stood alone." [Emphasis added]; Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 46), 
p. 83 &  f.n. 468 and pp. 84-5.
See relevant discussion in Section A.2 o f the present Chapter (above).
(1872), LR 5, HL, Cas. 395.50
Ibid., at p. 416; Davis, supra (f.n. 42), at p. 133 concerning the point under consideration said: "For 
example, in Equitable T rust Co. o f New Y ork v. Dawson Partners Lted. [(1926), 25 Ll.L. R. 90 (CA); 27 
Ll.L.R. 49 (HL)], where a cable code-word capable o f conveying the meaning o f both singular and plural 
was used, the correspondent bank, interpreting the word in the singular, when the trasmiting bank intended 
the plural, was held to be free from any liability for so doing." [Emphasis and the date o f case are added.]
For a similar argument see discussion concerning the discretion theory in Section B.2.1 o f the present 
Chapter (below).
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1.3. Rules and customs approved by a court
Sometimes banking customary rules approved by a court decision may 
impose obligations upon banks while at first they may seen to be a deviation from 
the principle of strict compliance but they are not so. Such a deviation would be 
interpreted as an exception to the principle and parties to LCs transactions should 
be aware of such a possibility. For instance, in an American case®® because of a 
missing bill of lading the presenting bank tendered a letter of indemnity instead and 
this was accepted as a banking solution locally; but the paying bank rejected it and 
refused payment. It was held in favour of the presenting bank. Would such a 
decision be supported under existing law concerning LCs at international level?
Article 13(a) of UCP 500 provides: "Compliance of the stipulated documents 
on their face with the terms and conditions of the Credit, shall be determined by 
international standard banking practice as reflected in these Articles."; so far as the 
UCP is concerned there is no provision about the point decided in the above 
mentioned American case (Dixon Irmaos). Moreover, a writer considering the 
acceptability of such a decision in the UK and difficulty(ies) which would arise in 
order to prove the existence of an alleged custom relevant to LCs at the 
international level, has stated: "It is extremely doubtful whether this decision would 
be followed in England. In any event, it is submitted that it would not be followed 
unless the court was satisfied that the alleged custom extended not only amongst 
bankers but also amongst exporters and importers. Any person seeking to prove 
such a custom would have a heavy and, it is felt, almost impossible task."®'^
Nevertheless, the above discussion highlights the possibility of another 
exception to the principle of strict compliance and its application under LCs. 
Similarly, it becomes obvious for having such an exception that it must be first
Dixon. ïrinaos &  Cla. v. Chase National Bank o f New Y o rk . CCA, 2d., (1944), 144 F. 2d., 759, (1944) 
Cert, denied, 324 US 850, 65 Sup. Ct. 687; Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 46), pp. 85-86.
Davis, supra (f.n. 42), at p. 176; Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 46), p. 85, col. 2, where it is pointed out that the 
decision o f the United States Circuit Court o f Appeals in Dixon Irom ax &  Cla. v. Chase National Bank, 
have not been followed by European legal systems.
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proved that such a practice or custom has been accepted by bankers as well as 
exporters and importers at an international level for a particular period of time/®
Another point of concern is related to the existence of different customs in 
different jurisdictions, potentially providing a cause of uncertainty so far as the law of 
LCs is concerned. In order to reduce their effect, it would be more suitable to study 
possible grounds for disputes and then prepare appropriate rules in legislative form 
rather than customary rules for them since the non-mandatory nature of customs 
would, to some extent, be the cause of uncertainty so far as the international law of 
LCs is concerned.®®
1.4. Waiver and ratification
1.4,1. In American law (doctrine of waiver)
In order to mitigate the harshness of the doctrine of strict compliance in 
several American authorities it has been suggested that if, at the time of 
presentation of documents, the banker raises no objection then later he is not 
entitled to put forward any objection against tendered documents, and it is 
supposed that the banker has waived his right under the credit. In Second National 
Bank of Allegheny v. Lash Corp.®^ it was held: "When it [the bank] named one 
ground for its refusal and remained silent with respect to three, the reasonable 
intendment of its conduct was to lull the drawer of the drafts to inaction and cause it 
to let pass what time and opportunity it had to correct the infirmities of the bills of 
lading, and then, if sued, to reap for itself a benefit from the utterly helpless position 
which it had induced its adversary to drift." However, such a doctrine is limited to the 
situation when the banker or his customer can prove that they were not aware of
As to the issue o f time and other conditions required for a practice or trade useage to be accepted as an 
international custom see relevant discussion in Chapter X I, Section A.2 (below).
56 See discussion concerning international customs in Chapter XI, Sections A.2 and A .3 (below).
299 F. 371, pp. 373-74 (1924); Bank o f American v. Whitneg Central National Bank. 291 F. 929 
(1923); Camp v. Corn Exchange National Bank. 285 pa. 337, 132 A. 189, pp. 192-93 (1926), held that the 
waiver rule applies also in the relationship between the bank and the buyer; Ellinger, supra (f.n. 11), pp. 
287-89.
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discrepancies at the time of presentation of documents; in other words they cannot 
be held to have waived an objection which came to their knowledge after the date of 
presentation, therefore, they may raise any objection in the courts later/® Of course 
the burden of proof is on the bank or its customer to prove that such knowledge 
reached them after that date. Would it be possible to argue that if as a precautionary 
measure banks or their customers (applicants for credits) do not give any reason for 
their refusal at the date of presentation of documents they are allowed to state any 
grounds they would prefer at court? If yes, would not the doctrine of waiver be a 
cause for delay in the operation of LCs? In respect of the above questions it has 
been said by a writer that "the person to whom the documents are tendered is 
estopped, from raising additional objections only when he stated at the date of 
presentation grounds for his rejection of the documents. In other words, if the 
person to whom the documents are tendered gives no reasons for his refusal, he 
can later on state any grounds he discovers.";®® and a commentator has pointed 
out: "The preceding formulation of the waiver rule can lead to damaging 
consequences for letter of credit law, and a closer look at its factual and conceptual 
contexts is necessary."®®
As to the point under consideration there is no reference in Section 5-112 of 
the UCC.®^  However, that point has been noticed by draftsmen of the new proposed 
final draft (PFD) for revision of Article 5 of the UCC and in Section 5-108(c) of that 
draft it is suggested: "Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), an issuer is 
precluded from asserting as a basis for dishonour any discrepancy if timely notice is 
not given, or any discrepancy not stated in the notice if timely notice is given."®^
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Lawyers' title  &  trust Co.. 297 F. 152, p. 156 (1924).
Ellinger, supra (f.n. 11), at p. 288.
™ Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 46), p. 86, col. 2.
See appendix 1 (below).
“  For text o f Section 5-108 see appendix 2 below; however, because o f importance o f the issue part o f 
comments No. 3, at p. 25 o f PFD, supra (f.n. 8), concerning subsection (c) o f Section 5-108 are quoted 
below; "The requirement that the issuer send notice o f the discrepancies or to be precluded from asserting16 6
1.4.2. In English law (doctrine of ratification)
The doctrine of waiver has not been followed by English courts. In 
Westminster Bank v. Banca Nazionaie Di Crédite®® the English attitude was 
explained by Roche, J., as: "It is too well settled in principle and abundantly covered 
by authority that if a person is entitled to reject documents and he rejects them on 
the wrong grounds or without taking all the grounds he could take, it is nonetheless 
open to such person, if he is questioned about the matter, or his action is impugned, 
to rely upon all the grounds that he might have taken.
As to the doctrine of ratification it has been said: "Ratification is a matter of 
intention. The behaviour of persons to whom documents are tendered can amount 
to ratification if their conduct can be proved inconsistent with an intention to reject. 
Silence can amount to ratification."®® This opinion is based on a decision by McNair, 
J., in Bank Melli Iran v. Barclays Bank,®® where the plaintiff after receiving 
documents and before rejecting them because of a discrepancy as to the 
description of goods, agreed to increase the amount of the credit and instructed the 
defendant to carry out that order. So when after six weeks the banker received an 
order not to pay, the court found such an order invalid and held that the instruction 
of Bank Melli to increase the amount of the credit was inconsistent with an intention
discrepancies is new to Article 5. It is taken from the similar provision in the UCP and is intended to promote 
certainty and finality. The Section thus substitutes a strict preclusion principle for the doctrines o f waiver and 
estoppel that might otherwise apply under Section 1-103. It rejects the reasoning in Flagship Cruises Ltd. v. 
New England Merchants' Nat. Bank. 569 F.2d 699 (1st Cir. 1978) and W ing On Bank L td . v. American 
Nat. Bank &  Trust Co. 457 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1972) where the issuer was held to be estopped only i f  the 
beneficiary relied on the issuer's failure to give notice. [...] Even though issuers typically give notice o f the 
discrepancy o f tardy presentation when presentation is made after the expiration o f a credit, they are not 
required to give that notice and the section permits them to raise late presentation as a despite their failure to 
give that notice." [Emphasis added.]
(1928) 31 L1.L.R.306; Ellinger, supra (f.n. 11), p. 289 &  f.n. 68 (for referred authorities); The Lena 
[1981] 1 Ll.L.R. 68, where M r Justice Parker stated that it is the issuing bank's right to check all documents 
and such a bank is not bound to give all reasons for its rejection at once.
Ibid., p. 311.
Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 46), p. 88; Ellinger, supra (f.n. 11), p. 291.
[1951]2 Ll.L.R. 367.
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to reject tendered documents, so there was a ratification by the principal and silence 
alone could, in certain cases, indicate ratification/^ The ratification view is thus 
supported by English law.
1.4.3. UCP 500
Article 14(d)(i) of UCP 500 provides: "If the Issuing Bank and/or the 
Confirming Bank [...] decides to refuse the documents, it must give notice to that 
effect and in sub-section (d)(ii) of the same article it is said: "Such notice must 
state all discrepancies in respect of which the bank refuses the documents [...]." 
This approach is different from what was accepted under Article 16(d) of UCP 400®® 
and seems to follow the view accepted in American law as the doctrine of waiver.
1.4.4. Waiver v. Ratification
Which one of those above approaches, i.e., the American waiver doctrine or 
the English ratification attitude, is preferable? It is difficult to decide which one of 
those approaches is to be preferred, since each one has its advantage(s). For 
instance, under the doctrine of waiver the beneficiary of a credit has a good chance 
of representing a new good set of documents and this prevents delay in the 
operation of LCs. In contrast, under the doctrine of ratification the beneficiary loses 
such protection. There are, however, several disadvantages relating to the waiver 
doctrine. Firstly, it is difficult to decide which reasons for rejection of documents are 
known by the bank at the time of presentation of documents. Secondly, that doctrine 
encourages the banker to give no reason for his rejection at the time of rejecting 
tendered documents in order to present his reasons, as much as it is possible, at a 
later stage, namely, in the court. This leaves the beneficiary of the credit in 
darkness. Finally, it is accepted under the credit contract that one of the 
beneficiary's undertakings is to present proper documents under the credit's terms
Ibid., at p. 378; in M idland Bank v. Seymour [1955] 2 Ll.L.R. 147, at pp. 168-71, Devlin, J., pointed out 
similiar view.
The relevant parts o f Article 16(d) o f UCP 400 (1983) are quoted below: " I f  the issuing bank decides to 
refuse the documents, it must give notice to that effect without delay [...] Such notice must state the 
discrepancies in respect o f which the issuing bank refuses the documents [...]."
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and conditions, and there is no promise by the banker to disclose all objections at 
one time/® Because of the above limitations to the waiver rule, it seems the English 
doctrine of ratification is a better approach regarding the point in discussion while it 
provides lesser protection for the beneficiary of a credit.
Although, Section 5-108(c) of PFD relating to UCC, considered previously, 
would provide more harmony between the UCC and UCP 500, it would not remove 
the possibility of diversing decisions in different jurisdictions even belonging to the 
same tradition of law (like the USA and the UK with legal systems derived from 
Common law). For having a greater certainty and uniformity of law at international 
level so far as LCs are concerned, therefore, it seems a further step needs to be 
taken, namely, as international legislation in the form of a convention.
1.4.5. Concluding remarks
As a result of the above research it becomes obvious that as to the notice of 
discrepancies given by banks regarding documents tendered by the beneficiary, a 
distinction exists between English Law on the one hand, and American law and 
UCP 500 on the other. It is also obvious that by revising Article 5 of the UCC further 
harmonisation between it and UCP 500 would be achieved in the future; however, 
for a greater uniformity of law of LCs at an international level, a new approach, 
namely, in the form of a convention would be the best possibility under the present 
conditions.^®
2. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PRINCIPLE OF STRICT COM­
PLIANCE
In order to avoid a requirement of literal compliance, arguments have been 
suggested, as follows.
Skandinaviska Kreditakticbolaget v. Barcly.s Bank (1925) 22 Ll.L.R. 523, p. 525; Ellinger, supra (f.n. 
11), pp. 291-92.
See Chapters X and X I (below), for discussions relevant to the unification o f law o f LCs in the future.
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2.1. The discretion theory
This supports the view that although the banker is under a duty to examine 
documents strictly, at the same time he is entitled to take up non-complying 
documents at his discretion/^ The logic behind such an idea is based on the 
agency relationship between the banker and his customer, namely, where the 
instructions are very general in the contract the agent is able at his discretion to 
deviate from the principal's mandate if such a deviation is in the interest of the latter. 
Of course, it is clear that the scope of such a theory is very limited and the banker 
should use this discretion only in exceptional cases.^^ This theory has found
T3support in an American case.
In contrast, English law has shown no sympathy for such an opinion. '^^ The 
disadvantage of the theory is that it puts the banker in a position to judge whether a 
document is necessary or not. it is the obligation of the seller and buyer to make a 
clear contract, and if there is any doubt the banker must consult with his customer.
For more details concerning the discretion theory look at Ellinger, supra (f.n. 11), at pp. 282-86, where at 
p. 282 pointed out: "The discretion theory originated in Germany. [...] The descretion o f the bank follows 
fr om para. 665 BGB which grants an agent a discretion to deviate from the instructions o f his principal, i f  the 
deviation is necessary in the interests o f the latter."
Ellinger-, supra (f.n. 11), at p. 283 said: "The more restrictive discretion suggested by Wiele and Zahn [.,.] 
in thier view, the banker should exrcise this discretion only in exceptional circumstances. [...] Perhaps the 
only case in which such a descretion may be justified is in the case o f ambigtiious instructions." [Emphasis 
added]; for similar point see discussion about "fair interpretation" in present Chapter, Section B.1.2 (above).
”  In Pacifc Financial Corporation v. Central Bank &  Trust Co.. 296 F.2d, 68 (1961), among other 
documents it was stipulated that, "a certificate o f title issued in blank" for an aeroplane was necessary. The 
banker paid against tendered documents but there was not such certificate, so those documents were rejected 
by the buyer. Bell, J., in course o f his judgment held for the banker and at p. 71 said: "Nor was it an error for 
the court to fail to charge that i f  the terms o f the letter o f credit were impossible o f performance there was no 
contract and the bank could not pay out the money under the letter o f credit [...] The question was that what 
the appellant and the bank meant by "certificate o f title issued in blank" and this question was properly 
submitted to the ju ry  [...]."; in Camp v. Corn Exchange National Bank 285 pa. 337, 132 A. 189, p .191 
(1926) said that, "The bank has a discretionary power o f acceptance, but this discretion must not be abused."; 
Laudisi v. American Exchange National Bank. 239 N.Y. 234, 146 N.E. 347 (1924); Ellinger, supra (f.n, 
11), pp. 283-84.
For example, see Equitable T rust Co. o f New Y ork v. Dawson Partners. L td. (1927)27 Ll.L.R. 49, at p. 
52 and English Scottish and Australian Bank. L td. v. Bank o f South A frica  (1922)13 Ll.L.R. 21, at p. 24;
Ellinger, supra (f.n. 11), at p. 285 said: "In France, too, there is no room for discretion."
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In only one situation in has the discretion theory received support in English law, 
namely, when the principals' instructions are ambiguious/® As a result of the above 
points it seems the discretion theory would be helpful in situations when an 
instruction is not clear or it is very general; in contrast, the wide interpretation of the 
theory (namely, the bank is entitled to decide which one of the required documents 
is necessary), would put the bank in a risky position, particularly when the disputed 
matter whould be considered under English law.
2.2. The technical defence theory
This theory originated in the American jurisdiction on the basis that it is the 
duty of courts not to give support to those objections which do not really concern the 
contract but are raised technically.^®
In contrast, English law allows such a defence. For instance, in a case 
decided by the Court of Appea/^ because of falling market prices of goods 
defendants made an attempt to escape from liability for paying for documents 
tendered under the credit. Scrutton, L.J., in the course of his judgment did not agree 
with the view of the judge in the lower court that the main motive for the defendant 
for his action was the falling of market price of the goods rather than several minor 
discrepancies concerning documents presented by the beneficiary/®
For details see discussion about "fair interpretation" in Section B.1.2 o f the present chapter (above).
In L iberty  National Bank &  Trust Co. o f Oklahoma v. Bank o f America National T rust &  Saving 
Association. 116 F. Supp. 233 (1953) [affirmed 218 F. 2d 831 (1955)], at p. 243, concerning the point under 
consideration stated; "Where a letter o f credit is substantially complied with every reasonable effort should 
be made by the Courts to uphold its validity, particularly where the objections are technical in nature and 
made in an effort to escape from the legal effect o f a business bargain." [Emphasis added]
G uaranty T rust o f New Y ork v. Van Den Berghs. L td .t 19251 22 Ll.L.R. 58, 112 (K.B.) 286, 447 
(C.A.).
Ibid., at p. 455, Scrutton L.J. said: "1 do not attach so much importance as the learned Judge below seems 
to do to the falling market. It is no doubt that the reason why Van den Berghs took the legal objections they 
did were that, as Drews were in financial difficulties. [...] these circumstances do not affect the legal merits 
o f the objections taken. "Falling market", though often an explanation o f commercial action, does not affect 
its legality."
1 7 1
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It seems the English view is better since in the documentary credits there is 
no ground for examining the motivation of a banker or his customer (the applicant 
for a credit) for his decision not to take up presented documents. Moreover, it is not 
an easy task to draw a line between technical and non-technical defences.^® On the 
other hand, it is vital to prevent any abuse of LCs' system which would arise as a 
result of a rigid interpretation of the principle of strict compliance. In that respect, 
theories like "technical defence" and "discretion" as well as exceptions to that 
principle, discussed previously (particularly the "de minimis rule" and "fair 
interpretation" exceptions), should receive sufficient support by courts in different 
jurisdictions in order to mitigate the harshness of the principle of strict compliance in 
practice.
CONCLUSIONS
In the light of the above discussion it is clear that documents play an 
important role in the operation of letters of credit, particularly regarding bank and 
client relationships. Moreover, disputes relating to different aspects of the doctrine of 
strict compliance have been raised and could continue owing to the generality and 
unpredictability of the UCP. Further, as has been pointed out, disputes arise from 
time to time concerning the number of documents required under a credit, 
description of goods, time of presentation of document and expiry date of a credit, 
with regard to differences exist between English law and UCP 500; examples are 
related to "stipulated/ not stipulated" documents, description of goods in an invoice, 
connection between expiry date and the date of shipment and a negotiation credit. 
In respect of American law, differences also exist between court decisions and UCP 
500. Examples pointed out previously relate to issues like "tendering two documents 
in one document", "delay in the post", "time of presentation of documents", and 
where the credit stipulates no expiry date.
Ellinger, supra (f.n. 11), at pp. 286-87 &  f.n. 59 said that the situation in French and German law is similar 
to English law.
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As to distinctions between English and American law, they have chosen 
different attitudes relating to "waiver" and "technical defence" theories. Similar 
divergences exist regarding the discretion theory. These differences have been the 
cause of uncertainty between parties to a credit contract, and they could be the 
cause for further disputes in future unless they receive proper attention worldwide.
The questions then are: what would be the reconcilable solution(s) for the 
above differences? Would it be possible to solve them through the ICC? if yes, to 
what extent it would be possible for the ICC to provide new provisions under the 
UCP? Would it be the most favourite solution? If no, what would be the substitution?
Generally speaking, issues considered in the present Chapter can be 
classified as.following:
1. Issues not considered under the UCP.
2. Issues noticed under the UCP but treated differently under the national law 
(English or American law).
3. Issues interpreted differently by English law (compared with American
law).
As to the first type of issues (e.g., "two documents presented in one 
document", "no expiry date stipulated in a credit", "delay in the post" and "time of 
presentation of documents"), the ICC would indeed be able to study them and 
provide necessary provisions within the UCP. So far as the second type of issues 
(above) is concerned, the only option open to the ICC is to clarify the position of 
parties to a letter of credit under the UCP, e.g., as it is suggested concerning the 
term "correspond" in Article 37(c) (description of goods in a commercial invoice). As 
to other situations (namely, the UCP is clear but still distinctions exist between the 
provisions and the respective national law) the ICC has no mandatory power (as a 
non-governmental international organisation) to replace a national law with the UCP. 
Such a barrier exists when the ICC faces issues in the above third category. This is, 
indeed, that part of the law of LCs that requires more harmonisation and unification 
at an international level; LCs' issues covered by the UCP have been, to a great 
extent, unified internationally. In that respect the only practical path open for
1 7 3
dissolving differences between the UCP (as an international customary/contractual 
instruments) and any respective national law on the one hand, and between two or 
more different legal systems on the other hand is an international legislative 
instrument in the form of a convention. This point and its relevant issues are 
considered later.®®
See Chapters X and X I (below).
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CHAPTER VII
THE BANK'S UNDERTAKING IN
RELATION TO THE BENEFICARY
OF THE CREDIT
(THE DOCTRINE OF "AUTONOMY")
SECTION A. LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE DOCTRINE OF 
AUTONOMY
The concept of the doctrine of autonomy and its importance in the operation 
of LCs has been considered previously.^ In the present Chapter a number of legal 
points relevant to the doctrine of autonomy are discussed below.
1. LETTERS OF CREDIT AND THE SALE CONTRACT
Is there any link between a credit arrangement and its underlying sale 
contract? If there is any connection between them, to what extent such a link is 
justified? Related issues are as follows.
1.1. Differences as to terms of a sale and a credit contract
If there is a distinction between the terms of a sale contract and LCs which 
term(s) should be preferred? In Urquhart Lindsay & Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Bank 
Ltd.,^ where the plaintiff included an additional sum in his draft, the buyer refused to 
accept it on the basis that such an additional sum was a breach of the sale contract. 
Therefore, he instructed his bank not to pay. Rowlatt, J., rejected that argument 
because, under the credit conditions, the buyer and his bank undertook to honour all 
drafts drawn by the seller. Moreover, it was pointed out that if there is any distinction 
between the terms of the sale contract and the credit transaction the latter must be 
preferred. He said: "The basis of this form of banking facility being that the buyer is 
taken for the purpose of all questions between himself and his banker or between 
his banker and the seller to be content to accept the invoices of the seller as correct. 
It seems to me that so far from the letter of credit being qualified by the contract of 
sale, the latter must accommodate itself to the letter of credit."®
Professor Ellinger made a point regarding the above decision by saying that: 
"The two contracts are independent of each other. There is no reason why the
' See relevant discussion in Chapter II, Section B.2 (above). 
 ^ [1922]! K.B. 318.
 ^ Ibid., pp. 322-23.
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credit, which is opened after the making of the contract of sale, should qualify the 
latter any more than the irrevocable credit is qualified by it."'^  This point seems to be 
a sound criticism because, if it is accepted that the terms of a sale contract can be 
easily/automatically changed by any amendment of a letter of credit, then the 
buyer's right under the sale contract can also be changed while the applicant's 
agreement for any amendment or cancellation of the credit is not included in Article 
9(d)(i) of UCP 500;® as a result, the buyer/applicant for a credit might find himself in 
a different position while his interests are put in danger. However, if there is 
evidence that the applicant for a credit gave his agreement to modification of the 
credit to his bank, it may be accepted that he has also waived his right under the 
sale contract. But, if there is nothing to prove such agreement by the applicant then 
conditions stipulated in the credit should be interpreted in the light of circumstances 
of the case, namely, intention of parties to the sale contract.
In the given case the expression "all drafts drawn by the seller" could also be 
interpreted as those drafts which are less than or equal to the amount of the credit, 
unless otherwise agreed by the applicant or his bank after the issue of a credit.
Ellinger, E.P., ''Documentary Letters o f C red it". Singapore, 1970, p. 184 [hereinafter referred to as 
Ellinger]; in Malas (Hatuzehl &  Sons v. British Im ax Industries L td.. [1958] 2 Q.B. 127, at p. 129, 
Jenkins, L.J. confirmed the independence nature o f the credit by stating that the confirmed credit was an 
absolute undertaking o f the banker "irrespective o f any dispute there may be between the parties as to 
whether the goods are up to contract or not [...]. [The system] would break down completely i f  a dispute as 
between the vendor and the purchaser was have the effect o f "freezing" [...] the sum in respect o f which the 
letter o f credit was opened."; a similar decision made in Frey v. Sherbour»e.( 1920) 184 N.Y. Supp. 661, 
where it was held that the banker is not entitled to refuse payment under the credit to the beneficiai-y, even 
where the applicant for the credit has rescinded the sale transaction or It has been terminated by the seller's 
fundamental breach. The seller, o f course, must present proper documents in accordance with the credit 
conditions; G.A. Penn, A.M. Shea, and A. Arora, "The Law and practice o f International B ank ing". 
Banking Law, Vol. 2, London, 1987, p. 309, para. 13.30 [hereinafter referred to as International Banking 
Law (Int.B.L.)].
 ^ Article 9(d)(i) o f UCP 500 provides: "Except as otherwise provided by Article 48, an irrevocable Credit 
neither be amended nor cancelled without the agreement o f the Issuing Bank, the Confirming Bank, i f  any, 
and the beneficiary."; see appendix 1 for Article 48 (considers a transferable credit) particularly paragraph 
(h) numbered several exceptions in which terms and conditions specified in the original credit are changed as 
a result o f transferring the credit; for more details concerning the right o f applicant for amendment o f a credit 
see relevant discussion in Chapter V, Section B.2.2.1 (above).
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1.2. The effect of amendment of the credit's terms on the sale 
contract
What would be the effect of the amendments or modifications of terms of a 
credit transaction upon a contract of sale? In Etablissement Soules et Cîe v. 
International Trade Development Co. L td ./ it was held that any modification of 
the terms of a credit agreement automatically changes the terms of its underlying 
sale contract/ Would such a decision be accepted in all cases of amendment of a 
credit? As pointed out above, the agreement of the applicant for a credit with any 
modification of an issued credit is vital. Since, otherwise, his position under the sale 
contract might be changed without his agreement and this would put his interests 
under the sale contract in danger. Moreover, in an American case, Dulien Steel 
Products, Inc., of Washington v. Bankers Trust Co.,® an action was brought 
against the confirming bank on the basis that the bank refused to accept the request 
of the issuing bank, namely, not to pay the full amount of the credit because of a 
later amendment of it. Although the defendant knew about the amendment and the 
beneficiary's consent to it, Brayan, J., accepted this argument and decided: "When a 
bank confirms a letter of credit the letter evidences its irrevocable obligation to 
honour drafts presented by the beneficiary upon compliance with the terms of the 
credit. The letter is quite independent of the primary agreement between the party 
for whose account it is issued and the beneficiary, or of any underlying transactions. 
Neither the issuing bank nor the confirming bank has any obligation, and is not 
permitted, to go behind the terms of the letter and the documents which are required 
to be presented, and to enter controversies between the beneficiary and the party
^ [1979] 2 Ll.L.R. 122; Ventns, F.M., "Bankers' documentary cred its". Lloyd’s o f London Press Ltd., 
2nd ed., 1983, pp. 249-60 [hereinafter referred to as Ventris].
’  In giving judgment Mr. Justice G off stated: "1 am satisfied that in the present case the letter o f credit which 
was operated by the parties, and which must be taken to have been agreed by them was in terms materially 
different to the original contract [...]. 1 therefore accepted [...] the original contract must be taken to have 
been amended in that respect." [See Ventris, ibid., p. 253]
" 189 F. Supp. 922 (1960), affirmed 298 F. 2d 836 (1962).
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for whose account the letter was opened concerning any other agreements or 
transactions."®
Why is there a difference between the position of an applicant and a 
confirming bank within a letter of credit? If the doctrine of autonomy is applied for 
protecting interests of banks (an issuing or a confirming bank, if any) and a 
beneficiary of a credit, it should similarly be applied for safeguarding the interests of 
an applicant for a credit.
1.3. Concluding remarks
Could the view in Urquhart Lindsay and Etablissement Soules et Cie be 
accepted as an exception to the doctrine of autonomy? For above mentioned 
reasons, namely, that the sale contract is established first, and authorities like 
Dulien Steel it is difficult to support such an opinion. Moreover, by choosing that 
view the buyer's right under the sale contract would be put at risk particularly if the 
issued credit is governed by the UCP for there is no right recognised for the 
buyer/applicant under Article 9(d)(1) when a credit is subject to amendment or 
cancellation.
2. LETTERS OF CREDIT AND A CARRIAGE CONTRACT
2.1. Introduction
Article 3 of UCP 500 provides that there is no connection between a credit 
agreement and the "other" contract(s).^® One of those transactions which may be 
established by a seller under a sale contract is a contract for carriage of the goods. 
Documents concerning that contract, like a bill of lading (BL), make up an important 
part of the seller's duty under the credit operation. Moreover, BL may be pledged for 
the interest of the issuing bank. If for any reason payment is not made by the buyer 
then a bank, in particular circumstances, can use BL (as a document of title) and 
claim possession of the goods from the carrier or his agent. Or, in contrast, the
Ibid., p. 927; Elliger, supra (f.n. 4), p. 187.
' See appendix 1 (below).
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carrier may have a desire to sue the bank instead of the owner of the goods (the 
buyer/ applicant). So, the issue for consideration is under what circumstances does 
an issuing bank become a party to the carriage contract? In other words, where the 
doctrine of autonomy does not apply in connection between a credit and a carriage 
contract?
2.2. In English law
A bank's right of possession over goods (as a pledgee of a bill of lading) or 
the possibility that the bank may be sued by a carrier under the carriage contract 
have been issues for consideration in English courts for decades. The reason for it 
is based upon the doctrine of "privity of contract", namely, that a stranger to a 
contract cannot as a general rule enforce any rights thereunder. So, a buyer of 
goods of in our case the issuing bank (as a pledgee) is in general unable to sue a 
carrier who lost or damaged the goods since he is a third party to the contract of 
carriage usually made between shipper (a seller of goods) and carrier. Different 
rules were applied in order to protect a third party's right and limit the harshness of 
the doctrine of "privity of contract". However, English law provides different 
treatment for a third party since his position may be different from one case to 
another. So, in this part of study we are dealing with possible rights and duties of an 
issuing bank (as a pledgee of bills of lading) against a carrier of goods in English 
legal system.
2.2.1. Section 1 of the Bills of Lading Act 1855
One of the solutions introduced and to some degree solved some of issues 
related to right of a third party in a bill of lading is Section 1 of The Bills of Lading Act 
1855.^  ^ In brief, the above rule provides no support either for a bank or carrier;
"  Terms o f the Section 1 are as following: "Whereas, by the custom o f merchants, a b ill o f lading o f goods 
being transferable by endorsement, the property in goods may thereby pass to the endorsee, but nevertheless 
all rights in respect o f the contract contained in the b ill o f lading continue in the original shipper or owner; 
and it is expedient that such rights should pass with the property: And whereas it frequently happens that the 
goods in respect o f which bills o f lading purport to be signed have not been laden on board, and it is proper 
that such bills o f lading in the hands o f the bona fide holder for value should not be questioned by the master 
or other person signing the same on the ground o f the goods not having been laden as aforesaid: 1. 
Consignees, and endorsees o f bills o f lading empowered to sue- Every consignee o f goods named in the 
b ill o f lading, and every endorsee o f a b ill o f lading, to whom the property in the goods therein mentioned
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since, in the case of indorsement it covers only the situation where as a result of 
indorsement the property in goods is also passed to the indorsee. In this situation all 
rights of suit are also transferred to the indorsee and he becomes subject to the 
same liabilities in respect of goods. But, where an issuing bank (as a pledgee and 
not as a consignee or indorsee) holds a bill of lading as a security it is not a subject 
covered by Section 1, because in such circumstances no property in goods is 
passed to the bank.
This point has also been confirmed by the decision of the House of Lords in 
Sewell V. Burdick^^ : "An Indorsee of a bill of lading by way of security, who 
converts his symbolical into real possession by obtaining delivery of the goods, 
ought never to derive any benefit from it."^ ®
2.2.2. Doctrine of "implied contract"
As a result of lack of appropriate legislation covering rights and liabilities of a 
bank under a bill of lading against a carrier, disputes have arisen from time to time 
between the bank and the carrier of goods. In one occasion namely in Brandt v. 
L iv e rp o o l, it was held that there is an implied contract where a pledgee of a bill of 
lading takes delivery since he is willing to accept the goods under the conditions 
which were specified in the bill of lading. The facts of the case are as follows. The 
plaintiff/ pledgee, who had accepted the bill of lading as a pledge and made 
advances to the shipper, brought an action against the shipowner for damages 
caused by delay and for which the defendant claimed a lien on the goods. In the 
Court of Appeal the decision of Geer, J., in the lower court was approved by their 
Lordships unanimously. Banks, L.J. said: "In this case the bill of lading holder
shall pass upon or by reason o f such consignment or endorsement, shall have transferred to and vested in him 
all rights o f suit, and be subject to the same liabilities in respect o f such goods as i f  the contract contained in 
the b ill o f lading had been made with himself."
(1884) 10 App. Cas. 74.
"  Ibid., pp. 85-86; Davenport, B.J., "Problems in the Bills o f Lading A c t". The Law Quarterly Review, 
Vol. 105, April 1989, p. 174.
"  [1924] 1 K.B. 575.
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offered the freight before the goods were delivered; and in fact paid it, and under 
those circumstances it seems to me that by the acceptance of the freight and the 
subsequent delivery the shipowners undertook an obligation to deliver the goods as 
described in the bill of lading."^®
How can "implied contract" be established between the issuing bank and the 
carrier? Would delivery of goods itself provide good grounds for such a contract? 
What would be the answer if goods are not delivered as a result of presenting a bill 
of lading? Does the situation become different if goods are delivered before a bill of 
lading is indorsed to the bank? These are some of the Issues raised after the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in the Brandt case, and in all of them the English 
courts accepted the view that the doctrine of "implied contract" has some limitations 
and it should be interpreted within the merits of each case. For instance, in The 
Captain Gregos (No. 2)^ ® it was not only said that there must be an implied 
contract between a bank and a carrier but such a contract must also be on the 
terms of the bill of lading. For establishing an implied contract it was said in the 
above case that there must exist a high degree of co-operation between interested 
parties. Moreover, the decision of the Court of Appeal in The Aramis^^, where it 
was held that mere delivery of goods is insufficient for accepting an implied contract, 
was supported in The Captain Gregos (No. 2). However, in a recent decision, The 
Gudermes ® the Court of Appeal overruled the decision of Hirst, J. in the lower 
court on the point that although a degree of co-operation between parties is one 
factor for establishing an implied contract, it is not a decisive one and it can be
"  Ibid., p. 589; Treitel, G;H., "B ills  o f Lading and Th ird  parties". LMCLQ, 1986, p. 294 and "B ills  of 
Lading and Implied Contracts". LMCLQ, 1989, p. 162; Beatson, J. and Cooper, J.J., "R ights o f suit in 
respect o f carriage o f goods by sea". LMCLQ, Part 2, May 1991, p. 196.
Com pa nia P o rtora fti Commerciale S.A. v. U ltram ar Panama Inc.. [1990]2 Ll.L.R. 395; Clarke, M., 
"M isde livery and Time Bar. The Captain Gregos". LMCLQ, 1990, p. 314, and "The Consignee's Right 
o f Action against the C arrie r o f Goods bv Sea". LMCLQ, 1991, p. 5; Berlingieri, F., "The Hague-Visby 
Rules and Action in T o r t" . The Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 107, January 1991, p. 18.
"  [1989]1 Ll.L.R. 213.
M itsu i &  Co. Ltd. v. Novorossiysk Shipping Co.. [1991]1 Ll.L.R. 456, and [1993]! L l.L.R  311 (CA).
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rejected on the merits of the case. Staghton, L.J. in that respect said: "Just as one 
does not imply a contract from refusal to enter into a contract, so one does not imply 
terms which one party has refused to accept."^®
In the light of the above decisions it is clear that under restricted conditions 
the doctrine of "implied contract" can apply in relationships between the issuing 
bank and the carrier. The question that should be dealt with is related to the effect of 
that doctrine after the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 (COGSA), namely, does 
the Act leave any room for application of doctrine of "implied contract"?
2.2.3. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 (COGSA) is an Act recommended 
by the English and Scottish Law Commissions^® to replace the Bills of Lading Act 
1855, since it did not cover some of problems related to a bill of l a d in g . i n  respect 
of the point in discussion, namely, relationship between an issuing bank and a 
carrier, a query may arise: does the new Act provide better protection for the issuing 
bank? Generally speaking, under sub-section 1(a) of Section 2 of COGSA 92 it is 
accepted that a person who becomes "the lawful holder of a bill of lading" is entitled
"  Ibid., at p. 323.
COGSA 1992 is based on the final recommendation o f the English and Scottish Law Commissions in their 
Reports R ights o f Suit in Respect o f Carriage o f Goods by Sea [(1991) Law Com. No. 196; Scot. Law 
Com. No. 130]; "Ownership o f Bu lk Cargoes. The Gosfoi t l i ". LMCLQ, 1986, p. 4; Hudson, A.H.,
"Sales from b u lk " . LMCLQ, 1989, p. 420; Reynolds, F.M.B., "Reform  o f the Bills o f Lading A c t" . The 
Law Quarterly Law Review, Vol. 106, January 1990, p. 1; Bradgate, R. and White, F., "The Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act 1992". The Modern Law Review, Vol. 56, March 1993, p. 188; Howard, Tim, "The 
Carriage o f Goods by Sea Act 1992". Journal o f Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 24, No. 1, January 
1993, p. 181; Fl atter, Jonathan, "Selected Bibliography on the law o f Carriage o f Goods by Sea, 1975- 
1992". Journal o f Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 24, No. 1, Januaiy 1993, p. 191.
In introduction to COGSA 1992, it is stated: "Unfortunately, there were at least five types o f case where 
this technique [means the B ill o f Lading Act 1855] proved inadequate: (i) where a consignee/indorsee did 
not obtain fu ll property In the goods but merely so-called special property o f a pledgee: Sewell v, Burd ick 
(1884) 10 App. Cas. 74; (ii) where the property did not pass at all although the buyer was on risk: Le igh and 
Sillivan v. A liakm on Shipping Co. [1986] A.C. 785; (ii) where property passed after consignment/ 
indorsement, as is usual in sales o f goods forming a larger bulk: Aramis. The [1989] 1 Ll.L.R. 213; (iv) 
where property passed before or independently o f the consignment/indorsement: Enichem Anic S.P.A. v. 
Ampelos Shipp ing Co.: Delfini. The [1990] 1 Ll.L.R. 252; (v) where a b ill o f lading was not used at all." 
[Emphasises are added]
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to bring an action against a carrier under the contract of carriage;^^ so, in contrast to 
Section 1 of the previously mentioned Bills of Lading Act 1855, right of suit is no 
longer connected to the right of property passed upon or by reason of consignment 
or indorsement.^^ As to the meaning of the lawful holder of a bill of lading Section 5, 
sub-section (2)(b) of the same Act provides: "a person with possession of the bill as 
a result of the completion, by delivery of the bill, of any indorsement of the bill, or in 
the case of a bearer bill, of any other transfer of the bill."
In respect of the application of the doctrine of "implied contract" after COGS A 
1992 it becomes clear that the decision in Brandt v. Liverpool may only apply in 
particular situations, namely, where a person who is not a lawful holder of a bill of 
lading or in case where a bill of lading is lost and a person who is entitled to deliver it 
never receives it.^ "^
2.3. Concluding remarks
UCP 500, as in its previous versions, includes a general provision under 
Article 3 that the documentary letters of credit are separated from the sales or any 
contract(s) on which it may be based; there is nothing related to the issuing bank's 
right to sue a carrier of goods. This is a clear indication that UCP as international 
customary rules left the issue for consideration by a respective national law.
Sub-section 1(a) o f Section 2 o f COGSA 1992 said: "Subject to the following provisions o f this section, a 
person who becomes, (a) the lawful holder o f a b ill o f lading; [...] shall [...] have transferred to and vested in 
him all rights o f suit under the contract o f carriage as i f  he had been a party to that contract."
In a general note to Section 1 o f the Act it is stated: "In the case o f b ill o f lading, subs. (1) finally breakes 
the link between the transfer o f contractual rights and the acquisition o f property "upon or by reason o f  
consignment or indorsement, as stipulated by s. 1 o f the Bills o f Lading Act 1855. Lawful possession o f the 
b ill o f lading, rather than having property in the goods or being on risk, becomes the key to the transfer o f 
contractual rights to the holder."
As to this point see the general note to sub-section 1 o f Section 2 o f the COGSA 1992, where it is stated: 
"Finally, there remains a question which may require resolution from the courts. What is the position where a 
person who is entitled to delivery o f the b ill o f lading never receives it (say, because it is lost) or receives it 
only after the expiry o f the one-year limitation period in the Hague-Visby Rules? In these circumstances, 
recovery may be denied under the Act. Recourse to an implied contract between the buyer and the carrier on 
the terms o f the b ill o f lading, a so-called b rand t v. Liverpool contract ([1924] 1 K.B. 575), remains one 
way o f circumventing problems which are not solved by the Act." [Emphasis added]; Baughen, S., 'T h e  
Guderines. W hat future fo r B randt v. L ive rpoo l?". J.B.L., January 1994, p. 62.
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If an issued credit is subject to English or Scottish law the issuing bank either 
as a "lawful holder of a bill of lading" or in appropriate circumstance by application of 
the doctrine of "implied contract" may sue a carrier for damage or loss of goods. 
Moreover, the bank by virtue of taking or demanding delivery or making a claim 
against the carrier, becomes subject to the same liabilities under the contract of 
carriage as it is a party to that cont ract .The trend in English and Scottish law from 
the Section 1 of the Bills of Lading Act 1855 to the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Brandt v. Liverpool (doctrine of implied contract) and from that decision untill the 
COGSA 1992 has gradually changed in favour of the bank's right of suit under a bill 
of lading, due to the impact of reality of business activities in international trade. 
Therefore, the view that there is no link between a credit arrangement and a 
contract of carriage is no longer acceptable, at least under English and Scottish law. 
In that respect, it seems necessary that the point under consideration has received 
attention by those who are involved in preparing a set of international standards 
concerning LCs. However, because of the legal nature of the issue and its 
complexity the ICC shows less interest to involve itself in such issues; so, dealing 
properly with such legal issues relevant to LCs requires a new approach, namely, an 
international legislation in the form of a convention. By adopting such a policy a 
greater uniformity concerning the law of LCs would be achieved at international 
level.
3. DOCTRINE OF AUTONOMY AND "MAREVA INJUNCTIONS"
The applicant for a credit sometimes seeks to prevent the sellers from 
receiving the amount of the credit by obtaining a "Mareva lnjunction"(M!) granted by 
courts.^® Does applying for a mareva injunction put the independent nature of the
See sub-section 1 o f Section 3 o f COGSA 1993.
It is named after decision in Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bu lk carriers $_,A,, 
[1975]2 Ll.L.R. 5 0 9 ,  where for the first time such an injunction was granted; see David G. Powles, "The 
Mareva In jun c tion ". J.B.L., 1978, p. 11, "V iva  m areva". J.B.L., 1980, p. 218, and "The Mareva 
In junction and Associated O rders". Proffessional Books Ltd., 1985; Schmitthoff, C.M., SchmitthofPs 
export trade, the law and practice of international trade". London, 8th ed., 1986 [hereinafter referred to 
as Schmitthoff], pp. 619-20; Collins, Lawrence, "The te rito ria l reach o f Mareva in junctions". LQR, 1989,
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credit at risk? Before considering that question it is useful to understand the purpose 
of the injunction and under what conditions it can be granted by the courts.
This is a right which has been authorized by The Supreme Court Act 1981, 
S. 37(1) and (3). However, courts are reluctant to grant such an injunction save in 
appropriate circumstances. It may be granted to prevent the seller removing or 
transferring assets he has received under the credit from the jurisdiction. Lord 
Denning, M.R., in Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL,^^ explained that point clearly by saying 
that: "The injunction does not prevent payment under a letter of credit or under a 
bank guarantee [...] but it may apply to the proceeds as and when received by or for 
the defendant."^® In P.C.W. (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd. v. P.S. Dixon,^^ Lloyd, 
J., explained the purpose of granting such injunction by saying that, "[It is] simply to 
prevent the injustice of a defendant removing or dissipating his assets so as to 
cheat the plaintiff of the fruit of his claim.Furthermore,  several conditions are 
needed before such an injunction is granted: "The injunction may now, it seems, be 
granted where (a) the plaintiff has a good claim against the defendant, (b) the claim 
is one over which the court has jurisdiction, (c) there is evidence that the defendant 
has assets within the jurisdiction, (d) there is a real risk that those assets will be 
removed from the jurisdiction, (e) there is a real risk that if the injunction is not 
granted the defendant will be unable or unwilling to satisfy a judgment against him 
on the plaintiffs claim and, (f) there is a balance of convenience in favour of granting 
the injunction. The injunction is typically in wide terms, restraining the defendant 
from dealing with his assets that are within the jurisdiction until trial or further order;
p. 262; see also "Halsbui y ’s Laws o f England". Banking, Butterworths, London, Vol. 3(1), 4th ed., 1989,
p. 260.
”  [1982] Q.B. 558.
Ibid, p. 574.
[1983] 2 Ll.L.R. 197.
Ibid., p. 202; Goode, R.M., "Reflections on Letters o f C re d it- II" . J.B.L., 1980, pp. 378-81, at p. 378-9 
[hereinafter referred to as Goode].
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and to avoid the possibility that the defendant might transfer his assets to another 
party within the jurisdiction who would then take them abroad, the injunction is not 
limited to transfer by the defendant out of the jurisdiction."^^
As a result of the above views it seems the autonomous nature of the credit 
would not be changed in case of application of a Ml, and the buyer is entitled to 
seek such a right while, at the same time, the banker is not prevented from making 
payment; therefore, the answer to the above asked question is negative.
For preventing any ambiguity concerning the issue under consideration, it 
seems necessary that the application of Ml and its llmitation(s) should be included 
within any international set of standards concerning the law of LCs. There is nothing 
as to the application of Ml or a similar approach in the UCP 500. In contrast. Section 
5-114 (2) of the UCC provides a similar solution in case of fraud in the credit 
operation by the beneficiary;^^ thus appears another distinction to exist between the 
UCC and the UCP.^^ It becomes also clear that since the UCC and the UCP are 
different in nature (namely, the former is in legislation form but the latter is in 
customary/ contractual form), "^  ^ the Ml has been left out of the UCP in the past. In 
order to cover legal issues concerning LCs such as Ml within the UCP, the scope of 
the provisions set out by the ICC should be widened. Would it be possible for the 
ICC to change its view adopted in the past? For reasons pointed out elsewhere^^ it 
would be difficult for the ICC to adopt a different approach unless Its structure and 
constitution are changed first, something which seems at present to be out of 
question.
Goode, ibid., p. 379.
See relevant discussion in Section B .i o f the present Chapter (below).
For other distinctions between Article 5 o f the UCC and UCP 500 see Chapter V  (above). 
See relevant discussion in Chapters V (Section B. 1.1) above and X I (Section B.2) below. 
See Chapters X (Section B) and X I (Section A.3) below.
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SECTION B: EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF AUTONOMY
Are there any exception(s) to the doctrine of autonomy? if so, what are the 
exceptions and their effects on relationship between parties to a credit contract? 
The issue of a beneficiary's fraud, as an exception to the above doctrine, has 
received much attention in different legal systems as well as in English and Scottish 
law. Beside the issue of fraud there are other issues like illegality of the underlying 
sale contract, or contractual agreement for unenforceability of the doctrine of 
autonomy by parties to a credit transaction, which puts limitations on the application 
of the doctrine of autonomy.
This part of the thesis is devoted to these issues, points related to them, 
and their impact on rights and liabilities of banks against other parties to a letter of 
credit. In that respect the issue of fraud is considered first, in the light of English law 
(Scottish law takes a view similar to English law) and American law in more details 
to find whether, to some extent, a common view exists between different legal 
systems as far as LCs are concerned. In order to have a better understanding of 
exceptions to the doctrine of autonomy and their impact upon the LCs system, the 
following discussion is presented.
1. FRAUD
Sarna, L., "Letters o f C red it" The Law and Practice". 2nd ed., 1986 [hereinafter referred to as Sarna], 
pp. 129-152; Ellinger, E.P.."Documentary credits and fraudulent documents" a paper published in 
Chinkin, C.M., Davidson P.J., and Ricquier, W.J.M., "C u rren t Problems o f In ternationa l Trade 
F inancing". Singapore Conferences on International Business Law, Malaya Law Review, 1983 [hereinafter 
referred to as Singapore Conferrence 1983], at p. 202 [hereinafter referred to as Ellinger's paper in Singapore 
conference 1983]; see Ellinger, supra (f.n. 4), p. 190 and from the same writer, "Docum entary Credits and 
Fraudulent Documents", a paper published in Kee, Ho Peng and HM  Chen, PL, "C u rre n t Problems o f 
In ternationa l Trade F inancing". Singapore Conferences on International Business Law, 2nd ed., 
Butterworths, 1990 [hereinafter referred to as Singapore Conferences 1990], pp. 139-87 [hereinafter referred 
to Ellinger's paper in Singapore conferences 1990]; Kozolchyk, B., "Letters o f C re d it" . 9 International 
Encyclopedia o f Comprative Law, Chapter 5, 1979, pp. 120-22 [hereinafter referred to as Kozolchyk] and 
from the same writer, "Comm ercial Law: The Immunization o f Fraudulently Procured Letters of 
C re d it" . 58 Brooklyn Law Review 369, Spring 1992, Brooklyn Law School [hereinafter referred to as 
Kozoichyk's article]; Mautner, Menachem, "L e tte r o f credit fraud: total fa ilu re  o f consideration, 
substantial performance and the negotiable instrument analogy". Law and policy in International 
Business, No. 18, 1986, pp. 579-647 [hereinafter referred to as Mautner]; Ellinger, E.P., "B ritish  Business 
Law. B ank ing", JBL, March 1991, p .170 &  JBL, May 1991, p. 279; Bennett, H.N., "Docum entary Credit, 
fraud and string contracts". LMCLQ, Feb. 1991, p. 43.
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The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) pointed out that fraud has 
sharply increased in international trade and in letters of credit (because of the wide 
range of documents required under this arrangement) in recent decades. 
Presenting forged or false documents is not a difficult job if an unscrupulous 
beneficiary is tempted to carry it out. Are banks obliged to accept documents which 
on their face comply with terms and conditions of the credit but, in fact, are not 
genuine documents? What is a bank's obligation if documents tendered by the 
beneficiary are not forged but there are no goods at all, or goods are not in 
accordance with the credit's conditions? To what extent does the bank's knowledge 
(or that of its client, as the case may be), as to the genuineness of tendered 
documents, become important? Under the present law what type of fraud is 
accepted as an exception to the doctrine of autonomy. What limitations apply to 
fraud? What would be the effect of fraud on a third party who acts in good faith? 
These points and issues related to them are discussed below.
1.1. Scope of the fraud exception
If banks can prove the forgery or the fraudulent behaviour of the beneficiary 
through their personal knowledge or information received from their customers, they 
have a duty to reject tendered documents and stop any payment under the credit 
since these amount to waste paper.^® And the seller seems in breach of conditions
ICC, "G uide to the Prevention o f International Trade Fraud". ICC Publication No. 420 [hereinafter 
referred to as ICC guidance], at p. 4 stated tliat: "In recent decades, there has been a marked increased in 
trade fraud, especially since the mid-seventies, when chronic port congestion in the M iddle East and Nigeria 
obliged vessel s to wait weeks and sometimes months to discharge. Owners and charteres naturally found the 
demurrage very costly and took their cargoes elsewhere to unload. From there, it was only a short step for the 
less honest operator to take the cargo elsewhere and usually sell it. Many variations based upon this 
essentially simple theme have since appeared."; see also at p. 6 o f the same reference in which it is said that a 
letter o f credit usually required over 16 separate documents among them are b ill o f lading, commercial 
invoice, insurance policy, certificate o f origin, certificate o f quality or survey certificate; M illett, P.J., 
"T rac ing  the Proceeds o f F ra u d ". LQR, 1991, p. 71.
Davis, A.G., "The Law Relating to Commercial Letters of C red it". 3rd ed., 1963 [hereinafter referred 
to as Davis], at p. 146, f.n. 4 referred to an American case and pointed out that: "Nacional Financiera s.a. v, 
Banco dc Ponce (1949), 89 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 480: where it was not evident on the face o f the documents 
presented that they contained an underlying false statements, payment o f a draft drawn under the letter o f 
credit was held to be proper."; Murray, Daniel E.. "Letters o f C redit and Forged and Altered Documents; 
Some Deterrent Suggestions". Commercial Low Journal, Vol. 98, No.4, Winter 1993, p. 504, at p. 504 
said: "Since letter o f credit sales are based upon documents rather than an examination o f the goods,
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stipulated in LCs, namely, to produce documents which comply with the terms of the 
credit.^® In contrast, if there is merely a suspicion of fraud, forgery or false 
documentation, a question may arise as to whether banks are under a duty to check 
the genuineness of tendered documents? It is said that there is no such 
responsibility for banks under the above cited circumstances."^^
Moreover, in respect of the banks' position in case of fraud there are two 
lines of arguments. The first is in favour of a narrow interpretation of the exception to 
the principle of autonomy, i.e. the seller is not liable for fraudulent action of a third 
party and therefore for the genuineness of the tendered documents under the credit 
contract."^  ^ The second view supports a wider interpretation of the fraud exception, 
namely, that a third party's fraud affects a beneficiary's position. A difference has 
also emerged as to the concept of "fraud in transaction" in Section 5-114 of UCC 
between American lawyers, namely whether fraud committed by a beneficiary is 
limited to LCs or also covers a contract of sale. Then the question is: which one of 
those attitudes is to be preferred? To find an answer to these questions, above the 
bank's position is considered under Common law and UCP 500 (below).
evei^thing depends upon the integrity o f the documents. In the event that the documents are forged or altered 
counterfeit forms are used, the total transaction becomes frustrated and the losses to innocent buyers and 
banks can be enormous."
Sztejn V. J.H. Schroeder Banking Corp. 11941) 31 NY Supp. 631.
In Basse and Selve v. Bank o f Australia. (1904) 90 LT 618, Bigham, J. supported such notion by 
stating that: "Once they were in thouch with the right man the defendants' only remaining duty was to see 
that the documents which he brought purported on their face to be the documents described in the mandate. 
It was no part o f their duty to verify the genuineness o f the documents."; this view was also confirmed in 
Maurice O 'Meara v. National Park Bank (1925) 239 N Y  386; 146 NE 636; Davis, ibid, pp. 147-48 and 
pp. 153-54; see ICC guidance, supra (f.n. 37), at p. 14 it is stated that: "When documents are presented to a 
bank against a documentai^ credit, it is not possible for the bank concerned, niether it is required under the 
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, to verify either the genuineness o f any such 
documents including the b ill o f lading or the signature thereon. The vast number o f shipping companies and 
their agents throughout the world, most o f whom are empower to issue bills o f lading, make such a check 
totally impracticable. However, the careful choice o f forwarding agent greatly reduces the risk o f fraud."
United C ity Merchants flnvestnient) L td. v. Royal Bank o f Canada. "The American Accord" [19791 
2 Ll.L.R. 498; [1982] 2 W LR 1039.
Generally speaking, it is said that banks are under no duty to investigate the integrity o f the seller since 
they are only acting upon their client's instruction; so it is the buyer's responsibility to select an honest 
partner for his contract; in that regard see ICC guidence, supra (f.n. 37), at p. 14 pointed out: "Banks advising
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1.2. Position in Common law
1.2.1. Fraud committed by the seller (Sztejn case)
In respect of fraud committed by a beneficiary of a credit the leading authority 
is an American case in which for the first time it was held that an unscrupulous 
beneficiary must not be allowed to benefit from the autonomous nature of the letter 
of c r e d i t . S o  far as English and Scots law are concerned, there are many 
authorities which support the rule set out in the Sztejn case. For instance, in 
Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v. Barclays Bank International Ltd.,"'"  ^ Lord 
Denning, M.R., after describing the general principle of autonomy of the letter of
documentary credits do so on the instructions o f their principals either their own customer or another bank) 
and are therefore, not responsible for investigating or vouching for the standing and : integrity o f the 
beneficiaries whether they are known to them or not. It is, therefore, essential that, as previously stated, any 
necessary enquiries should be made by the buyer before even entering into a purchase agreement."
In Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking C orporation.f 1941131 N Y  Supp. 631, the seller presented 
documents which on their face complied with credit's conditions but in fact he shipped rubbish; buyer 
discovered the truth and instructed his bank not to pay but the defendant negotiating bank did not comply 
with such a request, the plaintiff/buyer brought an action against that bank seeking an injunction. Shientag, 
J,, held in favour o f the p la in tiff and in course o f his judgment he explained facts o f the case and his view in 
follow ing words: "On the present motion, it must be assumed that the seller has intentionally failed to ship 
any goods ordered by the buyer. In such a situation, where the seller's fraud has been called to the bank's 
attention before the drafts and documents have been presented fo r payment, the princip le  o f 
indepcndece o f the bank's obligation under the letter o f credit should not be extended to protect the 
unscrupulous seller. It is true that even though the documents are forged or fraudulent, i f  the issuing bank 
has already paid the draft before receiving notice o f the seller's fraud, it w ill be protected i f  exercised 
reasonably diligence before making such payment." [Emphasis added]; nevertheless, the same judge made an 
exception to that by saying: " I f  it had appeared from the face o f the complaint that the bank presenting the 
draft for payment was a holder in due course, its claim against the bank issuing the letter o f credit would not 
be defeated even though the primaiy transaction was tainted with fraud."; Gutteridge, H.C. and Megrah, M., 
"The law o f bankers' commercial cred its". 7th ed., London, 1984 [hereinafter referred to as Gutteridge], 
pp. 186-7, particularly the view expressed by Cardozo, J., in Maurice which expressed a dissenting view; 
Sarna, supra (f.n. 36), pp. 134-35; see also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Lawyers' T itle  &  trust Co. 297 F. 152 
(1924) that it is said this case is related to issue o f fraud and the case o f Sztejn was decided upon the 
principle accepted in that case; however the distinction between them is that in Old Colony T rust there was 
no goods at all and the beneficiary used a forged warehouse receipt, but in Sztejn tendered documents were 
related to worthless goods [Kee, Ho Peng, "The Fraud Rule in Letters o f C red it Transaction". Singapore 
Conferences 1990, supra (f.n. 36) pp. 188-208, at p. 191 [hereinafter referred to as Kee]; Mautner, supra (f.n. 
36), at pp. 592-93 and pp. 617-18.
[1978]! A ll ER 976; [1978]1 Ll.L.R. 166; for position in Scottish law see Centri-Force Engineering v. 
Bank o f Scotland. The Times, December 23, 1992, held that Scottish law is similar to English law as to the 
issue o f fraud and rules in Edward Owen and in The American Accord are also applied in Scotland; Sarna, 
Lazar, "Letters o f credit: Bankruptcy, fraud and identity of parties". The Canadian Bar Review, Vol. 65, 
1986, p. 303.
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credit, referred to the Sztejn case as an exception to that principle by saying: "To 
this general principle there is an exception in the case of what is called established 
or obvious fraud to the knowledge of the bank, the most illuminating case is of 
Sztejn V. J. Henry Schroder/^^
Turning to The Sztejn decision, would the bank's position be different if the 
banker is informed of the fraud after the presentation of documents but before 
payment? In Bank Russo-lran v. Gordon Woodroff & Co. Ltd., Browne, L.J., 
made it clear that there should be no difference in the banker's position, namely, the 
bank is entitled to refuse payment/^ It is suggested that the situation In French and 
German law is similar to that expressed above.
1.2.2. Fraud by a third party (The American Accord case)
One of the controversial matters in dealing with the issue of fraud is whether 
fraud committed by a third party affects the rights of a seller/beneficiary under the 
doctrine of autonomy. This point arose for the first time in United City Merchants 
(investments) Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada, (The American Accord)."*® Since
Emphasis added; for other authorities see Hamzeh Malas &  Sons v. British Iniex Industries L td. [1958] 
2 QB 127; Discount Records Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd. [1975] 1 ll.L.R. 444; The American Accord, 
[1979]2 Ll.L.R. 498, [1982]2 Ll.L.R. 1, and [1982]2 WLR 1039.
[1972] The Times 4 October (an unreported case); the related part o f decision o f Browne, L.J., is as 
following; "In my judgment, i f  the documents are presented by the beneficiary himself, or are forged or 
fraudulent, the bank is entitled to refuse payment i f  it finds out before payment, and is entitled to recover the 
money as paid under a mistake o f fact i f  it finds out after payment."
Ellinger, supra (f.n. 4), pp. 191-92.
[1979] I Ll.L.R. 267 and [1979]2 Ll.L.R. 498 (QB); [1981J1 Ll.L.R. 604 (CA); [1982] 2 Ll.L.R. 1 and 
[1982] 2 WLR 1039. The facts o f the case arc that an English company (second plaintiffs) agreed to sell 
manufactured goods to a Peruvian company under an f.o.b. contract, London, for shipment to Callao and 
payment was to be furnished by an irrevocable confirmed letter o f credit. It  was also agreed by contracting 
parties that the price o f the merchandise was doubled in order to allow the buyer to exchange Perovian 
currency for the excess amount in breach o f Perovian exchange control regulations. A  letter o f credit issued 
by Banco Continental S.A. and correspondent to the seller through the defendants (Royal Bank o f Canada). 
Then the seller assigned his right under the credit to the United City Merchants (first plaintiffs). After 
tendering required documents the defendants refused to accept the tendered b ill o f lading on the ground that 
it was a forged document and it was inaccurate in some respects: (1) It contained the notation "these goods 
are actually on board 15th December 1976", whereas the goods were not on board until December 16; (2) 
The port o f loading was said to be the port o f London. It was in fact Felixstowe; (3) The date o f the issue o f 
the b ill o f lading was said to be Dec. 15 it was in fact Dec. 16.
191
this case has been the subject of many discussions by legal writers, it will be 
discussed in more detail. The fraudulent action of the loading broker's employee in 
issuing a forged document had been done in a manner that precluded the seller 
from honouring it; additionally there was no relationship existing between the 
loading broker and seller as agent and principal. In the judgement Mocatta, J., held 
that the sellers were innocent and therefore they were entitled to receive payment. 
This opinion was rejected by all three judges in the Court of Appeal on the ground 
that if a banker knows that tendered documents are forged he is under a duty to 
reject the documents (on the principle of strict compliance); it did not matter whether 
the fraud was done by a third party or the beneficiary of the credit himself. The 
House of Lords accepted Mocatta J.'s view on this point and reversed the decision 
of the Court of Appeal on the ground that the only exception to the doctrine of 
autonomy is that the fraud has been carried out by the seller/beneficiary, and there 
is no justification for extending the application of such an exception to cases 
involving fraud carried out by a third party rather than the seller.
1.2.2.1. Analysis of The American Accord decision
For the first time the two pillars of the documentary credit system, namely, 
the doctrine of autonomy and the rule of strict compliance, stood sharply against 
each other, raising the question as to a bank's position if it receives documents that 
appear on their face to be in order but actually they are forged and the bank knows 
this fact. In other words, is the fraud exception to the strict rule that the bank must 
pay if documents are, on their face, in order, limited to the case where the fraud is 
that of the seller/ presenter; or does it apply in all cases of fraud known to the 
bank?"*  ^ In the Court of Appeal Stephenson, L.J., took the view that "If a document, 
false in the sense that it is forged by a person other than the beneficiary, can entitle 
a bank to refuse payment, I see no reason why a document in any way false to the
See Ackner, L.J.'s view in the Court o f Appeal, at p. 627; and also Griffiths, L.J.'s judgment in the Court 
o f Appeal, at p. 632.
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knowledge of a person other than the beneficiary should not have the same 
effect."' '^’
Among commentators the strongest support of the view adopted by the Court 
of Appeal came from Professor Goode: "The beneficiary under a credit is not like a 
holder in due course of a bill of exchange; he is only entitled to be paid if the 
documents are in order. A fraudulently completed bill of lading does not become a 
conforming document merely because the fraud is that of a third party."®* The 
House of Lords took a different view from that expressed by the Court of 
Appeai(CA), namely, the only exception to the principle of independence of the 
credit is the seller's fraud, and it must not be extended to a third party's f raud .Lo rd  
Diplock disagreed with the Court of Appeal's approach on two grounds. Firstly, the 
view that forgery and fraud in the letter of credit is one subject with two different 
names is not acceptable; nevertheless he left open the question for further analysis. 
Secondly, it was said that even if the correctness of the above view was accepted it 
was wrong to conclude that fraud by a third party has a similar effect on the position 
of the innocent seller/beneficiary in connection with the confirming bank's obligation.
[1981] 1 Ll.L.R. 604 (CA), p. 623, p. 628-29 (Ackner, L.J.), and p. 632, col. 2, par. 2 (Griffiths, L.J.); 
Cotton, Smart, "LO Cs: Not Foolproof. But S till Safe". Best's Review, Vol. 88, No. 6, October 1987, p. 56, 
at p, 62 said: "The American Accord case sets up a d ifficult standard. In essence, it is for the court to 
determine what the beneficiary knew, not whether the documents were genuine. US courts do not accept the 
American Accord approach and tend to follow the rule that i f  the documents are irregular in the sense that 
they are forgeries or contain fraudulent information, the bank can dishonor the beneficiaiy's demand."
Goode, R.M., "Reflections on Letters o f Credit- I " . J.B.L. 1980, pp. 291-95, at p. 294 [hereinafter 
referred to as Goode's reflection I]; Schmitthoff, C.M., "F raud affecting documentary credits: refusal o f 
bank to p a y ". J.B.L. 1981, pp. 221-24, at p. 223; Ellinger's paper in Singapore Conference 1983, supra (f.n. 
36), pp. 205-6; Davis, supra (f.n. 38), pp. 145-46 and p. 156; Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 43), pp. 179-80; 
Kozoichyk's article, supra (f.n. 36) at p. 370 it was asked: "Why should a good faith applicant agree to 
procure the issuance o f a letter o f credit and reimburse the issuing bank i f  the letter o f credit becomes an 
automatic and unstoppable vehicle for the protection o f fraud?"
[1982] 2 W.L.R., p. 1039, at p. 1049, Diplock, L.J. in course o f delivering his judgment concern to the 
Court o f Appeal’ s view states: "The Court o f Appeal reached their half-way house in the instant case by 
starting from the premiss that a confirming bank could refuse to pay against adocument that it knew to be 
forged, even though the seller/beneficiaiy had no knowledge o f that fact. From this premiss they reasoned 
that i f  forgery by a third party relieves the confirming bank o f liab ility to pay the seller/beneficiary, fraud by 
a third party ought to have the same consequence."
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as forgery by a third party that may affect such obligation, i.e. rejecting forged 
documents and refusing payment.®®
1.2.2.2. Comment
When comparing the opinions of the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal 
in order to find a solution to this problem, it seems the view accepted by the House 
of Lords should be preferred, for the following reasons: firstly, it is obvious that 
forgery and fraud are two different crimes each with its own characteristics.®"* 
Secondly, a party to a contract is responsible for his own offence and his agent's 
failure. So, as the facts of the case show fraud can be carried out by a person who 
has no relationship with the seller/beneficiary. Moreover, the seller had no 
knowledge of any wrongdoing; but if a seller has such information and at the same 
time presents the documents, the crime of fraud can be established against him and 
the rule of Sztejn case governs the situation.®® Thirdly, having information that 
documents are forged and using them intentionally are main factors for establishing 
fraud and forgery offenses. A similar view is accepted in the relationship between a
”  Ibid., at p. 1049 Diplock, L.J., expressed his view as following: "I see no reason why, and there is nothing 
in the Uniform Commercial Code to suggest that, a seiler/beneficiary who is ignorant o f the forgery should 
be in a worse position because he has not negotiated the draft before presentation."; Korea Industry Co. 
Ltd. V. Andoll L td. [1990]2 Ll.L.R. 183 (supported the House o f Lords' decision in The American 
Accord); see also Tukan T im ber v. Barclays Bank [1987] 1 Ll.L.R. 171 (QB).
Bride, R., "Osborn's Concise Law D ictionary". London, 7th ed., 1983, at p. 152 said that forgery as an 
offence defined by the Forgeiy and Counterfeiting Act 1981 as "making o f a false instrument with the 
intention that it should be accepted as genuine to the prjudice o f another person" (sec.l o f the Act); and at p. 
153, relating to the fraud, it is said: "In general, fraud is obtaining o f a material advantage by unfair or 
wrongfull means; it involves moral obliquity. It must be proved to sustain the common law action o f deceit. 
Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without 
belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. To obtain damages for deceit it must 
be proved that the defendant intended that the p la in tiff should act on the fraudulent misrepresentation, that he 
did act on it, and suffered damage in consequence. Fraud renders a contract voidable at the option o f the 
injured party."
See RPPC v. Bank Leuin i [1992] 1 Ll.L.R. 513 where a fraud is committed by a third party and the 
beneficiary o f the credit knew it; so held that the bank is entitled to refuse payment; Ellinger, E.P., "The 
Uniform  Customs and Practice: a b rie f review of the ir salient points". JBL, Jan. 1994, p. 28 [hereinafter 
referred to as Ellinger's article in JBL 1994], at p. 36 stated: "In Rafsanjan Pistachio Producers Co­
operative V. Bank Leu mi fUKJ pic. [1992J1 Ll.L.R. 513, Flirst J. found on the merits that the application 
for the credit had included certain fraudulent misrepresentations o f which the beneficiary, too, was aware. On 
those facts, his Lordship concluded that the beneficiary was precluded from enforcing the credit against the 
issuing bank."
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bank and its customer, i.e. if the bank acts reasonably even though tendered 
documents are forged or there is a fraudulent seller, the bank is entitled to recover 
any money which is paid under the credit's conditions. So why does such a 
procedure not apply in the relationship between the seller and the bank (issuing or 
correspondent bank as the case may be)?®®
Is it that a bank is under a duty towards its client not to accept documents 
which do not comply with the credit's terms? Also may it lose its security over the 
goods by such acceptance? It can be argued that banks are dealing with 
documents and not with the individuals who present them; so if there is a forged 
document they are entitled to reject it. In reply, one can suggest that a beneficiary 
stands in the same shoes, as he may lose control over his goods even where there 
has been no failure on his part. He is also dealing with documents and if he acts 
reasonably no further obligations should be imposed upon him. In addition, by 
allowing an extension of the scope of fraud, the documentary credit system would 
not be able to work more efficiently; and it would inevitably give rise to the creation 
of a more complicated credit contract in the future.
As to the argument that it is not just a bank or its client who should suffer 
from such wrongdoing in preference to the seller/beneficiary, it can be said it is part 
of the risk that parties to an international trade agreement should accept. Moreover, 
under Article 3 of UCP 500, mentioned previously, a credit contract is separate from 
a contract of carriage; so, if there is fraud in the carriage contract it is a matter which 
does not relate to the credit agreement and the banks should in no way involve 
themselves in such a dispute.®^
See Mautner's article, supra (f.n. 36), pp. 623-25 for a different view namely "intention" is an strange 
factor to a contract where damages are measured; further, by accepting it we face a circular approach namely 
to prove a fraud we need to look at the beneficiary's intention and to establish a fraudulent intention we need 
to examine the quality o f the beneficiaiy's performance. Therefore, it is suggested that for establishing a 
fraud we should look at "performance" rather then "intention" o f a beneficiary.
For more details see discussion concerning the meaning o f "fraud in the transaction" in Section B. 1.2.5. o f 
the present Chapter (below).
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1.2.3. Time of a beneficiary’s knowledge as to fraud committed by a third 
party
In respect of the decision In The American Accord a point may arise: are 
banks entitled to refuse payment if they can prove that the beneficiary has 
knowledge of fraud committed by a third party after presenting the required 
documents under the credit contract? One may argue that on the basis of the House 
of Lords' decision in The American Accord the beneficiary's duty to present 
stipulated documents Is ended by tendering documents. Therefore, after that time 
the beneficiary has no duty to inform banks if he finds later that a fraud was 
committed by a third party. So, in such a situation banks are not entitled to refuse 
payment under the credit (narrow interpretation).
In contrast, it may be argued that in case of fraud the beneficiary's good faith 
should continued even after the time of tendering documents. Therefore, if banks 
are aware or can prove that the beneficiary is aware of fraud committed by a third 
party after presentation of documents, they can protect their Interests by rejecting 
payment under LCs (wide interpretation). Which one of those arguments is 
preferable? The second approach seems difficult to apply since it is directly 
opposed to a beneficiary's interest and few beneficiaries are ready to sacrifice their 
interests in such circumstances. However, if a bank can prove the beneficiary's 
knowledge as to fraud committed by a third party after the time of presentation of 
documents, it may be a good ground for establishing fraud against the beneficiary 
for using forged documents.
1.2.4. Issues of fraud in the relationship between banks
What would be the position of an intermediary bank if it is proved that 
documents presented by a beneficiary are forged documents or that a fraud is 
committed by the beneficiary of the credit? Could the issuing bank refuse payment 
to such a bank? It seems the relationship between an issuing bank and other banks, 
if they are acting reasonably, is governed by the same principles applying between 
the issuing bank and its client, namely, that the latter is under a duty to pay the
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amount which is paid by the former and there is also no right of recourse for the 
issuing bank against the beneficiary.®® However, questions may arise as to the 
position of a discounting and a negotiating bank, as follows.
1.2.4.1, Discounting bank
Is a discounting bank's position similar to that of other banks relating to their 
relation with the issuing bank in case of fraud? In other words, is an issuing bank 
obliged to accept a forged document presented by a discounting bank acting in 
good faith? An issuing bank usually furnishes a credit in the name of a specified 
beneficiary as promisee. On the other hand, a beneficiary/seller is entitled to assign 
his rights under the credit by discounting it to a third person who is a stranger to the 
credit contract.®® As the above question, because the issuing bank (as promisor) 
does not accept any undertaking towards the discounting bank, the latter bank acts 
at its own risk and courts of law have been unwilling to imply any obligation by the 
issuing bank vis-a-vis a discounting bank.®®
Ellinger's paper in Singapore Conference 1983, supra (f.n. 36), pp. 215-17.
Article 49 o f UCP 500.
M .A. Sassoon &  Sons Ltd. v. In ternational Banking Cor. [1927] A.C. 711, Viscount sumner states: "It 
is contended that in spite o f the words "when offering drafts for negotiation under this authority", which 
authorize negotiations to the eastern bank alone, the suceeding words "to enable the negotiating bank", 
convey that the authority advised in the letter o f advice extends to the transaction with othej- negotiating 
banks, and should not be construed as merely meaning "to enable us when we negotiate the drafts ..." Even i f  
this be so (and it is a very summai-y way o f converting the terms o f a discounts offer by any other bank), it 
does not follow that, i f  a third party bank negotiates, all the undertakings and all the dealings referred to in 
this letter o f advice w ill be or can be made applicable forthwith to such a substituted transaction."; in Banco 
Nacional U ltram arino v. F irst National Bank o f Boston. 289 F. 169 (1923), at p. 174, Peters, J. concern to 
the matter in discussion stated: " I f  the letter designates a particular person to whom the promise is made, it 
has been held that no other can take advantage o f it, on the principle that a person has the right to select his 
own promisee."; and Ellinger pointed out that "Sassoon's case and the Banco Nacional case show that the 
courts are unwilling to turn a straight credit into a negotiation credit by implying a promise o f the issuing 
bank to the discounting bank. It follows that, as aginst a discounting bank, the issuing bank is under no 
obligation to accept a draft drawn under a straight credit. It further follows that the discounting bank has no 
right to demand acceptance or payment from the issuing bank under a straight credit." [see Ellinger's paper in 
Singapore conference 1983, supra (f.n. 36), pp. 227-28]; Ellinger supported that aproach by saying: "If, in 
the absence o f such document [i.e. fraudulent document], the discounting bank has no right to demand 
acceptance or payment in its own name, it follows a fo rtio r i that the discounting bank has no such a right 
where the draft is accompanied by a forged or by a fraudulent document." [Ellinger's paper in Singapore 
conference 1983, supra (f.n. 36), p. 228; emphasis and words in the brackets are also added.]
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"Holder in due course"
The next question is: does a discounting bank's position fall into the category 
of "holder in due course"? In Discount Records Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd.,®* 
Megarry, J. in his judgment took the view that the rights of a holder in due course, 
who took a draft accompanied by forged and fraudulent documents, was not 
affected by a dispute between parties to a credit contract over the documents. The 
learned judge, however, did not distinguish between a discounting and a negotiating 
bank.
There are two lines of arguments relating to the meaning of "holder in due 
course". The first is based on a broad interpretation of the terms "holder in due 
course", namely, extending the responsibility of the issuing bank against a 
discounting bank. The second view accepts, in contrast, a narrow approach. Which 
one of these views is to be preferred? One may argue in favour of the narrow view 
by saying that if a credit is assigned to the benefit of a discounting bank, the position 
of the assignee remains the same as that of the assignor (the seller); then in the 
case of the latter's fraudulent action the former will lose any law suit against the 
issuing bank although he acted in good faith, since there is no contractual 
relationship between the issuer and a discounting bank. To support this argument 
attention may be drawn to a decision made by a United States District Court which 
took the view that Article 5-114 (2) "protects one who takes a draft [...] issued 
pursuant to a letter of credit, rather than the beneficiary of the letter of credit who
[1975] 1 Ll.L.R. 444; see appendix 2 for Section 5-114 (2) o f the UCC.
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issues the demand."®® Similarly, Article 14 (a) of UCP 500 may support such a 
conclusion albeit by implication."®®
Despite the above argument it seems the wide interpretation of terms "holder 
in due course", namely, that the issuing bank's responsibility would be extended to 
cover also a discounting bank, is the better one and it can be supported by a 
decision of the House of Lords in The American Accord, (discussed previously); 
having the intention to deceive the issuing bank by using forged documents is the 
central point for establishing a fraudulent action. To prove such an intention, it must 
first, be clear that a discounting bank as a third party knew about the fraud 
committed by the beneficiary of the credit. Consequently, an issuing bank is under a 
duty to pay a bank as a third party if that bank acts in good faith and its position 
should not be affected because of the lack of a contractual relationship between that 
bank and the issuing bank.
The meaning of "holder in due course" under Section 5-114(2)(a) of the UCC 
and issues related to it are considered below.
1.2.4.2. Negotiating bank
Is the position of a negotiating bank that innocently accepts a fraudulent 
document similar to the above situation? Generally speaking, if a bank is authorised 
to negotiate a credit by honouring drafts drawn by the seller/beneficiary the issuing 
bank is obliged to accept the tendered documents and reimburse the negotiating 
bank. Would a negotiating bank’s position be affected by the fact that since drafts
United Technologies Cor, v. C itibank N.A., 469 F. Supp. 473 (1979), p. 478; in addition Sec. 38 o f the 
B ill o f Exchange Act 1882 supports the view that b ill o f exchange should be issued under the credit in order 
to make the issuing bank responsible against the negotiating Bank; Ellinger stateted that: "This argument 
does not conflict with Goff, J.'s dictum in European Asian Bank v. Punjab and Sind Bank. [1981] 2 
Ll.L.R. 651, 657 to the effect that it would be an innovation to permit the issuing bank to repudiate liability 
to a third party bank on the ground o f fraud or forgery related to the documents. The letter o f credit effected 
in this case was clearly o f the negotiation type." [Ellinger's paper in Singapore conference 1983, supra (f.n. 
36), p. 228, f.n. 134; emphasis added]
Article 14(a) o f UCP 500 (1993) provides: "When the Issuing Bank authorises another bank to pay, incur 
a deferred payment undertaking, accept Draft(s), or negotiate documents which appears on their face to be in 
compliance with the terms and conditions o f the Credit, the Issuing Bank and the Confirming Banmk, i f  any, 
are bound: i. to reimburse the Nominated Bank which has paid, incurred deferred payment undertaking, 
accepted Draft(s), or negotiated, ii. to take up the documents." [ICC Pub. No. 500]
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have negotiable status, there is a right of recourse against a seller/drawer for the 
negotiating bank?®"* There are two views: (1) The issuing bank may dishonouring 
drafts on the basis that the issuing bank is under an obligation to its customer to 
reject documents which are not in compliance with the credit's conditions. It is also 
suggested that there is no harm caused to the negotiating bank since that bank, as 
mentioned above, has a right of recourse against the fraudulent drawer/ seller.®® (2) 
In contrast, it can be argued that the relationship between a negotiating bank and 
the issuing bank is similar to the relationship between the issuing bank and its client, 
not the relationship of that bank and the beneficiary of the credit (the seller). 
Therefore, similar principles should be applied to both situations, and by the rule in 
the Sztejn case and the other authorities applying that decision the issuing bank is 
only able to refuse payment if forged or fraudulent documents are presented by the 
seller himself or his agent.®® Moreover, if the negotiating bank can establish that it is 
a "holder in due course" of the drafts the present law is on its side.®'" As a result, 
although a negotiating bank seems to stand in a better position than a confirming 
bank, because of the right of recourse against the seller, on the basis of the 
principles discussed above, the issuing bank is not entitled to reject documents 
tendered by the negotiating bank by extending the application of the fraud exception 
to the relationship between the banks.
Coiirtccn Seed Co. v. Hong Kong &  Shanghai Banking Cor.. 216 App. Div. 495, 215 N.Y.S. 525, 529 
(1926).
Lord Denning in Etablissement Eseflta International Anstalt v. Central Bank o f Nigeria [1979] 1 
Ll.L.R. 445, at p. 447 stated: "Documents ought to be correct and valid in respect o f each parcel. I f  that 
condition is broken by forged or fraudulent documents being presented in respect o f any one parcel, the 
defendants [the bankers] have a defence in point o f law against being liable in respect o f that parcel."
For more details see discussion about the Sztejn and The American Accord cases in Section B .I o f the 
present chapter (above).
It is supported by United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Cor. 329 N.Y.S. 2d, 265 (1976), 
where the Court o f Appeals in New York held that the negotiating bank had the onus o f establishing that it 
was a holder in due course. Gabrielli, J. said: "Thus, a presenter o f drafts drawn under a letter o f credit must 
prove that it took the drafts for value, in good faith and without notice o f underlying fraud in the transaction 
(Uniform Commercial Code, s. 3-302)." [see p. 272 o f the case]; Ellinger's paper in Singapore Conference 
(983, supra (f.n. 36), p. 222; Goode's reflection I, supra (f.n. 51), p. 295.
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"Holder in due course" and Section 6“114(2)(a) of UCC
What is the scope of Section 5-114(2)(a) of UCC relating to the meaning of 
"holder in due course"? It is said the above section Is related to those drafts which 
are negotiated by a negotiating bank or any other person who legally becomes a 
"holder In due course". Therefore, a beneficiary of a credit who does not negotiate 
his draft is not covered by that section.®® This interpretation of Section 5-114(2)(a) is 
similar to that in English law.®® Recently, however, in The Banco Bamerindus^® an 
American court took a different view in connection with the point in discussion and 
held that even in a situation where a beneficiary's draft has not been negotiated the 
rule provided under the above section is also applicable regarding the beneficiary 
since he becomes a "holder in due course"; therefore, the court will not grant an 
injunction. The above decision confirmed a similar decision made in Gotham,^* 
holding that although the beneficiary committed fraud, his drafts were accepted and 
paid by the advising bank (as paying bank) so the issuing bank is under duty to pay 
such a bank. However, there is a distinction between these cases since in the 
former the intermediate bank did not accept the beneficiary's drafts.
Can the decisions made in The Banco Bemerindus be justified under the 
principles of law considered above? It seems, for reasons pointed out previously 
(concerning cases Sztejn and The American Accord), where a bank or its client 
understand that a fraud is committed by the beneficiary they are entitled to stop 
payment to such a beneficiary even if his drafts were accepted by the client's bank. 
So, there would be no justification for accepting a wide interpretation of "holder in 
due course". The situation, however, is different where drafts drawn by a fraudulent 
beneficiary are accepted and paid by an intermediate/paying bank if the bank acts
See Kozoichyk’s article, supra (f.n. 36), pp. 370-71.
Ibid., p. 370; and also it is said by the same writer that the situation in France, Germany, and Italy is 
simiair to what has been accepted by Common law [see the same reference above, at pp. 417-20].
921, F 2d. 32 (2d Cir. 1990).
Kozoichyk's article, supra (f.n. 36), p. 371.
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reasonably. Nevertheless, the cited case proves the importance of issues of fraud in 
LCs and differences in opinion which can arise between different courts in different 
jurisdictions, e.g., under the English and American law.
1.2.5. Standby letters of credit and fraud exception
Is the position of the contracting parties to a standby letter of credit (SLC), on 
the fraud exception, similar to that involving a letter of credit? Generally speaking, 
there are many authorities that support the view that there is no inconsistency 
between these types of credit so far as fraud is concerned.However, as to a "first 
or on demand" SLC, cases have been decided in American courts as follows.
1.2.5.1. Meaning of "fraud in the transaction"
In the United States the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in Article 5-114(2) 
provides rules concerning "forged or fraudulent or [...] fraud in transaction".^® As to 
the concept of "fraud in the transaction", does it only refer to the letter of credit 
contract (a narrow view), or does it also include the underlying contract of sale (a 
wide approach)?
1. Narrow interpretation
It is suggested the term "transaction" should be interpreted narrowly, limited 
only to the credit arrangement and not covering the underlying contract.^"* This view 
has been supported by some American courts.^®
For instance see cases like Hamzeh Malas &  Sons v. British Iniex Industries Ltd.. [1958]2 QB 127 and 
Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v. Barclays Bank International L td.. [1978]1 A ll ER 976, [1978]! 
Ll.L.R. 166, mentioned previously; for American point o f view see Wunnicke, Brooke and Wunnicke, Diane 
B., "Standby Letters o f C re d it" . W iley Law Publications, New York, 1989, pp. 293-324 and Mautner, 
supra (f.n. 36), p. 632.
See appendix 1 for details o f Article 5-114(2) and appendix 2 for Section 5-109(a) o f a draft proposed by 
The American Law Institute, "U n ifo rm  Commercial Code Revised A rtic le  5. Letters o f C red it (with 
ammeiidmcnts to Articles 1,2. and 9). Proposed Final D ra ft (A p ril 6. 1995)". Submitted by the Council 
to the Member o f the American Law Institute for Discussion at the Seventy-Second Annual Meeting on May 
16,17,18, and 19, 1995 [hereinafter referred to as PFD], where there is no reference to "fraud in transaction".
Thorup, A.R., "In junctions against payment o f standby letters o f credit: How can bank best protect 
themselves?". Banking Law Journal, Jan. 1984, Vol. 101, No. 1, pp. 6-30, pp. 15-16 &  f.n. 24 [hereinafter 
referred to as Thorup]; Harfield, H., "E n jo in ing  letter o f credit transactions", 95 Banking L.J., 1978, p. 
596 [hereinafter referred to as Harfield's bank guarantees], pp. 605-09.
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2. Wide interpretation
The second view has, in contrast,interpreted "transaction" in a broad sense 
including the underlying contract. In support of such an opinion it is said that the rule 
in the Sztejn case seems to support the broad exception to the rule of 
independence of a credit from its underlying contract.^® It is suggested that recent 
authorities adopt the latter view.^^ For instance, in Rockwell International
For instance, the Supreme Court o f Pennsylvania took a very narrow view in In traw orld  Industries v. 
G ira rd  T rust Bank. 336 A.2d 316 (1975), it is said: "We think that the circumstances which w ill justify  an 
injunction against honor must be narrowly limited to situations o f fraud in which the wrongdoing o f the 
beneficiary has so visiated the entire transaction that the legitimate purposes o f the independence o f the 
issuer's obligation would no longer be served. A  court o f equity has the limited duty o f "guaranteeing that 
[the beneficiary] not to be allowed to take unconcientious advantage o f the situation and run o ff w ith [the 
customer's] money on a proforma declaration which has absolutely no basis in fact."; Driscoll, R.J., "The 
ro ll o f standby letters o f credit in international commerce: Reflections after I ra n " . V irginia Journal o f 
International Law, Winter 1980, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 459-504 [hereinafter referred to as Driscoll],, at pp. 
482-83 pointed out that: "The entire legal precedent supporting enjoining payment on letter o f credit was 
created in the old-style commercial context wherein the transaction o f presentment o f the letter o f credit for 
payment was substancially identical and congrouent with the entirely o f the commercial transaction. The 
manufacturer and shipment o f bristles, for example, is at the same time the underlying contract and the 
presentment o f conforming documentation allowing for the payment on the letter o f credit, [...] Moreover, 
the Uniform Commercial Code, and particularly Section 5-114(2), does not deal w ith or purport to regulate 
the underlying transaction. The context w ithin which Section 5-114(2) is written makes clear that the 
"transaction" that is being discussed is the transaction o f presentment, which may or may not involve 
"forged or fraudulent documents," or "docments [which do] not in fact conform to the warranties on 
negotiation."; Throup, ibid, pp. 15-16 and f.n. 24 which he said: "Indeed, the drafters o f the UCC could 
easily have used the term "underlying" to modify the word "transaction" i f  that had indeed been the intent o f 
the section."
Note, "Letters o f C redit: In junction  as a remedy fo r fraud in UCC Sections 5-114". Minnesota Law 
review, 1979, Vol. 63, pp. 487-516 [hereinafter referred to as Minnesota Law Review], at p. 503, it was 
suggested: "The language o f section 5-114 would appear to provide a broader exception to the rule o f 
independent contracts than the "fraud represented in the documents" exception generally attributed to Sztejn. 
Section 5-114 allows dishonor not only when a "document [...] is forged or fraudulent," but also when "there 
is fraud in the transaction." On its face, this additional language would seem to provide for cases o f 
beneficiary fraud where there are no fraudulent documents; otherwise the "fraud in the transaction" language 
would be nugatory."; Becker, J.D., "Standby letters o f credit and the Iran ian cases: w ill the 
independence o f the credit survive?". Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal, Spring 1981, Vol. 13, No. 
4, pp. 335-347 [hereinafter referred to as Becker], at p. 343 said that: "After the unanimous decision o f the 
New York Court o f Appeals in United Bank L td. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods, holding that the shipment 
o f mildewed boxing gloves rather than new ones "constituted fraud in the transaction within the meaning o f 
subdivision (2) o f Section 5-114, "there can be no doubt that the broad inteipretation is proper." [United 
Bank case, 41, N.Y. 2d 254, 260 (1976); emphasis added]
Flo Peng Kee, "The fraud rule in letters o f credit transaction" [hereinafter referred to as Kee], 
Singapore Conference 1990, supra (f.n. 36), pp. 240-7; Minnesota Law Review, ibid., at p. 501; Blodgett, 
Mark S. and Wilson, Jeny W., "The Impact o f transaction Fraud: Strategics fo r the In ternationa l Letter 
o f c re d it" . Review o f Business, Spring 1993, p. 42, at pp. 43-44 stated: "The d ifficulty with "fraud in 
transaction" lies in determining the degree o f fraud necessary to prevent payment under the letter o f credit. A
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Systems Inc. v. Citibank, N.A. and Bank Tejarat/® the United States Court of 
Appeal for the Second Circuit considered the matter of "fraud in the transaction" 
as follows: "The "fraud in the transaction" defence marks the limit of generally 
accepted principle that a letter of credit is independent of whatever obligation it 
secures. [...] The logic of the fraud exception necessarily entails looking beyond 
supporting documents. [...] we must look to the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction. We think that the essence of the fraud exception is that "the principle of 
the independence of [a] bank's obligation under the letter of credit should not be 
extended to protect "a party that behaves so as to prevent performance of the 
underlying obligation."*^®
A similar argument was submitted in American Bell International v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran;®® facts of the case are that a contract had been entered into 
between American Bell and Ministry of War (its name was changed to Ministry of 
Defense after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979) for improving Iran's 
international communication system, with an amount of $280,000,000. As an
review o f recent court cases in the US indicates a terend toward broadening the interpretation o f fraud in the 
transaction. I f  this trend continues, then all parties to the international trade transaction must re-valuate the 
usefulness o f the international letter o f credit. [...] With the apparent broadening o f the intei-pretation and 
application o f the fraud exception to the international letter o f credit, all parties to foreign trade transactions 
should be Increasingly cautious. The issue o f fraud in the transaction, as interpreted in recent court cases, 
undermines both the independence and strict compliance principles."
United States Court o f Appeal for the 2d Circuit, Oct. 1983; Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 43), p. 183.
Sarna, supra (f.n. 36), at p. 138 concern to the practical difficulty which may arise by such interpretation 
stated: "It has been said that the practical d ifficulty o f construing "transaction" to include the underlying 
contract is that unscrupulous or over-anxious customers would be inspired to press claims o f fraud for the 
purpose o f postponing payment. On the other hand, reading "transaction" to exclude fraud in the underlying 
contract not only protects the fraudulent beneficiai-y but also ignores the reality that a fraudulent scheme 
usually affects both the documents and the shipment."; and he said: " [I]t is surely a semantic diversion to 
treat fraud in the documentation as distinct from fraud in the transaction. What one is truly trying to express 
is that the content o f the documents do not reflect the reality o f the shipment or the performance o f the 
obligations by the beneficiaiy. A forged certificate o f inspection which disguises the absence or impropriety 
o f a shipment can not be categorized as a fraud in the documentation without at the same time allowing to 
fraud within the transaction."; Kozolchyk, B., "Letters o f cred it” . International Encyclopedia o f 
Comparative Law, Vol. 9, Chapter 5, 1979 [hereinafter referred to as Kozolchyk], pp. 116-17.
474 F. Supp. 420 (SONY 1979); see also "Am erican International Law Cases". Reams, Vol. 1, 1979- 
86, Second Series, pp. 357-63 [hereinafter referred to as American cases]; Driscoll, supra (f.n. 75), p. 475.
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advance payment $38,800,000 was paid to the plaintiffs against a guarantee given 
by American Bell. The method was that the American companies provided a "first/on 
demand" SLC through their banks (the issuer) in favour of their Iranian counterparts, 
in a bank in Iran, and the latter bank issued a letter of guarantee for its customer 
(the beneficiary of SLC). Similar procedures were applied in the above case and the 
Manufacturers Honover Trust Co. (the issuer) issued a SLC for $38,800,000 in 
favour of Bank Iranshahr, and as a result the latter bank gave a letter of guarantee 
to its customer, the Ministry of Defense. Judge MacMahon in his judgment rejected 
the plaintiffs’ contention on the ground that the Islamic Republic had already been 
recognised as the legitimate Government of Iran by the United States;®* so, the 
plaintiffs' requirement for a preliminary injunction did not find support on a "non­
conformity of demand" ground. As to the allegation of fraud made by the defendant, 
MacMahon, J. after consideration of both parties' argument, held in favour of the 
defendants on the ground that the decision of the Government of Iran is an 
economically rational decision to recoup its financial affairs.®®
The American Bell case, ibid., p. 423; American cases, ibid., at p. 359, judge MacMahon after affirming 
the principle o f strict complaince as a bedrock rules o f credit, stated: we notice, and the parties agree,
that the United States now recognizes the present Government o f Iran as the legal successor to the Imperial 
Government o f Iran. The recognition is binding on American Courts. Guaranty T rust Co. v. United States. 
304 U.S. 126, 137-38, 58 S.Ct. 785, 82 L.Ed. 1224 (1938). [...] we point out that the American courts have 
traditionally viewed contract rights as vesting not in any particular government but in the state o f which that 
government is an agent. [...] Accordingly the Government o f Iran is the successor to the Imperial 
Government under the Letter o f Guarantee." [Emphasis added]; see also American Bell In t 'i Inc. v. 
Manufactureres Honover T rust Co.. No. 3157/79 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 26, 1979).
American cases, supra (f.n. 80), at p. 361, col. 2 it is said: "On the evidence before us, fraud is no more 
inferable than an economically rational decision by the government to recope its down payment, as it is 
entitled to do under the consulting contract and still dispute its liabilities under that contract. W liile fraud in 
the transaction is doubtless a possibility, p la in tiff has not shown it to be a probability and thus fails to satisfy 
this branch o f the Caulfield test." [Emphasis added]; see also p. 358, col. 2 about Caulfield test which it was 
said: "Criteria for perliminary injunctions [1] The current criteria in this circuit for determining whether to 
grant the extraordinary remedy o f a perliminary injunction are set forth in Caulfield v. Board o f Education. 
583 F.2d 605, 610 (2d Cir. 1978): "[T]here must be a showing o f possible irrepreable injury and either (1) 
probable success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair 
ground for litigation and a balance o f hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the 
perliminary relief." [Emphasis added]; see also "F raud in the transaction: Enjoin ing letters o f credit 
during the Iranian R evolution", Flarvard Law Review, Vol. 93, 1980, p. 992 [hereinafter referred to as 
HLR], at pp. 996-99 (which provided a classification regarding to cases dealing with "fraud in transaction").
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The distinction between the narrow and broad interpretation of "transaction" 
is important when there is fraud committed by a beneficiary related to the contract of 
sale rather than the credit arrangement, or in a "clean" credit where there is no 
requirement for presenting documents.
3. Which one of above interpretation is preferable?
It seems the wide concept of "transaction" is a better one if a beneficiaiy of a 
credit committed fraud; firstly, as pointed out in the decision of the House of Lords in 
The American Accord, the Important factor relating to the issue of fraud is to prove 
an "intention" to doing such a crime by the beneficiary, either by himself or by his 
agent when he is aware of it. Secondly, where the underlying contract of sale 
proved to be void, as a result of the beneficiary's fraud, the situation would be 
similar to a case of illegality (considered later), namely the issued credit is accepted 
as void.
As to the position of English law relating to the point in consideration, no case 
has yet been decided; however, English courts may, for above mentioned reasons, 
support the wide interpretation of "transaction".
1.2.5.2. Could "political turmoil" be treated like fraud?
In KMW International v. Chase Manhattan Bank,®® the plaintiffs, in order to 
obtain a preliminary injunction contended that the situation In Iran after the 
Revolution was so unstable that the contract was frustrated; so a demand for 
payment of the amount of the credit in such circumstances is similar to fraud and it 
must be accepted as an exception to the independent nature of the credit. The 
above argument found support in the court of first instance but the second court 
reversed the decision and required only three days notice in writing of receipt of a 
demand for payment before it is made by the defendants. The facts of the above 
case were that the plaintiffs agreed to sell telephone poles to Khuzestan Water and 
Power Authority (KWPA) under an irrevocable letter of credit to the amount of 
$347,539.55. A similar procedure to that in the American Bell case, i.e. furnishing a
606 F. 2d iO; American cases, supra (f.n. 80), pp. 405-410.
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first demand SLC by KMW through its bank (the defendant) in favour of Iranian bank 
(Banque Etebarate) and the latter bank issuing a performance guarantee in favour 
of KWPA, was used in the instant case. It was said that "the basis of KMWs 
complaint was a claim that any demand under the letter of credit issued by Chase or 
under any performance guarantee issued by Banque Etebarate "of necessity would 
be false and fraudulent", that the contract had been wholly frustrated because of 
non-performance of that contract by the Water and Power Authority, and that 
persons unknown during the civil turmoil in Iran made a fraudulent drawing under 
the performance guarantee or under the letter of credit."®'* In contrast to above 
argument, Oakes, Circuit J. said: "The "unsettled situation in Iran" is simply 
insufficient to release any party from obligations under the letter of credit which are 
separate from the underlying contract."®®
1.2.6. Limitations to the fraud exception
Several conditions must be established before banks are entitled to apply the 
fraud exception:
(1) Fraud must be established- A mere allegation of fraud by the banks or 
their clients is not sufficient to prevent a seller/beneficiary from entitlement to the 
security which is stipulated by the credit. In Discount Records Ltd. v. Barclays 
Bank Ltd.,®® Megarry, J. held in favour of the defendants on the ground that a fraud 
committed by a beneficiary must be established and mere allegation of fraud was 
insufficient to prevent payment under the credit by the issuing bank.®® (2) There
American cases, supra (f.n. 80), p. 406, col. 2.
American cases, supra ( fn . 80), p. 409, col. 2; Driscoll, supra (f.n. 75), pp. 487-8; HLR, supra (f.n. 82), 
pp. 997-8.
[1975] 1 Ll.L.R. 444; a similar approach was adopted by the Court o f Appeal in Bo liv in ter O il SA v. 
Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. [1984] 1 A ll ER 352 in following terms: "But the evidence must be clear, 
both as to the fact o f fraud and as to the bank's knowledge."
Ibid., at p. 447, the learned judge distinguished the instant case from the Sztejn on two grounds: "[I]n  the 
Sztejn case [...] the complaint alleged fraud, and so the Court was dealing with a case o f established fraud. In 
the present case there is o f course, no established fraud, but merely an allegation o f fraud [...]. I should also 
add that on the facts required to be assumed in the Sztejn case the collecting bank there was not a holder in 
due course, who would not be defeated by the fraud, but was merely an agent for the fraudulent seller.";
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may be a strong suspicion by the buyer as to the forged or fraudulent documents 
but that is not a sufficient reason for the issuing bank to reject the documents 
tendered. So, the banker himself must agree with the allegation of fraud. Moreover, 
it is not an easy task to prove fraud because, as has been said, there is no fraud 
unless, "a false representation has been made (i) knowingly or (ii) without belief in 
its truth or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false."^® (3) Banks are under 
a duty to prove that forgery or fraud is committed by the seller/ beneficiary himself 
(Sztejn) or that he knows of such an offence (The American Accord).
1.3. Fraud under UCP 500
There is no provision relating to the issue of fraud in the UCP 500. However, 
Article 15 provides that banks assume no duty as to the genuiness or falsity of 
documents presented under the credit agreement. It is noticeable, for reasons 
mentioned previously (namely, the ICC as a non-governmental organisation has no 
mandatory power and expertise over issues which are legal in nature), the ICC left 
the issue of fraud for to be decided by national law; as a result, UCP 500 contains 
no article relating to fraud and other possible exceptions to the doctrine of autonomy 
(consider below) in order to protect the interests of a bank or its client. This is in 
opposite to Section 5-114(2) of the UCC in which fraud and some of its relevant 
issues are considered (as noticed above). This confirms another difference between
Schmitthoff, C.M., "Aleged fraud by seller and payment under confirmed documentary cred it’ ’ . J.B.L. 
1976, pp. 267-9; Boliventer OH SA [1984]! Ll.L.R. 251, p. 256; Schmitthoff, supra (f.n. 26), p. 375 &  f.n. 
66, referred to the above case and also stated that "the English Courts have not adopted the practice o f the 
American Courts to grant temporary restraining on the basis o f strong suspicion o f fraud; see also United 
T rad ing  v. A llied Arab. The Times, July 23, 1984.
D erry v. Peek [1884] A.C. 337, p. 374; Schmitthoff, supra (f.n. 26), pp. 375-7; in DuHen Steel Products, 
Inc.. o f Washington v. Bankers T rust Co. 298 F. 2d, 836 (1962), affirm ing 189 F. Fupp. 922 (1960), the 
point in discussion was arosen by the plaintiffs that on the principle o f Sztejn case the defendants should 
have refused payment; but the Circuit Court o f Appeals rejected that argument and distinguished the present 
case from the Sztejn case: "But here Bankers [defendants] never had notice o f the type o f fraud Sztejn seems 
to require. Dulien's [plaintiffs'] own behaviour was indicative more o f one merely suspicious o f than one 
certain o f fraud." [see p. 841]; Ellinger, supra (f.n. 4), pp. 193-94 &  p. 195; DeRooy, F.P., "Documentary 
C red its ". Kluwer Law and Taxation publishers, 1984 [hereinafter referred to as DeRooy], pp. 118-19 (about 
Duch authorities); Ellinger's paper in Singapore conference 1990, supra (f.n. 36), pp. 211-12 (concern to 
decision in H arbottle case).
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the UCP and the UCC; moreover, the importance of fraud and its related issues 
leave no doubt that any international set of standards concerning LCs would not be 
completed unless it covers fraud. Therefore, a need for more harmonisation and 
unification of law of LCs exists, more than ever; something needs to be addressed 
in a legislative form (convention) at an international level.
The next points are related to those issues which would be cause of limitation 
of the doctrine of autonomy,
2. ILLEGALITY
Is it possible for banks or their customers under the documentary credit 
operation to challenge the autonomous nature of the credit if the underlying contract 
is illegal? As a general principle there is always support for the view that if an 
established contract is against the law, public policy makes the agreement legally 
void and invalid. In respect of credit transactions only one reported case refers to 
the word "illegal";^^ until recently it was not considered directly. Nevertheless, in The 
American A c c o r d , one of the legal issues which arose dealt with the Bretton 
Woods Agreement Act 1945. Mocatta, J. at first instance held that the credit contract 
was vitiated because the underlying contract between the buyer and the seller was 
inconsistent with the Bretton Woods Agreement and therefore the seller/beneficiary
For advantages o f international conventions over international customs see relevant discussion in Section 
A.3, Chapter X I (below).
Sarna, supra (f.n. 36), at p. 132 said: " I f  the letter o f credit is said to be independent o f the underlying 
contract, and a contract in its own right between the issuing bank and the beneficiary, one may ask whether 
the illegality o f the underlying contract is relevent to the enforceability o f the credit transaction. To permit or 
force the issuing bank to pay the credit at the instance o f the beneficiary would be to condone the illegal 
activities o f the beneficiary in the contract which fathered the credit. On the other hand, the beneficiaiy who. 
In good faith, transacts with the applicant by way o f contract which is held to be illegal for want o f formality, 
or o f substance in the jurisdiction o f the applicant or o f the negotiation bank, should not be unfairly 
penalized after having performed his part o f the bargain."
In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Lawyers' T itle  &  Trust Co. 297 F. 152 (1924) the court said: "Obvolusly, 
when the issuer o f a letter o f credit knows that a document, although correct in form, is, in point o f fact, false 
or illegal, he can not be called upon to recognize such a document as complying w ith terms o f a letter o f 
credit."; Ellinger, supra (f.n. 4), p. 190.
See discussion related to the American Accord decision in Section B. 1.2.2. o f the present chapter (above); 
Ellinger's paper in Singapore conference 1990, supra (f.n. 36), p. 202; Sarna, supra (f.n. 36), pp. 131-33.
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lost his right against the banker under the credit arrangement. That decision was 
reversed both by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords on the ground that a 
sale contract is not subject to the Bretton Woods Agrément. The seller/beneficiary 
was entitled to receive the purchase price under the credit. However, that decision 
supports the general principle that if the underlying contract is illegal the credit 
transaction itself becomes unenforceable.®^
it has been suggested in a commendatory on that case that "the House of 
Lords did not declare that the banker is under an obligation not to pay in any 
circumstances under an illegal credit. In other words, there is, at present, no 
absolute judicial authority declaring that a banker who does pay under an otherwise 
unenforceable credit is liable in damages to the applicant."®'  ^ The above suggestion
”  See The American Accord. [1982]2 W LR 1039, at p. 1050, in which Lord Diplock, who gave judgment 
in the House o f Lords about the Bretton Woods point, stated; "The Bretton Woods Agreements Order in 
Council 1946, made under the Bretton Woods Agreement Act 1945, gives the force o f law in England to 
article V III section 2 (b) o f the Bretton Wood Agreement, which is in the follow ing terms: "Exchange 
contracts which involve the currency o f any member and which are contrary to the exchange control 
regulation o f that member maintained or imposed consistently with this agreement shall be unenforceable in 
the territories o f any member then Lord D iplok on the meaning o f "exchange contracts" and
"unenforceable" gave his view as following: "I accept as correct the narrow interpretation that was place 
upon the expression "exchange contracts" in this provision o f the Bretton Woods Agreement by the Court 
o f Appeal in Wilson. S n iitlie tt &  Cope L td. v. Terruzzi [1976] Q.B. 683. It is confined to contracts to 
exchange the currency o f one country for the currency o f another; it does not include contracts entered into 
in connection with sale o f goods which require the conversion by the buyer o f one cuiTency into another in 
order to enable him to pay the purchase price. As was said by Lord Denning M.R. in his judgment in the 
Terruzzi case at p.714, the court in considering the application o f the provision should look at the substance 
o f the contracts and not at the form. It should not enforce a contract that is a mere "monetaiy transaction in 
disguise." I also accept as accurate what was said by Lord Denning M.R. in a subsequent case, as to the 
effect that should be given by English courts to the word "enforceable". The case, Batra v. Ebra liim  is un­
reported, but the relevent passage from Lord Denning's judgment is helpfully cited by Ackner L.J. in his own 
judgment in the instant case: [1982] Q.B. 208, 241f- 242b. I f  in the course o f hearing o f an action the court 
becomes aware that the contract on which a party is suing is one that this country has accepted an 
international obligation to treat as unenforceable, the court must take the point itself, even though the 
defendant has not pleaded it, and must refuse to lend its aid to enforce the contract. But this does not have the 
effect o f making an exchange contract that is contrary to the exchange control regulation o f a member state 
other than the United Kingdom into a contract that is "illegal" under English law or render acts undertaken in 
this country in performance o f such a contract unlawful. Like a contract o f guarantee o f which there is no 
note or memorandum in writing it is unenforceable by the courts and nothing more." [Emphasis are added]; 
lastly, at p. 1051 o f the same reference above. Lord Diplock accepted the view o f the Court o f Appeal about 
the letter o f credit holding: "I agree with the Court o f Appeal that there is nothing in the Bretton Woods 
Agreements Order in Council 1946 that prevents the payment under the documentary credit being 
enforceable to this extent. [...] In my opinion the sellers are entitled to judgment for the part o f the second 
instalment which was not a monetary transaction in disguise [..,]."
Sarna, supra (f.n. 36), p. 133.
210
was put forward to support the bank's position in the situation where they acted in 
good faith.
Following the judgment of Diplock, L.J. in The American Accord, on the 
basis of current authority, if the underlying contract is against public policy the courts 
are obliged to give no support even though such action is not required by any 
interested party. As was decided in that case, the banker was not under a duty to 
pay against that part of the contract which is based on an illegal act, and by 
implication, if such banker does so knowingly he is acting at his own risk.
3. CONSENT OF THE PARTIES AS TO A CONNECTION BETWEEN 
LCs AND THE UNDERLYING CONTRACT OF SALE (CONTRAC­
TUAL AGREEMENT FOR UNENFORCEABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE 
OF AUTONOMY)
In the documentary credit operation banks are dealing with documents and 
not with other facts, such as the performance of the underlying contract by the 
beneficiary.®® However, it may be agreed between the banks and its customer that 
among other conditions the former is under a duty to check whether the seller 
actually performs the underlying sale contract or not. If the tendered documents 
comply with the credit's conditions but there is no evidence to show that the seller 
performed his undertaking under the sale contract is the bank obliged to pay under 
the principle of autonomy or not? On that point in Davis O'Brien Lumber Co. v. 
Bank of Montreal®® it was decided in favour of the defendants on the basis that the 
letter of credit expressly stipulated that the tendered documents must evidence 
shipment according to the terms of the sale contract and there was no evidence to 
prove that the seller shipped the goods. The Court of Appeal took an even stronger 
view by saying that the issuing bank is under duty to ask for a certificate of shipment
See Article 4 o f the UCP 500 and discussions concerning the principle o f stric compliance in Chapter II, 
Section B .l and Chapter V  (above).
(1951), 28. M.P.R. 22 (N.B.C.A.), p. 550.
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from the seller.®  ^ So the beneficiary of a credit must pay careful regard to the terms 
of credit and provide all necessary documents to cover all aspects of the credit, both 
those required expressly and also those which are needed because of any 
particular terms in the credit itself.
CONCLUSIONS
Generally speaking, in LCs all parties dealing with documents not goods (the 
principle of strict compliance) and a credit contract is separate from all other 
contracts and from any dispute that may arise under them (the doctrine of 
autonomy). These points are generally confirmed in UCP 500.®® As to the 
independent nature of a credit, points are raised from time to time; for instance, is 
there any link between LCs and their underlying contract(s)? Is/are there any 
exception(s) to the doctrine of autonomy? The first question is clarified in the 
present study in the meaning that English law, for previously mentioned reasons,®® 
would not support the view that any change in terms of LCs automatically affects the 
terms of an underlying sale contract.
In respect of the bank's right to sue a carrier under a carriage contract it 
becomes, however, clear that the bank can enjoy such a right under English law; it 
is the result of changing the law, namely, replacing Section 1 of the Bills of Lading 
Act 1855 with COGSA 1992. Therefore, under present English or Scots law, the 
issuing bank either as a "lawful holder of a bill of lading" or in appropriate 
circumstance by application of the doctrine of "implied contract" would be able to 
bring an action against the carrier for damage or loss of goods; similarly, the bank 
by suing the carrier becomes subject to the same liabilities under the contract of
Ibid., p. 558; N.M.C. Enterprises Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System Inc.. 14, UCC R. 1427 (1974 
N.Y.S.C.); Sarna, supra (f.n. 36), pp. 129-31.
See Articles 3 and 4 o f the UCP 500.
See concluding remarks to Section A . l o f the present Chapter above (letters o f credit and the sale 
contract).
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carriage as it is a party to that contract.^®® Consequently, as a result of such a 
gradual transformation of the law (namely, changing the law from the Section 1 of 
the Bills of Lading Act 1855 to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Brandt v. 
Liverpool (doctrine of implied contract) and from that decision to the COGSA 1992) 
in favour of the bank's right of suit under a bill of lading (due to the impact of the 
reality of business activities in international trade) in English law (similarly applied in 
Scotland), there seems a link exists between a credit arrangement and a contract of 
carriage. Moreover, because of the. importance of such a matter it may be 
necessary to give the point under consideration more attention by experts involved 
in preparing a set of international standards concerning LCs. A similar approved 
should be taken concerning the Mareva injunction (Ml) and thereto relevant issues 
in order to remove any ambiguity since, at present, a distinction exists between the 
relevant contexts of the UCP 500 and Section 5-114(2) of the UCC.^ ®^
In respect of the above second question (Is/are there any exception(s) to the 
doctrine of autonomy?) several possibilities (fraud, illegality, and contractual 
agreement for unenforceability of the doctrine of autonomy) in which the application 
of the doctrine of autonomy would be limited. Fraud (which is carried out by the 
seller/ beneficiary) has been accepted by courts in different jurisdictions as an 
exception while other possibilities pointed out above have received less attention. 
Nevertheless, none of these possibilities are covered by the UCP whereas in 
Section 5-114(2)(a) of the UCC rules are provided concerning fraud. Therefore, a 
distinction exists between the UCP and the UCC.
In the application of the fraud exception it has been concluded previously that 
adopting a broad interpretation of it may damage the effect and usefulness of the 
credit system. Therefore, the Flouse of Lords’ approach in The American Accord 
case, although it may on the one hand put banks in a difficult situation, would on the 
other hand prevent the application of a double standard in applying the doctrine of
See sub-section 1 o f Section 3 o f COGSA 1993.
See relevant discussion in Section A.3 o f the present Chapter (above).
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autonomy (namely, relations between the bank and its customer and the bank and 
the beneficiary are treated similarly)/®® Moreover, to apply such a relief banks must 
adopt careful procedures to prevent mistakes and further liability. To prove fraud 
under the conditions set by Common law (English or American law) is not an easy 
task.
A more practical solution is for the buyer in the credit contract to bring such 
an action against the seller outside the credit arrangement by seeking an injunction 
to prevent the seller from receiving the amount of the credit, or preventing the bank 
from honouring drafts drawn by the seller/beneficiary. In that respect questions may 
arise as to the entitlement of the buyer to bring an action against both the 
beneficiary and the banker in charge of payment; and also as to the latest deadline 
for such a request. On the first point, in theory, there is no reason why the buyer 
could not make such a request; but in practice, because of time and cost, the buyer 
chooses one of the above mentioned procedures, mostly trying to stop payment by 
his bank.^ ®® On the second point the New York Supreme Court held that no 
injunction could be issued "[...] where, prior to service of a temporary, restraining 
order, the issuing bank had determined that the beneficiary had complied with the 
terms of the letter of credit and had issued its check in compliance therewith."^®'  ^
However, it is accepted by American courts that the banks customer may lose his 
right to an injunction if he acts in a manner that may be implied as waiver.^ ®®
See Mautner, supra (f.n. 36), p. 629 where the writer accepted the decision o f the House o f Lords in The 
American Accord.
Kozolchyk, supra (f.n. 79), p. 127, par. 224.
Ibid., p. 128, par. 225; Tranarg C.A. v. Baiica Commercial Itallana. 90 Misc. 2d, 829, 396 N.Y.S. 2d, 
761 (1977); in connection to the meaning o f "service o f the temporary restraining order" it is said that, "the 
service o f the temprory order was made on the defendant bank after its remittance o f beneficiary's cheque to 
the correspondent bank in California, but prior to the clearance o f the cheque between the correspondent and 
the issuing bank. In other words, the issuing bank had neither paid the cheque to the beneficiaiy nor cleared 
it for payment with the correspondent bank."
Ibid., p. 129, para. 225.a; J &  K  Plumbing &  Heating v. In ternational Tel &  Tel. 51 A.D. 2d 638, 378, 
N.Y.S. 2d, 822 (1976); for more details concerning the doctrine o f waiver in American law see the relevant 
discussion in Section B.1.4, Chapter V I (above).
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As pointed out above, there is a difference between English and American 
law in connection with the meaning of "holder in due course" and American courts 
seem more prepared to interpret these terms in a wider sense and consequently 
reject a request for granting an injunction to prevent payment under LCs.
As to a "first demand" standby letter of credit it is submitted in the present 
research study that such a credit contains a potential risk in itself; so, issues related 
to it should be necessarily noted under the UCP. Regarding the meaning of "fraud 
in the transaction" the wide interpretation of these terms rests on a better 
justification and has been supported by both American and English courts. In 
contrast, fraud committed by a third party cannot harm the right of the beneficiary 
under the credit contract if the latter has no knowledge of it.
In respect of the time of the beneficiary's knowledge of fraud committed by a 
third party, there seems no difference between a time before or after presenting 
documents. So, if banks can prove that the beneficiary is aware of a third party's 
fraud after tendering required documents they are entitled to refuse payment. This is 
a situation which is not covered by The American Accord.
As a result of what has been said above, firstly it becomes obvious that the 
banks' position in case of fraud, illegality, and the consent of contracting parties as 
to the connection between a letter of credit and its underlying contract of sale and 
their relevant points are issues not properly dealt with in the UCP 500. Secondly, 
there is a difference between the UCP and the UCC as far as the issue of fraud is 
concerned since the latter provides rules concerning fraud. Lastly, differences also 
exist between English and American law (e.g., concerning "holder in due course"). 
Since these issues have a great impact upon the interests of parties to an 
international letter of credit, particularly banks, there is a real need for their 
clarification at an international level.
To provide a proper and uniform solution for dealing with the above 
mentioned issues an international legislative instrument would be required because 
of the their legal rather than customary nature (namely, fraud and illegality) and their 
connection with the sovereignty of states. This may be the main reason that ICC has
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not provided any provisions related to issues of fraud and other possible exceptions 
to the application of "doctrine of autonomy" under the UCP. The need for an 
international convention concerning the law of LCs, its advantaged over the present 
system governing LCs (international customary/contractual and national law) are 
treated elsewhere/®®
Another matter of importance relating to LCs from the bank's point of view is 
the issue of security for the amount of money paid by banks under LCs (the subject 
of the next Chapter).
See Part 4 particularly Chapters X  and X I (below).
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CHAPTER VIII
THE BANK'S RIGHT OF SECURITY
UNDER LETTERS OF CREDIT;
LEGAL ISSUES
Banks need security for payments advanced under the documentary credit 
operation since, in most cases, the bank's customer has to reimburse the amount of 
the credit after the bank makes payment to the beneficiary. The importance of 
security measures is obvious particularly when an applicant for a credit becomes 
insolvent. Another reason for the present study is that rules related to the bank's 
security under LCs have not yet been considered at the international level, and UCP 
500 as the only international customary instrument related to LCs provides no 
coherent provisions regarding the issue under consideration. To provide a sufficient 
security, however, different methods have been used by banks in the United 
Kingdom. This part of the study reviews those methods which are specially provided 
to safeguard the issuing bank's right of security against its client in English law. 
Moreover, other related issues, namely the possibility of the bank's right of recourse 
(as a security measure) against the beneficiary and the position of a person other 
than a bank in connection with the bank's right of security, namely, whether that 
person stands in a position similar to the bank as far as the right of security is 
concerned, are also discussed below.
In respect of Scots law and its difference(s) from English law concerning the 
bank's right of security the relevant points in Scots law relating to issues discussed 
under the present chapter are noted below.
SECTION A: POSITION TN ENGLISH LAW
A bank's right of security is part of a wider issue in common law, namely, "a 
right in security" which is defined as "any right which a creditor may hold for 
ensuring the payment or satisfaction of his debt, distinct from, and in addition to, his 
right of action and execution against the debtor under the latter's personal 
obligation".^ Two immediate conclusions can be drawn from the above definition:
' Gloag and Irvine, "L aw  o f rights in security, heritable and moveable, including cautionary obliga­
tions". W illiam Green &  Sons, 1897, p. 1; Marshall, Enid A., "Scots M ercantile L a w ", W. Green &  Son 
Ltd. Law publishers, Edinburgh, 1983, p. 406, para. 8-01 [hereinafter referred to as Marshall 1983].
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(1) There must be a principal obligation to which the right in security is accessory or 
subsidiary. (2) As long as the debtor remains solvent (i.e. able to pay his debts), the 
creditor will have no need to resort to any right in security. Rules governing the issue 
under consideration are largely based on common law both in English and Scots 
law while the latter has been influenced by the former.®
There are two types of rights in security, namely, a right over the property 
and a right against a person. The second type of rights which are known in Scots 
law as "cautionary obligations" are not the subject of consideration since they are 
not expected to be as real rights in security.® In respect of the first type of rights in 
security, the general principle accepted at common law (both In English and Scots 
law) is that there must be some form of delivery (actual, symbolic, or constructive)'^ 
of the property to the creditor and a mere promise by the debtor to such an effect is 
not sufficient to create a valid right in security.® Various attempts, however, have
 ^ For example the term "lien" has been imported from English law; see discussion concerning Hen in Section 
A .1.1.3.2 o f the present chapter, below.
 ^ Marshall 1983, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 407, para. 8-06 said: "These give the creditor a jus in personam 
(literally, "right against a person") or jus ad rem (literally, "right with reference to a thing"), i.e. a personal 
right, against some person other than the debtor." [Emphasis added]
'' Actual delivery means the pledger/debtor physically transfers the moveables to the pledgee/creditor; and 
the main instance o f symbolical delivery is the b ill o f lading, which is regarded as a symbol o f the goods 
shipped: transfer o f the b ill o f lading has the same legal effect as actual delivery o f the goods themselves (as 
to the symbolic function o f a paper document see relevant discussion in Section B . l.3, Chapter IX , and 
Marshall 1983, supra (f.n. I), at p. 422, para. 8-84 stated: "A  wider form o f symbolical delivery is provided 
for by the Factors Act 1889. extended to Scotland by the Factors (Scotland) Act 1890: a "m ercantile 
agent", who is in possession o f "document o f title" to goods with the consent o f the owner o f the goods, may 
make as valid a pledge o f the documents o f title  as i f  he were expressly authorised the owner o f the goods, 
provided: (1) he is acting in the ordinary course o f business o f a mercantile agent when making the pledge; 
(2) the pledgee is acting in good faith and has given valuable consideration; and (3) the pledge is not for a 
debt already due by the mercantile agent to the pledge." [Emphasis added]); as to constructive delivery it 
refers to a situation where goods are in a store, and the pledger/debtor delivers them to the pledgee/creditor 
by addressing a delivery order to the storekeeper or by indorsing the storekeeper’s warrant.
 ^ The general principle is expressed in the maxim "traditionibus. non nudis pactis. dominia rerum 
transfe run tur" ("by deliver, not by mere agreement, are real rights in property transferred."; and a well- 
known illustration o f the general principle is C la rk  &  C. v. West Calder O il Co. L td. &  C. (1882) 9 R. 
1017, at p. 1033, Lord Shand said: "There is no principle more deeply rooted in the law than this, that in 
order to create a good security over subjects delivery must be given. I f  possession be retained no effectual 
security can be granted."; Davis, A.G., "The law relating to commercial letters o f c red it". London, 3rd 
ed., 1963 [hereinafter referred to as Davis], p. 185; Marshall 1983, supra (f.n. 1), p. 409, para. 8-16.
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been made to avoid the application of this principle® and exceptions are accepted 
concerning the above general principle, namely, hypothec and statutes relating to 
floating charges/
1. THE BANKAS RIGHT TO SECURITY AGAINST THE APPLICANT 
FORA CREDIT
The type of security generally depends on the strength of the relationship 
between the contracting parties. In brief, there are three types of security which may 
be used by banks against an applicant for a credit; they are as follows.
1.1. Security measures
1.1.1. The deposit of sufficient funds by the buyer/applicant
There may be situations where the buyer's credit worthiness is not clear for 
the bank which then requires that the applicant for the credit deposit sufficient funds 
(normally the amount of the credit, plus a percentage for commission, stamp duty 
etc.) in a special account as security for the advance payment of the credit before 
the credit is issued. From the bank's point of view this type of security is the best. By 
contrast, the applicant/buyer loses any opportunity to benefit from the documentary 
credit operation because one of the benefits of using such an arrangement is that 
the buyer is not obliged to use his funds before receiving the goods or documents of 
title related to them.
1.1.2. Banks take shipping documents as a pledge
Another type of security for a bank is an agreement between the bank and its 
client that prior to payment of the credit all shipping documents tendered by the
^ For details see Marshall 1983, supra (f.n. 1), pp. 409-12.
’  See discussion concerning hypothec in Section A. 1.1.3.1 and floating charges in Section A . I .1.3.3,2 o f the 
present chapter below; for the situation in Scotland see Marshall 1983, supra ( fn . 1), at p. 408, para. 8-10 
said: "There are some exceptions to the general principle as to delivery: in particular, there are, under the 
common law, hypothecs (see 8-30 et seq., below) which enable a creditor to exercise rights in security over 
movable property o f which he does not have possession, and various statutes have created exceptions, o f 
which the most important is the floating charge affecting heritable and moveable property o f companies, 
introduced in 1961 and now governed by the Companies (Floating Charges and Receivers^ (Scotland) Act 
1972." [Emphasis added]
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beneficiary are retained as pledge by the bank.® This method is based on the status 
as a document of title of these documents; bills of lading, for example, are accepted 
by English law as a good security for a holder of the bill of lading® Several issues 
may arise relating to this type of security, as follows.
1.1.2.1. The legal nature of the bank's possession
Do banks (as pledgee) have a special right of property over the goods, or do 
they deal with ownership of goods? Generally speaking, the banks' intention is only 
to secure their advanced payment to their applicants. In Rosenberg v. 
International Banking Corporation, ® Scrutton, L.J., relating to the nature of 
pledge observed; "Banker's liens or banker's pledges effected in such a way give, 
according to the views of merchants, the bankers a right of sale. Whether you talk
 ^ "Pledge is a contract by which the owner o f a corporeal moveable deposits it with a creditor for it to be 
retained by the creditor until payment or satisfaction o f the debt or other obligation due to the creditor. The 
person who owns the moveable is called the " p ledger", and the creditor who obtains the moveable in 
security is called the "p ledgee"." [Emphasises are added; Marshall 1983, supra (f.n, 1), p. 420, para. 8-78]; 
and at same reference pointed out:"The creditor has no right o f use during his possession, and the security 
expires with loss o f possession." [pp. 420-21, para. 8-79]
As to a different form o f pledge accepted in Scots law in the above reference pointed out that a form 
o f pledge known as pawn used in Scotland which has a meaning wider than the pledge; the relevant part o f it 
quoted below: "As regards corporeal moveables other than ships and aircraft, the usual mode o f ereating 
security is pledge. The general law o f pledge is common law, but the form o f pledge known as "paw n" has 
been governed by statute- the Pawnbrokers Acts 1872 and 1960 and the Money lenders Act 1927, all to be 
replaced by provisions o f the Consumenr Credit Act 1974 [...] The word "pawn" in the Act o f 1974 has a 
wide definition: it means "any article subject to a pledge" (1974 Act, S. 189(1)). It must be kept, in mind, 
however, that these provisions o f the 1974 Act apply only where the article is pledged under a "regulated 
agreement" as defined by the 1974 Act (see 5-50 et seq., above)." [Emphasis added; Marshall, supra (f.n. 1) 
p. 420, para. 8-77]
’  In Banner v. Johnson (1871) L.R. 5, H.L.C. 157, at p. 173 Lord Cairns gave his support to its availability 
o f documents o f title as security by saying: "The bankers may be protected for the acceptance which they 
have promised to give."; M iller, J.B, "A  case book on banker's commercial cred its", pp. 8-9 [hereinafter 
referred to as M iller]; Ellinger, E.P., "M odern Banking L a w ". Oxford, 1987 [hereinafter refened to as 
Ellinger’s banking law], at p. 568 stated: "It has been said that the pledge ranks between a mortgage, which 
confers on the mortgagee a definite property right, and a lien, which is purely possessory in nature. [...] The 
main distinction between a pledge and a lien is that a lienee’s only right is to detain the subject matter 
pending satisfaction o f the debt. He does not have a right o f sale."; Marshall 1983, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 408, 
para. 8-11 said: "Rights in security which are not exceptional are said to be "founded on possession". 
because they comply with the general principle mentioned above. It is usual to divide securities founded on 
possession into two classes- those created by express contract and those implied by law. Into the first class 
fall the standard security over heritable property, and the pledge o f moveable property, while securities 
implied by law are Hen and retention." [Emphasis added]
(1923) 14 Ll.L.R. 344.
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about it as an express pledge, or whether, [...] you talk about it as an implied pledge, 
in my view such a transaction gives an independent right, or right of property, to the 
bank to secure the amount which they have advanced, and the bank are not put on 
inquiry unless there is something obviously wrong with the transaction."^^
In Sewell v. Burdick,^® in a similar situation it was considered that a contract 
of "pawn or pledge" is a special property right with the power of selling the pledge 
passing from the borrower to the lender if the former fails to pay his debt on time.
One should be careful, however, as to the issue under consideration 
(pledgee's power to sell) under Scots law, since, as pointed out by a writer, a 
pledgee has no power to sell the goods unless otherwise expressly agreed by 
parties to a pledge contract. In contrast, if a contract is in the form of ex facie 
absolute transfer the holder of documents has an implied power to sell the goods. 
Accordingly a difference appears between English and Scots law concerning the
"  Ibid., at p. 347; Gutteridge, H.C, and Megrah, M., "The bankers' commercial credits", London, 7th ed., 
] 984, p. 211 [hereinafter referred to as Gutteridge],
(1884)10 A.C. 74; M iller, supra (f.n. 1), p. 99; in Bristol Bank v. M idland Railway Co. [1891] 2 Q.B. 
653, followed similar attitute; for other authorities see Gutteridge, ibid., p. 212, f.n. 4; also look at Chriystie, 
K.G., "The nature &  importance o f the banker's security under commercial letter o f credit, and the 
ccntcral concept o f pledge, lien and hypothec". Ph.D. thesis, 1973, Glasgow university [hereinafter 
referred to as Chriystie]; Ellinger's banking law, supra (f.n. 9), pp. 529-601.
See Marshall 1983, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 427, paras. 8-105 to 8-110, where it is said: "The express contracts 
by which securities founded on possession are constituted may take one or other o f two general forms: (1) 
The contract may take the form o f transfer to the creditor expressly as a security. Pledge belongs to this 
category. The creditor obtains possession o f the moveables but the right o f ownership remains with the 
person who is granting the security. (2) The contract may take the form o f an ex facie ("apparen tly ") 
absolute transfer to the creditor, so that he appears to become the owner, not merely the possessor, o f the 
moveables. The true nature o f the transaction w ill be explained in a separate document- a "back-letter" or 
other agreement- in which the creditor w ill undertake to retransfer the moveables to the debtor when the debt 
has been repaid. The two forms have different effects in relation to: (i) the creditor's power to sell [...] A 
creditor to whom moveables are transferred expressly in security (e.g. a pledgee) has no implied power to 
sell them. In order to sell he must either have an express power to do so conferred on him by the transferor or 
he must obtain a power to sell from the court. If, on the other hand, the creditor has had the moveables 
transferred to him ex facie absolutely, he does have a power o f sale, which he may exercise even without 
giving notice to the debtor. In the "back-letter" or other agreement the creditor may have undertaken not to 
sell the moveables or to follow a specified procedure in selling them, and i f  he violates any such undertaking, 
he w ill be liable in damages to the debtor for breach o f contract, but the title o f the purchaser w ill not be 
affected." [Emphasis added]
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pledgee/creditor's power to sell/'^ But, as a result of the above cited authorities, it 
becomes clear that the pledge is a transaction independent of any other agreement 
which may exist between the contracting parties; therefore, banks obtain an 
especial right of property over the goods. Consequently, the preferable approach 
concerning the issue under consideration is the one explained in English law.^ ®
1.1.2.2. Buyer's right under a sale contract v. banks' right under the pledge
What is the effect of a buyer's right under English law (namely the right of 
rejecting goods under the sale contract) over the right of a bank under the pledge? 
Does the buyer, by practising his right, put the bank's interests under LCs in 
danger? Before giving any answer, it seems necessary to consider the buyer's right 
under the sale contract in English law. in Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders & 
Shippers Ltd., ® relating to the point in discussion under a CIF sale contract the 
court held that the buyer has two separate rights: a right to reject documents and a 
right to reject goods. By accepting presented documents at an earlier stage the 
buyer does not lose his right to reject the goods if it becomes clear that their 
condition is not in compliance with the terms of tendered documents in a later stage 
(namely at the time of delivery of goods).
For differences between the Scottish and English law as to the subject o f pledge see Lingard, J.R., "Bank 
security documents". 2nd ed., London, Edinburgh, 1988, p. 253, where it is stated that in English law a 
pledgee does have power to sell on default in payment after giving due notice to the pledgor; Re David 
Allester [1922] 2 Ch 211; see also Chriystie, supra (f.n. 12), pages 3, and 24 (Hayman v. M acllntock 1907 
SC 942, where Lord President stated; "We are here dealing with Scots law o f pledge and talked o f this as 
apparently involving "absolute property with reversionaiy right."; and at p. 950 it is pointed out that in 
Scotland there is no distinction between the property right and the special property right; In law o f Scotland a 
pledgee may lose his rights by losing possession and in case o f b ill o f lading one can not lose his right unless 
he lose the documents.)
For more details concerning the bank's right to sell goods see relevant discussion in Section A. 1.2 o f the 
present chapter (below).
[1954] 2 Q.B. 459.
Ibid., head notes (4), it is said: "Under a c.i.f. contract a buyer had a right to reject documents and a right 
to reject the goods, those rights being separate and distinct in law [...]."; and at p. 487 o f the same case 
concerning the defendants’ argument that the buyer by taking the documents had lost his right to reject the 
goods Devlin, J. in rejecting that claim said: "I think that the true view is that what the buyer obtains, when 
the title under the documents is given to him, is the property in the goods subject to the condition that revest 
i f  upon examination he finds them not in accordance with the contract. That means he gets only conditional 
property in the goods, the condition being a condition subsequent. A ll his dealings with documents are
2 2 2
In respect of the above issue there is no authority and it was left open in the 
above case. However, the issue and its difficulty was noticed by Devlin, J., in that 
case.^® Professor Gutteridge suggested that "under an irrevocable credit the pledge 
drives from the seller."^® Its meaning was explained as follows: "Seeing that under 
an irrevocable credit, the pledge actually derives from the seller, acting either as 
principal or as the buyer's agent, if the seller by so pledging could destroy the 
buyer's right to reject, the whole purpose of documentary credits would be lost, at 
any rate so far as the buyer is concerned, because it could rarely afford to dispense 
with his right to reject."®®
In my opinion the buyer's promise to the bank under the credit agreement 
(namely to pledge documents of title as security for advanced payment by the bank)
dealings only with that conditional property in the goods. It follows, therefore, that there can be no dealing 
winch is inconsistent with the seller’s ownership unless he deals with something more than the conditional 
property. I f  the property passes altogether, not being subject to any condition, there is no ownership left in 
the seller with which any inconsistent act under Section 35 [o f the Sale o f Goods Act, 1893] could be 
committed. I f  the property passes conditionally the only ownership left in the seller is the reversionary 
interest in the property in the event o f the condition subsequent operating to restore it to him."; Davis, supra 
(f.n, 5), pp. 187-88.
Ibid., at p. 488, said: "It might further be suggested that in any event, in the circumstances o f this case, the 
buyer having pledged the goods to a banker was not in a position to reject, because it was his banker who 
exercised dominion over them by reason o f the pledge. That, again, raises a question o f some theoritical 
d ifficulty: can a buyer in effect defeat a pledge by exercising his right o f rejection? One view might be that 
although the property is conditional by his own voluntary act in puting the condition subsequent into 
operation defeat the pledge. The other view would be that it can not have been contemplated as between the 
banker and seller that when the buyer pledged the documents he was intending to abondon or impair his right 
o f rejection. It would certainly be very far from the circumstances o f the present case in the course o f the 
argument has taken that I should express any view on that. It is merely a matter to which attention might be 
paid by those who are concerened with it."
Gutteridge, supra (f.n. I I ) ,  p. 212 and f.n. 7, where it is said: "The whole system o f commercial credits 
depends on the seller's ability to give a charge on the goods and the policies o f insurance", per Lord Wright 
in Ross T. Smyth &  Co. Ltd. v. T.D. bailey &  Co. [1940] 3 A ll E.R. 60, 68." [Emphasis added,]
M iller, supra (f.n. 9), p. 103 (quoted from Gutteridge, ibid., 3rd ed., p. 139). [Nothing was stated by 
Professor Gutteridge in text o f the 7th ed., 1984]; another writer suggested that: "The banker, by the very act 
o f paying against documents, obtains an implied pledge or lien over them. That lien or pledge inevitabily 
arises long before the question o f rejection can arise, and at the instance o f the seller. The right o f rejection is 
exerciseable against the seller, but it is the seller who gives the pledge he could not obtain tlie value o f his 
goods otherwise. If, therefore, he does an act which lays him open to rejection he can not assert his newly 
acquired title (as the result o f rejection) as against the banker who has financed the transaction unless he is 
prepared to repay the banker the moneys he has received from him." [Davis, supra (f.n. 5), pp. 188-89]; 
Journal o f the Institute o f Bankers, 1954, Vol. 75, p. 183.
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is given priority to the application of his right of rejection of the goods under the sale 
contract. So, he should not be entitled to break his promise to the bank; and if the 
applicant/buyer would like to apply his right of rejection he must compensate the 
bank. This argument can also be supported by the autonomous nature of the credit 
arrangement, namely, under the "doctrine of autonomy". As discussed elsewhere,®^ 
the credit contract is a separate transaction from the sale contract. Consequently, 
from the above different statements, it becomes clear that the issue in consideration 
has not yet been solved in English law; so banks should make the point clear in their 
contract with their clients.
1.1.3. "Letter of hypothecation" and "letter of trust or of lien"
Another security measure which a banker may use in his relationship with the 
applicant is the "letter of hypothecation" (LH) or "letter of trust or of lien" (LT).®® 
Under each of them, while the banker keeps his control over the property of the 
goods, he gives permission to the buyer to act as his trustee and sell the goods.®® 
There are authorities which support such a practice, and the nature of letter of 
hypothecation or letter of trust has been judicially considered.
1.1.3.1. Nature of the "letter of hypothecation"
As pointed out previously, hypothec is an exception to the general principle 
accepted at common law, namely, for having a right in security there must be some 
sort of delivery of goods.®'  ^ in Palmer v. Carey®® the Privy Council in an appeal
See Chapter II, Section B.2 and Chapter V II (above).
"Hypothecation" is an odd term in English law and it is drive from the meaning o f property in Martime 
law and that seems originated from Roman Law; for more details see Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 11) p. 214 and 
f.n. 10 &  11; M iller, supra (f.n. 9) pp. 103-04; Ellinger's banking law, supra (f.n. 9), pp. 552-55, and at p. 
555, it is said: "An important exception is made in respect o f letter o f hypothecation made over imported 
goods prior to their being warehoused, stored, reshipped for export, or delivered to a person other than the 
debtor who executes the document."
M iller, supra (f.n. 9), at p .104 stated: "This intention is usually expressed in such terms as: "I (we) hand to 
you herewith bills o f lading for [...] on the express undertaking that you are to hold the said bills o f lading, 
the property represented thereby, and the net proceeds thereof respectively in trust for this Bank."
See relevant point mentioned at the begining o f Section A o f the present chapter; Marshall 1983, supra 
(f.n. 1), at p. 412, para. 8-30 concerning the hypothec pointed out: "A hypothec is "a real right in security, in 
favour o f a creditor, over subjects which are allowed to remain in the possession o f the debtor" (Gloag and
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from a decision of the High Court of Australia reversed the High Court decision and 
held that there was no "equitable assignment"®® between the contracting parties 
and therefore the respondent had no right against the assets remaining in the 
plaintiffs hands. The facts of the case are that the respondent, under an agreement, 
advanced money to a trader to buy and sell goods. It was agreed also that the 
respondent, after receiving the money through a letter of credit should deduct the 
payment advanced and one-third of the gross profits, and what remained was for 
the trader. Some time later the trader became bankrupt owing a large amount of the 
money paid under the contract which had not been repaid. The trader also had 
goods which had been purchased under the agreement. After the trader's 
bankruptcy, the respondent claimed that he had a charge over those assets. Street, 
J., in the lower court held that, "the agreement did not amount to an equitable 
assignment, and that consequently the respondent was not entitled to a charge."®  ^
On appeal to the High Court of Australia that decision was reversed, the High Court 
"being of the opinion that there was an equitable assignment by the agreement."®® 
In brief, it was held that "as the agreement did not, either contractually or otherwise, 
create any right of the lender in either the goods or their proceeds, it did not amount
Irvine, op. cit., p. 406). It is an exception to the general rule that for the creation o f a real right in security (as 
opposed to a personal right against the debtor), the creditor must have possession o f the property." [Gloag 
and Irvine, "Law  o f rights in security, heritable and moveable, including cautionary obligations". 
W illiam  Green &  Sons, 1897.]; and for different types o f hypothec in Scots law ("conventional (created by 
contract" and "legal" or "tacit" (implied by law)) see Marshall 1983, supra (f.n. 1), pp. 412-419, paras. 8-33 
to 8-72.
[1926] A.C. 703.
A s  to the meaning o f an equitable assignment see the relevant point in Section B.3.8, Chapter IV  above.
Ibid., p. 707.
Ibid., p. 707; at pp. 704-704 o f the same case Lord Wrenbui-y, who delivered the judgment o f the Privy 
Council, said: "The question on the appeal is whether on agreement dated A p ril 30, 1917, made between 
Johanstone o f the one part and the respondent o f the other part is an Equitable assignment. I f  it is not, no 
other question arises. I f  it is then in as much as the agreement was not registered under the B ills o f sale Act, 
a further question arises under that Act." [Emphasis added]
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to an equitable assignment so as to entitle the respondent to the charge claimed."®® 
In Re Kent & Sussex Sawmills, Ltd.,®® a company (Re Kent) agreed with 
the Ministry of Fuel and Power to supply logs (30,000 tons); thereafter it obtained 
facilities from its bank and it was agreed that the Ministry was to make all payments 
to the bank (to the Company's account). It was also agreed that the procedure was 
not to be revoked without the bank's consent. However, after a year the company 
passed a resolution for voluntary liquidation, with assets of £30,000 and a debt to 
the bank of £83,674. A dispute arose between the bank and the liquidator when the 
latter asked for a declaration that two letters of authority, between the bank and the 
Ministry, charged the book debts of the company under S. 79 (2)(e) of the 
Companies Act, 1929 (now Companies Act 1985),®^  and that, not having been 
registered under that section they were void as against the applicant the liquidator. 
The contents of the two letters between the bank (the Westminster Bank Ltd.) and 
the Ministry which were related were in these terms: "With reference to the above 
mentioned contract, we hereby authorize you to remit all moneys due thereunder
See p. 707 (par. 2) o f the same case, ibid., for the related parts o f decision which are as following: "Their 
lordships have to look at the agreement o f A p ril 30, 1917, with these principles in mind. Under art. 1 o f that 
agreement the money when borrowed is the borrower's money, and the lender becomes a creditor. The 
goods when purchased are the borrower's goods. They have been bought with his money. There is nothing in 
the agreement to make them the lender's goods. The goods are to be sold. The proceeds o f sale when the 
goods are sold belong to the borrower. They arise from the sale o f goods belonging to him. Under art. 3, 
however, the proceeds are to be paid to the lender's credit at his bank. This gives the lender a most efficient 
hold to prevent the misapplication o f the proceeds, but there is nothing in that article to give him a property 
by way o f security or otherwise in the moneys o f the borrower before or after he, the lender, has them in his 
charge. Article 6 was not relied on as giving an equitable charge, and it is d ifficu lt to see how it could be 
relied upon for that purpose. It is an article determining the distribution between the parties in manner there 
defined o f the fund which is in the hands o f one o f them."
[1947] Ch. 177.
Companies Act, 1929, S. 79: "(1) Subject to the provisions o f this Part o f this Act, every charge created 
after the fixed date by a company registered in England and being a charge to which this section applies 
shall, so far as any security on the company's property or undertaking is conferred thereby, be void against 
the liqidator and any creditor o f the company, unless the priscribed particulars o f the charge, together with 
the instrument, i f  any, by which the cahrge is created or evidenced, are delivered to or received by the 
registrar o f companies for registration in manner required by this act w ithin twenty one days after the date of 
its creation [...] and when a charge becomes void under this section the money secured thereby shall 
immediately become payable. (2) This Section applies to the following charges [...] (e) a charge on book 
debts o f the company." [Later it became as Sec. 95 o f Companies Act, 1979]
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direct to this company's account at Westminster Bank, Ltd., Crowbrough, whose 
receipt shall be your sufficient discharge. These instructions are to be regarded as 
irrevocable unless the said bank should consent to their cancellation in writing, and 
are intended to cover any extension of the contract in excess of 30,000 tons if such 
should occur."®®
Wynn-Parry, J., in his judgment distinguished that case from Bell v. London 
and North-Western Ry. Co.,®® because of the second sentence of the letter quoted 
above; and the judge accepted that the letters in the present case were an 
equitable assignment. Returning to the point as to whether it is an assignment of 
the whole benefit or if it is an assignment by way of security, the same judge 
concluded by implication, "an equity of redemption is to be discovered in the 
language of the second paragraph."®'  ^ Nevertheless, the court found that those 
letters were inconsistent with S. 79 (2)(e) of the Companies Act 1929 (namely, that 
they had not been registered), and held in favour of the liquidator.
In Ladenberg & Co. v. Goodwin & Ferrerira,®® a similar question was 
raised and the same conclusion was reached and it was held that, "the letter of 
hypothecation gave a charge over book debts, and that the case accordingly fell
Re Kent case, supra (f.n. 30), at p. 178.
15 Beav. 548; it was decided that: "The words o f this letter are these: "You w ill oblige by passing the 
cheques that may become due on my contract N o .l, o f the Engby and Standford Railway, into the National 
Provincial Bank o f England" [...] I should have thought that an effectual assignment o f all that might become 
due to Thomas Burton under that contract had been made to the bank; but this order directs it to be paid to 
the account o f Thomas Burton, not therefore, as it appears to me, doing more than constituting the bank to 
the Thomas Burton's agents for the reciept o f the money." [Re Kent case, supra (f.n. 30), p. 181]
Re Kent case, supra (f.n. 17), p. 181; Roger Bird, "O sborn’s Concise Law D ic tion a ry ". London, 1983 
[hereinafter referred to as Bird], at p. 135 defined the "equity o f redemption" as: "(1) The equitable right o f 
mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged property after the legal right to redeem has been lost by default in 
repayment o f the mortgage money at the due date. (2) The equitable estate or interest o f a mortgagor in his 
mortgaged land in respect o f which an equitable right to redeem subsist."
[1912] 3 K.B. 275; 18 Com Cas. 16.
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within the provisions of S. 93 of the Companies Act 1908,®® thus rendering the 
document void for want of registration."®^
In conclusion, the letter of hypothecation may, in proper circumstances, be 
accepted as an equitable assignment in English as well as Scots law and give the 
banker special right over the assets of the pledgor; but at the same time it must not 
be inconsistent with other rules of law.
1.1.3.2. Nature of "letter of trust or of lien"
It is said that "A letter of trust arises where a bank-pledgee, having 
possession of documents of title, actual or constructive possession of the goods, 
received from or on behalf of the owner, delivers them to the owner or to a third 
parties."®® In Sale Continuation Ltd v. Austin Taylor & Co. Ltd.,®® concerning the
Now it is Section 95 o f the Companies Act 1948.
Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 11), p. 219; Davis, supra (f.n. 5), pp. 198-99.
Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 11), p. 215; in respect o f lien and its relevant issues in Scots law one should be 
careful since the law on this topic is complicated by the lack o f uniformity in the definition o f the term "lien" 
and "re ten tion ". The term "lien" was adopted from English law, and the original Scottish term was 
"retention", which includes a wide variety o f rights in security like retention on property title, retention o f 
debt and the liens o f English law; as to meaning a lien it is said: "A  lien is "the right o f a creditor to retain 
moveable property, belonging to the debtor but entrusted to the creditor's possession for some purpose, until 
the creditor's claims against the debtor are satisfied" [Walker, David M., "Principles o f Scottish Private 
L a w ", Oxford, Clarendon Press, Vol. 3, 3rd ed., 1982-83, p. 408.]; for more details concerning Hen and 
other types o f securities (pointed above) in Scots law see Marshall 1983, supra (f.n. 1), pp. 430-39; however, 
important points stated in that reference are quoted below:
1. As to distinction between Hens and the pledge it is said: "A Hen may be either created by express 
contract or implied by law. Where created by express contract, a Hen comes very near to being a pledge: 
the point o f distinction is that Hen w ill arise out o f another contract collateral to it or associate with it, 
whereas pledge w ill be a transaction in its own right." [p. 430, para 8-123; emphasis added]; then it is 
continued: "Normally, however, Hens are not created by an express contract, but are implied by law from 
various contractual relationships established between parties for other purposes [...] A  Hen merely entitles the 
holder o f it to retain the movables; he has no righ t to sell them unless authorised by the court." [p. 431, 
paras. 8-125 and 8-126; emphasis added]
2. Other main points concerning Hens are: "(i) the need for possession; and (ii)  the distinction 
between special and general Hens." [p. 431, para. 8-127]; as to need for possession see pp. 431-33; in respect 
o f the second point above it is said: "A special lien is one which entitles the holder o f the moveables to retain 
them until satisfaction o f an allegation arising out o f the contract through which he obtained possession o f 
them. A  general lien, on the other hand, entitles the holder o f the moveables to retain them until a balance 
due to him on a whole course o f dealing is discharged. For instance, a carrier, whose Hen is a special Hen, is 
entitled to retain a parcel (but not any outstanding charges for the carriage o f parcels previously carried), 
whereas a solicitor, whose Hen is a general Hen, is entitled to retain his client's paper until his business 
account and ordinary outlays for a whole series o f transactions are met." [p. 433, para. 8-139; emphasis 
added]; it is also pointed that special lien are normally allowed and the general Hen s are only allowed in 
limited situations by law as well as usage o f trade. In that regard stated: "The most prominent o f the general
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trust receipt and its nature in ordinary course of business, it was said: "In such a 
case the seller parts with his ownership in the documents as soon as he sends the 
documents to the bank. His right is to be paid the draft. The ownership of the goods 
passes to the buyer but the bank has the possessory title of a pledgee as against 
the buyer. He has that title until the buyer puts the bank in funds in respect of the 
draft and discharges his liability for interest payable in respect of the draft. If the 
pledgor does not do so the bank has the usual right of a pledgee to sell as if he 
were the owner.
The nature of the bankers' right as pledgee under the trust receipt had been 
noticed in North Western Bank v. Poynter.'^^ In this case the plaintiffs (NWB) paid 
an advance (5000 1.) to Page & Coy (merchants in Liverpool) on security by way of 
pledge of the bills of lading for 3455 tons phosphate rock in value of £6783. The 
goods were carried in two vessel ("Cyprus" and "Starra Lee"). A bill of lading related 
to the cargo carried by the Cyprus was delivered to the NWB and it was agreed that 
the bank would have power to sell the phosphate rock. Later, the plaintiffs returned 
the bills of lading to Page & Coy under a letter of trust. But prior to that arrangement 
the Page & Coy sold 1,600 tons of phosphate to A Cross & Son through their 
agents (Poynter) in Glasgow. The buyer took delivery and remitted their cheque to 
Page & Coy. Then the merchants paid that cheque to the account of another 
advance payment they had taken from the NWB.
liens recognised by usage o f trade are those o f factor or mercantile agent, the banker, and the solicitor.”  [p. 
435, para, 8-149]; and concerning the banker's lien the relevant point is that, "A  banker has a general lien 
over negotiable instruments, such as bills o f exchange (including cheques) and promissory notes, belonging 
to his customer, provided they have come into the possession o f the banker in his capacity o f monetoiy agent 
[...]." [p. 435, para 8-155]
[1968] 2 QB 849.
Ibid., p. 861; and at pp. 861-62 as to the general understanding o f a pledge and the trust receipt it was 
stated: "Now the essence o f a pledge is that it is security against either an immidiate advance or against a 
present liab ility to make a future payment. The trust receipt contemplated that the defendants would part with 
the documents [...] and recover the purchase price. It was no breach o f trust to do so. In my judgment the 
same principle applies to the money as applies to the obligation to put the plaitiffs in funds before the 
maturity date o f the draft,"
[1895] A C  56.
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An action was brought against Page & Coy by their agents in respect of an 
entirely different transaction and the latter arrested the balance of the price of the 
phosphate remaining in the hands of the buyer. When the plaintiffs heard of the 
arrestment they brought an action against the agent on the ground that the goods 
and its value belonged to them. The Sheriff Court and later the Second Division held 
for the defendants, but on appeal to the House of Lords that decision was reversed 
and it was held that the bank as the pledgee does not lose its right of possession 
over the pledge. The House of Lords explained its view in the following terms: "By 
the law of Scotland, as well as by the law of England, the holder of a pledge with a 
power of sale does not lose possession of the pledge by delivering it to an agent for 
the purpose of sale, although the agent may be the owner of the pledge."'^®
As a result of these authorities the commercial validity of the letter of 
hypothecation and the letter of trust/lien has been well established in English and 
Scots law. However, there are defences against the application of those securities, 
as follows.
1.1.3.3. Limitations to "letter of hypothecation" and "letter of trust"
1. Bill of sale
The first argument against the bank's right under the letter of hypothecation 
and the letter of trust is whether such a right in English law (different than Scots law) 
is subject to Section 4 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, and therefore requires 
registration.'^® This point was raised in Re Hamilton Young & Co.,'*^ where the
M iller, supra (f.n. 9), p. 106; Davis, supra (f.n. 5), p. 106; for a difference between English and Scots law 
concerning the pledgee’s power to sell see the relevant discussion in Section A. 1.1.2.1. o f the present chapter 
(above).
Section 4 o f the Bills o f Sale Act, 1878 which does not apply in Scotland provides: "4. In this Act the 
follow ing words and expressions shall have the meanings in this section assigned to them respectively, 
unless there be something in the subject or in the context repugnant to such construction; (this is to say).
The expression "b ill  o f sale" shall include bills o f sale, assignment, transfers, declarations o f trust 
without transfer, inventories o f goods with receipt thereto attached, or receipts for purchase money o f the 
goods, and other assurances o f personal chattels, and also powers o f auttorney, authorities, or licenses to take 
possession o f personal chattels as security for any debt, and also any agreement, whether intended or not to 
be followed by the execution o f any other instrument, by which a right in equity to any personal chattels, or 
to any charge or security thereon, shall be conferred, but shall not include the following documents; that is to 
say, assignments for the benefit o f the creditors o f the person making or giving the same, marriage 
settelments, transfers or assignments o f any ship or vessel or any share thereof, transfers o f goods in the
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facts were that bankers made advances to traders to enable them to purchase 
goods for shipment to the East. The course of the transaction was that the traders 
goods were to be delivered to bleachers to be bleached, and thereafter they were 
returned to the traders or sent direct to packers for packing for shipment; and on the 
occasion of each advance the traders sent the bank a letter of lien accompanied by 
the bleachers' receipt for the goods. Regarding the dispute between the contracting 
parties Bigham, J., stated the question of law as: "Whether the letters of lien were 
"bills of sale" and therefore required registration under S. 4 of the Bills of Sale Act, 
1878."'^ ® If the letter of lien fell within the meaning of section 4, the bank loses its 
right of security over the goods. The judge held for the bank on the basis that in this 
case the bank's right under the letter of lien was not the subject of S. 4 of the 1878 
Act but fell within the exceptions in that section and therefore did not require 
registration. On appeal from the Bigham, J.'s decision the Court of Appeal confirmed 
that decision.'^®
ordinary course o f business o f any trade or calling, bills o f sale o f goods in foregin parts or at sea, bills o f 
lading, India warrants, warehouse-keepers' certificates, warrants or orders for the delivery o f goods, or any 
other documents used in the ordinary course o f business as proof o f the possession or control o f goods, or 
authorising or purporting to authorise, either by indorsement or by delivery, the possessor o f such document 
to transfer or receive goods thereby represented:
The expression "personal chattels" shall mean goods, furniture, and other articles capable o f 
complete transfer by delivery, and (when separately assigned or chrged) fixtures and growing crops, but shall 
not include chattel interests in real estate, not fixtures (except trade machinery as hereinafter defined), when 
assigned together with a freehold or leasehold interest in any land or building to which they are affixed, nor 
growing crops when assigned together with any interest in the land on which they grow, nor shares or 
interests in the stock, funds, or securities o f any government, or in the capital or property o f incorporated or 
jo in t stock or produce upon any farm or lands which by virtue o f any covenant or agreement or o f the custom 
o f the country ought not to be removed from any farm where the same are at the time o f making or giving o f 
such b ill o f sale:
Personal chattels shall be deemed to be in the "apparent possession" o f the person making or 
giving a b ill o f sale, so long as they remain or are in or upon any house, m ill, warehouse, building, works, 
yard, land, or other premises occupied by him, or are used and enjoyed by him in any place whatsoever, 
notwithstanding that formal possession thereof may have been taken by or given to any other person:
"Prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under the provisions o f this Act,
[Power to exclude S.4 given by Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1967 (C.48), S. I]."  [Emphasis added]
[1905] 2 KB 772.
Ibid., p. 779.
Ibid., at p. 785 Vaughan Williams, L.J., stated: "[...] the letters o f lien were not void as being bills o f sale 
not in prescribed form and unregistered under the B ills o f Sale Acts, but were [..,] "documents used in the
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2. Companies Act 1948, S. 95 (S. 395 of Companies Act, 1985 as amended by 
1989 Act)
The second defence against the banker's right under the letter of trust is 
whether his right fell within Section 95 of Companies Act, 1948/^ In Ladenburg & 
Co V. Goodwin & Ferreira,"^® the defendants (merchants in Manchester trading 
with South Africa) obtained advances from the plaintiffs (merchant bankers in 
London) against shipments made by the defendants to their customers against 
drafts, bills of lading, invoices, and letter of lien in 1904. The defendants, in a letter, 
announced that it was not their policy to give a letter of lien, but they were ready to 
hypothec the shipment as security and the plaintiffs agreed to that suggestion. After 
the defendants' company went into voluntary liquidation in 1911, a dispute arose 
between the plaintiffs and the liquidator over the assets of the defendants' 
company.'^® It was held for the liquidator on the basis that although there are 
charges on the book debts of the defendant company since they were not registered 
they are void.
ordinary course o f business as proof o f the possession or control o f goods" within the exceptions in S. 4 o f 
the B ills o f Sale Act, 1878."; and in another part o f the judgment he said: "[Wjhether these documents 
intended to be proof o f possession and control o f the goods in question. Now Bigham, J. has arrived at the 
conclusion, as appears from his Judgment, that the documents described in the letters o f lien were intended 
both as proof o f possession and also as proof o f control. Î am not saying that is not so, but I prefer to take the 
simpler case o f whether they are used as proof o f the possossion o f the goods." [Ibid., pp. 787-88]; see Re 
David Allester [1922] 2 Ch 211, in which similar point was raised and Austbuiy, J., followed decision made 
in Re H am ilton : Davis, supra (f.n. 6), pp. 199-201; see also Gutteridge, supra (f.n, 3) at p. 218, f.n, 26, 
which it is said that Austbury, J., did not notice decision in R.V. Townshend (1884), 15, Cox C.C. 466; 
Ellinger's banking law, supra (f.n. 9), p. 554.
S. 93 o f Companies Act, 1908; for the situation in Scotland see the rules concerning floating charge, 
which is affecting heritable and moveable property o f companies, introduced in 1961 and now governed by 
the Companies (Floating Charges and Receivers! (Scotland) Act 1972.
[1912] 3 K.B. 275.
Ibid., at p. 280, Pickford, J. put the argument as: "The question which arises in this case is whether the 
result o f transactions between the defendant company and the plaintiffs is that there is a charge on book debts 
o f the defendant company within the meaning o f S. 93 o f the Companies Consolidation) Act, 1908."; the 
same judge, in course o f his judgment pointed out that "It is said that when the money is paid by the 
customers to the defendants company or to the liquidator it becomes impressed with a trust in favour o f 
plaintiffs. 1 am unable to see how this suggested trust could arise unless there had previously been a charge 
on the money. I think there was a charge on the money which was to be paid for the goods until the money 
was in fact paid it was a book debt o f the defendant company." [Ibid, p. 280]
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A similar argument was pointed out in Re David Al!ester^° but Astbury, J., 
did not follow the decision in Ladenburg and distinguished the instant case on the 
ground that the bank as pledgee created a trust agency under the letter of trust and 
as a result he had an especial and independent right over the goods.M oreover, in 
Bond Woi-th^^ there was a similar argument but taken from a different approach. 
The facts were that a seller (who supplied synthetic fibre) indicated in his contract 
with the buyer that risk in the fibre passed to the latter on delivery of the goods but 
the equitable and beneficial ownership of the fibre was to remain with him until full 
payment for the fibre delivered had been made, or until its prior resale in which case 
the seller's beneficial entitlement was to attach to the proceeds of sale. The buyer 
later became Insolvent and receivers were appointed by a debenture holder at a 
time when the buyer owed the sellers £587,397.
The sellers claimed that by virtue of the retention of title clause in the contract 
they were entitled to trace their fibre into the stocks of yarn and carpets held or to 
the proceeds of sale of the carpets in which it had been used. On the other hand, 
the receivers took out a summons seeking the direction of the court as to whether 
the sellers had any interest or charge over fibre held by the buyers in the form of the 
raw fibre, or proceeds fibre. The receiver contended that the only rights conferred on 
the seller by that retention of title clause were those under a floating charge which
[1922] 2 Ch. 211.
Ibid., p. 218, that the relevent part o f his judgment is as follows: "Now in that case [the Ladenburg case] 
the bank had no pledge or other right in the goods at all before the transaction in question; the transaction 
was one which notwithstanding its form could not and did not give the bank any right except a charge over 
the companies book debts, and as Pickford, J., pointed out, it was simply and solely a mortgage or charge on 
the company's book debts, and as such was avoided by the Act. [...] Here, [...] the bank as pledgee created a 
trust agency in the company for the purpose o f the realization o f the bank's security. That trust agency was 
acknowledged and recorded in the letters o f trust are neither bills o f sale within s. 93, sub-s.l (c), nor are 
they in any sense mortgages or charges on book debts within cluse (e) or any other clause o f the section."; 
Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 11), pp. 219-20; Davis, supra (f.n. 5), pp. 194-201.
[1979] 3 All ER 919.
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was void as against other creditors, under S. 95(1) of the Companies Act, 1948 for 
want of registration.^^ The Court supported the receiver's argument. '^^
1.2. Banks' right to sell goods under a security measure
As discussed earlier, banks by virtue of giving an advance payment under 
the letter of credit obtain an independent and special right of property over the 
goods which belongs to the applicant/buyer.^^ If the bank's client cannot pay his 
debt to the bank, does the bank have a right to sell the goods? Generally speaking, 
it is accepted that if a certain date for repaying the debt is contained in the contract 
and the applicant is not able to reimburse the bank in due time, a power of sale is 
implied in favour of the bank. If there is no such fixed date in the contract the bank is 
not entitled to exercise its right of sale unless a notice to that effect has been given 
to the buyer/customer.
In Deverges v. Sandeman^® the defendant, a share broker, as mortgagee 
sold the plaintiffs shares which were mortgaged to him. The question of law was 
whether that sale was within the power of the defendant. As a matter of fact there 
was no express power of sale to the defendant’s favour, so the point was whether, 
given the facts of the case, there was an implied power of sale. The court of first 
instance held for the defendant and that decision was confirmed by the Court of 
Appeal on the ground that sufficient notice was given by the defendant, Vaughan
”  Section 95(2) o f Companies Act 1948 provides: "(c) a charge created or evidenced by an instrument 
which, i f  executed by an individual, would require registration as a b ill o f sale [...] (e) a charge on book debts 
o f the company; (1) a floating charge on the undertaking or property o f the company [...]."
The court gave its support to the receivers argument by deciding that: "On the construction o f the contract, 
the equitable charge in favour o f the seller was created by the buyers by way o f an implied grant back to the 
sellers after the whole o f the property in the fibre had first passed to the buyers, and not by the sells reserving 
or excepting to themselves on interest out o f the property passing to the buyers. Furthermore, having regard 
to the buyer's implied authoj'ity in the course o f their business, the charge could only be construed as a 
floating charge and not as a specific charge over specific assets, and was in fact a floating charge. Since it 
was a shifting charge against fluctuating assets which the buyers were free to deal with in the ordinary course 
o f their business." [Bond W orth  case, supra (f.n. 52), head notes and p. 945 &  pp. 953-55]
See Rosenburg v. International Banking Corpn and Far East Gerhard and Hey Co. (.1923) 14 Ll.L.R. 
344 (per Scrutton, L.J.) and relevant discussion in Section A. 1.1.2.1 o f the present chapter above.
[1902] 1 Ch. 579; see also Rosenburg. ibid.
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Williams, L.J. distinguished the principles of law dealing with both pledge and 
mortgage and stated: "In case of pledge, whether of chattels or of stock or shares, a 
power of sale is implied at law if a day fixed by the contract for the payment of debt; 
[...] In the case of a mortgage in which there is a fixed day for payment and default 
in payment, a similar power of sale would seen to arise.
Here no date was fixed by the contract, so turning to that fact it was pointed 
out that "In case of pledge if no time is fixed, it would seem to be fairly well 
established that, when a loan is for an indefinite time, the lender may terminate the 
credit by giving notice to the debtor to pay on a certain day and that upon default in 
payment on that day the pledgee may sell the pledge.
The reasons for requiring notice as a condition of the implied power of sale is 
said to be that "The answer is plain - to give the mortgagor a reasonable opportunity 
to r e d e e m . A s  pointed out above, the other judges (Sterling, L.J. and 
Cozens-Hardy, L.J.) in the Court of Appeal were in favour of the defendant since 
they were of the opinion that sufficient notice had in fact been given to the plaintiffs. 
However, they shared the view of Vaughan Williams, L.J., that giving a notice to that 
effect is necessary for an implied power of sale. Sterling, L.J. discussing the general 
principle of law where a fixed date was set by the contract, agreed with the views 
saying "If stock is itself made the security for money, and the day appointed for
Ibid., p. 589; Tucker v. W ilson. 1 P. WMS 261; 5 Bro. F.C. 193.
Ibid., p. 589; another distinction between English and scots law is about security over stocks and shares o f 
a company. In that regard it is said: "English law recognises both a legal m ortgage (i.e. where there is a 
transfer o f the shares to the moitgagee (the lender) and the transfer is registred by the company) and an 
equitable mortgage (i.e. where the share certificate is deposited with the lender, usually accompanied by a 
"blank" transfer (a transfer signed by the borrower but with the transferee’s name left blank so that the 
transfer may, i f  necessary, be later completed by the lender and then registred with the company). The 
English equitable mortgage does not give the lender absolute security, because the borrower is still registered 
as the holder in the company’s register o f members and so might fraudulently sell the shares to a third party 
who would then, by registering his transfer with the eompany, become, as far as the company would be 
concerned, the undisputed owner o f the shares. [...] In Scotland the valid ity o f blank transfers is doubtful 
because the Blank Bonds and Trusts Act 1696 declares null "bonds, assignations, dispositions or other deeds" 
subscribed blank in the name o f the person or persons to whom they have been granted." [Emphasis added; 
Marshall 1983, supra (f.n. 1), pp. 425-26 and 427, paras. 8-97 and 8-108.]
Ibid., p. 590.
235
payment is passed, the mortgagee may at once proceed to sell the stock, and repay 
himself principal and interest, without commencing an action of foreclosure."®^ 
Specifically on the matter under discussion, "what are the rights of a mortgagee 
when no day has been appointed for payment?", he stated that there was no 
authority directly relating to the point but he referred to some authorities which 
related to pledge. The first case was Ex Parte Hubbard®^ where Brown, L.J. said; 
"There is at Common law an authority to the pledgee to sell the goods on the default 
of the pledgor to repay the money, either at the time originally appointed, or after 
notice by pledgee."®^
Another case referred to was Re Wlorritt®® in which Cotton, L.J. stated: "A 
contract of pledge carries with it implication that the security may be made available 
to satisfy the obligation, and enables the pledgee in possession (though he has not 
the general property in the thing pledged, but a special property only) to sell on 
default in payment and after notice to the pledgor, although the pledgor may redeem 
at any moment up to sale."®"^
As to the position of the mortgagee, Cotton, L.J. pointed out that "Where 
there is no express power of sale given by the mortgage, he has, after default in 
payment, and after he has given the mortgagor a reasonable time to pay the money 
due, a power to sell and give a good title to the purchaser, though, of course, the 
mortgagor has, at any time before sale, a right on payment of the money due, 
including expenses, to prevent the sale and redeem the chattels."®®
Ibid., p. 592.
17QBD 698.
Deverge case, supra (f.n. 56), p. 593. 
18QBD232.
Dcvergc case, supra (f.n. 56), p. 593.
Ibid., p. 593; Re M o r r it . supra (f.n. 63), p. 233; see also per Fry, L.J. view in Re M o rr it . where he held in 
contrast with the majority opinion and said; "that a mortgage (as distinguished from a pledgee) o f chattels 
has, in the absence o f statute, no implied power to sell them on default by the mortgagor, even i f  he has taken 
possession o f them."
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In conclusion, Sterling, L.J. gave his view in the following words: "According to those 
authorities it would seem to me that when no time for payment has been originally 
fixed, then before the power of sale can be exercised, no notice is to be given to the 
mortgagor, and default must be made by him in payment after such notice."®® In the 
context of the notice no definition was given but it was said that such notice must be 
in all respect reasonable; and also that "a notice demanding payment of an 
excessive sum has been held to be bad."®^
Another point is that bankers have the right to claim against the goods to 
satisfy advances made by them. However, no right is recognised for holders of 
drafts drawn against the credit (whether the seller himself or a third person to whom 
drafts have been negotiated) against a banker in circumstances where a letter of 
lien is issued by the bank. The reason for this principle is that the banker is not in 
the position of a trustee. This point was decided in Banner v. Johnston,®® and the 
issue for consideration was whether the banker was a trustee and therefore obliged 
to accept every bill which was drawn under the credit. In other words is the banker 
the only person who is entitled to benefit from the security available under the lien? 
The House of Lords took a negative view. Lord Cairns stated: "The order to send 
home the shipping documents, and the conditions annexed to the promise to accept 
that the shipping documents shall be sent to them are for the protection of the 
bankers, and not, as it seems to me, in any way for the protection of person who 
negotiate bills of exchange."®®
1.3. Grounds against a bank's security
There are grounds in which banks may have lost their rights over the goods: 
(1) "estoppel by conduct" and, (2) "Factors Act, 1889, Sec. 2(1)."
Ibid., p. 593.
Ibid., p, 593; Pigot v. Cublev. 15 C.B. (N.S.) 701. 
(1871)LR 5 HL 157.
Ibid., p. 173; Davis, supra (f.n. 5), p. 202.
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1.3.1. "Estoppel by conduct"
There are authorities who apparently indicate that a banker by his conduct 
can damage his right under the security. For instance, in R/Ioorgate Mercantile Co. 
Ltd. V. Twitchings^® the majority view (of Lord Denning, M.R. and Brown, L.J. in 
favour of estoppel but Geoffrey, L.J. (dissenting), supported the notion that the 
plaintiff (a finance company) lost his control over the goods under the rule of 
"estoppel by conduct". Lord Denning, M.R., said relating to the definition of 
"estoppel by conduct": "There is no doubt that a buyer of goods can acquire a title 
by estoppel. This is recognised by S. 21(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, which 
says: "The buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had unless the 
owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to 
sell."^  ^ Nevertheless, this decision was reversed in the House of Lords by a majority 
(three from five) later.^^ Although both views (above) are based on rules of common 
sense, from a practical point of view it seems that the view adopted by the majority 
of the Court of Appeal is the better one and it is based on the principle which may 
acquire more support in the future.^®
™ [1975] 3 A ll ER 314 (CA) and [1977] AC 890 (HL) reversed the decision o f the Court o f Appeal.
M oorgate case, ibid., p. 323 (CA); in respect o f the meaning o f "conduct" it is pointed out that: "In 
applying these principles o f properitary estoppel, the owner is estopped, not only by his own conduct, but 
also by conduct o f his agent or any one who is in privity with him." [M oorgate case, ibid., pp. 323-24 (CA)]
Ibid., at pp. 917-18 Lord Edmond Davis stated: "I prefer the view expressed by Geoffrey Lane, L.J. 
([1976] QB 225, 253) that "HPI, when they give information to a dealer that the car in question is not on 
their files, are not asserting that no hire-purchase agreement exist in relation to it, but only that no such 
agreement has been communicated to them. The dealer in the end has to rely on his assesment o f the 
customer’s honesty, and i f  he misjudges it, it is that misjudgment brought about by the customer’s dishonesty 
which is the real and approximate cause o f his loss."
A similar point and different view was raised in Central car Auctions v. U nity Finance [1957] 1 QB 
371; [1956] 3 WLR 1068; [1956] 3 A ll ER 905 (CA). In that case Denning, L.J. discussed the Doctrine o f 
estoppel by conduct but he was not in majority and his view had not been supported by other judges in the 
Court o f Appeal; Berg, Alan, "Charges over book debts: a rep ly ". JBL, September 1995pp. 433-71, at p. 
460 pointed out: "If, on the other hand, the bank permits the company, without first obtaining the bank’s 
consent, to make withdrawals from a bloked account into which the bank debt’s proceeds are paid it is 
thought that, depending on the particular circumstances, the bank would become bound by an equitable 
estoppel requiring it to give the company a reasonable period o f notice before it could reassert its right to 
object to withdrawals from the blocked account." [Emphasis added]
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1.3.2. Section 2(1) o f the Factors Act, 1889
A banker as a pledgee loses his right of pledge if he is subject to S. 2(1) of 
the Factors Act, 1889/^^ In Lloyds Bank v. Bank of America^® the plaintiff banker 
paid advances to Strauss & Co. Ltd. (S&C) and as security for such payments under 
a letter of hypothecation and two other agreements it received documents relating to 
the goods and an immediate right of sale. Subsequently it chose S&C as its trustee 
and the latter pledged the documents with the defendants who acted in good faith 
and without knowing that the transaction was not in order. Then S&C having gone 
into liquidation, and as a result of a dispute between the banker and the defendant 
on the ground that they were not the owner of the goods and subject to the Factors 
Act, 1889, S. 2(1), they, as pledgee with an special interest in the goods pledged, 
under decided authorities, did not lose their rights under the letter of trust over the 
goods. In court Porter, J. held for the defendants and his decision was confirmed by
"2. Powers o f mercantile agent with respect to disposition o f good, (1) Where a mercantile agent is, with 
the consent o f the owner, in possession o f goods or o f the documents o f title to goods, any sale, pledge, or 
other disposition o f the goods, made by him when acting in the ordinary course o f business o f a mercantile 
agent, shall, subject to the provisions o f this Act, be as valid as i f  he were expressly authorised by the owner 
o f the goods to make the same; provided that the person talking under the disposition acts in good faith, and 
has not at the time o f disposition notice that the person making the disposition has not authority to make the 
same."; the Factors A ct 1889, extended to Scotland by the Factors (Scotland) Act 1890.
Lloyds Bank v. Bank o f America [1938] 2 KB 147, pp. 150-51; see also Northern Western Bank v. 
Poynter. [1895] AC 56 and Re David Allester. [1922]2 CH 211.
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the Court of Appeal, but on a different ground/® Taking the agency point, it was 
decided that S&C was "a trust agent for the bank."^^
1.4. Measure of damages caused by the applicant
if the bank's customer fails to pay the amount of the credit he may be sued 
by the bank/® What is the measure of damages? The case of Re Ludwig 
Tillman,^® held that Tillman, who because of outbreak of war could not to put the 
bank in funds, was obliged to indemnity the bank against the amount borrowed by 
the latter from the Bank of England for the purpose of paying his acceptance.®® Of 
course other expenses like charges for opening a credit, legal expenses and 
interest, if any, must be paid by the applicant for the credit. There is no provision as 
to this point under consideration in the UCP 500.
1.5. Security measure for the applicant in case of insolvency of the 
bank
It is suggested that a buyer's right is the same as the others on liquidation in 
the case of a banker's insolvency where the buyer puts the bank in funds prior to
Ibid., at p. 162, W ilfrid  Greene, M.R., said: "It happens very frequently that the incidents and rights o f 
ownership are divided among two or more hands. One person may have the right to possession, which is one 
o f the rights incident to ownership, and another person may have all other rights incident to ownership. 
Nevertheless, it is only the two o f them who can confer on a third party the ownership o f the property in 
question. It is only by their combining in an assignment that they can confer a good title. I am quite unable to 
read the word "owner" [in S. 2 o f the Factors Act, 1889] as excluding such a case. It seems to me that, where 
the right o f ownership has become divided among two or more persons in such a way that the acts which the 
section is contemplating could never be authorised save by both or all o f them, those persons together 
constitute the owner."; then he continued: "In the present case, i f  Lloyds Bank and Strauss &  Co., Ltd., had 
agreed to employ a broker in Mincing Lane, and with the consent o f both o f them, which was necessary 
because the bank had the right o f possession, these documents had been handed to that broker and thus come 
into his possession, I can not for one moment doubt that the broker would have been in possession o f the 
documents with the consent o f the owner within the meaning o f the section, the owner being, for that 
purpose, the two o f them acting in combination." [Ibid., p. 162]; Davis, supra (f.n. 5), pp. 192-93.
77 Ibid., p. 165; Davis, supra (f.n. 5), p. 193.
Equitable T rust Co. o f New Y o rk  v. Dawson Partners Ltd. (1927) 27 Ll.i.R. 49, 52; Gutteridge, supra 
(f.n. 11), p. 58 and f.n. 8.
(1918)34TLR322.
Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 11), p. 228 and f.n. 9.
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receipt of the proper documents of title from the bank.®^  There is an exemption 
when the applicant for the credit deposits cash or securities for particular purposes, 
i.e., to meet the beneficiary's draft. In such a case if the issuing bank becomes 
insolvent, the buyer is entitled to claim back what he deposited.®^ However, the 
onus of proof is on the buyer to prove his claim.
Therefore, there must be some proper appropriation in order to show that the 
money or securities were deposited for a specific reason.®® Furthermore, such a 
right belongs only to the person who deposited the securities or cash, namely the 
applicant for the credit.®"^
Z  THE BANKAS RIGHT OF RECOURSE (AS SECURITY MEASURE) 
AGAINST THE BENEFICIARY
Do banks, as security, have a right of recourse against a beneflciaiy of a 
letter of credit? There are three situations in which the issuing bank may look to the 
beneficiary/seller, namely, (1) insolvency of the applicant for credit, (2) wrongful 
acceptance of documents presented by the beneficiary, and (3) fraud committed by 
the beneficiary. In the third situation obviously, as mentioned previously, the bank 
has a right of action against a fraudulent seller and courts in different legal systems 
are of the opinion that the beneficiary must not be allowed to benefit from the right 
provided under the "doctrine of autonomy".®® Nevertheless, the banker has no right
Davis, supra (f.n. 5), pp. 62-63.
82 Fariev v. Turner (1877), 26 L.J. Ch. 710.
See Lord Romilly, M.R., decision in Re Barned's Banking Co.. Massey's case. (1870), 39 L.J. Ch. 635, 
that the learned judge distinguished the Farley case, and held that in contrast w ith the Farley case, in Re 
Barncd [...] the applicant for the credit merely had the right o f pro ff because there is no appropriation o f 
money as it was in Farley case; Davis, supra (f.n. 5), p. 63, f.n. 1.
Banner v. Jolianston (1871), L.R, 5 H.L. Cas. 157; Davis, supra (f.n. 5), p. 64 and f.n. 2.
The subject o f fraud is considered in Section B .l o f Chapter V II (above); Ellinger, EP, "Docum entary 
letters o f c red it". Singapore, 1970 [hereinafter referred to as Ellinger], p. 201; Goode, R.M., "Reflections 
on Letter o f C redit- I I I " . Journal o f Business o f Law, 1980, pp. 443-46, at p. 443 [hereinafter referred to as 
Goode]; Bank Russo-ïran v. Goordoii W oodrofle &  Co. L td. [1972] The Times, 4 October (an unreprted 
cases); Edward Owen Engineering L td. v. Barclays Bank International L td. [1978]1 Ll.L.Rep. 166.
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of recourse against a purchaser of the beneficiary's draft as "a holder in due 
course"/® But the law may be different in the first two situations. Each will be 
discussed separately.
2.1. Insolvency of the buyer/applicant for credit: the issuing bank’s 
right of recourse
Does the issuing bank has a right of recourse against the seller/beneficiary 
when its client becomes insolvent in the case of an irrevocable letter of credit? It is 
difficult to give a positive response to this question because, first of all, it depends 
on the type of credit, whether the credit is an acceptance, payment or negotiable 
one. If the credit is not in the third category, then it is not easy to suggest that the 
law of negotiable instruments can apply to the other types of credit since such 
provisions deal only with payment in cash, or where the issued drafts are accepted 
by the acceptor, i.e. the banker, who does not have a right of recourse against the 
drawer under the credit's conditions.®^
If the credit is categorised as a negotiable one there may be support from the 
law of negotiable instruments but in that situation the banker may lose his right of 
recourse because, usually, there is a clause in the credit that the banker undertakes 
to negotiate drafts without using his right of recourse.®® What would be the solution 
if there is no such condition in the credit? Even in that situation it is hard to give 
support to the view that the banker is entitled to look to the seller for.the amount 
which was paid, since the right of the holder of a bill of exchange is different from 
that of the banker as the holder of a negotiable draft, and under the credit system 
there is a certain promise by the bank to accept such drafts.®®
Goode, ibid., p. 443 and f.n. 3; Guaranty T rust Co. o f New Y ork [I981J2 K.B, 623; see also discussions 
concerning "holder in due course" in Section B .l.2.4., Chapter V II above.
It is said by Ellinger that no right is conferred on an acceptor in Bills o f Exchange Act 1882 in England 
(see Ellinger, supra (f.n. 85), pp. 201-202 &  f.n. 86).
Article 9 (a)(iv) and (b)(iv) o f the UCP 500; Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 11), pp. 84-85.
Ellinger, supra (f.n. 85), p. 202.
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This point has not yet been considered by English courts, but it is clear that 
under American and French law the banker has no right of recourse against the 
seller/® For instance, in an American case directly dealing with the point it was held 
that "The genera! provision of that statute which permits the holder or any 
subsequent indorser of a negotiable instrument dishonoured to maintain an action 
therein against the drawer is not applicable in the present case because the drafts 
here involved specifically state that they are drawn under the irrevocable letter of 
credit, and by that the bank was required to pay when a draft and other documents 
specified were presented."®^
Moreover, by accepting a right of recourse for the banker in case of the 
buyer's failure, the main purpose of the letter of credit would be destroyed. 
Therefore, it is not appropriate to suggest such a solution for the problem under 
discussion.
2.2. Wrongful acceptance of tendered documents
The issuing bank seems to be in much greater difficulty if it wrongfully 
accepted tendered documents. Since, firstly, by accepting documents presented by 
the beneficiary the bank agreed that the seller/beneficiary has carried out his 
obligation under the credit; it will lose its right of recourse, if there is any, against the 
seller. Secondly, the bank in such a situation failed to carry out its duty under the 
credit contract, namely, protecting the applicant's interests by controlling tendered 
documents and to ensure that they are in compliance with terms and conditions 
stipulated in the credit. Therefore, nobody should suffer from that negligence; it is 
the bank what should bear all responsibility and any consequent risk.
Flowever, there are suggestions giving some support to the banker's point of 
view. For instance, it is suggested that the banker is entitled to a right of recourse 
against the seller based on the doctrine of "mistake of fact".®^ It is also stated by
™ Ibid., pp. 202-04.
Bank o f East Asia. L td. v. Fang 140 Wash. 603, 249, p. 1060 (1926), at p. 1063. 
Goode, supra (f.n. 85), pp. 444-45.
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another legal writer that "Where the documents, thought apparently what they 
should be, are in fact not and the beneficiary (not fraudulent) is himself responsible 
for the discrepancy, the bank should be able to recover the money it has paid 
against them as paid in mistake of fact, unless it has expressly contracted not to 
have recourse. The mistake is certainly between the payer and the payee and is a
mistake as to the correctness of the documents."®®
In contrast, Professor Ellinger seems to disagree with this opinion®'  ^; he has 
accepted the decision of Bank of New York v. Partola Manufacturing Co.,®® 
where it was held in favour of the defendant seller on the ground that the mistake 
happened only through the banker's actions and there had been no fraud committed 
by the seller. In addition there was no mistake of fact on the part of the defendants, 
because they surrendered the required documents for the amount of the credit. 
However, the same writer has stated that such a view may find less support in 
English law.®®
It is also pointed out by Professor Goode that although the doctrine of 
"mistake of fact" has found support in both English®  ^ and American law,®® such an 
approach should be rejected in the light of the principle of restitution.®® The same
Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 11), p. 85. [Emphasis added] 
Ellinger, supra (f.n. 85), p. 207.
96
191 App. Div. 424, 181 N.Y.S. 464 (1920); Ellinger, supra (f.n. 85), pp. 204-05. 
Ellinger, supra (f.n. 85), at p. 205, f.n. 96 (for referred authorities).
Barclays Bank L td. v. W.J. Simms Sons &  Cooke Is on them ) L td . [1980]I Ll.L.Rep. 225; Chase 
Manhattan Bank N. A. v. Israel-British Bank fLondonl Ltd. [1979]3 A ll E.R. 1025.
Fitzgerald v. T itle  Guarantee &  Trust Co.. 290 N.Y. 376, 49 N.B. 2d 289 (1943).
Goode, supra (f.n. 85), pp. 444-45, at p. 445 stated; "Yet there are doctrinal difficulties which are not easy 
to resolve. It is a general principle o f the law o f restitution that " i f  A  confers a benefit on B under a valid 
contract, he must seek his remedy under that contract and not in restitution." The restitutionary remedy can 
therefore be persued only where the mistake is such as to nullify  the contract or results in it being set aside. 
To allow the bank to recover its payment where there is only partial failure o f the consideration for the 
payment would be contrary to principle. Total failure o f consideration, which does attract a restitutionary 
remedy, could only come about as the result o f the bank rejecting the documents. But having accepted them 
the bank surely can not be allowed to change its mind and convert its acceptance into a rejection. This would 
contravene a separate principle o f contract law, that the innocent party can not both approbate and reprobate
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writer also for drawn attention to the point that if the banker pays a person (other 
than the main beneficiary) who purchased his draft in good faith, namely, "holder in 
due course", the purchaser is immune from liability and the banker is not entitled to 
sue him. But if payment was made to the original beneficiary of the credit, there are 
other possible grounds for recovery by the banker. The first solution is for the 
banker to prove that the seller has a duty of care under the credit operation; by 
presenting documents which do not fulfil the conditions of the credit, the seller, by 
that negligence, breaches his undertaking to the banker.^ ®® Such a defence does 
not seem very strong because in the first place there is no evidence for it under the 
credit contract as the contracting parties have no such intention. Secondly, even if it 
is supposed by implication that the beneficiary is under such a duty, the banker 
himself has a separate duty of care towards his customer (the buyer) to examine the 
tendered documents.^®^ So, if the banker fails to carry out his duty, he should bear 
all the risks and responsibilities which may follow. This sort of interpretation of the 
provisions is nearer both to the present practice of the letter of credit and to a fair 
solution.
Another possible solution that has been suggested is based on the idea of 
breach of warranty by the beneficiary. It is said "That is no reason why, if the 
beneficiary chooses to make a tender, he should not be held to warrant that the 
documents conform to the credit."^®  ^ There is no case in English law to support the 
view that the seller undertakes any such warranty concerning tendered documents 
under the irrevocable letter of credit. Nevertheless, the view is expressly supported 
in Section 5-111(1) of the UCC.^ ®® There are no similar provisions under the UCP
[...] Having accepted documents in first place, the bank loses its right to reject (in the absence o f forgery or 
fraud)
Goode, supra (f.n. 85), p. 444.
Article 13 o f the UCP 500.
Goode, supra (f.n. 85), p. 445.
See appendix 1 for the text o f Section 5-111(1); and for more details concerning the point under 
consideration see the relevant discussion in Section B.2.2.4, Chapter V (above).
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500. The main objection to that suggestion is that by transferring the duty of care 
from the bank to the beneficiary, the former is freed from its main duty of care in 
relating to the applicant for credit; then the whole purpose of the credit operation, as 
a promise for payment, would be destroyed. Moreover, if there is a degree of duty of 
care on the seller/beneficiary, relating to the documents, it does not extend to 
remove all of the banker's obligations in relation to the documents.
Consequently, the view that the issuing bank has no right of recourse against 
the beneficiary of credit is much preferable, also as an opinion has been supported 
in all major legal systems.
3. THE BANKAS RIGHT OF SECURITY IN RELATING TO A PERSON 
OTHER THAN THE BANK
The main issue in this part of the study is whether holders of bills of lading 
(other than a bank) have similar rights over the goods as banks have under such 
security measures, namely, letters of hypothecation, letters of trust or as a pledgee. 
In other words, can they stand in the same shoes as a bank against the applicant 
for credit? As discussed before, nobody other than the bank (issuing or intermediary 
bank) has any right by way of lien or charge over the goods or to the proceeds of 
the goods/®^ There are several authorities which support this view. For instance, in 
ex parte Dever, In re Suse,^ ®® a buyer (J.S. Mussett, carrying on business in 
London) asked his bank (Messers. W.E. Sibeth [...], who were merchants and 
bankers in London) to issue a confirmed letter of credit for the seller (W.V. 
Sentence, carrying business at Shanghai, in China) against drafts drawn by the 
seller to be accompanied by shipping documents relating to the purchase of tea. 
The credit was in these terms, "We hereby agree with you and also as a separate
See Banner v. Johnson. (1871) L.R. 5, H.L.C. 157; Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 11), pp. 222-25, where at p. 
224, stated: "It was also pointed out in the same case [Banner v. Jolianson] that the only instance in which a 
bill-holder could have a claim to goods pledged as security for the b ill would be when it was possible to 
apply the rule in ex parte W aring [(1815), 19 Ves. 345], i.e., i f  the estates o f two parties who are liable on 
the b ill are brought under a forced administration and one o f the parties holds by way o f cover for the b ill 
goods which are still unrealized." [Emphasis and brackets are added]
(1884), 13 Q.B.D. 766.
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engagement with the bona fide holders respectively of the bills in compliance with 
the terms of this credit, that the same be duly accepted on presentation and paid at 
maturity."^®®
Subsequently, bills of lading and other related documents were discounted 
by a bank in China which presented them for acceptance through their agents in 
London. The issuing bank suspended payment and went into liquidation. Afterwards 
the holders of the bills claimed to be entitled to a lien or charge on the goods and 
the proceeds of sale. Lindley, L.J. summarised the seller's claim as, "His claim was 
to have those teas which remained unsold at the date of suspension of payment of 
Suse & Sibefh applied in taking up the bills, and also to have the proceeds of those 
teas which had been sold before the suspension similarly applied."^®  ^ As to the 
goods which were unsold it was decided that there was no problem and the seller 
was entitled to have the sale proceeds of those goods; but with regard to that part of 
the goods which were sold before the suspension Lord Lindley stated that the 
position was different.^®®
In Brown Shipley & Co v. Kough^®® in respect of the subject under 
discussion Fry, L.J., after considering different aspects of the case stated: "I do not 
think they are intended to transfer any lien, supposing it existed. Nor can I help 
observing that there would, to my mind, be very considerable difficulty in holding.
Ex parte case, ibid., p. 767-68.
Ibid., pp. 777-78.
Ibid., at p. 778, said; "We do not see our way to hold that Sentance has any equitable right or lien as 
regards these moneys, or to treat them as subject to any trust, or that he can insist upon having them applied 
as the unsold teas are applicable."; at p. 776 o f the same case, ibid.. Cotton, L.J,, took a similar position 
stating: "With regard to the claim o f the blll-holders, Mr. Pollard contented that, having regard to the terms 
o f the letter o f credit, and to the fact that the bills were drawn with referance to it, each particular b ill being 
drawn to the credit o f a particular shipment o f tea, a lien or charge on the tea was given to the holder o f the 
bill. I am unable to arrive at that conclusion. Mr. Pollard relied on the decision in F rith  v. Forbes [4 D.F. &  
J 409]. That case, however, was decided on its own very special circumstances, and in my opinion, it is no 
authority in the present case. Banner v. Johnston and the cases in the Court o f Appeal which have been 
referred to are much more like the present case. The form o f the b ill o f exchange and o f the letter o f advice, 
written at the time by the drawer to the acceptors, did not give the bill-holders any line on the goods."
(1885), 29 Ch. D. 848.
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that an instrument at the same moment operated as a bill of exchange and as an 
equitable assignment.
So, from the above authorities it becomes clear that bankers are the only 
parties who are entitled to benefit from security measures designed to cover 
advanced payments; and if a person other than a bank would like to have securities 
similar to those have been arranged for a bank in English law, he should make 
proper arrangements when entering into the agreement.
SECTION B: POSITION TN UCP 500
The bank's security has not been considered under the UCP 500. There is 
only a general provision in Article 14(a) regarding the right of reimbursement of an 
authorised bank which made payment under credit's condition. Even In that respect 
no method has been suggested and everything has been left for negotiation 
between the parties to the credit contract outside the UCP framework. Moreover, it 
seems appropriate that the subject of insolvency of the bank and its impact on the 
applicant be addressed by UCP, as presently there is no provision.
Ibid., at p. 875, he added: "[...] it would require some argument to convince me that the same instrument 
could have that double operation, because d ifficu lt questions would rise. A  b ill o f exchange is a negotiable 
instrument, taken in the ordinary course o f business, free from the equities between the parties. I f  the same 
instrument creates the one and the other, does the equitable assignment travel to the hand o f every holder o f 
the b ill o f exchange? Or i f  not, where does it stop? I f  it travels into the hands o f all the holders o f the b ill, it 
is like a b ill o f exchange free from equities, or is it like an ordinary equitable assignment?"; for another 
example see Robey &  Co.'s Perservenee Ironworks v. 011ier.tl872) LR 7 Ch. 695, the defendants (who 
paid cash in advance) entered into a jo in t adventure with Brown for the shipment o f maize and it was agreed 
that the b ill which was to be drawn on them by Brown to cover the price o f the goods. Bills were drawn for 
the defendants which were later indorsed for the plaintiffs. Subsequently, Brown failed to carry out his duty 
and stopped payment. As a result o f that failure the defendants refused to accept the bills and sold the goods. 
The plaintiffs (as third party and holder o f bills) commenced an action claiming a lien over the proceeds of 
sale but his argument was not supported. James, L.J. said: "I am not prepared to say that merely because a 
b ill o f exchange purports to be drawn against particular cargo, it carries a lien on that cargo into the hands o f 
every holder o f the b ill."; similar view was stated by M illish, L.J. as follows: "The indorsement o f a b ill gives 
only a right to the bill, and I do not think that any mercantile man would suppose because he saw in the bill 
the words "which place to account cargo per A " that he was to have a lien on that cargo. A  mercantile man 
who is intended to have a lien on a cargo expects to have the b ill o f lading annexed; I f  there is no b ill o f 
lading annexed, he only expects to get the security o f the b ill itself." [See Gutteridge, supra (f.n. 11), at p. 
222 for above quotations]
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In respect of a bank's "right of recourse", Article 9 of UCP 500 provides that 
in a negotiable credit banks have no right of recourse against drawers and/or bona 
fide holders of drafts drawn by the beneficiary. The silence of UCP regarding the 
other above mentioned points, namely, the buyer's insolvency and the wrongful 
acceptance of documents by the banks, may itself support the idea that banks have 
no right of recourse in such situations against the beneficiary of the credit. 
Nevertheless, one may chose an opposite argument and suggest that banks have a 
right of recourse in the above situations where other types of credit, namely, sight, 
deferred, and acceptance credit are used for payment.
CONCLUSIONS
In providing sufficient security for banks in their relation with other parties to a 
credit contract two issues are of importance: (1) having a proper security measures 
against the applicant; (2) having a "right of recourse" against the beneficiary.
The present study clearly points out that, relating to the second issue, 
although English lawyers' point of view are divided in that respect the preferred 
opinion, also accepted by the international business community under UCP 500, is 
that banks would not be able to look to the beneficiary in case of the applicant's 
insolvency, or wrongful acceptance of documents tendered under the credit 
arrangement, unless otherwise agreed between contracting parties.^
As to the subject of the bank's right of security against the applicant for a 
credit (the first point above), although depositing sufficient funds by the applicant is 
the best possible solution from the banker's point of view, It would damage LCs' 
reputation since the applicant/buyer loses any opportunity to benefit from the 
system, namely, he is obliged to use his funds before receiving required documents 
of title or the goods. The second option for bankers is to pledge document(s) of title 
(bill(s) of lading) as a security for the amount paid under a letter of credit. Such an
For relevant discussion see Section A.2 o f the present chapter (above).
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option has been accepted by banks as the only reliable security; while it prevents 
disreputation of the letter of credit system, at the same time it keeps the balance of 
interest(s) between contracting parties (the bank and its customer (the applicant). In 
that respect, however, important legal issues would emerge: (1) whether the 
bankers have any special right of property over documents of title presented under 
the credit arrangement; (2) whether they have any power of sale of goods if it is 
necessary; (3) whether their rights under LCs are prior to the applicant/buyer's right 
of rejection of goods under the sale contract; (4) is there any limitation related to the 
"letter of hypothecation" and "letter of trust"?; (5) is there any defence against banks' 
right of security?; and (6) what would be the measure of damages caused by the 
applicant as a result of failing to pay the advance money paid by the bank?
Concerning the above first and second issues, it has been clarified in the 
present chapter that the banks' intention is only to secure their advanced payment 
to their applicants; therefore, they are not interested in becoming owner of the 
goods as a result of their security a rrangem ent.B ecause  of the pledge 
transaction, however, bankers have an independent right of property over the goods 
and a power of selling of goods if the applicant/buyer fail to pay his debt on time; 
English law supports such an attitude while Scots law takes a different view on the 
issue.
In respect of the above third issue no decision has been made in English law; 
for reasons pointed out previously, however, the preferred view is that banks' right of 
property under the pledge agreement should be safeguarded against the 
applicant/buyer's right of rejection of goods under the sale contract, as accepted 
under English law.^ '^^  Regarding the above questions (4 and 5) the answer is 
positive but not identical under English and Scots law, namely, Section 4 of the Bills
' Sections A .1.1.2 and A. 1.1.2.1 (above).
' See Section A. 1.2 o f the present chapter (above).
See relevant discussion in Section A .I. 1.2.2 o f the present chapter (above).
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of Sale Act, 1878 does not apply in Scotland/^® As to issue number six above, the 
applicant should be held responsible for the amount of money paid by the bank, 
charges for opening the credit, legal expenses and interest (if any)/^®
Regarding an applicant's right of security in case of bank's insolvency, it is 
accepted by English law that the applicant/buyer has the same right as the others 
on liquidation, unless he proves that his deposits (cash or other securities) are for 
particular purposes, namely, to meet the beneficiary's draft(s) under LCs; however, 
the applicant is the only person who is entitled to apply such a right/
Another matter of concern is whether a holder of document of title other than 
the bank would be able to enjoy from the same right of security provided for banks 
under a letter of credit transaction in English law. As considered previously,^a 
similar right has not been recognised for a person other than the bank in English 
law; therefore, bankers are the only parties who are entitled to benefit from such 
security measures designed to cover their advanced payments under LCs.
In contrast to English law, UCP 500 provides nothing relating to the bank's 
right of security and legal issues related to it. In order to clarify the position of parties 
to a credit arrangement relating to bank's security and to prevent further disputes in 
future, this issue should be addressed by a proper international instrument.
The last three chapters (Chapters VLVIII) made it clear that UCP as the only 
internationally accepted provisions relating to LCs only, covers some of the issues 
relating to that type of payment in international trade; other important legal issues 
related to such devices have not yet been codified at International level. They are 
subjects for consideration by the national laws of states. In that respect, it also 
becomes obvious: firstly, the scope of issues considered by different national law
For more details see Sections A .1.1.3.3 and A .1.3 o f the present chapter (above); as to "letter o f 
hypothecation" and "letter o f trust" and their legal nature see Section A, sub-sections 1.1.3 to 1.1.3.2 (above).
See relevant discussion in Section A. 1.4 o f the present chapter (above).
' ”  For relevant discussion see Section A. 1.5 o f the present chapter (above).
See Section A .3 o f the present chapter (above).
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(e.g. English and American law concerning the issue of fraud) is not identical; 
secondly, differences of opinion relating to the same issue between different legal 
systems exist (e.g. English and Scots law are not identical concerning the bank's 
right in security). As a result, the present system related to LCs, which is based on a 
mixture of international customary provisions (UCP) and the national law of a 
respective state becomes an uncertain and unpredictable system and its reliability 
may be doubted by business community internationally. Of course, there may 
always be new issues and no manmade system would be one hundred percent 
perfect. It is also true that having a code covering all details may not be impossible 
but it would be impractical; so, there is always a need for national law, namely, to 
leave details to be considered by courts in different jurisdictions. But, to prevent 
further disputes between parties to a letter of credit in international trade and to 
boost the credibility of LCs, a new solid foundation based on mutual interests seems 
to be necessary. This new platform can be built upon common points existing in 
different legal systems and particularly in UCP 500. Differences between them 
would be resolved by a co-ordinated comparative study under the auspices of an 
international organisation like the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) with the help of other, non-governmental organisations like the 
ICC. Of course there are practical and legal difficulties which v/ould confront any 
attempt towards unification of law of LCs, and they should not be underestimated, 
but such difficulties should not be justified as an excuse to prevent such an effort. 
To unify the next few chapters are particularly designed to study the future of LCs 
system under current world trade conditions, in order to examine whether to some 
extent the situation is ready for having international mandatory uniform rules (in the 
form of a convention) for LCs.
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PART FOUR
THE FUTURE OF
THE LETTERS OF CREDIT SYSTEM
CHAPTER IX
AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING
ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE
The system of documentary letters of credit and its rules and provisions are 
exposed to a strong pressure from new technology used for transferring data and 
information^ as well as from a movement, led by the United Nations Commission 
for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), towards preparing an international set of 
standards in the form of a legislative instrument relating to Standby Letters of 
Credit (SLCs)/ To what extent will the present system remain relevant to LCs, as a 
paper-based system governed prevailingly by non-mandatory provisions like those 
of the UCP 500, and how is it going to be affected by technological progress and 
UNClTRAL's activities? In the light of discussions in the preceding Chapters of the 
present study it has been shown how documents, particularly transport bills of 
lading, play an important role in documentary credits operation since they facilitate 
the purchase of goods and provide a sound security for banks/
How would it be possible to maintain the system at a workable level from a 
credit applicant's point of view as well from the point of view of banks? Similarly, to 
what extent would the UNClTRAL's plan for providing an international legislative 
instrument, instead of present international customary provisions, provide better 
services for all parties to a letter of credit transaction? These and other relevant 
questions and issues are the subject of consideration in the present Chapter. 
SECTTON A: ADP/EDI: GENERAL BACKGROUND
Technological improvements in the field of electronics provide a good 
opportunity for traders and bankers active in filing LCs to accelerate their activities
' Locliei', Gabriel, "B ank Technology Streamlines International Transactions” . Business Credit, 
November/ December 1990, p. 22 [hereinafter referred to as Locher], at p. 22 said: "While the basic terms o f 
letters o f credit have remained unaltered for hundered years, technology now allows banks to speed up the 
process and reduce paperwork. Banks that have invested in the appropriate systems can provide quicker 
services, lower eiTor rates, prompt status and resolution o f problems, better security, and more management 
information than their countei-parts that have not."
 ^ This issue is considered in Section A.2 o f Chapter X  (below) and Section A .2.1.3, Chapter I (above); as to 
SLCs and their relevant issues see Section B o f Chapter I (above).
 ^ For more details see discussion concerning bank's securities under LCs in Chapter V III, Section A. 1.1.2 
(above) and the role o f paper-based documents in international trade in Section B .l o f the present chapter 
(below).
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and reduce operation costs as well as errors which may arise in the course of 
transacted business/ Market-acceleration becomes possible by using computers 
for transferring data and information under terms agreed between contracting 
parties. A method which provides such a facility is used for Automatic Data 
Processing (ADR), later renamed Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)/ Although 
still in its infancy, ADP/EDI is becoming a strong area of development affecting trade
Kozolchyk, Boris, "The paperless letter o f credit and related documents o f t i t le " . Law and
Contemporaiy Problems, Vol. 55, No. 3, Summer 1992, pp. 39-101 [hereinafter it is referred to as 
Kozolchyk's article], at p. 39 stated: "Computers, telephones, and artificial satellites have made the 24-hour 
global financial marketplace a reality. A t any hour o f the day, a trader o f goods, services, or financial 
undertakings can, by using computers linked with telephone lines, microwave dishes, or a itific ia l satellites, 
engage in transaction to sell, buy, lease, assign, or borrow instantaneously w ith another trader, no matter how 
distant. Bank letters o f credit and guarantees occupy an important corner o f this global marketplace. And 
while most o f letter o f credit communications between banks and beneficiaries are still paper-based, 
communications among banks themselves are in a very large measure paperless."
 ^ UNCITRAL, "B . W orking paper submitted to the W orking Group on In ternational payments at its 
twenty-forth  session: possible issues to be included in the programme o f fu ture  w ork  on the legal 
aspects o f ED I: note by the Secretariat. (A/CN.9AVG.ÏVAVF.53) [O rig ina l; English]". Yearbook o f the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Vol. X X IIl, 1992, pp. 365-82 [hereinafter it is 
referred to as UNCITRAL Yearbook 1992, WP] at p. 371, pointed out: "The two most recent studies 
prepared for the Commission on the subject (AC/N.9/333 and A/CN.9/350) make use o f the term "EDI". It 
may be noted that in prior reports to the Commission and in the reports to the Commission and in the reports 
o f the Commission the subject had been considered under the general heading o f "autom atic data 
processing" (ADP), which was the term generally used to describe the use o f computers for business 
applications (see AC/N.9/333, para. 7). The change in terminology from ADP to EDI was not intended to 
introduce a distinction between the transmission and the processing o f data to exclude consideration o f the 
issues raised by the transmission o f any form o f free formatted text or image for commercial purposes. It 
may be noted, however, that communication o f data through EDI inherently supposes a degree o f 
standardization in the form o f a predefined syntax used in common by all parties to the EDI relationship so 
that the data can be read and processed by the computers o f both the sender and the recipient o f the data." 
[Emphasis added]; it is also said: "Various suggestions were made as to possible substitute for the term 
"EDI". Support was expressed in favour o f a suggestion to use the term "electronic commerce", which was 
described as sufficiently broad to encompass all existing communication techniques." [Emphasis added; 
UNCITRAL, "H I. ELEC TR O N IC  D A TA  INTERCHANG E lEDD. A. Report o f the W orking  G roup on 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDD on the w ork o f its twenty-fifth session (New Y o rk  4-15 January 
1993VA/CN.9/373I [O rig ina l: E ng lish ]". UNCITRAL Yearbook, Vol. X X IV , 1993, pp. 191-225 
[hereinafter it is referred to as UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1993], at p. 194, para. 20]; see also Strecker, 
Raymond F., "Autom ation is still an advantage in global banking services". Information Strategy: The 
Executive's Journa (IFS), Vol. 7, Iss. 1, Fall 1990, pp. 5-8, where in an abstract to that article it is said: 
"Although importers and exporters desire quick turnaround, low error rates, and prompt problem resolusion, 
trade services can be extremely paper and labour intensive. Automated letters o f credit and collection 
processing provide several benefits, including: 1. elemination o f paper and labour; 2. faster document 
handling; 3. the opportunity to innovate deliveiy mechanisms; 4. support for banks' marketing efforts; and 5. 
enhancement o f banks business reputations."
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finance.® Because of its evident importance the issue of transferring funds and data 
by electronic means has been considered in the past three decades by different 
organisations, national as well as international.^ In this respect UNCITRAL has 
shown a special interest and has put the matter for more detailed consideration on 
its agenda® and has accepted the task of coordinating all activities relevant to 
Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) and EDI.^
^ Kozolchyk’s article, supra (f.n. 4), at p. 39 said: "According to a reliable estimates, seventy-five percent o f 
banks' requests for other banks' issuance, advice, confirmation, or negotiation o f credits are sent 
electronically; the reminder are sent by letter."; see also Jaben, Jan, "Trade Services Software'l, United 
States Banker (USl), Vol. 98, Iss. 9, September 1987, pp. 86-89, where in an abstract to that article it is said: 
"In the past few years, automation has entered the trade services departments o f banks because o f absolute 
necessity. There are 5 reasons for doing so which are; 1. to provide more detailed accounting service for 
customers, 2. to gain better market position, 3. to improve compatetive status, 4. to enhance management 
reporting, and 5. to increase business volume without adding to staff."
’  International organisations active in the field o f Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) are Economic Commission 
for Europe and its suborgans ("Working Party on Facilitation o f International Trade" and "Inland Transport 
Committee"), International Maritime Organization (IMG), International C ivil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
International Rail Transport Committee (CIT), Customs Co-operation Council (CCC), Council o f Europe, 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Plague Conference on Private 
International Law, "Legal Observatoiy for the European Information Market", International Maritime 
Committee (CMI)(Sea Waybills Group), and the Committee on International Monetary Law o f International 
Law Association (ILA ); and projects concerning to different aspects o f ADP can be classified as follow: 1. 
Efforts relating to the privacy aspect o f ADP; 2. Efforts relating to the evidence aspect o f ADP; 3, Efforts 
relating to the substitution o f data transmission for written documents; 4. Studies dealing with the use o f 
electronic authentication in place o f signature; 5. Efforts in connection with liab ility  which may arise by 
adopting ADP; 6. Efforts to find solutions through contractual relationships o f the contracting parties; 7. 
Efforts to make necessary changes in rules o f any underlying transactions; for other details about ADP see 
"A n  exploration o f legal issues in information and communication technologies" and "P rivacy 
protection and transboarder data flows" (papers on legal issues were presented in Symposium on 
Transborder Data Flaws, held in London from 30 November to 2 December 1983) and the first international 
conference on "Paperless trading and the law in the EEC" by the European Community was held in 
Brussels on 17-18, March 1986.
® UNCITRAL, "L E G A L  ISSUES OF ELEC TR O N IC  DATA IN TE R C H N G E ". Report o f the W orking 
G roup on In ternational Payments on the work o f its tw entv-fortli session" (Vienna, 27 January- 7 
February 1992)(A/CN.9/360) [Original: English], Yearbook o f the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, Vol. X X III, 1992, pp. 347-65 [hereinafter it is referred to as UNCITRAL 
Yearbook, 1992], at p. 347 stated: "The Commission, at its seventeenth session (1984), decided to place the 
subject o f the legal implications o f automatic data processing to the flow o f international trade on its 
programme o f work as a priority item. It did so after considering a report o f the Secretary-General entitled 
"Legal aspects o f automatic data processing" (A/CN.9/254), which identified several legal issues, relating to 
the legal value o f computer records, the requirement o f a writing, authentication, general conditions, liability 
and bills o f lading."; see also Patrikis, Ernest T., "G loba l EFT Guidelines: W hat They Can Mean to US 
Banks". Bank Administration, September 1987, pp. 30-31 [hereinafter it is refeiTed to as Patrikis], at p. 31 
said: "UNCITRAL, which was established in 1968 by the UN General Assembly, place EFT on its priority 
list in 1978. It has worked with the UN staff to identify three types o f legal issues affecting EFT: those 
associated with the payments process, those associated with electronic telecommunications and record
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Among other organisations active in the field of EDI, the ICC has begun a 
study about the effect of EDI on provisions related to LCs;^° and, because of the 
importance of the issue under consideration, the ICC in cooperation with the UN 
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) has undertaken to prepare Uniform Rules 
for Communication Agreement (UNCA)J^ Article 20 (b)(i) of UCP 500 (similar to
keeping, and those associated with the institutional structure within which an EFT system operates. [...] 
Harmonization can be gained more easily i f  implemented before national rules have been set in concrete. I f  
national rules are developed on the basis o f the model rules, or indeed, i f  the model rules are adopted in their 
entirety as national rules, the opportunity to create greater commercial certaintity accross border may be 
easily achieved."
 ^ UNCITRAL Yearbook 1992, WP, supra (f.n. 5), at p. 369 said: "A t its nineteenth session (1986), the 
Commission had before it a report o f the Secretaiy-General describing the work o f international 
organisations active in the field o f automatic data processing (A/CN.9/279). The Commission approved the 
suggestion contained in the report that it might undertaken leadrship in the coordination o f activities in this 
field by requesting the Secretariat to organise a meeting in late 1986 or early 1987 to which all interested 
intergovernmental and non-governmental international organisations might be invited. The meeting was held 
at Vienna on 12-13 March 1987."
The International Chamber o f Commerce (ICC) in Paris has begun the task o f revising its letter o f 
credit rules to accommodate changes in technology, transportation and communications. Included in this 
review w ill be an attempt to adapt to the progress and effect o f EDI on international trade. By the ICC’s own 
admission, an electronic letter o f credit is a long time off; Kozolchyk's article, supra (f.n. 4), at p. 40 said: 
"Rules do exist, however, for the operation o f the Society fo r W orldw ide In terbank Financial 
Telecommunications ("S W IF T "), a banking telecommunications network [...] banks that now send 
paperless messages to one another adhere universally to the Uniform  Customs and Practice fo r 
Documentary Credits ("U C P "). But the interaction between the UCP and SWIFT rules is not entirely 
harmonious, and conflicts are similarly apparent between the recently enacted article 4A o f the Uniform  
Commercial Code ("U C C ") and the practices o f banks engaged in prepaying, paying, or reimbursing letters 
o f credit." [Emphasis added; see also p. 42 o f the same reference in which it is said: "SWIFT was created in 
1973 as a bank-owned, Belgian, not-for-profit cooperative organisation. Its purpose was to facilitate the 
transmission o f bank-to-bank financial transaction messages."]
“  The draft UNCA is reproduced in ECE document TRADE/WP.4/300 and in ICC document No. 374/1; the 
first meeting was held at ICC, Paris, on 16-17 Jan. 1986 and representatives o f the European Insurance 
Committee, CCC, International Organisation for Standardisation, UNCTAD, and UNCITRAL were attended 
on that meeting [ICC Document 374/3]; see also ICC Document No. 470-35/5 where in general statement 
number 2 it is said: "Members o f the Working Group expressed their disagreement with the decision taken 
by the Commission to disban the EDI-UCP Working Party. They are strongly opposed to the idea o f trying to 
create a new UCP rules applicable both to paper credit paperless credit. They underlined their awareness that 
for practical reasons and due to legal problems paper documents rules can not be applied to EDI messages. 
The Group therefore proposed that separate rules should be elaborated by muitidisciplinaiy Working Group. 
Realising that it is forwarded strategy and not an immediate goal, members ask the Commission to reconsider 
its decision regarding the EDI-UCP Working Party."; UNCITRAL, "L E G A L  ISSUES OF ELEC TR O N IC  
D A TA  INTERCHANG E. Electronic data interchange: report o f the Secretary-General (A/CN.9/350>" 
[O rig ina l: English]". Yearbook o f the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Vol. X X II, 
1991, pp. 381-97 [hereinafter referred to as UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991], at p. 387 stated: 256
Article 22 (c)(ii) of UCP 400, 1983) provides: "[.••] banks will also accept as an 
original document(s), a document(s) produced or appearing to have been 
produced: i. by reprographic, automated or computerized system unless
otherwise agreed by parties to the credit arrangement.
"In 1990, the ICC decided to create a "Joint Working Party on Legal and Commercial Aspects o f EDI". The 
mandate given to that Working Party is to study the work undertaken on legal issues by other organisations 
such as the TEDJS Group, UN/ECE WP.4, UNCITRAL and the International Data Exchange Association 
(IDEA), with a view to establishing "common position which can then be presented to the relevant 
governmental and private sector organisations". That Working Party was also created to "monitor EDI 
developments, providing the impetus to address issues critical to global business practices, through close 
liasion with other EDI organisations."; UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, WP, supra (f.n. 5), at p. 369 said: "The 
first effort accomplished by the international EDI community to harmonize and unify ED I practices resulted 
in the adoption o f the Uniform Rules o f Conduct for Interchange o f Trade Data by Teletransmission 
(UNCID) by the International Chamber o f Commerce (ICC) in 1987 (ICC Publication No. 452, 1988). 
UNCID was prepared by a special jo in t committee o f the ICC in which the follow ing organisations were 
represented: the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE); the Custom Cooperation Council 
(CCC); the UNCTAD Special Programme on Trade Facilitation (FALPRO); the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and development (OECD); the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO); the 
Commission o f the EEC; the European Insurance Committee; The Organisation for Data Exchange via 
Teletransmission in Europe (ODETTE) and the secretariat o f UNCITRAL." [See also p. 264 o f UNCITRAL, 
"L E G A L  ISSUES OF ELEC TR O N IC  DATA INTERCHANG E. "E lectronic data interchange: 
p re lim inary study o f legal issues related to the formation o f contracts by electronic means: report of 
the Secretary-General fA/CN.9/3331 [O rig ina l: English)". Yearbook o f the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law, Vol. X X I, 1990, pp. 253-65 [hereinafter it is referred to as UNCITRAL 
Yearbook, 1990]]; UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, WP, supra (f.n. 5), at p. 369 said; "Although the first draft 
o f UNCID was based on the idea o f creating a model communication agreement, it was found that, due to the 
differing requirements o f various user groups, the creation o f a model communication agreement was an 
impractical objective at such an early stage o f the development o f EDI techniques. It was therefore decided 
to create a small set o f non-mandatory rules on which EDI user and suppliers o f network service would be 
able to base their communication agreements. UNCID was also incorporated into the United Nations Rules 
for Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce and transport (UN/EDIFACT) as part o f the 
United Nations Trade Data Interchange Directory. Although UNCID constituted a limited achievement, it 
also represented a major step in the development o f a legal framework for EDI, both because it furnished a 
basis for praparing individual communication agreements and because it served as a first effort that could 
later be used to reach a higher level o f reinforcement (see A/CN.9/333, paras. 82-86). [...] The following 
issues are covered by UNCID: definitions; use o f interchange standards; standard o f care to be applied by the 
parties when communicating through EDI; identification and authentication o f messages and transfers; 
acknowledgement o f a transfer; confirmation o f content o f messages; protection o f trade data; storage o f 
data. In addition, the introductory to UNCID outlines the following issues to be considered when drafting a 
communication agreement; liability; situation o f third parties; insurance; time w ithin which a receiver should 
process the data; securecy or other rales regarding the substance o f the data exchanged; rules o f a 
professional nature; encryption and other security measures; rules on signature; applicable law and dispute 
resolution."
Emphasis added.
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So, a question, put fonvard by an expert on documentary credits, asks 
whether it is possible to have a "documentless documentary credit"?^® In recent 
decades, as mentioned above, UNCITRAL has attempted to find proper solutions to 
technical and legal problems which may arise when applying the new 
electronic/paper-less system. Of course, the UNCITRAL Commission has focused 
its efforts on EFT as a wide field covering all technical and legal problems affecting 
the subject.^^ It has been concluded that ADP/EDI is an essential part of the 
concept of electronic banking.^®
The purpose of this part of the present study, after a general background 
concerning ADP/EDI, is to consider the effect of the new technology on the
Whebel, B.S., "In te rna tiona l trade data interchange systems", from Goode, R.M., "E lectronic 
Banking, the legal im plica tions", published by the Institute o f Bankers &  Centre for Commercial Law 
Studies, Queen Mary College, University o f London, 1985 [hereinafter it is referred to as Goode], pp. 
123-29, at p. 129 [hereinafter referred to as Whebel], stated: "In time, electronic communication possibilities 
may well lead to the "documentless documentary c re d it"- to "funds transfer" instruction being held in 
abeyance in a data bank at the instance o f the buyer until specified "goods transfer" instructions are fed in at 
the instance o f the seller, completing the connection and releasing the funds to the seller and the goods to the 
buyer."
Patrikis, supra (f.n. 8), at p. 31 said: "After several years o f work, the U.N. has just published a guide for 
legislators and attorneys involved in developing EFT regulations. The "Legal Guide on Electronic Funds 
Transfers" identifies 41 legal issues that should be considered in EFT system development, describes the 
various approaches being used to address them, points out the advantages and disadvantages o f each, and 
suggests alternative solutions." [Emphasis added]; for other relevant articles concerning EFT see Santa 
Lucia, John S., "Exchange Losses from  International Electronic Funds Transfers: Time to U nify  the 
L aw ". Northwestern Journal o f International Law &  Business, Vol. 8, 1988, p. 759 and O'Keefe, Brian, 
"Autom ated Clearing House G rowth in an In ternational Marketplace: The increased flex ib ility  of 
E lectronic Funds Transfer and its impact on the m inimum contacts test". University o f Pennsylvania 
Journal o f International Business Law, Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring 1994, p. 105; Malaguti, Maria Chiara, 
"L ia b ility  fo r fraud and mistake in electronic transfers o f funds", an article published at p. 63 o f the 
book edited by Carr, Indira and Williams, Katherine, "Computers and la w ". Intellect, Oxford, England, 
1994 [hereinafter referred to as Carr].
Wheble, supra (f.n. 13), at p. 129 said: "Trade data interchange may seem an area somewhat remote from 
electronic funds transfer but it is an essential part o f concept o f electronic banking. No one would dissociate 
funds transfers from documentary cerdits, any more than they would ignore the trade data transfer by means 
o f paper documents."; see also ""Autom atic  Data Processing" legal value o f computer records: report o f 
the Secretary-General tA /CN.9/265)". UNCITRAL publication. Yearbook 1985, pp. 351- 65 and Ian 
Walden and Nigel Savage, "The legal problems o f papperless transactions". J.B.L., March 1989, pp. 
102-12 [hereinafter referred to as Walden], at p. 102 regarding to electronic data interchange (EDI) stated: 
"In simple terms EDI replaces all standared paper business documentation- such as invoices, orders, customs 
entries or reservations- by standardised electronic messages. The more formal definition is o f EDI as 
"computer-to-computer transmission o f data in structured forms" in essence, paperless trading."
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documentary credits system as a paper-based method of payment. What 
advantages and disadvantages does ADP/EDI as a paper-less system offer as 
against a paper-based system? What legal problems may arise by adopting the new 
system as far as document(s) are concerned, and what could the ADP/EDI's impact 
on UCP be, since by adopting the electronic system, the operation of LCs may, in 
some aspects, be changed?
1. INTRODUCTION, DEFINITION, RELATED PROJECTS
1.1. Introduction
The transfer of funds by methods based on electronic forms of 
communication, cable, telex and phone, has been used in international trade for 
over a hundred years and computer-to-computer access may be seen as a modern 
version of this.^ ® For the first time UNCITRAL placed the subject of Electronic Funds 
Transfer (EFT) as a matter of priority on its agenda at its 11th session in 1978. A 
draft text on EFT, prepared by the Secretariat, was examined by the UNCITRAL 
Study Group on International Payment at a meeting held in the Flague in April 
1982.^^ A related report stated that as a consequence of EFT, a payment 
instruction transmitted to or between banks in electronic form rather than through 
traditional transmission of a paper-based payment instruction, speeded transmission 
and facilitated the handling of messages, thereby reducing the cost of operation. It 
was also pointed out that although there may be some EFT systems which are
Kozolchyk’s article, supra (f.n. 4), at p. 82 said: "Facsimile (Fax) transmissions o f applications for the 
issuance o f letters o f credit and subsequent fax issuance have become quite popular. The fax medium is not 
paperless, but it combines the speed o f a telecommunication with the conveniance o f paper. Yet fax 
communications, unlike SWIFT, are not part o f a system or network, but are open to anyone w ith a fax 
machine and connected telephone line. This explains why the bankers' main concern with faxed letter of 
credit or application messages is their lack o f security. [...] Thus the valid ity o f the signature or o f other 
authentication devices in a fax operative credit instrument cannot reliably established unless the message 
were subjected to sophisticated enciphering and authentication procedures that are unsuited, as o f this 
writing, for widespread use."
UNCITRAL Study Groupe on International Payments is a consultative body composed o f representative 
o f banking and trade institutions [see UNCITRAL, "E lectronic funds tra n s fe r". UNCITRAL Yearbook, 
1982, A/CN.9/221, pp. 272-86 [hereinafter referred to as UNCITRAL Y.B. 1982], p. 273, pars. 1-3 and 
UNCITRAL Yearbook 1984, p. 118, par. 5]
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completely electronic from the entry of data by the originating bank to the 
processing of data by the recipient bank, most of the systems are based at present 
on the paper form in connection with the instructions of the bank's customer or when 
sending a message to another customer. So the term EFT means "equivalent to the 
term "paper-based funds transfer" in that it describes the medium of communication 
but does not describe the banking or legal aspects of making the payment"^® The 
difficulties which may arise in replacing the traditional paper-based system by 
electronic messages, particularly for those who are dealing with bills of lading in a 
letter of credit, were admitted in the report as a problem of great importance to be 
solved in the future. This issue is considered later below.
1.2. Definition of ADP/EDI
Although the terms Automatic Data Processing (ADP) or Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI) have been widely used in practice to describe the use of 
computers for business applications in recent years, there is no unified definition for 
them. This may create some confusion in the legal field.^° Although existing 
definitions about EDI differ as to their wording, it is said; "[...] most definitions of EDI 
contained in existing model interchange agreements seem to rely on a combination
UNCITRAL Yearbook 1982, ibid., p. 273, par. 7; see also par. 22 o f the same reference which is said that 
payment instruction between two banks can be based through one o f three types as: 1. Transmitted directly 
between two banks; 2. Using services o f another bank; 3, In large numbers o f payment instructions, using 
"clearing-house"; the United States Electronic Funds Transfer Act o f 1978 in Section 903(6) defines the EFT 
as following: "The term "electronic funds transfer" means any transfer o f funds, other than a transaction 
originated by check, draft, or similar paper instrument, which is initiated through an electronic terminal, 
telephonic instrument, or authorise a financial institution to debit or credit an account. Such term includes, 
but is not limited to, point o f sale transfer, automatic teller machines, direct deposits or withdrawals o f funds, 
and transfers initiated by telephone." [See Martine Karmel, "Procedure and advances: the maintenance o f 
transaction records, proving the state o f account in EFT transaction" Goode, supra (f.n. 13), p. 45.
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1982, supra (f.n. 17), p. 275, par. 19.
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, WP, supra (f.n. 5), p. 370; it is also said (at the same page o f the same 
reference): "No statutoiy or case law definition o f EDI has, as yet, come to the knowledge o f the Secretariat. 
However, it may be noted that a number o f definitions o f EDI can be found in working documents from 
international organisations and are used as a basis for the work o f these organisations. For example, the 
United Nations Trade Data Interchange Directory (UNTDID) published by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (TRADE/WP.4/R.721) contains the follow ing definition: "Electronic Data 
Interchange: the Computer-to-computer transmission o f business data in a standard format.""
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of two or more of the following elements: the transmission of trade data; between 
computers; operated by different trading partners; by reference to a standardised 
syntax or format; through the use of electronic m e a n s . F o r  example, the 
commentary developed by the American Bar Association (ABA) reads as follows: 
"Electronic data interchange (EDI) is the method by which business data may be 
communicated electronically between computers in standardized formats (such as 
purchase orders, invoices, shipping notices and remittance advices) in substitution 
for conventional paper documents. [...] Technically stated, EDI is the transmission, 
in a standard syntax, of unambiguous information between computers of 
independent organisations."^^ On the other hand, the term EDI may interpreted 
strictly, namely, it covers only interchange rather then processing of transferred data 
which is an issue independent from transferring data.^® However, as pointed out 
previously, UNCITRAL has in its recent reports emphasised that using the term EDI
See UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, WP, supra (f.n. 5), in which at p. 370 pointed out: "Examples o f such 
definition o f EDI in model communication agreements include the following: "the interchange o f trade data 
effected by teletransmission"; "the transmission o f data structured according to agreed message standards, 
between information systems, by electronic means"; "the transmission o f structured data via electronic 
communications links between the parties". Wording the same effective can be found in other model 
communication agreements and commentaries."
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, WP, supra (f.n. 5), p. 370; Commission, "Commission recommendation 
o f 19 October 1994 relating to the legal aspects o f electronic data interchange (Text w ith  EEA 
relevance) r94/820/ECV. Official Journal o f the European Communities Legislation, Vol. 37, Part 1, 
December 1994, pp. 98-117 [hereinafter referred to as Commission], at p. 100 concerning definition o f EDI 
provides: "2.2. EDI: Electronic data intechange is the electronic transfer, from computer to computer, o f 
commercial and administrative data using standard to structure an EDI message."; and at the same page of 
the same reference about EDI message stated: "2.3. EDI message: An EDI message consists o f a set o f 
segments, structured using an agreed standard, prepared in a computer readable format and capable o f being 
automatically and unambiguously processed."
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, WP, supra (f.n. 5), at p. 371 stated: "[...] the preliminary report entitled 
"DOCIMEL report de base droit" (March 1991), published by the International Rail Transport Committee 
(CIT), contains the following indication: "It seems that [the term "EDI"] strictly covers the interchange o f 
data but not the processing o f these data which is independent from their actual transmission. [...] Another 
distinction Is drawn in a report prepared for the Organisation for Simplification o f International Trade 
Procedures in South Africa (SITPROA), which reads as follows: "Electronic Data Interchange is usually 
defined as the electronic exchange o f machine processable, structured data, formatted to agreed standard and 
transmitted across telecommunication interfaces directly between different applications running on separate 
computers. Thus defined, it is clear that EDI does not include facsimile transmissions, electronic mail or 
other forms o f free formatted text or images."
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instead of ADP does not mean that there is an intention to introduce a distinction 
between transmission of data and processing of data.
Regarding the new concept of "Open-EDI" developed by the International 
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO),^® it is said that the above terms rely on the 
following definition of EDI; "The automated exchange of predefined and structured 
data for some "business" purpose among information system of two or more parties 
their number being determined by the "business operation" or equivalent con­
cerned."^®
1.3. EDI and related projects
There have been efforts by organisations other than UNCITRAL and ICC in 
the field of EDI in order to facilitate the use of EDI and to remove barriers which may 
cause the unpopularity of the electronic s y s t e m . A  result that has emerged from
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, WP, supra (f.n. 5), p. 371.
An open-EDl defined as following: "Electronic data interchange among autonomous parties using public 
and non-proprietary standards aiming towards global interoperability over time, business sectors, information 
technology systems and data types." [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, WP, supra (f.n. 5), p. 371]
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n. 11), pp. 390-91 (about definition o f EDI messages as written 
documents); see also UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, WP, supra (f.n. 5), at p. 371.
For instances look at following projects: 1. W ork  undertaken under the TEDIS 1 programme: A 
comparative survey o f European legislation: the TEDIS study- It is said: "In 1988, the Commission o f the 
European Communities began to implement the TEDIS (Trade Electronic Data Interchange Systems) 
programme, which has as one o f its purposes the development o f an appropriate legal framework for the 
increased use o f EDI in the twelve member States o f the European Communities." [UNCITRAL Y.B., 1990, 
supra (f.n. 11), at p. 256 and UNCITRAL Y.B., 1991, supra (f.n. 11), p. 383]; 2. W ork ing  Party on 
Facilitation o f In ternational Trade Procedures tW P.4)- It is pointed out: "In March 1990, the Working 
Party on Facilitation o f International Trade Procedures (WP.4) o f the United Nation Economic Commission 
for Europe "requested its rapporeurs on Legal Questions to establish, in cooperation with an ad hoc Group, a 
detailed action programme on legal aspects o f trade data interchange, with indication o f priorities and 
proposals concerning the resources which would be needed to execute the programme. The ad hoc Group 
w ill comprise France, Romania, Switzerlan, the United Kingdom, the Uinted States, UNCITRAL, the 
European Economic Community, and the International Chamber o f Commerce. New Zealand w ill contribute 
by correspondence to the prepration o f the action programme." (See TRADE/WP.4/171, par. 19)." 
[UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n. 11), p. 385]; 3. International Rail T ransport Coinm itteeTCIT) 
[UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n. 11), p. 387]; 4. International Road Transport Union tlR U ) 
[UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n. 11), p. 388]; 5. International M aritim e  Committee (C M I)- It is 
stated: "A t its thirty-forth Conference (Paris, June 1990), the CMI adopted the text o f "The CMI Rules for 
Electronic B ills o f Lading " (see A/CN.9/333, para. 89), hereinafter referred to as the CMI Rules [...] It is 
recalled in the introduction to those Rules that non-negottable sea-waybills should be preferred to negotiable 
bills o f lading and that "non-negotiable sea waybills could easily be replaced by messages sent between the 
interested parties by electronic means." However, it is also noted that the electronic b ill o f lading would play
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the efforts is that there are no coherent and unified legislative instruments In 
international trade, even among the member states of the European Un i on.Th i s  
is also true insofar as courts' decisions are concerned.However, several model 
law agreements for national as well as international use exist; they have been 
provided by different organisations active in field of EDI.®°
an important function as regards the commodities that are sold in transit." [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, 
supra (f.n. 11), p. 388]; 6. The report o f the Observatoire jurid ique des technologies de l'in fo rina tion  
(FranceV It was reported that: "The French Government mandated a study on the French law o f evidence 
and the manner in which it would need to be modified (or affirmed) in order to accomodate the development 
o f paperless legal relationships. The results o f that study were published at the end o f 1990 by the 
Observatoire juridique des technologies de l'information (OJTI) in a report entitled "Une socle'tc' sans 
pap ier?" (hereinafter refeired to as OJTI Report)." [Emphasis added; UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra 
(f.n. 11), p. 388]; and 7. The report o f the American Bar Association- It is said: "A  study was initiated in 
1987 by the Electronic Messaging Services Task Force under the auspices o f the American Bar Association 
(ABA ) to examine the effects o f electronic commerce upon fundamental principles o f contract law and 
related legal issues. A  first report on "Electronic Messaging" was released in 1988 and the final Report on 
Electronic Commercial Practices, incorporating a Model Electronic Data Interchange Trading Partner 
Agreement and commentery, was Published in 1990." [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1990, supra (f.n. 11), p. 259]
Formerly called European Communities; see also UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1990, supra (f.n. I I ) ,  at p. 256, 
relating some o f results achieved by TEDIS 1 programme stated: "One o f the finding o f the study was that, in 
the European Communities, no country had as yet fu lly  adopted its legislation to meet the especific needs 
and problems related to the development o f EDI. [...] The TEDIS study makes it clear that, although efforts 
have been made at the national level to solve some o f the problems arising from the use o f EDI, and more 
specifically those related to the legal value o f computer records, many other problems, typically those o f 
contract making by electronic means, remain subject to traditional rules. Those rules would need to be 
interpreted, developed and updated by case law or national administrative practice in order to fit w ith an EDI 
enviroment."
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n. 11), at p. 389 said: "As regards case law, the OJTI Report notes 
that very few cases have actually been brought before the courts. It may be recalled that a similar finding was 
contained in the American Bar Association (ABA) Report on Electronic Commercial Practices discussed in 
the report submitted to the twenty-third session o f the Commission (see A/CN.9/333, para. 44), A  reason for 
the absence o f case law may lie in the fact that EDI is currently used mainly between trading partners with a 
long-term relationship."
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n 11), pp. 389-91, numbered three types o f agreements which are 
as following: 1. Model agreements prepared fo r national use: The "EDI Association Standard Electronic 
Data Interchange Agreement" (hereinafter referred to as the UK-EDIA Agreement) prepared by the EDI 
Association o f the United Kingdom (2nd Edition, August 1990); The "M odel E lectronic Data Interchange 
T rad ing Partner Agreement" (hereinafter referred to as the ABA-Agreement) prepared by the American 
Bar Association (June 1990); The model ED I interchange agreement (hereinafter referred to as the 
CIREDIT Agreement) prepared by the Centre International de Recherches et d'Etudes du Droit de 
l'Informatique et des Te'Ie'communications (France, 1990); The "Standard E D I Agreement" (hereinafter 
referred to as the NZEDIA Agreement) prepared by the New Zealand Electronic Data Interchange 
Association (New Zealand, 1990); The "E lectronic Data interchange Trad ing Partner Agreement" 
(hereinafter referred to as the EDICC Agreement) prepared by the EDI Council o f Canada (Canada 1990); 
The standard interchange agreement (hereinafter referred to as the Quebec Agreement) prepared by the
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Although model rules reflect the different legal systems they have originated 
from and cover those aspects of EDI which are interesting for parties to electronic 
transactions, they have one common point, namely, they are of a contractual nature 
and can be brought into force only by consent of the contracting parties.®  ^ This can 
cause uncertainty since contractual provisions are not enforceable against a person 
not party to a contract.®  ^ It should also be pointed out that paper document(s) and 
handwritten signatures,®® are needed as written evidence in situations involving 
international payments (letters of credit), and transport (bills of lading);®"^  there is
M inistry o f Communications o f the Province o f Quebec (Canada, 1990); The d ra ft model interchange 
agreement (hereinafter referred to as the d ra ft SITPROSA Agreement) prepared by the Organization for 
Simplification o f International Trade procedure in South Africa (March 1991)."; 2. In ternational model 
agreements covering the issues o f ED I in general: The draft "TEDIS European Model EDI Agreement" 
(hereinafter referred to as the draft TEDIS Agreement) prepared by the Commission o f the European 
Communities (December 1990); The "M odel Agreement on Transfer o f Data in In ternationa l Trade" 
(hereinefter referred to as the FINPRO/CME Agreement) agreed upon by the Republic o f Finland and 
CMEA Member States (1991)."; and 3. In ternational model agreements lim ited to some specific legal 
issues: The draft "Guideline Concerning Customs-Trader Data Interchange Agreements and EDI User 
Manuals" (hereinafter referred to as the draft CCC Guidelines) prepared by the Customs Co-operation 
Council (March 1990); The Guidelines fo r Interchange Agreements (hereinafter referred to as the 
ODETTE Guidelines) prepared by the Organization for Data Exchange through Teletransmission in Europe 
(1990); The "C M I Rules fo r Electronic B ills o f Lad ing" adopted by the International Maritime Committee 
(CM I) in June 1990.
For instance, see UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n. 11), at p. 390, which it is said; "A clear 
expression o f that characteristic is contained in Article 1 o f the CMI Rules ("These rules shall apply 
whenever the parties so agree").
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n. 11), at p. 390, it is said: "That situation raises difficulties where 
the applicable law would not allow the parties to deviate from provisions o f statutoiy law. However, the 
main d ifficu lty results from the fact that provisions o f contract cannot regulate the rights and obligations o f 
person who are not parties to that contract. Contractual provisions can be appropriate and even necessary to 
solve the legal issues o f communication through EDI within a closed network but they are unlikely to 
regulate the same issues when they w ill arise in an open enviroment. Conti actual solutions to the legal issues 
o f EDI are therefore to be considered as a first step that can help to resolve many o f the present practical 
difficulties and to better understand the questions that w ill require the prepration o f future legal instruments."
"The analysis was oriented towards these latter requirements, the predominance o f writing and 
handwritten signatures having been identified as a priority matter. It noted that in fields such as transport, 
methods o f payment or the settelment o f legal disputes, paper supporting documents were required and 
represented a major obstacle to the development o f EDI." [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n. 11), at 
pp. 383-84]
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n. 11), p. 384, which is said: "The report concluded that a major 
barrier to the use o f EDI resulted from the need for written evidence essentially in the fields o f transport 
(negotiable bills o f lading), payment techniques (cheques, b ill o f exchange, letter o f credit), and the 
settlement o f disputes (though international agreements have solved some o f the problems in this area)."; it is
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also the "symbolic" function of a bill of lading as a "document of title" in international 
trade.®®
2. ADP/EDI: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Does the application of ADP/EDI provide a better service for traders and help 
international commerce? To persuade the governments of different states, traders, 
and organisations involved in international trade to adopt ADP instead of the 
traditional paper-based systems, a report by the Nordic Legal Committee®® supports 
a fundamental change by pointing out that the paper-based system, with many 
documents as used or required, makes the business operation too complicated and 
expensive; it is also stated that required documents often contain unnecessary data 
already found in other documents.®^ It has been assessed that, as a result of such
38disadvantages, the cost of goods increases by 7 to 10 per cent.
also pointed out; "This requirement in regard to a contract for the sale o f goods is set out in section 2-201 o f 
the Uniform Commercial Code as follows: "A  contract for the sale o f goods for the price o f $500 or more is 
not enforceable unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made between the 
parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought." [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1990, supra 
(f.n. 11), p. 259]; and at p. 259 o f the same reference also stated: "The report also notes that the United States 
has ratified the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale o f Goods and that, as a 
result, no writing is required for contract o f sale subject to that Convention."
For more details see the relevant discussion in Section B.1.3 o f the present chapter (below).
36 NORDIPRO special paper No. I, "The export contract as a management to o l" . Oslo, March 1978.
The relevent part o f the report had summerized by UNCITRAL, in Yearbook 1983 ( "E lectron ic funds 
transfer, and legal aspects o f automatic da ta ". UNCITRAL Yearbook 1983, A/CN.9/242 &  A/CN.9/238, 
p. 34 &  pp. 174-88 [hereinafter referred to as UNCITRAL Yearbook 1983]), at p. 177, para. I as following: 
"(a) Too many documents are used or required; (b) Doeuments are too complicated and often contain both 
too much and unnecessary data; (c) The same data are repeated in many documents; (d) The movement o f 
essential documents takes too long, and frequently leads to severe delays in securing release o f goods at 
destination."
kozolchyk's article, supra (f.n. 4), at p. 42 said: "An experienced American banker estimated the cost o f 
sending a letter o f credit by telex in the early 1980s to be between ten and twenty-five dollars as compared to 
17.5 Belgian francs or approximately fifty  cents had the same message been sent by SWIFT. This saving was 
made possible by the adoptation o f a method o f electronic communication known as Electronic Data 
Interchange ("EDI"). EDl's application to financial, bank-to-bank messages has lowered costs by requiring 
that the messages be structured in uniform fasion, including standardized elements for allocation o f message 
space and for the text o f the message itself. This emphasis on uniformity and standardization has made it 
possible for the computers communicating through EDI to exchange and process data without rekeying the 
data."
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It has been suggested, on the other hand, that by using the ADP/EDI system 
a major economic gain would be achieved and most of the problems would be 
solved as under the new regime errors would decrease, higher quality in managing 
trade statistics, nationally as well as internationally, would result and the speed of 
business activities would be increased while the relevant costs of operations would 
be lower than the costs of an operation under the paper-based system.®® To what 
extent is the above argument correct? There are several factors which make 
ADP/EDI unpopular; they can be summarised as follows:
1. Firstly, the physical characteristics of the paper document are absent in 
ADP/EDI. So, a paper document can be used for any type of transaction or any type 
of business record. Paper is durable and it can be retained for a longer time and it is 
not easy to remove, alter, or add to its text; any such alterations to a paper record 
would be normally detected. Moreover, paper-based documents can be sent by post 
or messenger to distant places. In addition there is no problem of authentication 
since it can be authenticated by signature or any other legally acceptable means. 
Lastly, there are other functions concerning the physical nature of a paper-based 
document. First of all, a document in paper form is a carrier of information so it has 
an "informative function."'*® Secondly, it constitutes good evidence if any
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1983, supra (f.n. 37), at p. 177, par. 4 pointed out: "(a) Fewer errors, since data 
would be transmitted and controlled by machines, thus eleminating errors which often occur through manual 
transmission o f information; (b) Better cash flow management, with consequential financial savings; (c) 
Availability o f data for direct use in trader's own ADP systems, e.g. accounting, stock and production 
management, and a wide range o f inhouse statistics; (d) Higher quality o f national and intemational trade and 
transport statistics, since these would be based on standardised data governed by exact harmonised 
definitions; (e) Fewer misunderstandings (through inaccurate transaction) owing to use o f international 
standard data elements and codes; (f) Swifter turn-around o f ships in port, since the necessary data would be 
available before the arrival o f the goods"; Walden, supra (f.n. 17), pp. 103-104.
Kozolcyk's article, supra (f.n. 4), at p. 84 said: "The documents usually required by letters o f credit have 
either informational or title-transferring functions. The date in an informational type o f document may 
include the description o f the goods, the listing o f the terms and conditions o f insurance coverage, or the 
certification o f volume, wieght, helth, or quality. Considerable progress has been made on a uniform layout 
and standardized text for the customs' invoice and possibly other informational documents. The trading 
nations' adoption o f the United Nation’s syntax for electronic business and administartive messages 
(EDIFACT) should make it possible to transmit many o f the informational messages cheaply and reliably 
from beneficiaries' and third parties' place o f business to banks."
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argument arises between the contracting parties; the "evidential function" of a 
paper document is a matter of importance. Thirdly, some documents are legally 
accepted as a document of title, such as a bill of lading, so therewith another 
function of a document, as its "symbolic function"'*^ is given. As considered later 
below, the main legal problems concerning ADP/EDI are concerned with the two last 
functions of a paper document, namely, the evidential and the symbolic character of 
a paper document.'*^
2. There is no specific law or other authority relating to ADP/EDI; the existing 
law is associated, to a large extent, with documents issued in a traditional form.'*®
3. Using ADP/EDI needs technical and legal expertise to make the system 
workable, whereas in the traditional form of payment based on paper there is no 
necessity for such expertise.'*'*
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1993, supra (f.n. 5), p. 197, para. 51 (about 11 functions o f a writing); 
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1983, p. 180, par. 47; Walden, supra (f.n. 15), p. 103; Kozolchyk's article, supra (f.n. 
4), at p. 84 stated: "Computers and telecommunications technology has also attempted to incorporate the 
three main functions o f the ocean b ill o f lading (receipt o f the goods, contract o f freight, and document o f 
title) into telecommunicated messages. As a result o f this technology, several types o f paperless bills o f 
lading are currently in use. Most o f thses bills, however, are just carrier-issued receipts. Only a few o f the 
paper-less bills currently in use can act as documents o f title to the merchandise, and fewer qualify as 
negotiable documents o f title. The fact that the negotiable document o f title function has not yet been fu lly  
incorporated into a paperless b ill does not mean that paperless bills have no banking value. A paper-based 
ocean b ill o f lading is valiable to banks for both its informational and its document o f title functions."
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1993, supra (f.n. 5), p. 201, paras. 77-79 (about requirement o f an original 
document which constituted an obstacle to the use o f EDI); UNCITRAL, "A utom atic  data processing, 
legal value o f computer records, reports o f the Secretary G en ia l". UNCITRAL Yearbook 1985, 
A/CN.9/265, pp. 351-67 [hereinafter referred to as UNCITRAL Yearbook 1985], pp. 355-62; see also report 
o f the Secretary-General on 18th session o f UNCITRAL in Vienna, 3-21 June 1985, about "D ra ft legal 
guide on electronic funds transfer, chapter one, legal issues raised by E F T ", pp. 6-7 [hereinafter referred 
to as legal issues]; Enyon Smart, "E lectron ic Banking: An Overview o f the legal Im plications", see 
Goode, supra (f.n. 13), pp. 1-4.
Talmor, Sharona, "Technology: Trade partners get hooked up". The Banker, February 1994, p. 65 
[hereinafter it is referred as Talmor], at p. 66 said: "The fact that there is no intemational trade finance 
industry standard for EDI opens a golden opportunity for banks which are now setting up their own 
standards. The one that comes up with a good product first w ill gain the competitive edge."; and at p. 67 it is 
pointed out: "EDI and trade facilitation w ill prove attractive to banks as the way o f the future. But this take a 
long time; the technology might be here today but a myriad technical, statutory and regulatory details remain 
to be resolved."; Hoeren, Thomas, "E lectron ic data interchange: the perspective o f private international 
law and data p ro tection". Carr, supra (f.n. 14), pp. 128-41.
Talmor, ibid., at p. 65 said; "What proved to be d ifficult in the automation process was that document 
processing requires a certain level o f expertise. Due to complexity and a high number o f exceptions it is hard
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4. In most countries traditional communication services, such as mail, 
telephone, telegraph and telex are, to a great extent, well established nationally and 
internationally. They are often state monopolies in one form or another, a fact that 
makes the system both more certain and more secure.
SKCTTON B: LEGAL ISSUES ABOUT ADP/EDI
1, ROLE OF A •TAPER’-'BASED" DOCUMENT IN INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE
As previously mentioned, issues relating to functions of documents may arise 
and should also be considered under ADP/EDI: what is the nature of an electronic 
transmission? Can such transmission perform similar functions to a document 
provides under the paper-based system?
1.1. "Informative" function of a paper document
Regarding the importance of the "informative" function of a document and 
whether ADP/EDI as a paper-less system satisfies parties to an international 
transaction (like LCs), UNCITRAL has included this issue in a question: "How far is it 
possible to retain the informative function of paper documents in an ADP-based 
system in a manner that satisfies the need of parties to achieve the same technical 
and legal standards as before?"'*® So far as the form and contents of documents are 
concerned there seems no problem would arise since It is possible to produce 
electronic documents similar to those used in a paper-based system. In respect of 
rules, however, there may be legislative texts which may require a paper document. 
There seems to exist no problem as to the acceptability of an electronic document if
to model this expertise. There always needs to be manual intervention to ensure that details o f the trade are 
accurate."; and at p. 66 the same writer pointed out: "The first challenge for EDI lies in the modelling the 
manual complexity that still shrouds trade finance. The second is the installation o f the EDI networks in the 
emerging countries, which are increasingly opening to trade. [...] The final challenge is achievement o f an 
agreement among the key parties involved in trade finance EDI. Agreeing on standards would allow an EDI 
message to be transmitted irrespective o f the communicating parties particular hardware and software, and 
for the eventual creation o f a total EDI enviroment for trade finance."
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1983, supra (f.n. 37), p. 181, para. 64.
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it is accepted that an ADP/EDI document is a perfect document as long as it 
performs functions similar to those of a paper document/®
A question of importance is the meaning of "signature" under ADP/EDI: 
must it be a hand written symbol or can it be made by mechanical or electronic 
means? To answer that question, firstly, funotion(s) of a signature should be 
clarified; secondly, it should be considered whether a signature other than a hand 
written symbol would satisfy the necessary requirements for a signature. A 
handwritten signature indicates two things to the recipient of a document: firstly, the 
source of the document; and secondly, the approval of a person who has authority 
to approve the contents of an issued document (authenticating party).'*^ With regard 
to these requirements most legal systems permit other types of signature made by 
stamps, symbol, facsimile, mechanical, and electronic means.'*® As a result, and 
because of the increasing use of ADP/EDI in international trade, the meaning of 
"signature" has been expanded in a recent international convention to cover 
electronic authentication.'*®
UNCITRAL Yearbook 1983, supra (f.n. 37), at p. 181, para, 69 pointed out: "The validity o f such 
"incorporation clauses" is being discussed in many form and is accepted in most instances. (See Kurt 
Gronfors, "Cargo Key Receipt and Transport Document Replacement". Gothenburg 1979, pp. 18-19; 
and E. du Pontavice, "Legal restraints on trade data interchange". ECE document TRAD/WP. 4/R. 116 
para. 7 et seq.)" [Emphasis added]; in order to avoid long texts different methods are suggested, such as 
using an "incorporation clause" in the form o f code words such as "carrier's conditions" or "ICC rules"; see 
also UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1993, supra (f.n. 5), p. 202, paras. 87-88 (about the concept o f originality and its 
connection to the reliability o f the information in a document).
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra (f.n. 8), p. 357; UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1993, supra (f.n. 5), at p. 199, 
para. 63 said: It was generally agreed that among the functions o f a handwritten signature were the 
following: to identify a person; to provide certainty as to the personal involvement o f that person in the act o f 
signing; to associate that person with the content o f a document."
"The most common form o f authentication required by national law remains a signature, which is usually 
understood to mean the manual writing by an individual o f his name or initials. Legal systems increasing 
permit the required signatures o f some or all documents to be made by stamps, symbol, facsimile, perforation 
or by other mechanical or elecftonic means. This trend is most evident in the law governing transport o f 
goods, where all the principal multilateral conventions that require a signature on the transport document 
permit that signature to be made in some way other than by mutual signature." [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 
1990, supra (f.n. 11), p. 260]
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra (f.n. 8), at p. 357 said: "The Working Group proceeded with a review 
o f the provisions o f some multilateral conventions concerning the definition o f "signature" and other means 
o f authentication. It was noted that a number o f recent international instraments envisaged functional
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There is, on the other hand, a tendency to support the idea that there is no 
need for nnandatory requirements of signature in EDI, and the issue of 
authentication as to the source and contents of an EDI message should be left for 
parties to a commercial transaction to decide what sort of authentication would be 
suitable for them/® However, in countries where signature is required by law for a 
particular document, the above mentioned view would cause great uncertainty 
unless appropriate legislation is provided to cover EDI messages/^
Appropriate legislation should consider differences which exist between a 
hand-written signature and an EDI authentication, as pointed out in a Scandinavian 
study (Nordipro Special Paper Number 2- Legal Questions of Trade Facilitation): "It
equivalents to the handwritten signature to be used in the context o f electronic transmissions. Those 
provisions generally provided an extended definition o f "signature", such as the follow ing definition found in 
article 5(k) o f the United Nations Convention on International Bills o f Exchange and International 
Promissory Notes: "“ Signature”  means a handwritten signature, its facimile or an equivalent authentication 
effected by any other means."; see also Article 22 o f UCP 500, mentioned previously; it is also said: "In 
determining whether a method o f authentication was commercially reasonable, factors to be taken into 
account might include the following: (1) the status and relative economic size o f the parties; (2) the nature o f 
their trade activities; (3) the frequency at which commercial transactions took place between parties; (4) the 
kind and size o f the transaction; (5) the status and function o f signature in a given statutory and regulatory 
enviroment; (6) the capability o f the communication systems; (7) the authentication procedures set forth by 
communication system operators; and (8) any other relevant factors." [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1993, supra 
(f.n. 5), p. 200, para. 67]
"The Working Group was generally agreed that there existed a need to eliminate the mandatory 
requirements o f signatures in EDI communications. It was also agreed that there existed a need to promote 
the use o f electronic authentication procedures regarding the source and the content o f EDI messages, and 
that such procedures should be adopted to the functions served by an electronic message. Parties should be 
allowed to determine the nature o f such authentication procedures within the reletn o f commercial 
reasonableness. Wide support was given to the idea that legislative provisions might be needed to establish 
the principle o f "commercial reasonableness". The Working Group was agreed that the Issues raised by the 
notion o f signature, as well as by related techniques such as the digital signature, required close cooperation 
with other organisations active in the field, both at the technical and at the legal level." [UNCITRAL 
Yearbook, 1992, supra (f.n. 8), pp. 357-58]
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1990, supra (f.n. 11), at p. 261 said: "However, the extent to which such methods 
would receive legal recognition in States where signature is required by law for a particular documents 
remains a matter o f great uncertainty. Where the law has not been interpreted by the courts or other reliable 
sources so as to consider an electronic form o f authentication as a "signature", it is likely that this uncertainty 
w ill be overcome only by legislation. A question o f consideration is how far such legislation, when specially 
permitting or requiring authentication to be made by EDI, should require evidence o f conformity with an 
applicable EDI protocol, at least as a condition o f attracting a presumption o f authenticity, the onous o f proof 
being shifted to the party asserting the authenticity o f the message in cases where the requirements o f the 
protocol are not satisfied."
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is important to understand the essential difference from the legal angle between a 
document and automatic data transfer. The ordinary export document retains its 
identity: a signature on that document will remain there, whether made by an 
authorised person or not- and even if it is forged. Correction and addition will also 
show on the document itself. Automated data transfer, on the other hand, by its very 
nature, has a completely different characteristic. Once fed into the computer the 
data seem to lose their identity; they are retained in a computer memory and 
become accessible only by computer programs. Here also there is a legal aspect 
the problem of regulatory law. Paper-born data is acceptable- but with a known 
specified format, data content and method of authentication. A corresponding legal 
acceptability for data produced automatically or electronically may not exist."®  ^
Lastly, it is pointed out that it is necessary for those who intend to use ADP/EDI to 
make clear what they mean by "authentication".®® At present, different techniques 
are available for the authentication of electronically transmitted documents®'* but 
one should be aware of the cost of operation.®®
Wheble, supra (f.n 13), p. 126.
UNCITRAL Yearbook 1983, supra (f.n. 37), para. 71; Walden, supra (f.n. 15), pp. 105-6; see also legal 
issues, supra (f.n. 42), pp. 20-21, issue no. 12 that pointed out, “ Should there be a legal requirement as to 
the form  o f authentication necessity in an electronic funds transfer?" It  is commented that: "L  [...] there 
seems to be no general requirement that a funds transfer instruction must be authenticated; [...] 4, However, it 
may be thought to be impracticable to specify by law in any meaningfull way the manner in which an 
electronic funds transfer instruction should be authenticated. In contrast to authentication o f a paper-based 
document, where a reasonably exhaustive list o f means o f authentication, including signature, could be given 
i f  desired, there are innumerable ways to authenticate a message sent by telecommunications. W ith the rapid 
development o f technology, some current methods o f authentication can be expected to become weaker 
while new and more secure forms o f authentication can be anticipated; 5. As a result, it might be thought that 
any statutory provision concerning that authentication o f an electronic funds transfer instruction should do 
little more than to authorize the use o f means appropriate to the type o f instruction involved. Questions as to 
the liability for loss caused by fraudulent or erroneous authentication might be dealt w ith separately, as might 
questions as to the party who bears the burden o f proof as to whether the authentication was genuine or not."; 
see also UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1993, supra (f.n. 5), at p. 201, paras. 75 and 76 various suggestions were 
made relating to the a possible definiton o f "authentication".
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n. I I ) ,  at p. 393 said: "The issue o f authentication o f documents is 
addressed in most model agreements. It may be recalled (see A/CN.9/333, paras. 50 to 59) that the number o f 
techniques have been developed to authenticate electronically transmitted documents. As regards 
identification o f the transmitting machines, telex and computer-to-computer telecommunications often 
employ call-back procedures and test keys to verify the source o f the message. Techniques combining 
several keys can be used as a means o f identifying the operator o f the sending machine."; see also
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1.2. "Evidential" value of EDI messages
Another function of a paper document is that of the evidential value of such a 
document in courts. Would an electronic transmission be accepted as good and 
valid evidence in the eyes of the law? There are major variations in the general law 
of evidence regarding the validity of a document as evidence/® Firstly, in many 
legal systems it is accepted as a principle that all kinds of information relevant to a 
dispute are allowed to be submitted to the court and it is the court's obligation to 
accept presented information as good evidence, or to reject it. In the legal systems 
in question it seems no problem would arise as to the evidential nature of an 
electronic document.®^ However, variations have existed regarding the exact 
manner in which an electronic-based evidence is admitted and handled.®®
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1990, supra (f.n. 11), at p. 260 pointed out: "Most generally, as regards identification 
o f persons in an EDI context, verification procedures can be based upon one or more o f three parameters: 
what the operator knows (passwords, secret codes), what the operator holds (microcircuit cards) or what the 
operator is (biometrics). O f the three, biometrics (i.e. the physical characteristics o f the operator) is the most 
exact. Six biometric technologies are currently available: retina scans which record the eye signature o f an 
individual and store it in microprocessor; thumb print or finger print identification systems; hand 
geometiysystem which measure, record and compare finger length, skin translucency, hand thickness or 
palm shape; voice verification devices which record voice patterns and inflections; signature verification 
devices which trace either the static or dynamic characteristics o f a person's signature; keystrok dynamics 
which identify individuals by their typing patterns and rhytmes. A ll o f these biometric products compare the 
stored templets with fresh patterns or scans to allow or deny access to the secured mechanism."
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n. 11) at p. 393 said: "As concerns the issues o f authentication, it is 
clear that the legal reliability o f EDI techniques that high standards be implemented achiveing legal certainty 
as to the identity o f the sender, its level o f authorization and the integrity o f the message. However, it must 
be pointed out that the various authentication methods available involve veiy different costs."; see also 
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra (f.n. 8), at p. 357 it was stated that: "[...] various techniques (e.g., 
"digital signature") had been developed to authenticate electronically transmitted documents. Certain 
encryption techniques could authenticate the source o f message, and also verify the integrity o f the content o f 
the message. It was observed that, in considering whether to employ such authentication methods, attention 
needed to be paid to the cost involved, which might vaiy considerably according to the extent o f computer 
processing that was required."
"As regards the law o f evidence, the TEDIS study broadly distinguishes between the rules applied to 
litigation in civil law countries and to litigation in common law countries, and the rules governing the 
retention o f business record for tax and regulatoiy purposes." [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1990, supra (f.n. 11), 
p. 257]; see also UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, WP, supra (f.n. 5), pp. 372-73 (about evidential value o f EDI 
messages).
”  "A t its eighteenth session (1985), the Commission had before it a report by the Secretariat entitled "Legal 
value o f computer records" (A/CN.9/265). That report came to the conclusion that, on a global level, there 
were fewer problems in the use o f data stored in computers as evidence in litigation than might have been
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Secondly, in some states there is a list of acceptable evidence always 
required to be in the form of written documents. An electronic document is not 
accepted as evidence in court, or it might be accepted for clarifying the facts of the 
case. However, there may not be restrictions about commercial matters as 
compared with criminal questions in countries adopting such procedures.®®
expected." [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra (f.n. 8), pp. 347-48]; see also UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, 
WP, supra (f.n. 5), p. 368, UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra, pp. 393-94 (regarding evidential value o f 
computer records), and UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1990, supra (f.n. 11), p. 258 (about evidence in acconting 
and tax law); see Commission, supra (f.n. 22), p. 101 provides: "Article 4: Admissibility in evidence o f EDI 
messages- To the extent permitted by any national law which may apply, the parties hereby agree that in the 
event o f dispute, the records o f EDI messages, which they have raaintend in accordance with the terms and 
conditions o f this Agreement, shall be admissible before the Courts and shall constitute evidence o f the facts 
contained therein unless evidence to the contraiy is adduced."
See UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra (f.n. 8), at p. 353 (about the admissibility o f EDI messages as 
evidence) which is said: "The Working Group commenced its consideration o f this item by hearing 
statements concerning statutoiy and case law in different legal systems on the question o f admisibility o f 
computer records and other forms o f electronic-based evidence. This exercise revealed a veriety approaches. 
In many legal systems, parties to commercial disputes were generally permitted to submit any type o f 
evidence that was relevant to the dispute. Among those countries, however, variations existed as to the exact 
manner in which electronic-based evidence was admitted and handeled. For example, in some countries 
specific rules had been established governing the introduction o f electronic evidence. Such requirements 
were aimed at establishing the intellig ibility, reliability and creditability o f the evidence, focusing 
specifically on the methods o f entiy o f the information and the adequacy o f protection against alteration. 
Some Jurisdictions required expert certification as a condition for introduction o f the evidence. In some 
countries, the procedures for objecting to the introduction o f electronic evidence differed from the procedure 
involved in objecting to other forms o f evidence. In quite number o f countries in this first general group, 
when a question arose as to the accuracy or value o f the electronic evidence, it was left to the court to weight 
the extent to which the evidence should be relied upon. The factors to be considered in such an assessment o f 
the quality o f electronic-based evidence might include the degree o f security in the system that produced the 
evidence, its management and organisation, whether it was operating properly and any other factors deemed 
relevant to the reliablity o f the evidence."
"The above survey revealed that in most countries a distinction had to be drawn between the admissibility 
o f electronic evidence in jud ic ia l proceedings and the acceptance and use o f such evidence by administartive 
authorities. [...]" [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra (f.n. 8), p. 354]; see also UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1990, 
supra (f.n. 11), pp. 257-58 (regarding the issue o f evidence in C ivil law countries) which relevant parts are 
quoted below: "The TEDIS study notes that the development o f EDI meets legal obstacles in c iv il law 
countries due to the uncertain value o f a copy, since all computer records and the computer printouts are 
copies o f an original, whether the original is paper document or an electronic message. [...] In those countries 
where a general rule o f c iv il law (as distinguished from commercial law) is that economic transactions can be 
proven in litigation only by a writing, there are many exceptions. [...] It must be pointed out that the general 
requirement o f a wrting is considered as an evidentiaiy requirement o f c iv il law and not o f commercial law, 
where evidence o f contracts can be presented to a court in any form. [...] The consequence is that the 
requirement o f a writing does not affect EDI as used for most trading contracts. Since the determination o f 
which rule on evidence applies depends upon the status o f the defendant, the rule o f civil law applies when a 
party who is not a merchant is the defendant and the rule o f commercial law applies when the defendant is a 
merchant. In this context, the characterization o f the p la in tiff as a merchant or as a non-merchant is
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Thirdly, in common law countries the general principle is based on oral and 
adversarial procedures, namely, a witness is able to testify only about matters which 
he knows personally. So, such procedures give the other side an opportunity to 
verify statements by cross-examination. Therefore, what he learns from another 
source, e.g. from another person, a book, etc., is called "hearsay evidence", and it 
is not automatically accepted as evidence by tribunals. There are many exceptions 
to this principle; for instance, business records generated in the ordinary course of 
business may be accepted as evidence even though there may be no individual 
available to testify from his personal knowledge and memory of the record.®®
Nowadays, no difficulty seems to exist in accepting electronic documents as 
evidence. Some common law jurisdictions have accepted computer print-outs as
irrelevant. [..,] Even when the civil law rule applies, in many countries the requirement o f a written evidence 
is considered not to be mandatoiy. It is therefore generaly possible for the parties to agree beforehand that 
contracts they enter into w ill be evidenced by means other than a writing."
“  UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1990, supra (f.n. 11), at p. 258 (regarding the issue o f evidence in Common law 
countries) said: "The TEDIS study states that in the common law, the rules o f evidence that have a direct 
impact on EDI are the "heresay evidence rule" and the "best evidence rule". According to the hearsay 
evidence rule, subject to certain exceptions, a document is not admissible as evidence for the purpose o f 
proving the truth o f the matters stated in the document. According to the best evidence rale, only the original 
documents should be presented as evidence. As in c iv il law countries, there is general agreement that a 
computer printout is not an original. Both o f those rules in their pure form would be serious obstacles to the 
increasing use o f EDI. To overcome them in the United Kingdom, section 5 o f the 1968 C ivil Evidence Act 
expressly allowed the use o f computer printouts as evidence. [...] The general conclusion o f the TEDIS study 
on evidence in litigation was that, while there were no major obstacles to the development o f EDI in c iv il law 
countries, and therefore no need for fundamental changes o f the rules, the common law countries showed 
theoretical difficulties which made it necessary to adopt statutory law to meet the need o f EDI."; it is also 
said: "It was reported that, in common law countries, in which an oral and adversarial procedure was 
generally employed in litigation, emphasis was placed on testimony based on the personal knowledge o f 
witness, thus allowing the opponent an opportunity to verify the statements through cross-examination. In 
those countries, in which there tended to be more elaborate statutory structure governing the admission o f 
evidence and more limited judicial discretion, secondary sources were generally excluded as "hearsay 
evidence". In those countries in which computer records and other forms o f electronic-based evidence were 
considered as hearsay evidence, admissibility was nevertheless possible by way o f the "business records" 
exception to the hearsay rule. In order to be able to benefit from this exception, the proponent o f the 
evidence would typically have to demonstrate that the information was complied in the nonnal course o f 
business and would have to describe the chain o f events involving the compilation o f the information and 
leading up to the point when the evidence assumed its current form, so as to ascertain the integrity and 
reliability o f the system producing the evidence. In some cases the testimony o f an expert m ight have to be 
tendered to certify the reliability o f the evidence. Opponents o f the evidence would be peimitted to present 
conflicting evidence in written, oral or electronic form." [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra (f.n. 8), pp. 
353-54]; Hirst, Micheal, “ Computers, hearsay and the English law o f evidence". Carr, supra (f.n. 14), p. 
159.
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business records and as exception to the hearsay-evidence rule/* In England 
under Section 5 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 a computer record is accepted as 
evidence: "In any civil proceeding a statement contained in a document produced by 
a computer shall, subject to rules of court, be admissible as evidence of any fact 
stated therein of which direct oral evidence would be admissible."®^
1.3. "Symbolic" function of a paper document
Documents like bills of lading, beside having other characteristics of a 
document (namely informative and evidential functions), are negotiable since they 
are accepted by law as well as in practice as "document of title."®® The question is: 
would an electronic message, which loses its physical character and thus its 
negotiability, provide the same services (transferring the title of purchased goods to 
the buyer or provide a good security for bankers who issued LCs) as a paper-based
61 UNCITRAL Yearbook 1985, supra (f.n. 42), p. 355, paras. 27-34.
Walden, supra (f.n. 15), pp. 106-7; see also the Police and C rim ina l Evidence Act 1984 and Uniform  
Rules o f Counduct fo r interchange o f Trade Data by Teletransniission (UNCID  Rules. TRADE/W .P. 
4/R. 483 AnnexL Article 10, which states that contracting parties need to ensure that "a complete log is 
maintained o f all trade data as they were sent and received"; for technical solution look at UNCITRAL 
Yearbook 1983, supra (f.n. 37), para. 106 in which 6 methods were suggested namely logging, print-outs, 
passwords, protocols, confirmation and cryptography; and for contractual rules on admissibility o f evidence 
see UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n. 11), at p. 392, said: "In earlier days, controversies arose about 
the validity o f privately agreed standards on admissibility o f evidence in case o f litigation. It  now seems to 
be widely conceded that under both common law and civil law systems, such private commercial agreements 
on admissibility o f evidence are valid or, at least, they are not faced w ith a general prohibition.";.see also 
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1993, supra (f.n. 5), at p. 202, para. 92 (for latast view regarding the contractual 
rule).
"There are considerable problems with regard to the value and status in law o f EDI messages and the 
dematerialization o f essential documents in commercial law such as bills o f lading, letters o f credit; etc." 
[UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n. 11), p. 385]; UNCITRAL Yearbook 1983, supra (f.n. 5), p. 186, 
par. 128; and "negotiability" is also defined as "the legal effect attached to the possesion and transfer o f the 
original document."; for the relevant Act in English law see the Carriage o f Goods by Sea Act 1992 
(COGSAI and see Faber, Diana, “ Shipping documents and E D I". Carr, supra (f.n. 14), p. 83 [hereinafter 
referred to as Faber], at pp. 90-91, concerning the Act stated: "This Act deals w ith title to sue and replaces 
the Bills o f Lading Act 1855 in relation to documents issued after 16th September 1992, I t  covers bills o f 
lading including received for shipment bills but excluding bills which cannot be transfened. It applies to sea 
waybills which are defined as documents which are not bills o f lading but do contain or evidence a contract 
o f carriage by sea and which identify the consignee even in a way which allows the identity o f the consignee 
to be varied after issue. Non transferable bills o f lading would probably fa ll w ithin the definition o f sea 
waybills. The Act also applies to true ship's delivery orders." (for other details related to COGSA 1992, see 
relevant discussion in Chapter V II, Section A.2.2.3, above); Tettenborn, A.M., “ Transferable and 
negotiable documents o f title - a redefin ition?". LMCLQ, Part 4, Nov. 1991, pp. 538-42.
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bill of lading provides?®'* It is admitted that this matter constitutes a serious obstacle 
to movement towards a ADP/EDI system.®® Although there are efforts by different 
organisations active in the field of international trade to overcome the difficulties and 
different projects have been examined by organisations, they have not yet achieved 
any success.®® To tackle the problem it is suggested that the use of negotiable bills
"Explanations were given regarding the transfer o f title to goods in transit under the "CM I Rules for 
Electronic Bills o f Lading", adopted by the Comite’ Maritime International (CM I) in 1990. Those Rules 
applied i f  the participating parties so agreed. It was pointed out that an electronic b ill o f lading, in order to 
attractive alternative to a paper-based b ill o f lading, had to fu lfil in particular the follow ing functions: to 
evidence the contract o f carriage; to evidence receipt o f goods; to provide a right to control goods and the 
possibility o f transferring that right; to secure reliable information concerning the description o f the goods; to 
allow veryfication by interested third parties (e.g., insurers) o f information concerning goods; and to allow 
establishment o f a security interest in the goods." [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra (f.n. 8), p. 363]
For instance, see UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n. 11), p. 358; and Faber, supra (f.n. 63), at p. 89 
concerning some o f difficulties which may arise regarding the issue o f signature o f an electronic b ill o f 
lading pointed out: "These problems are firstly that banks would not accept them as security for their loans 
and this would effectively prevent letter o f credit sales and amount to a significant obstacle to international 
trade. Secondly, it would not be possible to pass property in the goods using an electronic b ill. Thirdly, the 
holder o f an electronic b ill would not be able to establish title to sue the carrier. The forth potential problem 
concerns the incorporation into the contract o f carriage o f internationlly recognised rules governing the rights 
and liabilities o f the parties."
Some instances, in respect o f a negotiable electronic b ill o f lading, are as following: 1. “ SeaPocs registry 
lim ite d "- It is quite common in the oil sopt market to sell one oil cargo repeatedly during a trading day to 
traders in different parts o f the globe. SeaDocs Registry Limited (SeaDocs), a London cooperative venture 
between Chase Manhatan Bank and INTERTANKO (an association o f o il tankers), was intended to bring 
about the telecommunicated negotiation o f b ill o f lading issued in comnnection with o il shipments. 
Unfortunately, while SeaDocs was the first serious attempt to fashion a negotiable electronic b ill o f lading 
that proved to be technically feasible, it was unsuccessfull and was closed w ithin one year o f its inauguration 
in 1986. [...] Despite its demise, SeaDocs proved that an intemational, centralized, largely electronic b ill o f 
lading was technically feasible. From the standpoint o f the paperless letter o f credit, its most important lesson 
was that unlike the DFR, the CKR, and the English sea waybill, SeaDocs' PIN conveyed right to the goods 
equivalent to those conveyed by a negotiable b ill o f lading that were enforceable as o f the moment o f 
transmission o f the approriate messages by SeaDocs." [Kozolchyk's article, supra (f.n. 4), pp. 89-90];
2. "The comité' m aritim e international's (C M I's I "priva te  key." The rules for the electronic 
bills o f lading adopted in 1990 by the CMI are the most sophisticated attempt to date to regulate open-ended, 
computerized issuance and negotiation o f bills o f lading. Unlike the SWIFT rules, the CMI rules can apply to 
any contracting party w illing  to abide by them. As optional rules, however, the CM I rules require that the 
parties to the electronic b ill o f lading specify the application o f the rules in the "master" or in individual 
agreements. [...] The main feature o f the CMI rules is the creation o f an electronic b ill o f lading not by 
centralized entity such as SeaDocs but by the carrier, which also acts as a registry o f negotiations. 
Accordingly, the CMI electronic b ill o f lading can be issued by as many as carriers as have the necessaiy 
hardware and software, and it can be "endorsed" by as many endorsees as have the same facilities. The 
device that makes such issuance, endorsement-negotiation, and registration possible is the "private key." The 
private key, in the words o f one o f CMI draftsmen, is "akin to single transaction personal identification 
number. [...] The CMI's private key operative scheme is as follows: (1) upon receiving the goods, the caiTier 
electronically sends to the shipper or the party designated by the shipper a "receipt message" containing the
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of lading should be discouraged and other types of transport documents like sea 
waybills®  ^ should be used by parties to an international transaction involving a letter
description o f the goods and reservations by the carrier on the state o f the goods. (2) The recipient confirms 
receipt o f the message to the carrier, and following this confirmation, the carrier provides him with the 
private key. (3) Depending upon the specific system in use, the shipper and subsequent holders o f the 
electronic b ill o f lading receive a password to access the carriers computer network and/or an identification 
number and a private key. (4) The shipper or subsequent sending party then inputs the electronic address o f 
the carrier-receiving party, and, as with telex messages, each party to the transmission sees the other party's 
address as the electronic "handshake" takes place. (5) After the security procedures are satisfied and the 
message is sent, the private key is used by the shipper or subsequent holders to verify the authenticity o f the 
message. Thus, even though a fraudulent sender may know how to access the network and establish a valid 
identity, he cannot obtain possession o f the goods without the use o f the private key. [...] Bankers cannot 
visualize how telecommunications between strangers can be accomplished without incurring a hig risk o f 
fraud. They prefer the security o f uniform log-in procedures, message numbering, error cheking, encryption, 
record retention, uniform formats and message self-auditing associated with SWIFT procedures, [...] From a 
legal standpoint, it is doubtful whether the private key procedure can be function as a negotiable b ill o f 
lading. The transferee's rights in the private key procedure depend upon both the issuance o f a private key 
and the transferee’s acceptance o f the right to control. Yet the transferee's acceptance o f the right to control is 
based upon the information in the receipt message transmitted by the carrier or by someone purporting to the 
carrier. Accordingly, it is not clear what rights are accepted by the transferee; relying upon fraudulent 
information, he may have accepted nonexisting rights. Meanwhile, the carrier may issue the private key to 
the transferee in the belief he has accepted a genuine receipt message. The rights incorporated into the 
private key, then, depend not only on the lawful acquisition o f the private key, but also on the text o f the 
carrier's valid receipt message. And while no carrier would want to be bound by terms and conditions other 
than those on the receipt message it sent, no transferee would want to pay for an electronic b ill whose terms 
and conditions are other than those he received. The difficulty cannot be overcome by a stipulation that the 
receipt message and the private key together are the equivalent o f a paper-based negotiable b ill o f lading. For 
as a rule, the creation o f negotiable documents o f title is a prerogative reserved solely for the legislature." 
[Kozolchyk's article, supra, pp. 90-92]; see also UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra, p. 364, where it is said; 
"It was noted that mere possession o f the cuiTently valid private key was not sufficient to transfer the right to 
control and transfer. The carrier, in communicating with the holder o f the key, would also verify whether the 
instruction for transfer was given by the person identified by the perivious holder. Such verification o f 
identity would be done by electronic means o f authentication in addition to the private key. [...] It was noted 
that the CMI Rules did not make it possible for two persons to have simultaneous control over goods, one as 
the owner o f the goods and the other as the holder o f the security interest in the goods. I f  a security interest 
was to be established in favour o f a person (e.g., a bank), that person would have to be made the single 
holder o f the right o f control and transfer over the goods. A  suggestion was made that consideration should 
be given to a possibility that an owner o f goods, while retaining a degree o f control over the goods, would 
establish through EDI a security interest in the goods in favour o f a creditor. A  related suggestion was to 
explore the possibility o f an electronic transfer o f a security interest in goods independently from the transfer 
o f ownership over goods."
Kozolchyk's article, supra (f.n. 4), at p. 85, said: "The sea waybill, the air waybill, and the rail 
consignment note function as receipt o f the goods by the sea, air, and rail carriers and also an informational 
documents. Unlike document o f title, these b ill do not have to be presented to the carrier in order to obtain 
possession o f the goods. The consignee o f an air, sea, or railroad b ill o f lading needs only to identify himself 
to obtain possession. Nonetheless, since these receipts are often needed before the art ival o f the goods to 
expediate their release, they can be transmitted electronically to the consignee [...]." And as long as their 
layout is uniform and their text is structured and standardized, they can be transmitted to anyone, including 
customs officials and banks, using the same EDI software. 277
of credit contract/® As to the electronic transmission of the bill of exchange it is 
similarly suggested that before the adoption of such an electronic document, the 
following issues should be resolved first; issues related to string contracts 
(contractual problem), transferability of a document, concepts of possession and of 
property, and "procedural difficulties."®® Several theories in connection with legal
In addition to allowing the ship to unload immediately upon arrival (thereby reducing the time and 
cost o f unloading, processing, and warehousing o f the cargo), the sea waybill also allows the consignor to 
vary his delivery instructions during the carriage. This feature can be useful when buyers suddenly become 
insolvent or when unfavourable market conditions require re-routing o f the cargo."; and the same writer at 
pp. 85-86 pointed out: "The Scandinavian Data Freight Receipt. In 1971, the Atlantic Container Tines 
(ACL), one o f the world's largest container carriers, introduced a sea waybill labeled Data Freight Receipt 
(DFR) for its North Atlantic shipments. As with the air waybill, the DFR eliminated the need to send paper 
documents with the shipment. [.,.] As with air waybill, the DFR was non-negotiable. It acknowledged receipt 
only for shipment and not for on-board loading."; see also UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n. 11), at p. 
396, said: "Another view on the questions raised by the documents o f title in an EDI context favours the use 
o f non-negotiable transport documents. That view is reflected, for example, in the first draft o f a policy 
statement by the ICC which states that: "Many o f the perceived legal “ obstacles” to the use o f EDI are not 
true obstacles, rather they are long-standing commercial habits which must be broken i f  EDI is to be used its 
maximum advantage [...] One example o f a perceived obstacle is found in common misconception that 
transactions involving negotiable documents represented by signed writings cannot be handled with EDI. 
They can via the use o f non-negotiable electronic messages."; and in the same Yearbook, at p. 396 pointed 
out: "A  commentator on the subject noted that: "Most probably the use o f the negotiable transport document 
would be diminish in the future. Commercial practice w ill prefer the non-negotiable waybill system or 
replace transport documents altogether by transferring the relevant information electronically. Be that as it 
may international commerce w ill have the same need to transfer the legal rights from sellers to buyers in 
international contract o f sale as previously. Is the only satisfactoiy solution to elaborate an international 
convention on transfer o f title to goods in transit from one countiy to another? Most probably those questions 
w ill be the focus o f attention from now on and during the rest o f the present centuiy. " [Ramberg, Jan, 
"In te rna tiona l Carriage o f Goods: Some Legal Problems and Possible Solutions". The international 
Commercial Law Series, Vol. I, 1988]
See UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1983, supra (f.n. 37), at p. 186, para. 129, recommendation No. 12 
"Measures to facilitate m aritime transport document procedures".
The relevent part o f that suggestion is quoted below: "Four legal problems would have to be solved before 
any attempts were made to introduce the required technological innovations. [...] The characteristic o f bills o f 
exchange foreshadow the problems that would have to be solved i f  tliey were to be replaced by defferred 
payment EFTs. The first problem and major one may be described as the contractual problem. Despite its 
terms and steriotyped text, a b ill o f exchange embodies a string o f contracts. [...] These are not only the 
contracts between the holder and the persons who have signed the b ill in one or another capacity but also 
contractual relationships substituting between those parties. Basically, each party has a right o f recourse 
against earlier ones i f  the b ill is not m et It is d ifficu lt to see how much such a string o f contracts can be 
created by deferred payment EFTs. [...] The second problem regarding the creation o f bills by deferred 
payment EFTs is based on the fact that à negotiable instrument needs to be transferable. This means that it 
must be o f a type that may be indorsed and delivered, [...] The third obstacle to creating bills o f exchange by 
means o f deferred payment EFTs is related to the fact that a negotiable instrument constitutes an item o f 
property and not just a string o f contracts. This attribute o f a b ill is reflected by the importance played in 
respect o f it by the concepts o f possession and o f property. [...] The fourth and last objection may be best
2 7 8
and technical issues have been suggested, but the lack of legal rules, both 
nationally and internationally, leads to a feeling of insecurity which may hinder 
further developments/®
2. RISKS AND LIABILITY (LEGAL SECURITY)
There are several factors involving risks in an ADP/EDI system in contrast to 
the paper-based funds transfer, such as non-standardized messages and 
procedures, reproducing messages, error, and failure of equipment. Consequently, 
there may be different types of losses, for instance, loss of principal (which may 
happen by fraud), loss of interest and losses which may arise from exchange rate 
variations and consequential damages. Therefore, for mitigating such risks the 
system should adopt, both technically and legally, security measures as a matter of 
priority and importance. So far as the present study is concerned, issues related to 
legal security are discussed below.^*
Legal security
From the legal point of view, methods of security under an ADP/EDI system 
can be based on administrative instruments, practices and court procedures in order
called the "procedural difficulties". A  b ill o f exchange has to be presented for acceptance and for payment. I f  
it is dishonoured, the holder has to fo llow a certain procedure before he can bring actions to enforce his 
rights against the drawer and the indorsers. He has to sent notice o f dishonour and, in the case o f a foreign 
b ill, has to effect protest through a notary." [Ellinger, Peter, "E lectronic Funds Transfer as a Deferred 
Settlement System", see Goode, supra (f.n. 13), pp. 38-43]; see also UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra 
(f.n. 11), at p. 396, said: "As to whether an electronic system providing negotiability o f transport documents 
can function satisfactorialy on a purely contractual basis, the question arises whether all the persons to whom 
the title to the goods in transit would currently be transmitted by use o f a paper negotiable b ill o f lading 
would be w illing  or able to become parties to a contractual network arrangement that would regulate the 
rights and obligations o f the parties to the transport operation itself. For those parties absent from the 
network arrangement at least, statutory law or an international convention seems to be needed."
™ UNCITRAL Yearbook 1983, supra (f.n. 37), pp. 186-7, paras. 130-48; Knut Helge Reinskou, "B ills  of 
lading and ADP: description o f a computerized system fo r carriage o f goods by sea". Journal o f Media 
Law a Practice, Vol.2, No.2, September 1981 (about legal approach); Roger Henriksen, "The Legal Aspects 
o f Paperless In ternational Trade and Transport". Copenhagen, 1982 (dealing with technical approach); 
Cargo Key receipt System and the INTERTANKO Project-sale o f Cargo through a clearing house (systems 
are testing at present).
Regarding technical security a classification has been suggested as covering physical security, 
organizational security, operational security, and system orientated security. [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1983, 
supra (f.n. 37), p. 182, paras. 77-79]
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to give a clear picture to the contracting parties as to their mutual rights and duties. 
Important legal points may arise, for example, to what extent is the sender of a 
message (as an offeror or acceptor) legally bound if his statement has been 
unintentionally changed in the transmission or pre-transmission process? What 
would liability for losses caused by such errors be? What Is the responsibility of the 
intermediary party who is providing the transmission of the message?^^ Generally 
speaking, it is suggested that liability for damages by a party causing a failure or 
error in communication should rest with the sender, unless agreed otherwise, under 
the principle of freedom of contract.^^
Another question is: which party would have to bear the risk of loss resulting 
from failure or error in communication? In other words, to what extent is the sender 
of an electronic message, in case of failure or error caused by the computer, 
responsible? It is generally accepted that the sender has no liability in such a 
situation, unless he would have been able to prevent the failure or reduce its 
consequences/^ It seems the network operator should be held responsible for any
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1983, supra (f.n. 37), p. 182, paras. 81-92; Walden, supra (f.n. 15), at p. 109 said: 
"W ith regard to alterations in a message forming the basis o f a contract, United Kingdom law states that: 
"Where corruption occurs, a message may be received in substantially different from the form in which it 
was transmitted. I f  this occurs, and neither party is aware o f the corruption, the mutual misunderstanding w ill 
prevent any enforceable contract horn arising."; see also Jonathan Lass, "F raud. E rro r  and S y s t e m  
M alfunction" and Robert pennington's paper with similar title [see Goode, supra (f.n. 13), pp. 57-83].
"A  suggestion was made that the question o f liability and risk might be addressed by a provision along the 
follow ing lines: "Subject to the agreed procedures for authentication or verification, the risk and liab ility  for 
any faulty transmission and resulting damages rest w ith the sender."" [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra 
(f.n. 8), p. 361]
In a comment on a legal question namely "should a bank be free from responsibility for errors or delayed 
funds transfers caused by failures in computer hardware or software?" it was concluded that: "As a result, a 
generalized exoneration from liab ility may be thought not to be Justified but that exemption from liab ility for 
computer failure might be justified when the bank could not be expected to have prevented the failure or 
reduced its consequences." [Legal issues, supra (f.n. 42), issue no. 19, p. 27]; there are 41 legal issues 
concern to EFT and for more detailes, for instances, see issue no.18 (Should public telecomunications 
carriers, private data communications services, electronic funds transfer networks and electronic 
clearing-houses be responsible for losses arising out o f errors or fraud in connection with a funds transfer 
instruction?), issue no, 20 (Should a bank be liable to its customer for having entered a debit or credit to the 
account according to the account number indicated on the funds transfer instruction it has received i f  the 
name on that account does not correspond to the name given on the funds transfer instruction?), issue no. 21 
(Should the bank or the bank customer carry the burden o f proof whether a debit to the transferor's account 
was authorized by him or occured through his fault?), issue no.27 (Should either the transferor or the
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loss caused by failure of the communication system, although It Is said that, in 
practice, the liability of the operator is restricted/^ However, it is generally agreed 
by UNCITRAL's Working Group that parties to an EDI transaction should be free to 
agree about the level of their liabilities under a contract. Similarly, it is suggested 
that such a freedom should be limited by a mandatory provision to ensure that the 
network's liability was not excluded or set at an unreasonably low level.^®
transferee recover interest for a delay o f a funds transfer?), issue no.28 (Should either the transferor or the 
transferee recover exchange losses for delay o f a funds transfer?), and issue no. 29 (Under what 
circumstances should the bank be liable for consequential damages?).
" It was observed that, in practice, the liability o f network operators was to a large measure restricted. In 
the case o f network operators that had a public status (e.g., those that were state-owned, enjoyed a degree o f 
monopoly, or were o f special importance to the national economy), the restriction or exclusion o f liability 
was often established in the law or regulation governing the functioning o f the network. The responsibility o f 
passive carriers o f data (such as telephone, telex or facsimile networks) in particular was low or excluded. In 
the case o f networks that has no such public status, liab ility restrictions were founded in contracts with users 
o f the communication services. In addition to excluding or placing financial limits on liability, liability 
restrictions generally concerened the basis o f liability and the burden o f proff. L iab ility  might be restricted 
also through rules determining that the operator was liable only for direct loss or loss that the operator could 
reasonably foresee; for example, when a payment order or an acceptance o f a contract offer was not 
transmitted properly, the liab ility might be limited to the fee paid for the transmission and to the interest lost 
because payment was made late." [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra (f.n. 8), p. 362]
See UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra (f.n. 8), p. 362; it is also said; "[...] a provision on liab ility  might 
be broadly modelled on the approach adopted in article 12 o f draft TEDIS Agreement as produced in 
paragraph 103 o f document A/CN.9/350: "Each party shall be liable for any direct damage arising from or as 
a result o f any deliberate breach o f this agreement or any failure, delay or error in sending, receiving or 
acting on any message. Neither party shall be liable to the other for any incidental or consequential damage 
arisning from or as a result o f any such breach, failure, delay or error. The obligations o f each party imposed 
by this EDI agreement shall be suspended during the time and to the extent that a party is prevented from or 
delayed in complying with that obligation by force majeure. Upon becoming aware o f any circumstances 
resulting in failure, delay or error, each party shall immediately inform the other party(ies) hereto and use 
their best endeavours to communicate by alternative means. [...] Another example as a possible model for a 
provision on liability was article 16 o f the draft SITPROSA Agreement as produced in paragraph 103 
document A/CN.9/350 as following: "16.1 The risk and liability for any faulty transmission and the resulting 
damages rests with the Sender: a. subject to the exceptions described in clause 16.2; b. subject to the 
condition that the Sender w ill not be liable for any consequential damages other than those for which he 
would be liable in the case o f a breach o f contract in terms o f the Main Contract or which have been 
specifically agreed.
16.2 Although the Sender is responsible and liable for the completeness and accuracy o f the TDM 
[Trade Data Message], the Sender w ill not be liable for the consequences arising from reliance on a TDM 
where: a, the error is reasonably obvious and should have been detected by the Recipient; b. the agreed 
procedure for authentication or verification have not been complied with." [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, 
supra (f.n. 8), p. 361]; Article 4A o f the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) establishes liabilities for an 
originator o f a n  electronic credit payment and the originator' bank.
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3. FRAUD IN ADP/ED!
Another matter of concern for users of an ADP/EDl system is fraud, 
particularly with regard to the fact that as paperless, EDI is more insecure and open 
to f r audAl t hough  using methods like a call back system, private key, electronic 
signature, and other methods of authentication, mentioned previously, may to some 
extent prevent the abuse of EDI system, there is always a risk that the system may 
be intercepted by an unauthorised person. Suggestions have been made for 
reducing such a risk by: "1. limiting access to terminals and data, 2. segregating 
functions, 3. encrypting data, 4. using message authentication, and 5. conducting 
key exchange in a secure environment."^®
4. TIME OF ESTABLISHMENT OF A PAPERLESS LETTER OF 
CREDIT
As previously pointed out,^ ® in connection with a documentary credit, issues 
related to the time and place of formation of a contract are important matters since 
rights and duties of contracting parties as well as issues related to applicable law of
Rowbotham, Graham; Schwank, Friedrich; Mitchell, Wendy, "E D I. The Practitioner's View: Data and 
the Documentary C re d it" . International Financial Law Review (IFL), Vol. 7, Iss. 8, August 1988, pp. 35- 
38, in an abstract to that article it is said: "The sudden popularity o f electronic data interchange (EDI) in the 
commercial world, the contractual nature o f EDI communication, and the fact that it is paperless makes EDI 
interesting to attorneys. [...] Eastablishing documentary credits on screen has caused concern among 
international commercial bankers and financial institutions. One problem is prventiiig  fraud  in the 
electronic transfer o f funds since there are no paper-based supporting documents that are signed.” ; 
Stuparich, Mark, "Security issues in E F T /E D l". Journal o f Cash Management (JCG), Vol. 13, Iss. 1, 
January/Februaiy 1993, pp. 22-24 [hereinafter it is referred to as Stuparich], in an abstract to that article it is 
pointed out: "in  electronic funds transfer (EFT) or electronic data interchange (EDI) transactions, fraud can 
occure through access to unprotected data terminals or disk files, or through interception o f data as they are 
being transmitted over a telephone line."[Emphasis added]
Stuparich, ibid. (abstract).
See relevant discussion in Chapter V, Section B.2.2.2 (above); Kozolchyk's article, supra (f.n. 4), at pp. 
52-53, said; "In the light o f the speed with which SWIFT messages are communicated and the receiving 
bank's need to act quickly in response to the electronic request or instruction, the receiving bank must know 
as o f what moment the sender o f the message is irrevocably bound. Article 5 o f the UCC refers to this event 
as "establishment" and, almost uniquely, lays down specific rules by which it may be determined- a matter as 
to which even the UCP are silent."
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contract are directly related to them.®® This is also true in the context of EDI 
relationships,®^ for which two rules have been suggested as a solution regarding the 
time of formation of contract, namely, the "receipt" rule and the "dispatch" rule.®^
According to the dispatch rule, a contract is formed at the moment when the 
declaration of acceptance of an offer is sent by the offeree to the offeror. According 
to the receipt rule, a contract is formed at the moment when the acceptance by the 
offeree is received by the offeror.®® It has also been suggested by a writer that the
"Parties to a contract have a practical interest in knowing where and when the contract is fonned. When 
the contract is formed, the parties become bound by the legal obligations they have agreed upon and the 
contract may start producing effects. In different legal systems, the time when the contract is formed may 
determine such issues as the moment when the offeror is no longer entitled to withdraw his offer and the 
offeree his acceptance; whether legislation that has come into force during the negotiations is applicable; the 
time o f transfer o f the title and the passage o f the risk o f loss or damage in the case o f the-sale o f identified 
goods; the price, where it is to be determined by market price at the time o f the foimation o f the contract. In 
some countries, the place where the contract is formed may also be relevant for determining the applicable 
customary practices; the competent court in case o f litigation; and the applicable law in private international 
law (see A/CN.9/333, para. 69)." [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1991, supra (f.n. 11), p. 395 and UNCITRAL 
Yearbook, 1990, supra (f.n. 11), p. 262]
"The question o f the time and location o f the formation o f an EDI contract is identified in the TEDIS 
study as the one which receives the widest variety o f solutions within national legislations in the EEC. The 
same question is addressed by the A BA report and may be regarded as one important issues to be settled in a 
communication agreement." [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1990, supra (f.n, 11), p. 263]
"It was noted that when dealing with the issue o f time and place o f formation o f contracts in the context o f 
EDI relationships, two solutions were most commonly found in legal systems (see A/CN.9/333, Paras. 72- 
74): the receipt rule and the dispatch rule. [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra (f.n. 8), p. 359]; for more 
details see also UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1993, supra (f.n. 5), p. 207, paras. 137 and 147.
"It was recalled that the TEDIS Study on the Fomiation o f Contracts (see AC/N.9/WG.IV/WG.53, Para. 
68) contained a chapter on the issue o f time and place o f formation o f contracts. The conclusion o f the study 
were that the receipt rule should be promoted as particularly suitable for EDI. It was observed that the 
transmission o f EDI messages might be initiated in different places, such as a place o f business o f sender, or 
the place where the sender held its computer. It  was also observed that, during the transmission process, 
particularly where third party service providers were involved, EDI messages might travel through places 
that were irrelevant to the underlying commercial contract. It was thus submitted that only the place where 
the message had been placed at the disposal o f the recipient was sufficiently predictable to provide legal 
certainty, particularly as to the place o f formation o f a contract. It was also mentioned that the receipt rule 
was in line with article 18(2) o f the United Nations Sales Convention, w ith the draft Principles for 
International Commercial Contracts prepared by the International Institute for the Unification o f Private Law 
(UNIDROIT) and with national legislation in a number o f states. [..,] In the absence o f madatoiy provisions, 
article 9.2 o f the "TEDIS European Model EDI Agreement" prepared by the communication o f the European 
Communities (May 1991) read as follows: "Unless otheiwise agreed, a contract made by EDI w ill be 
considered to be concluded at the time an place where the EDI message constituting the acceptance o f an 
offer is made available to the information system o f the receiver." [UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra (f.n. 
8), p. 359]
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establishment of the paperless letter of credit between banks could occur at various 
times: 1) when the SWIFT message is released to the SWIFT access point; 2) when 
the message is acknowledged by the receiving bank; and 3) when the receiving 
bank performs the requested or instructed act.®'^  However, in practice, most bankers 
rightly accept the time of release of the message as the time of establishment of 
their duty against the recipient bank.®®
SECTION C: ADP/EDT AND TTS IMPACT ON UCP 500
In the light of previous discussions (above), it has been explained that 
although under a paper-less method of payment some functions of a document 
such as "informative" and "evidential" functions are foreseeable, there is an 
important issue (like the "symbolic" function of a document) which makes an 
ADP/EDl system incompatible with a paper-based system such as that of LCs, since 
it provides no security as well as possession of goods for its holder (the bank or the
Kozolchyk’s article, supra (f.n. 4), pp. 52-53; it is also stated by the same writer that; "Other moments o f 
establishment are conceivable, such as when the message actually reaches the recipient's "options" computer 
(as distinguished from a mere "host" or "depositoiy" computer), when the recipient's operations officers gain 
knowledge o f the existence o f the message, or when the message is received by the beneficiary. Yet none o f 
these moments is sufficiently objectively ascertainable to warrant consideration."
See discussion related to the time o f establishment o f a credit contract in Chapter V, Section B.2.2.2; 
Kozolchyk’s article, supra (f.n. 4), at pp. 52-53, said; "V irtually every American and European Banker 
interviewed by this writer pointed to the moment o f release o f the message as the moment when the deemed 
his liab ility  established vis-a-vis correspondent banks. This moment usually coincides with the time the 
issuing bank records its liab ility and any other debits or credits related to the message in question. As a result 
both o f the regulatory requirements and o f electronic programs that carry out the bank's issuance o f credits 
and related bookkeeping functions, this recording (also known as "booking") occurs in conjunction w ith and 
immediately following release. [...] The SWIFT User Handbook does not state when a credit is established. 
Instead, these rules assures the issuer that messages not yet "delivered" to the intended recipient can be 
revoked or canceled."; and at p. 54, the same writer said: "Yet after A  released its message o f issuance to 
SWIFT but before the message reached B, A  asked SWIFT to revoke or cancel the message o f issuance, and 
SWIFT revoked or cancel it. This revocation or cancellation occured after that moment when bankers feel 
they are irrevocably bound not only by the their message o f issuance, but also w ith respect to a pre-advised 
credit. And the consensus among banks and banking lawyers- now expressed in the proposed revision o f the 
UCP- is that a pre-advice iixevocably binds the issuing bank to issue the operative credit instrument "without 
delay"; see also UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra (f.n. 8), at p. 358, said; "As regards the issue o f 
revocability o f an offer, the Working Group recalled that article 16 o f the United Nations Sales Convention 
provided that an offer could normally be revoked i f  the revocation reached the offeree before dispatch o f the 
acceptance. While support was given to the idea that such a rule should also be applicable to contracts 
formed in an EDI context, doubts were expressed as to the workability o f such a rule, given the speed o f EDI 
transmission."
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applicant for a credit as the case may be). Therefore, there is a need to deaf with 
these issues and, as a result, with the present system of payment based on 
documents like LCs and its relevant provisions which continue to provide necessary 
services for users of the documentary credits system. The point that should be 
underlined is the extent to which the relevant provisions (namely UCP 600) would 
be affected by ADP/EDl? Generally speaking, articles of UCP 500 related to the 
definition of the letter of credit and parties to such a transaction (Article 2), the time 
necessary for checking documents required and presented by the beneficiary as 
well as the time necessary for accepting or rejecting them by banks (Article 13 (b)) 
are among aspects that would be the subject of chahge(s) because of the speed of 
the EDI system. Moreover, as to the negotiation of a credit it has been pointed out 
by a writer that under the UCP®® the procedure stipulated for such a situation is 
different from what has been accepted under an EDI system at present.®^
Excepting the above mentioned articles, it seems the rest of UCP’s articles 
would remain unchanged since they are related to principles and practices mostly 
accepted worldwide by business communities, for instance, the revocability and 
irrevocability of a credit (Article 6), banks’ duties under the "doctrine of autonomy" as 
well as the "principle of strict compliance" (Articles 3 and 4), transferability of a credit 
(Article 48), and assignment of proceeds (Article 49) remaining unchanged.®® A
See Articles 9 (a)(iv) and 10 (b)(li) o f UCP 500.
Kozolchyk's article, supra (f.n. 4), at pp. 66-67, said: "Conflicting procedures and definitions. SWIFT 
procedured are significantly at odds with procedures set forth for the vei-y same transactions by the UCP. 
Consider, for example, the negotiation procedures in both sources. The SWIFT User Handbook requires that 
"the advice to the bénéficia^ must note each negotiation," and "[t]he negotiation bank must note each 
negotiation on that advice." In contrast, the UCP requires neither the presentation o f the advice at each 
negotiation nor a notation for each negotiation. This conflict raises a number o f troublesome everyday 
practice questions, such as: (1) Can a confirming-negotiating bank that negotiates a credit subject to the UCP 
reject a tender o f documents that does not contain a hard copy o f the credit advice even i f  such a requirement 
is not listed among the terms and conditions o f the operative credit instrument? (2) Can a bank that has 
issued a credit subject to the UCP and silent on the need to present the operative credit instrument refuse to 
reimburse a confirming bank that did not require such an instrument and/or failed to note the negotiation? (3) 
Is an issuing bank bound to honour such a presentation i f  the beneficiary bypass the confirming bank and 
presents the documents directly to it?"
For more details about those issues see relevant discussions in Chapter IV  (above).
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similar conclusion can be drawn regarding those articles of UCP 500 which deal 
with different types of documents required under LCs (Articles 20-22 and 24-38), 
except bills of lading (because of their nature as a document of title (Article 23)).
CONCLUSIONS
Generally speaking, new devices and techniques are not free from risks (at 
least initial) weaknesses and they may create uncertainty and insecurity. The 
ADP/EDl is not an exception to such a situation. Nevertheless, the mutual 
co-operation of all interested parties to find solutions for unsolved problems can, as 
always, be a best prescription. Therefore, as a matter of priority, previously 
discussed advantages, namely, speed of an electronic system, greater accuracy, 
and less expensive systems, may motivate the interested parties to coordinate their 
efforts for improving the system; but such efforts, by governments and all other 
interested parties at both international and domestic levels, would have to be 
concentrated on the technical as well as legal aspects of electronic transmission. 
This may be the only way to provide an electronic/paper-less documentary letters of 
credit system which could then also be called a "documentless documentary 
credit".®® To achieve it several points would have to be clarified from the beginning. 
For instance, how would an electronic transmission provide a good security for 
banks as well as a good title and constructive possession over the goods for the 
applicant for a credit? Moreover, questions related to the formation of contract (such 
as time and place of establishment of a credit transaction), rights and obligations of 
contracting parties to EDI, fraud, risks and liabilities under an electronic/ paper-less 
system, and the "authentication" are other hurdles to be overcome for the 
widespread use of an ADP/EDl system. By removing these problems from the 
system, ADP/EDl could become a fact of life in international trade.
Martino, A.A., "Paperless Trade; Legal and Technical Standardisation Problem s". COMPAT 88 [see 
Walden, supra (f.n. 15), p. 112]; Gronfors, Kurt, "S im plification o f d o c u m e n t LMCLQ,  Vol. 1, 1976, 
pp. 250-54.
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Regarding the application of LCs in the future, an issue of importance may 
arise: is there any need for banks' services under LCs as mediators between sellers 
and buyers in the electronic age? In other words, whether ADP/EDl would put an 
end to the use of LCs and corresponding provisions such as those of UCP 500. 
Different views regarding this point exist; but the preferable opinion is that, excepting 
the main reason for establishing the documentary credit system (namely, avoiding 
distrust between parties to a sale or service transaction), the use of LCs would not 
be in danger even in an ADP/EDl system.®® It should also be remembered that the 
banker's role under LCs is not only as a paymaster, but also as an agent of the 
applicant for the credit also trusted by the beneficiary. As a result of such a trust 
between parties to an international transaction (sale/service contract) and because 
of an established worldwide network of banking systems that carries a valuable 
banking and trade information, it would not be right to suggest that there is no role 
for LCs in future international trade markets. As rightly stated by a writer, EDI would 
change the form of letter of credit transaction but it would not be able to change its 
underlying commercial function.®  ^ Therefore, as long as such a commercial function
Kozolcyk's article, supra (f.n. 4), at pp. 97-99 said: "Two viewpoints are frequently expressed on the 
future o f the electronic letter o f credit. The first regards the commercial letter o f credit as a dying instrument 
soon to be replaced by direct electronic or network payment communications directly between buyers and 
sellers. A second viewpoint maintains that the paper-based letter o f credit w ill be replaced by two types of 
electronic credit. Type one w ill be the "default" credit, a credit payable upon certification that the parties did 
not settle the claimed debt by themselves. [...] second type o f credit under which payment w ill be made by 
the issuing or confirming bank upon tender not a group o f paper documents, but o f a single type o f EDI 
message. This EDI message w ill state that the confirming bank has received, for example, an electronic bill 
o f lading or waybill that on its face conforms with the terms and conditions o f the credit, that it has paid or 
accepted a draft, and that it expects reimbursement. Documents transmitted electronically w ill not convey 
title to the goods; they w ill only acknowledge receipt o f the goods and convey other requested information. 
These documents, therefore, w ill lack intrinsic value or merchantability. [...] Bernard Wheble [...] in a lecture 
delivered in Singapore in 1990, [...] predicted that many documents as traditionaly understood w ill cease to 
exist in the context o f the paperless credit. A t the same time, he warned that the replacement o f the 
traditional, paper-based bills o f lading may have to continue to be used. He also warned o f problems with 
respect to the presentation o f electronic documents other than the b ill o f lading. Among these problems were 
the determination o f the time and place o f presentation, to whom the messages should be addressed, who 
should be their direct recipient, and whether the "originality" requirements should be preserved. According to 
Wheble, some o f these problems could be resolved by the parties' reliance on UNCID and appropriate user 
manual. [...] This writer shares Wheble's view o f an eclectic (paper-based and electronic) future. In addition, 
this writer is optimistic about the future o f the letter o f credit, whether as a paper-based or paperless promise, 
owing to the fact that distrust among trading partners is now likely to disappear soon. [...]"
Kozolchyk's article, supra (f.n. 4), p. 99.
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exists, the need for having relevant rules and provisions like UCP 600 will also exist. 
Nevertheless, although the general movement toward ADP/EDl on the international 
level is, for a variety of reasons, proceeding slowly, including the difficulty in getting 
all parties to such a transaction (namely importers, exporters, banks, transportation 
companies, and customs brokers) into an electronic loop,®  ^ it has become clear (as 
in the present research study) that LCs’ provisions (UCP 500) would be affected by 
an EDI system on grounds related to time (namely, time for checking and deciding 
to accept or reject documents presented by the beneficiary), definition of a credit 
transaction and parties to such a contract, as well as issues which are related to 
fraud, risks and liabilities, and time and place of establishment of a paper-less letter 
of credit contract.
Another point should also be tackled, namely, how issues about ADP/EDl 
can be put together with issues related to paper-based LCs? It is reasonable to 
disagree with the view that issues related to an electronic/paper-less letter of credit 
should be dealt with separately; having two international sets of standards about 
LCs would cause uncertainties and would damage the purpose of uniformity in 
practice as well as law and provisions for stability and for preventing disputes 
between parties to a credit transaction. It may be pointed out that issues about 
paper-less LCs are also considered under UCP at an international level by the ICC. 
It is one of the options, but for reasons discussed in the previous Chapters of the 
present study, the legal nature of issues (like fraud, time and place of establishment 
of credit, "authentication" etc.), necessitate comparative studies between different 
legal systems, for safeguarding the rights of all parties to a credit transaction (the 
applicant for a credit and the beneficiary). Lack of expertise and costs seem to 
indicate that it is for the ICC impossible to carry out such comparative studies and 
the experience of the ICC in the last 60 years seems to support such a view.
O'Heney, Sheila, "The wired world o f trade finance". Bank Management, Vol. 69, No. 2, February 
1993, pp. 18-25.
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Having an internationally unified set of standards about LCs covering all 
relevant aspects to the extent it is possible, and at the same time safeguard its 
simplicity and flexibility, require cooperation between all the Interested parties. 
Governments, international organisations, bankers, traders, lawyers, and scholars 
from different backgrounds and legal systems would have to work and cooperate 
closely, with financial as well as political support, in order to achieve the goals of 
reliability, simplicity and flexibility. Efforts by UNCITRAL towards drafting a uniform 
law (in the form of a convention) on Standby Letters of Credits (SLCs) and 
guarantees which would have a serious impact on LCs, are considered in the next 
part of the present study. However, as to efforts by different organisations to provide 
a uniform law related to ADP/EDl, none of them have succeeded, because they 
were based on different purposes and address issues which may cover some but 
not all relevant issues about ADP/EDl.®® It must be noted, however, that all model 
agreements, rules and guidelines mentioned previously are of a contractual nature 
and can be brought into force only by the consent of the contracting parties. This 
involves two particular problems; firstly, when the applicable law of the contract 
prevents the parties to deviate from provisions of statutory law; secondly, when a 
non-mandatory provision of contract can only regulate the rights and obligations of 
those persons who are parties to the contract. So, provisions in a contractual form 
may be appropriate for a closed network of individual EDI communication, but they 
would not be able to regulate similar issues arising in an open environment. As a 
result, UNCITRAL has taken the view that the basic rules related to EDI should be 
unified and a standard communication agreement for use in international trade 
should be treated as a prime necessity.®"  ^ Such a necessity seems acceptable in
”  See UNCITRAL, Yearbook 1991, supra (f.n. 11), at p. 390 said: "Those various model rules take different 
stands as ragards the legal issues related to the formation o f contracts by electronic means that were 
considered in the perliminary study by the Secretariat (A/CN.9/333). In addition, their structure often reflects 
the different legal systems they originated from."
UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, WP, supra (f.n. 5), p. 367; UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra (f.n. 8), at p. 
350 pointed out: "In favour o f work on the legislative level, it was recalled that the mandate given by the 
Working Group was to consider possible statutiry provisions. It was also stated that statutory provisions, 
because they would offer detailed guidance, would be more effective tool in assisting States to remove legal
2 8 9
case of letters of credit, ft is an issue considered in the next part of the present 
study.
obstacles to the increased use o f EDI. It was observed that, due to a lack o f such detailed guidance, the 
recommendation adopted by the Commission in 1985 (see above, paragraph 2) with a view to establishing 
legal principles and to providing guidance to national legislators and regulatoiy authorities for the removal o f 
legal obstacles to the increased use o f EDI had resulted in little progress in the removal o f those obstacles. 
[...] It was also agreed that any attempt to design legal rules and principles on EDI should be based on a close 
observation o f commercial practices and aimed at enhancing the use o f EDI."; it is also said: "The 
Commission also took note o f the suggestion by the Secretariat to prepare a uniform law on the replacement 
o f negotiable documents o f tilte, and more particularly transport documents, by EDI messages." 
[UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1992, supra (f.n. 8), p. 349]; see also Locher, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 23 said: "Paperless 
international trade can not become a reality, however, until a few significant barriers are tom down. First, a 
truly universal standard for the international interchange o f electronic data (EDI) must be developed and 
accepted within the financial industry and by a host o f other service providers. Foreign governments, 
customs brokers, transporters, and insurance earners all have their own electronic networks, non o f which are 
currently compatible with those o f the financial community. [...] A  second obstacle to international EDI 
appears on the legal front. Many countries prohibit cross-border data exchange, rendering even the most 
versatile system useless. Finally, whatever standards are decided upon must also be embraced by the entire 
business world. Even with the architecture in place, EDI w ill remain an elusive dream unless it is w ithin the 
means o f the common man, or in the case, the middle market company."
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CHAPTER X
THE FUTURE OF
THE LETTERS OF CREDIT SYSTEM
SECTION A: INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
1. INTRODUCTION
There have been different views about the unification and codification of the 
law of international trade at different times/ Having a complete and universal 
unification or codification based on the laws of various nations is a remote hope 
unless fundamental changes in attitudes about the concept of "sovereignty” are 
agreed and States may envisage partial transfers of national authority to a 
supranational authority/ Furthermore, a successful unification of law requires a 
strong political desire as well as a real social and economic need for unification 
between countries participating in such a process.® As far as international 
commerce in general and letters of credits in particular are concerned a certain 
degree of clarity, stability, and uniformity in the law and practice of international 
commercial contracts is necessary for their proper functioning internationally.^
' For example, see Sclimitthoff, C.M.."T lie  unification o f the law of international trad e ". JBL, 1968, p. 
105, once it was commented that "the concept o f global and universal code o f international trade law 
introduced into the national laws o f all countries o f the world is not only unrealistic at the present juncture 
but might easily become a straitjacket which could slow down the growth o f commercial practices and 
usages and could stifle the continued creation o f customai-y law by international business community."; later, 
you could read from the same writer that: "The realisation o f this aim [i.e. codification o f the law o f 
international trade] is not utopian."" [Schmitthoff, C.M., "Commercial law in a changing economic 
c lim a te". 2nd ed. 1981, p. 30 [hereinafter refeixed to as Schmitthoff 1981]]; Garro, Alejandro M., 
"U n ifica tion  and Harmonisation o f Private Law in La tin  A m erica". The American Journal o f 
Comparative Law, Vol. 40, No. 3, 1992, p. 578 [hereinafter referred to as Garro]; see also the same journal, 
at p. 683 for Rosett, Arthur, "U nifica tion. Harmonisation. Restatement. Codification, and Reform in 
In ternationa l Commercial Law " [hereinafter referred to as Rosett].
 ^ See discussion concerning state's sovereignty in Section B.3.3.4 o f the present chapter below; David, Rene', 
"The International Institu te o f Rome fo r the Unification o f Private Law ". Tulane Law Review, Vol. 8, 
No. 1, December 1933, pp. 406-16 [hereinafter it is referred to as David], at p. 406 said: "The complete and 
universal unification o f the laws o f the various nations is a vain hope which cannot, for one moment, be 
seriously contemplated. The civilization o f the different countries, their living conditions, their customs and 
traditions, the very ethical principles which social relationships have as their foundation are all diverse; and 
in this diversity there must correspondingly be as great a difference in public institutions as in the field o f 
private law itself."
 ^ Graveson, R.H., "The inteniational unification o f law ". American Journal o f Comparative Law, 16, 
1968, pp. 4-12.
Horn, Norbert, "U n ifo rm ity  and diversity in the law o f international commercial contracts". Studies in 
Transnational Economic Law, Vol. 2, "The transnational law o f international commercial transactions".
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The diversity of legislation, particularly as regards international transactions, 
constitutes for traders a considerable and constant source of annoyance. In order to 
provide some comfort efforts have been made by governments as well as 
governmental and non-governmental (international) organisations (such as the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),® the 
International Institute of Rome for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT),® and 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)^ regarding different aspects of
edited by Norbert Horn and C.M. Schmitthoff, Kluwer, 1982 [hereinafter referred to as Horn and 
Schmitthoff], pp. 3-18, at p. 4 [hereinafter referred to as Horn].
 ^ See relevant discussions in Section A.2.1. o f the present Chapter (below) and Chapter III, Section A.2.1.3 
(above); Horn, ibid, at. p. 18 (for the role o f international agencies active in field o f international trade law); 
Herrmann, Gerold, "The contribution o f U N C ITR A L to the development o f international trade la w ". 
Horn and Schmitthoff, ibid., pp. 35-50, at pp. 35-37 (creation o f UNCITRAL) [hereinafter referred to as 
Herrmann]; see also Schmitthoff, C.M., "The Unification o f the Law o f International T ra d e ". JBL, 1968, 
p. 105, at p. 115 (concerning a need for an international organisation such as UNCITRAL), and 
"Progressive Development o f the Law o f In ternational T rade". Report o f the Secretary General, UN 
Doc. A/6396, para. 210 (reprinted in UNCITRAL Yearbook (1968-70), Vol. 1, Part One, II), in which it is 
said: "The General Assembly o f the United Nations, upon the initiative o f Hungary, established the new 
Commission by its Resolution 2205 (X X I) o f December 17, 1966. The mandate given to UNCITRAL is 
described therein as follows, in addition to other provisions on the objectives and methods o f work: "The 
Commission shall further the progressive harmonisation and unification o f the law o f international trade 
by: (a) Co-ordinating the work o f organisations active in field and encouraging co-operation among them; 
(b) Promoting wider participation in existing international conventions and wider acceptance o f existing 
model and uniform laws; (c) Preparing and promoting the adoption o f new international conventions, model 
laws and uniform laws and promoting the codification and wider acceptance o f international trade terms, 
provisions, customs and practices, in collaboration, where appropriate, with the organisations operating in 
the field; (d) Promoting ways and means o f ensuring a uniform inteipretation and application o f international 
conventions and uniform laws in the field o f the law o f international trade; (e) Collecting and disseminating 
information on national legislation and modern legal developments, including case law, in the field o f 
international trade; (I) Establishing and maintaining a close collaboration with the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development; (g) Maintaining liaison with other United Nations organs and special 
agencies concerned with international trade; (h) Taking any other action it may deem useful to fu lfil its 
functions." [Emphasis added]
 ^ The International Institute o f Rome for the Unification o f Private Law was created on October 3, 1924, and 
was formally established on May, 1928; Dolzer, Rudolf, "In te rna tiona l agencies fo r the form ulation of 
transnational economic la w ". Horn and Schmitthoff, supra (f.n. 4), p. 61, at pp. 71-72 (UNIDROIT) 
[hereinafter referred to as Dolzer]; Bonell, M.J., "U n ifica tion o f Law by Non-Legislative Means: The 
U N ID R O IT  D ra ft Principles fo r In ternational Commercial C ontracts". The American Journal o f 
Comparative Law, Vol. 40, No. 3, 1992, p. 617 [hereinafter referred to as Bonell].
 ^ For discussions relevant to the ICC see Chapters I (Section B.2.1) and II I  (Section A.2.1.2) above; Rowe, 
Micheal C., "The contribution o f the IC C  to the development o f international trade la w ". Horn and 
Schmitthoff, supra (f.n. 4), p. 51 [hereinafter referred to as Rowe], at p. 51 pointed out: "The International 
Chamber o f Commerce (ICC) is a non-governmental organisation, representing business internationally. Its 
contribution to the development o f international trade law arises from three main areas o f activity: the
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international sale transactions from the early years of the twentieth century, 
especially in the last three decades.® Such efforts indicate a real need for a more 
unified set of standards for those involved in international trade contracts although 
several obstacles would have to be dealt with first in order to achieve a true 
unification in international trade and commercial law.®
As pointed out in previous parts of the present thesis (Chapters IV and V) 
rules and provisions related to the documentary letters of credit (namely UCP 500 
and Article 5 of the UCC in the USA) are affected, sooner or later, by activities 
sponsored by UNCITRAL^® as well as national organisations like the Commission
development o f standard rules and procedures aimed at trade facilitation in its brodest sense; co-operation 
and contacts with other organisations interested in the same subjects; the organisation o f seminars and 
research projects on business law topics."
® For instances, look at ICC Pub. No. 500 (UCP 1993), and the Convention on International B ills o f 
Exchange and Promissoiy Notes published by UNCITRAL; see also Patrikis, Ernest T., "G loba l EFT 
guidelines: what they can mean to US banks". Bank Administration, September 1987, p. 30 [hereinafter 
referred to as Patrikis], at p. 30 said: "UNCITRAL is now in the final stages o f drafting a uniform law on 
international Bills o f Exchange and International Promissory Notes- a convention which sets out model legal 
rule that individual nations can adopt to bring a dgree o f standardization to the international payments 
system. This has been lengthy and difficult task because it has involved the harmonization o f Anglo- 
American law with European Continental law; it is no simple matter to reach agreement on issues where 
long-established commercial laws and practices differ."
 ^ See relevant discussion in Section B.3.3 o f the present chapter below; David, supra (f.n. 2), at pp. 413-14 
pointed out some o f problems which may arise when there is an effort for unification o f mternational law. He 
stated: "The unification o f law encounters grave obstacles: the first and principal one is the state o f confusion 
in which all branches o f the law find themselves, and for some o f these an immediate eventuality of 
unification must be disregarded. [...] A  second obstacle created by the existence o f already existing juridical 
literature. [...] A  third obstacle in the path o f unification is created by the antagonism o f legislators, viewing 
with animosity this consequent withdrawal, by international agreements, o f their power to make and unmake 
the internal law o f their respective countries according to their ideas. [...] Finally, the interested merchants 
and manufacturers naturally view with rancour any legislative innovations, whether o f internal or 
international character, in view o f their attachment to the laws with which they are already familiar and to the 
customs and practices which they helped to create."; Garro, supra (f.n. 1), at pp. 610-11; it is said by another 
writer that, "Unification o f international trade law can be acheived through the adoption o f uniform 
normative texts such as conventions and model laws. But the efficacy o f a uniform text can be diminished as 
a result o f divergencies in interpretation and application by judges, arbitrators and practitioners. This 
problem w ill never be completely resolved while there remain different legal systems and traditions: the 
ultimate solution, unattainable for the forseeable future, would be the creation o f some international court 
able to make definitive ruling for the uniform operation o f uniform laws." [Fisher, Geoff, "U N C IT R A L  
Gives International Trade Law C L O U T ". Australian Business Law Review, Vol. 21, October 1993, p. 
362 [hereinafter referred to as Fisher], at p. 362]
Fisher, ibid., at p. 362 said: "The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (U N C ITR A L) 
is establishing a system for collecting and disseminating information on arbitral awards and court decisions
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for the revision of Article 5 of the UCC in the USA/^ These efforts, however, involve 
no fundamental changes of principles accepted under the documentary credit 
system/^ For instance, as noticed in discussions related to the Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI), principles like "doctrine of autonomy" and "the principle of 
strict compliance" remain enforceable/®
rendered on UNCITRAL Conventions and model laws. The system, styled C LO U T (case-law on 
UNCITRAL texts), is intended to enhance awareness o f UNCITRAL legal texts and promote their uniform 
interpretation and application. [...] Given the acronym o f "C L O U T " [...] the system is intended to promote 
international awareness o f UNCITRAL legal texts and the uniform interpretation and application o f those 
texts. A draft User Guide for the CLOUT system has been prepared by the UNCITRAL Secretariat, outlining 
the nature o f the system and its method o f operation."; Maurer, V irginia G., "The United Nation 
Convention on Contracts fo r the In ternational Sale o f Goods". SYR. J. Int'I L. &  Com., Vol. 15:361, 
1989, p. 361, at pp. 361-62 said: "The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale o f 
Goods (CÏSG) was drafted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) at 
the Vienna Conferreace in 1980. [...] The Convention represents a major effort at unification o f international 
trade law across economic, legal, developmental, and political barriers. The gole o f Convention is to reduce 
the uncertainty inherent in contracting for the sale o f goods among international traders who do not 
understand or accept one another's substantive trade law. Reducing uncertainty in trade law should reduce 
the cost o f international transactions and promote efficient world trade. To this end, the treaty establishes a 
common body o f national law for certain international sales transactions. It also provides a common basis for 
interpreting contract provisions, and it provides substantive law for "filling  the gap" left by the contract 
drafters. In addition, the CISG addresses the choice o f law problems that vex drafters o f international sales 
contracts."
"  Boss, Amelia I I . and Fry, Patricia B., "D ivergent or parallel tracks: International and domestic 
codification o f commercial la w ". Business Lawyer, Vol. 47, Iss. 4, Aug. 1992, pp. 1505-1515. In an 
abstract to that article it is pointed out: "Activities are currently under way on the international level lending 
to the creation o f an International Uniform Commercial Code. The first step was the drafting and signing o f 
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale o f Goods. The current development o f 
the emerging international code is taking place when the US Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is 
undergoing tremendous scrutiny and revision. The challenge facing commercial lawyers is to harmonise the 
activities that are occurring on the domestic and international levels in order to assure that the events 
occurring on both levels fu lfil the purposes o f commercial codification: 1. to simplify, clarify and modernise 
the law, 2. to remit the continued expansion o f commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement 
o f the parties, and 3. to make uniform the law among various jurisdictions. Specific areas where progress in 
domestic and international codification seem to parallel include sales, letters o f credit, secured financing, 
payment systems, and documents o f title."; The American Law Institute, "U N IF O R M  C O M M E R C IA L  
CODE REVISED A R T IC LE  5. LETTERS OF C R ED IT  fw ith  amendments to Article.s 1. 2. and 9L 
Proposed Final D ra ft (A p ril 6. 1995V. Submitted by the Council to the members o f The American Law 
Institute for Discussion at the Seventy-Second Annual Meeting on May 16, 17, 18, and 19, 1995 [hereinafter 
referred to as PFD]; for more details concerning revision o f Article 5 o f the UCC see relevant discussions in 
Chapter V (above).
As to principles applied to LCs see relevant discussions in Chapters II (Section B .l), V I and V II (above).
See Section C o f Chapter IX  (above).
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Nonetheless, beside other changes relevant to issues like the time of 
establishment of a credit contract, fraud, banks' security, etc.,^ "^  a need for a 
fundamental change as to the present legal form of existing provisions about LCs 
(UCP 500), namely, changing its legal status from an international customary 
instrument to an international legislative instrument, is required more than ever 
for business communities in international trade. The UCP 500 is non-mandatory and 
covers issues which parties to a credit transaction need to know when dealing with 
LCs; however, many issues relevant to the legal aspects of LCs have been, 
deliberately, left untouched by the ICC.^ ® As a result of such shortcomings existing 
under UCP 500, on the one hand, and because of the importance of issues like 
fraud, banks' rights of security and conflicts of law on the other a trend towards a 
uniform law has been started, for many years, in order to provide more unified and 
mandatory rules about standby letters of credit (SLCs) and bank guarantees 
(BGs).'®
The first step in that direction are the activities of UNCITRAL involving a 
serious review of the rules and provisions about SLCs and BGs since 1988.^^ As a
See relevant point in Chapters V (Section B.2) to V III (above).
For shortcomings o f the UCP see Section B.3 o f Chapter X I (below).
UNCITRAL, "B . Stand-by letters o f credit and guarantees; report o f the Secretary-General 
rA/CN.9/30Ll [O rig inal: English]". Yearbook o f the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law, Vol. X IX , 1988, pp. 46-61 [hereinafter referred to as UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988], at p. 48, para. 8 said: 
"The topic o f this report as outlined above has been with the Commission since its inception, albeith with 
varying scope and emphasis, first on bank or contract guarantees and later on stand-by letters o f credit. 
Pursuant to a request by the Commission at its fist session in 1968 (A/7216, para. 29), the secretariat 
submitted to the second session a perliminary study o f guarantees and securities as related to international 
payments (A/CN.9/20 and Add.l). Ten years later, the secretariat submitted a preliminary study on stand-by 
letters o f credit (A/CN.9/163), following a decision by the Commision at its eleventh session in 1978 to 
include in its programme o f work as a priority topic "Stand-by letters o f credit, to be studied in conjunction 
with the International Chamber o f Commerce" (A/33/17, paras. 67(c)(ii)a, 68 and 69). The wording o f the 
topic indicates what has been a recurrent feature in the Commission's previous involvement, namely co­
operation with ICC."
UNCITRAL Y.B. 1988, ibid.; UNCITRAL, ’TV. STAND-BY LETTERS OF C R ED IT  AND 
GUARANTEES. A. Report o f the W orking  Group on Tntcriiational Contract Practices on the w ork of 
its twelfth session (Vienna. 21-30 November 1988) fA/CN.9/3161 [O rig ina l: E ng lish ]". Yearbook o f the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Vol. XX, 1989, pp. 182-200 [hereinafter referred to 
as UNCITRAL Y.B., 1989]; for other relevant materials look at below bibliography for UN CITR AL’s 
Yearbooks, 1990-93.
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result of such continuous efforts a draft convention has been prepared for 
consideration and deliberation by member states participating in a Working Group 
established for such a task in 1993/® Although the work of the UNCITRAL Working 
Group has not yet reached its final stage and it is related only to issues about SLCs 
and BGs and not traditional letters of credit (LCs), it indicates the importance of the 
matter, namely, concerning a real need for more harmonious provisions regarding 
SLCs in the international trade community. Such a necessity is so obvious in the 
case of LCs^ ® that, as a result, it has been suggested that the future "uniform law" 
(UL) should be extended to issues which are also of matter of importance for 
traditional commercial letters of credit.^® This is another indication that the
UNCITRAL, "11. GUARANTEES AND STAND-BY LETTERS OF CREDIT, A. Report o f the 
W orking Group on International Contract Practices oti the work of its eighteenth session (Vienna, 30 
November-11 December 19921 rA/CN.9/372I [O riginal English]". Yearbook o f the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, Vol. XX IV , 1993, pp. 139-154 [hereinafter referred to as UNCITRAL 
Y.B., 1993, part A], at p. 140, para. 7 stated; "The Working Group, which was composed o f all States members 
o f the Commission, held its eighteenth session at Viemra, from 30 November t o l l  December 1992. The 
session was attended by represeiitetives o f the following States members o f the Working Group: Argentina, 
Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Geniiany, Hungary, Iran 
(Islamic Republic of), Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Poland, Russian Federation, Saudi Arbia, 
Spain, Thailand, United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States o f America and 
Uruguay."
19 For more details see Section B o f the present chapter below.
UNCITRAL Y.B., 1989, supra (f.n. 17), at p. 195, para. 125 said: "After deliberation, the Working Group 
was agreed that the uniform law should focus on independent guarantees, including stand-by letters o f credit, 
and that it should be extended to traditional letters o f credit where that was useful in ■ view o f their 
independent nature and the need for regulating equally relevant issues."; similarly pointed out: "In view o f 
this latter question o f possible scope o f any uniform law, this note, while focussing on guarantees and stand­
by letters o f credit, takes into account some special issues o f commercial letters o f credit (e.g. relationship 
between issuing and confirming bank, deferred payment credit). The considerations on most o f the more 
general issues (e.g. principle o f independence, applicable law) would apply to guarantees and stand-by letters 
o f credit as well as commercial letters o f credit, although solutions might differ in detail." [UNCITRAL, "B . 
W ork ing  papers submitted to the W orking  Group on International Contract Practices at its tw e lft 
session. 1. Standby-by letters of credit and guarantees: review o f IC C  d ra ft Uniform  Rules fo r 
Guarantees: note by the Secretariat rA/CN.9AVP.II/WP.62) [O riginal: English]". Yearbook o f the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Vol. XX, 1989, pp. 200-205 [hereinafter referred to 
as UNCITRAL Y.B., 1989, part two], p. 203, para. 3]; moreover, it is said: "It was noted, however, that the 
uniform law might also apply to some aspects o f documentary credits, in which case reference to a 
confirming bank would be expected." [UNCITRAL, " IV . GUARANTEES AND STAND-BY LETTERS 
OF CREDIT, a. Report o f the W orking Group on International Contract Practices on the w ork o f its 
th irteenth session (New York. 8-18 January 19901 CA/CN.9/3301 [O rig inal: E ng lish ]". Yearbook o f the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Vol. XX I, 1990, pp. 227-238 [hereinafter referred 
to as UNCITRAL Y.B., 1990], p. 231, para. 43].
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international trade community has reached a stage where more unified rules are 
essential for business activities under the present circumstances of world trade and 
LCs provisions are not an exception, any more/^
In brief, step(s) should be taken, so far as legal matters are concerned, in 
order to provide more uniformity in the worldwide application of LCs. Moreover, by 
providing a more reliable and predictable set of standards for LCs, from an 
international legal point of view, the credibility of the documentary letters of credit 
could possibly be improved and their importance compared with other methods of 
payment like bills of exchange,^^ promissory notes, and cheques could be 
recognised worldwide/® and, at the same time in this way, another part of the 
jigsaw (namely, the international law for sale contracts) could be completed.
For other reasons see relevant discussions in Section B.2 o f the present chapter and Section A .3.2 o f 
Chapter X I (below).
The basis o f the law o f the negotiable instruments in the United Kingdom is the B ills o f Exchange Act 
1882, which has been adopted as the basis o f the law in the United States o f America, and the former British 
Dominion, as well as in other countries which are, or were, members o f the British Commonwealth o f 
Nations (see Hedley, W., "B ills  o f Exchange and Banker's Documentary C red it". Lloyd's o f London 
Press Ltd., 1986, at p. 4 and foot note 1 said: "The law relating to bills o f exchange had developed through 
the usage o f traders from about the 14th century into a body o f law called the "Law Merchant". This body o f 
law was only lightly touched on by Parliament, until it was codified by the Bills o f Exchange Act 1882. [...] 
The law o f Scotland differs in one or two important aspects; for instance ss. 98 and 100 o f the Act 1882."); 
the 1882 Act contains special sections (ss. 76-82) relating to cheques. In addition, there is the Cheques Act 
1957, passed in order to eliminate the necessity for indorsement o f cheques and other orders to pay; the 
United States equivalent o f the BEA Act 1882 is Article 3 o f the UCC dealing with commercial paper 
governing laws relating to negotiable instruments (NI), part 7 thereon, section 3-701, o f the UCC on Advice 
o f International Sight Draft covers Letters o f Advice o f International Sight Draft and, therefore, international 
aspects o f the BOB and NI.
There are wide differences between the laws o f the United Kingdom on the one hand and, on the 
other hand, those o f the Continent o f Europe, certain South American countries and Japan whose laws are 
founded on the League o f Nations Conventions Number 3313 and 3314 (Uniform Law and Conflicts o f Law) 
relating to Bills o f Exchange and Promissory Notes, date June 7, 1930, and Numbers 3316 and 3317 
(Uniform Law and Conflicts o f Law) relating to Cheques, dated March 31, 1931."
The United Nations Convention on International Bills o f Exchange and In ternationa l Promissory 
Notes fC IB N l (approved by UN General Assembly, December 9, 1988; cite as 28 IL M  170, 1989) [UN 
Document A/43/820 o f November 21, 1988, pp. 2-42]; the UN Convention on International B ills and Notes 
(CIBN) should be regarded as part o f a series o f projects which attempts to provide unification o f 
international commercial law. Prior conventions prepared by UNCITRAL include the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale o f Goods (19 IL M  671, 1980), ratified by the United States in 1986, and 
by 16 other nations to date. Other such treaties include: The Conventions on In ternationa l Lease 
Financing and on In ternational Factoring [27 ILM  931, 1988] prepared by the International Institute for 
the Unification o f Private Law (UNIDROIT), the final text o f which were adopted by a Diplomatic 
Conference at Ottawa in May 1988]; Reisman, Albert F., "A  Uniform  International Law: Financing and
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A question may arise whether an effort towards a uniform law for LCs would 
provide a better ground for safeguarding the interests of parties to a credit 
transaction and for preventing abuse of the documentary credit system? In order to 
give an adequate response to this question, it is necessary to review, first, what has 
been done by UNCITRAL then to consider whether the International trade 
community is ready for accepting such a change, namely, by adopting a uniform law 
for LCs; and if the answer is positive, then what type of legal instrument (e.g. a 
"model law" or a "convention") would provide a sound and reliable future solution for 
unifying the law of LCs in international trade. The present chapter will 
correspondingly deal in two sections with (1) UNCITRAL's activities: background 
reasons, latest deliberations, and whether these amount to an effort in the right 
direction; and (2) the socio-economic situation of the commercial world and 
international trade at present: does a more integrated and barriers-free situation 
exist from the commercial, economic, and social points of view? If so, does such a 
situation require more co-operation between trading partners; and how such a need 
should be dealt with? The remaining issues are considered in Chapter XI in two 
sections: (1) international legal Instruments available for serving such a purpose:
Factoring o f Transnational Accounts Receivable". The Secured Lender, Vol. 48, No. 6, Nov/Dec 1992, p. 
6, at the same page said: "On May 28, 1988, the final text o f the UNIDROIT Convention on International 
Factoring (IFC) was approved at a diplomatic conference in Ottawa, Canada without dissent by 
representatives o f fifty-five nations."; and at p. 12 o f the same reference pointed out: "Export factoring o f 
transnational sales on open account terms offers an alternative to traditional letter-of-credit financing 
arrangements and may provide a reasonable accommodation for the expectations o f both the exporter and the 
importer."
The United Nations Convention on Contracts fo r the Internationa! Sale o f Goods (CISGI was drafted 
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) at the Vienna Conferrence in 
1980; as it became effective from Januaiy 1, 1988, and 11 nations have ratified it. The United Kingdom was 
represented on the Working Group, at UNCITRAL and at the Vienna Conference; but, it has not signed or 
acceded to the Convention. Previous experiences in the field o f international trade and commerce have 
included the Uniform Law on International Sale o f Goods and the Uniform law on the Foimation o f 
Contracts for the International Sale o f Goods; parallel to these developments, on the international shipping 
and transport scene there have been the United Nations Convention on the Combined Transport 
Document 1980. The United Nations Convention on Carriage o f Goods by Sea which seeks to replace 
the International Convention for the Unification o f Certain Rules o f Law Relating to the Carriage o f Goods 
by Sea 1924 as revised by the Convention Concerning Certain Rules Relating to Carriage o f Goods by 
Sea 1968.
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"customary" and "legislative" instruments, advantages and disadvantages of each 
one of these methods; and (2) unification/codification of law of LCs at an 
international level.
2. UNCITRAUS ACTIVITIES
2.1. General background
UNCITRAL's decision to include in its work programme, as a priority, the 
topic of the Standby letters of credit (SLCs) goes back to 1978.^® SLCs have been 
used in the USA for many years and have been introduced for the first time under 
Articles 1 and 2 of the UCP 400 (1983) by the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC); a similar policy has been followed in UCP 500 (1993). Since UNCITRAL has 
begun a study related to SLCs, it is worth to consider the relevant issues (like 
background, definition, function, classification, similarities of SLCs with and 
differences from the traditional letters of credit (LCs)) as well as bank guarantees 
(BGs) in order to find more about SLCs, their importance in international trade, and 
practical difficulties (like fraud) which may arise as a result of using them. In that 
respect, see the relevant discussion in Chapter III (above).
In brief a standby letter of credit is accepted worldwide as a device which is 
similar, in principle, to traditional commercial letters of credit (LCs);^® therefore, 
SLCs' provisions may be said to be the same as for LCs. This view has been 
formally accepted by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) for more than a 
decade^^ and supported by courts in the United Kingdom^®, as well as in the
For details concerning UNCITRAL's activities about SLCs see Chapter III, section A.2.1.3 (above); 
Bergsten, Eric E., "A  new Regime fo r International Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of 
C redit: The U N C ITR A L D ra ft Convention on Guaranty Le tte rs". The International Lawyer, Vol. 27, 
No. 4, Winter 1993, p. 859 [hereinafter referred to as Bergsten]; UNCITRAL, "Reports o f the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the w ork o f its twenty-eight session, 2-26 Mav 
1995. General Assembly O ffic ia l Records- Fifteen Session Supplimcnt No. 17 (A /50/17)", United 
Nations, New York, 1995.
See Chapter III, Section B .l (above).
See Articles 1 and 2 o f UCP 400 (1983) and UCP 500 (1994); similarly, look at UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988, 
supra (f.n. 16), at p. 53, paras. 51, and 53 to 56 which is pointed out: "The international rules most 
commonly referred to in stand-by letters o f credit are the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits. While this practice developed under previous versions o f UCP, the 1983 revision (ICC Publication
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u sa /® while concerning the BGs the law is not identical in these countries. 
Referring to such a clear fact, it has been suggested by the WG that the future 
studies should include issues related also to LCs/^
No. 400, reproduced in annex II  to A/CN.9/251) now specifically covers stand-by letters o f credit. [...] No 
rules or guidelines are offered for determining which o f the articles o f UCP are in fact applicable to a stand­
by letter o f credit and, i f  they are applicable, to what extent. The answer has to be sought by examining the 
purpose and scope o f each provision and then judging its suitability for this functionally different type o f 
credit. While questions o f applicability may be easily answered at a general level, there remains a 
considerable amount o f uncertainty when it comes to concrete issues. [...] Generally applicable are, for 
example, the general provisions and definitions set forth in articles 1 to 6, the rules on the form and 
notification o f credits (articles 7 to 14) and the imposition or exclusion o f liabilities and responsibilities o f 
banks (article 15 to 21). O f these provisions, article 3 and 6 are o f particular relevance to stand-by credits in 
that they establish and underline the independence or autonomy o f the letter o f credit. As an important 
complement, article 4 provides that "all parties concerned deal in documents, and not in goods, services 
and/or other performances to which the documents may relate"; the refrence to services and.performances as 
well as goods reflects the wide coverage o f UCP, including its extension to stand-by credits. [...] In general, 
the provisions that would not be applicable include those on transport documents, insurance documents and 
commercial invoices (articles 22 to 42), which are geared to the traditional documentaiy credit in a sales 
transaction. However, those provisions may be relevant to a stand-by letter o f credit operating as a secondary 
payment (see above, para. 30). [...] The miscellaneous provisions o f UCP(articles 43 to 53) combine 
applicable and non-applicable rules. This may happen even within one and the same article; for example, 
article 44 deals with partial drawings that may occur in stand-by operations and with partial shipments that 
are unlikly to occur. In respect o f a number o f these articles, no certainty exists as to whether they are 
applicable to stand-by letters o f credit. To mention only one example, the question has arisen (and is 
currently before the ICC Commission on Banking Technique and Practice) whether subparagraph a) o f 
article 47 governing the period o f time for presentation o f documents and their refusal after the expiry date is 
applicable to a stand-by letter o f credit."; for a different view see Schmitthoff, C.M., "The New U niform  
Customs fo r Letters o f C red it". JBL, 1983, p. 193, at p. 195 in which the late Professor Schmitthoff was o f 
the view that the UCP 1983 Revision should never have been extended to include standby credits.
Edward Owen Eng. L td. v. Barclays Bank I i i t ' l . [1978J1 QB 159, pp. 170-171 (CA); Bergsten, supra 
(f.n. 25), at p. 866 said: "In the fundamental case in the United Kingdom, independent guarantees. labelled 
as performance bonds or performance guarantees, were said by the Court o f Appeal to be "virtually 
promissory notes payable on demand" and furthermore, "the performance guarantee stands on a s im ilar 
footing to a letter o f c re d it.""  [Emphasis added]
Bergsten, supra (f.n. 25), p. 864, f.n. 22 and 23.
Horn, Norbert, "Securing international commercial transactions: standby letters o f credit, bonds, 
guarantees and s im ilar sureties". Horn and Schmitthoff, supra (f.n. 4), p. 275 [hereinafter referred to as 
Horn's article], at p. 279 pointed out: "American banks do not issue guarantees because they are not 
expressly authorised to do so by federal and state banking laws and prevailing authority concludes that 
issuing guarantees would thus be u ltra  vires the banks. British banks, on the other hand, issue such a 
guarantees including those to pay "on first demand.""; and at the same page continued: "In the common law 
o f both the United States and Great Britain, a guarantee is a "secondary obligation" securing an underlying 
debt and depends upon conditions and defences in the underlying contract. British common law recognises, 
in addition, a surety which creates a primary obligation independent from the underlying contract, which is 
termed " in de m n ity "."[Emphasis added]; for more details see Harfield, H., "B ank credits and 
acceptances". 5th ed., 1974, pp. 154-55 [hereinafter referred to as Harfield]; Williams, K.P., "O n demand
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It seems that the view accepted by the WG is important for the following 
reasons: firstly, the view is emphasised that SLCs are similar to LCs as to principles 
and comparable functions. Therefore, they should be governed by the same rules 
and provisions. Secondly, it is indicated that rules and provisions about LCs are not 
adequate to deal with different legal issues (e.g. fraud, bank's security, applicable 
law, and so on) which may arise in the wake of international letter of credit 
transactions;®® therefore, there is a real need for providing a uniform law in this 
respect too.
2.2. Analysis of the UNCITRAL's stand concerning SLCs
Although in the light of what has been submitted previously (Chapter III), it 
becomes obvious that SLCs have more similarities with LCs rather than BGs 
(namely similarities in principles, operations and relevant rules as well as provisions 
which are accepted by British and American courts as well as by international 
business communities like the ICC),®® UNCITRAL has preferred to study SLCs
and conditional performance bonds". JBL, 1981, p. 8 [hereinafter referred to as Williams], and JBL, 1978, 
p. 58; Border Nat'I Bank v. American Nat’ l. Bank. 282 F. 73, 75 (5th Cir. 1992).
UNCITRAL Y.B., 1989, supra (f.n. 17), at p. 195, para. 125; as to rules o f interpretation it is suggested 
that, "the uniform law, assuming that it would cover commercial letters o f credit, should accord priority to 
UCP, as referred to in almost eveiy letter o f credit, over any inconsistent provision o f the uniform law. Such 
a rule o f priority could refer to party autonomy or to universal customaiy law, i f  an express mention o f UCP 
appeared undesirable. It was noted in reply that the suggestion related to the issues that had been discussed 
earlier, namely, the possible limits to party autonomy and the advisability o f avoiding conflicts between the 
uniform law and UCP (see, in particular, above, paragraphs 60, 66-67). It was stated that both issues were o f 
continuing importance throughout the prepration o f the uniform law and that the suggestion o f according 
general priority to UCP could thus not appropriately be decided upon at the current stage o f the preparatory 
work," [UNCITRAL Y.B., 1990, supra (f.n. 20), p. 237, para. 101]; on the other hand, see UNCITRAL Y.B., 
1993, part A, supra (f.n. 18), at p. 142, para. 33, said: "An alternative suggestion was not to reference any 
typical purpose but to list those independent undertakings that should not be covered. Examples o f such 
undertakings include insurance contracts and, especially, commercial letters o f credit, which the Working 
Group again decided not to cover in the draft Convention, without thereby precluding consideration at a later 
statge as to the appropriateness o f the finally agreed provisions for commercial letters o f credit."
See Section B.3, Chapter X I (shortcomings o f the UCP 500), below.
See foot notes 27-29 (above); Horn's article, supra (f.n. 30), at p. 282 stated: "Standby letter o f credit as 
[...] an independent and p rim ary obligation o f the bank [...] is an offspring o f trad itiona l commercial 
letter o f c red it, which has been in worldwide use for years and is governed by the Uniform Customs and 
Practices for Documentary Credits [...] and by the Uniform Commercial Code. The standby letters have been 
created as a substitute fo r guarantees which, as mentioned, are ultra vires American Banks. [...] letters o f 
credit create a primaiy obligation on the bank, independent o f the underlying commercial transaction and its
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beside BGs. A point which should be noticed is: for what reason(s) did UNCITRAL 
adopt such a view? The reason for it is said to be their common operational legal 
character and functional equivalence®"* and UNCITRAL has taken the view that 
there are more difference between SLCs and LCs than BGs.®® This view is in 
contradiction with the facts, as admitted even by the Commission, namely in 
national law SLCs and LCs are treated similarly.®® Therefore, for reasons pointed 
out above and elsewhere (Chapter III, Section B above) it is more preferable that 
rules and provisions related to SLCs and LCs be studied together and one 
international set of standards govern both of them®  ^ because, by adopting a
conditions and defences. Standby letters share this qua lity." [Emphasis added]; Section 5-105(l)(a) and 
Section 5-114 o f UCC (1972 version).
"The view was expressed that the stand-by letter o f credit should be dealt w ith clearly separately from the 
independent guarantee because o f its different functional origin. The prevailing view, however, was in favour 
o f a jo in t treatment in view o f their common operational legal character and functional equivalence." 
[UNCITRAL Y.B., 1990, supra (f.n. 20), p. 229, para. 14]; see also previous notes and UNCITRAL Y.B. 
1993, part a, supra (f.n. 18), p. 140, para 13.
"By its function and puipose, the stand-by letter o f credit différés considerably from the traditional 
commercial letter o f credit or documentary credit and is equivalent to independent bank guarantees and 
similar indemnities. [...] As regards stand-by letters o f credit, it is often doubtful whether a given provision o f 
the law on letters o f credit is applicable, i.e. appropriate in view o f the special nature and purpose o f the 
stand-by letter o f credit. As regards guarantees, uncertainty arises from the fact that the autonomy or 
independent nature o f the undertaking is not yet recognised in fu ll and firm ly established in all 
jurisdictions." [UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988, supra (f.n. 16), p. 57, paras. 91 and 92]
"Stand-by letters o f credit and guarantees (or bonds), while functionally equivalent or at least similar, 
differ as to their legal treatment for the formal reason that the stand-by letter o f credit is a letter o f credit. 
Thus, the laws and rules governing documentary letters o f credit would generally be applicable to stand-by 
letters o f credit. [...] For guarantees and bonds, the legal framework is different. As discussed below (Part II, 
B), it is characterized by a varied development o f national laws, in particular case law, towards recognizing 
the independent (non-accessory) legal nature o f the guarantee and by attempts to prepare uniform niles." 
[UNCITRAL Y.B., 1988, supra (f.n. 16), p. 47, para. 5]
It is a sensitive issue in the USA; for instance, it is recorded that: "A t its egitheenth session (A/CN.9/372), 
the Working Group [...] had before it draft rules on stand-by letters o f credit as proposed by the United States 
o f America (A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.77). It was noted that those draft rules were based on the assumption that 
independent guarantees and stand-by letters o f credit would be dealt with in separate parts o f  the future 
Convention. It was agreed that the need for such treatment in separate parts could appropriately be 
determined only when it was clear which, and how many, provisions should be applicable exclusively to 
bank guarantees or to stand-by letters o f credit. The Working Group thus focused its discussion on the draft 
articles prepared by the Secretariat, with special attention to the question whether a given rule was 
appropriate for both types o f undertakings or for only one o f them." [UNCITRAL, "C . Report o f the 
W orking  G roup on In ternational Contract Practices on the w ork o f its nineteenth session (New York, 
24 Mav-4 June 19931 fA/CN.9/374 and C o r r . l l  [O rig inal: English]". Yearbook o f the United Nations
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different approach (as accepted by the UNCITRAL), a new area of conflict of laws 
would emerge between UCP 500 and the future set of standards provided by 
UNCITRAL. In other words, the international business communities would be faced 
with two sets of standards for SLCs, namely a first one (UCP published by the ICC) 
would treat them like LCs while under a second type (the future UNCITRAL's set of 
standards) SLCs would be accepted as being similar to BGs/® Although there may 
be similar provisions about SLCs in both sets of standards, there would also be 
distinctions between them, as something in contradiction with the task of 
UNCITRAL, namely, providing a more unified front regarding an international 
payment system.®® So, a question may arise: what could be the solution of the 
UNCITRAL Commission in order to prevent the emergence of such a problem? As 
far as the ICC is concerned it has announced its' disagreement with the present 
trend adopted by the UNCITRAL since the ICC is more in favour of treating SLCs 
and LCs together and separate from BGs/® it seems, therefore, it is possible to
Commission on International Trade Law, Vol. X X IV , 1993, pp. 175-189 [hereinafter referred to as 
UNCITRAL Y.B., 1993, part c], p. 176, para. 7 and UNCITRAL Y.B., 1993, part a, supra (f.n. 18), p. 140, 
para. 13]; for a different view see Buckley, Ross p., "T H E  1993 R EV IS IO N  OF TH E U N IFO R M  
CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR D O C U M ENTARY C R ED ITS ". Geo. Wash, J. In f 1 L. &  Econ., Vol. 
28, 1995, p. 265 [hereinafter referred to as Buckley], at pp. 299-300 pointed out: "The principal weakness in 
this approach o f the ICC is that the fraud Exception needs to be more expeansive for guaranty letters and 
standby credits than for trade-related documentary credits because fraud is so much easier to engineer in the 
guaranty or standby situation. With a trade credit, a number o f parties usually need to contribute to the 
documents to be presented to trigger payment. With a standby credit or guaranty letter, payment is usally 
triggered by the certificate o f only one party, so a fraud is much easier to effect." [Emphasis added]
A similar confusion would be arise concerning BGs; for instance, Buckley, ibid., at p. 299, referred to 
such a matter and said: "The ICC, on the other hand, has promulgated the Uniform Rules for Demand 
Guarantees, and has chosen to leave standby credits to be regulated by the UCP."; ICC Pub. No. 458, 
"U n ifo rm  Rules fo r Demand Guarantees". 1992; see relevant discussions in Chapter III, Section A.2.1.2 
(above).
See foot note 5 (above) for paragraph (a) o f the UNCITRAL's mandate.
ICC, "IC C 's  opinion on U N CITR A L's d ra ft convention on independent guarantees and stand-by 
letters o f c re d it" , a document published by the ICC, about the UNCITRAL's sessions held in New York, 
9th-20th January, 1995 that in its foreword pointed out: "On November 1988, the ICC was given the 
opportunity to make a presentation to UNCITRAL's Working Group on Independent Guarantees and Stand­
by Letters o f Credit, on the ICC's Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees. A t that time, the ICC's
between the ICC's Rules and U N C ITR AL's Convention or Model Law on Stand-by Credits and 
Guarantees." [Emphasis added]; in that respect see also ICC, "IC C 's Second Opinion on U N C ITR A L's
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suggest that the ICC remove SLCs from the ambit of the UCP as a solution and that 
reconciliation should be effected between the ICC and the UNCITRAL concerning 
their different approaches about SLCs/^ but as a remote possibility under the 
present circumstances. In treating this point different approaches may be 
envisaged, as follows.
One solution for overcoming the above difficulty is to extend the scope of 
standards to cover issues related to LCs under the future uniform law. This idea, as 
pointed out above, was noted by the UNCITRAL Commission, but because 
fundamental distinctions exist between LCs and BGs (namely, under LCs banks' 
undertaking is primary and is independent from an underlying contract while it is not 
so under BGs), different views were submitted during discussions in the Working 
Group and a final decision on that issue was left for later sessions. Another solution 
for tackling the above mentioned problems is to treat SLCs and LCs together 
(because of their similarities), completely separate from BGs. As to the question 
under consideration, there are four possibilities before the Commission, as follows: 
(1) it may be decided by the Commission that the future set of standards should be 
limited to issues relevant to SLCs and BGs; (2) it may be decided that beside SLCs 
and BGs, issues related to LCs be covered by the future set of standards; (3) the 
view suggested by the American delegation, namely, that issues related to SLCs 
and BGs should be studied separately and different sets of standards should be 
prepared for them would be accepted by the Commission; and (4) it may be 
accepted by the Commission that both SLCs and LCs are similar to each other and 
hence they should be treated separately from BGs.
It seems that both the first and the second possibilities would solve part of 
the problem but, at the same time, would cause more confusion and conflicts of
D ra ft convention on independent guarantees and stand-by letters o f c re d it", a document published by 
the ICC, about the UNCITRAL's sessions held in Vienna, 2-26 May 1995 (Document A/CN.9/408, 15 
February 1995).
Buckley, supra (f.n. 37), at p. 299 said: " An even more cffectious solution would be to remove standby 
credits from  the ambit o f the UCP." [Emphasis added]
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laws between parties to an international sale transaction. Firstly, as mentioned 
above, because of two sets of standards SLCs (one under UCP and the other one 
under UNCITRAL's standards), business communities would be confused about 
SLCs and their legal nature and purposes. Secondly, by having two sets of 
standards about one instrument, a different treatment as well as a different body of 
rules and provisions would emerge in different parts of the world of commerce; this 
would in total contrast to UNCITRAL's effort, at present, namely, for providing a 
uniform set of standards about SLCs and BGs under the title of "guaranty letters"."^^
The third of the above cited possibilities would, on the other hand, provide 
more certainty since it would be based on a reality accepted by the business 
communities, namely, SLCs as being something different from BGs and thus 
treating them differently. However, such a solution would still be subject to the same 
critique, namely, it would not solve the problem of conflict of laws arising by having, 
as mentioned above, two sets of standards about SLCs. Moreover, under such a 
suggestion only issues about SLCs would be considered but LCs' issues, which 
include the larger and more important part of documentary letters of credit system 
as an international method of payment, would be left untouched.
The above mentioned fourth possibility, in contrast to the other three 
approaches, would open a new direction for the Commission in order to reach its 
goal satisfactorily. After a decision by the Commission that SLCs and BGs should 
be dealt with separately (with a possibility under 3 above), it would be vital for the 
UNCITRAL Commission in its final consideration to take the view that the scope of 
uniform law should not be limited only to SLCs and issues related to traditional 
commercial letters of credit should also be included in any future international set of 
standards about documentary credits. By doing so any cause of confusion and 
conflict of laws would be, on the one hand, removed from the beginning and, on the 
other, a more complete, reliable, and predictable set of standards regarding 
documentary letters of credit (for both LCs and SLCs) would emerge in order to help
UNCITRAL Y.B., 1993, part A, supra (f.n. 18), pp. 140-41, paras. 17 to 19.
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international business communities. Similarly, by adopting such an approach 
UNCITRAL would be able to fulfil its task successfully by presenting a more 
acceptable and unified set of standards regarding documentary letters of credit.
As to what the final form of the future uniform law should be, namely, whether 
in the form of a "model law" or "convention", this is an issue on which the Working 
Group has not reached any decision, and as has left the issue for further 
consideration at a later stage. This issue is discussed in a later part of the present 
study. Prior to that, it is necessary to have a further discussion regarding the socio­
economic situation of the international trade world at present. This is the issue 
considered in the next section below.
SECTION B: NEED FOR TINTFTCATTON OF THE LAW  RELATED TO 
LCs
1. INTRODUCTION
As shown in section A of the present Chapter, the activities of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) relating to preparation 
of a draft convention on standby letters of credit (SLCs) and bank guarantees (BGs), 
the scope of such a convention, and its possible impact on existing rules and 
provisions affecting documentary letters of credit (LCs), particularly Article 5 of UCC 
in the USA and UCP 500, clearly indicate the readiness of the trading and 
commercial communities around the world to consider possible further integration 
between different national laws on SLCs and BGs. To what extent is the current 
situation of the world of commerce ready for another change, namely, considering 
possible uniformity in international law related to LCs? In that respect reference is 
made to the meaning of unification, available techniques for achieving the 
unification/ codification of the law on documentary credits, and obstacles which may 
endanger the uniformity of international rules; but before that, the current condition 
of the world of commerce is considered below.
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2. THE WORLD OF COMMERCE; CURRENT CONDITIONS
2.1. Historical background
"For ever since men began to organize their common life in political 
communities they have felt the need of some system of rules, however rudimentary, 
to regulate their intercommunity relations","^  ^ and as ever, people living in different 
parts of the globe have similar basic needs like procuring food, clothes, housing, 
health, education, etc. It is obvious that no community is able to produce all its 
needs alone and it is essential for each community to establish some sort of 
exchange and trading relationship with other communities. This involves the buying 
and selling of goods and of services and having commercial and trade relations 
between countries as an old type of co-existence between human communities 
around the world.
With the rise of modern states in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, 
governments have Invested authority and power in ruling and providing law and 
o r d e r . W h i l e  borders were drawn by new states in Europe and political 
developments concerned national interest and sovereignty for each state,
Brierly, J. L., "T H E  L A W  OF NATIONS. AN  IN TR O D UC TIO N  TO TH E IN T E R N A T IO N A L 
L A W  OF P E A C E ". Oxford, 6th ed., 1963, p. 1 [hereinafter referred to as Brierly],
See Brierly, ibid., at pp. 1-6, for origin o f international law and rise o f modern state in Europe and role of 
feudalism and church in that respect.
For more details about the doctrine o f sovereignty see Brierly, supra (f.n. 43), at pp. 7-23; and at pp. 8-9 
o f the same reference it is said: "[...] a new theory o f the nature o f state, the doctrine o f sovereignty. This 
was first explicitly formulated in 1576 in the De Republica o f Jean Bodin, and since sovereignty has become 
the central problem in the study both o f the nature o f the modern state and the theory o f international law [...] 
The essential manifestation o f sovereignty (prim um  ac praecipuum caput majestatis) he thought, is the 
power to make the laws (legem universis ac singulis civibus dare posse), and since the sovereign makes the 
laws, he clearly cannot to be bound by the laws that he makes (m ajestas est summa in cives ac subditos 
legibusque solute potestas)," [Emphasis added]; at p. 126 o f the same reference about the meaning o f 
"sta te" said: "A  state is an institu tion , that is to say, it is a system o f relations which men establish among 
themselves as a means o f securing certain objects, o f which the most fundamental is a system o f order within 
which their activities can be carried on."; and as to the meaning o f territorial sovereignty it is said by the 
same writer that: "A t the basis o f international law lies the notion that a state occupies a definite part o f the 
surface o f the earth, w ithin which it normally exercises, subject to the limitations imposed by international 
law, jurisdiction over persons and things to the exclusion o f the jurisdiction o f other states. When a state 
exercises an authority o f this kind over a certain territory it is popularly said to have ‘‘sovereignty" over the 
territoi-y [...]." [Emphasis added]
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promoting the identity of each state as well as the effectiveness of governmental 
authority, other functions were forcing states to maintain mutual relations. One such 
factor has been, not least, the role of businessmen and traders from different states 
in keeping doors open for relations between different countries.'^® This holds also in 
our time. European states have accepted, as a principle, the notion of co-operation 
with each other and such acceptance has promoted the rise of international law 
(public and private) in general, and international commercial law in particuiar."^^
A similar process has happened in Britain. For instance, before the time of 
Lord Justice Mansfield (1756) commercial law was international in real sense, 
namely, the laws and practices concerning the commercial law in London, Paris and 
Venice were much the same;"^ ® but Lord Justice Mansfield integrated the 
commercial laws and practices into common law and created a systematic body of 
commercial law since the sphere of commercial law was extended from foreign to 
domestic trade'^  ^ and commercial law was regarded as a kind of natural law of
Brierly, supra (f.n. 43), at pp. 6-7 stated: "[...] among these causes may be mentioned (1) the impetus to 
commerce and adventure caused by the discovery o f America and the new route to the indies; (2) the 
common intellectual background fostered by the Renaissance; (3) the sympathy felt by co-religionist in 
different states for one another, from which arose loyalty transcending the boundaries o f states; and (4) the 
common feeling o f revolution against war, caused by the savagery with which the wars o f religion were 
waged. A ll these causes co-operated to make it certain that the separate state could never be accepted as the 
final and perfect form o f human association, and that in the modern as in the medieval world it would be 
necessary to recognize the existence o f a wider unity."
Brierly, supra (f.n. 43), p. 7; and the same writer pointed out some definition regarding states' relations to 
each other as following; "Contractual engagements between states are called by various names- treaties, 
conventions, pacts, acts, declarations, protocols. Non o f these terras has an absolutely fixed meaning; but a 
treaty suggests that the most formal kind o f agreement; a convention or a pact generally, but not always, an 
agreement less formal or less important; an act generally means an agreement resulting from a formal 
conference and summing up its results; a declaration is generally used o f a law-declaring or law-making 
agreement, e.g. the Declarations o f Paris or London, but such agreements are equally often called 
conventions, e.g. the Hague Conventions; protocol is a word with many meanings In diplomacy, denoting 
the minutes o f the proceedings at an international conference, an agreement o f less formal kind, or often 
supplementary or explanatory addendum to another treaty, e.g. the Geneva Protocol o f 1924, so called 
because intended to amend the Covenant." [Emphasis added]
Baker, "The law merchant and the common law before 1700". Cambridge Law Journal, 1979, p. 295, 
concerning the nature o f commercial law at the time o f Sir Edward Coke (1552-1632).
Schmitthoff, C.M., "M odern trends in English commercial la w ". Sartryck ur (Tidskrift av Juridiska 
Foreningen i Finland) 1957, Haft 6, reprinted in the "C live  M . Schm ittho ffs selected essays on
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mankind by the same Lord Just ice.Such integration, however, caused a situation 
in which commercial law lost its international character and was completely 
absorbed by English common law. In that respect, commercial law moved from the 
level of international, universal, cosmopolitan custom into the orbit of the national 
law of England^^ until it finally became part of It in the 18th century.^^
2.2. New age of co-operation between states: Moving from inter­
national private law towards transnational commercial law
As different conditions exist in different countries as to living standards, 
customs and traditions, ethical values, public institutions as well as private law have 
not been uniform between states; and different legal systems have emerged.This
international trade law ", edited by Cliia-Jui Cheng, Martinus N i jh o ff  Publishers, 1988, p. 5 [hereinafter 
referred to as Schm itthoff s article 1957].
In one o f his judgements L.J. Mansfield said: "The mercantile law, in this respect, is the same all over the 
world. For from the same promises, the same conditions o f reasons and justice must universally be the 
same." [Pellv v. Roval Exchange Assurance Co.. (1757), Burr. 341, at p. 347.]
Schmitthoffs article 1957, supra (f.n. 49), at p. 6 referred to such a matter by saying that "Historically, 
commercial law was absored by the common law. Originally, commercial law in Western Europe was 
distinctly the law, or more recently the usage or practice, o f a class people, namely o f cosmopolitan 
merchants who frequented the fairs and pots o f various European countries, usually cari-ying their wares with 
them."
That developments was not restricted to England but occured everywhere in the 18th and 19th centuries 
when the national state became a reality." [Schmitthoffs article 1957, supra (f.n. 49), at p. 6]; Goldstajn, A., 
"The new law merchant reconsidered", in Schmitthoff, C.M., "Law  and international trade". 1973, p. 
171 [hereinafter referred to as Goldstajn], at p. 174 said: "Before the 19th century the movement for the 
unification o f law took, for example, on the national level that every country attempted to reduce the 
variety o f local and regional customs. One o f the best example in this field is Britain "Where a common law 
(Commune Ley) was imposed upon the whole kingdom in the Middle Ages." [Emphasis added]; Lando, Ole, 
"Princip les o f European Contract Law: An A lternative to or a Precursor o f European Legisla tion?". 
The American Journal o f Comparative Law, Vol. 40, No. 3, 1992, p. 573, at p. 574 (concerning the situation 
in France, Italy, and Germany)[herinafter referred to as Lando].
Megrah, Maurice, "A  uniform  code fo r documentary credit practice?". International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, Vol. 8, Jan. 1959, p. 41 [hereinafter referred to as Megrah 1959], at p. 42 concerning the 
difficulties o f unification o f international law many years ago pointed out: "A  more fundamental reason fo r 
lack o f unification, however, may be the basically d ifferent systems o f law . Broadly speaking, the legal 
systems o f the western world in this respect fall into two groups; the law o f British Commonwealth is at 
bottom the common law o f England, virtually unwritten, whereas those o f European and south American 
countries are largely codified and derive from very different beginnings. It cannot have been expected, 
therefore, that the two sides would find it easy to come together, even i f  the question o f unification in the 
case o f negotiable instruments law had been urgent, which probably it was not." [Emphasis added]
309
was the situation until the early years of the 20th century when co-operation 
between states began to improve the law of international t r a d e . S u c h  an effort, 
however, was not successful in unifying international commercial law in a real 
sense, namely, as a law which is understood and applied similarly everywhere. 
Reasons for this related partly to gaps between industrial and non-industrial 
countries concerning their strength in economy and trade and partly because of the 
increasing role of states in regulating their international affairs from a national point 
of view mostly based on national rather than international interests. So, a large part 
of international law, at the time formed upon mutual interests between two or more 
states, left issues of differences to be solved by rules of conflict of laws. Therefore, 
the possibility that a similar issue would be decided differently in different jurisdiction 
was high. This was the status of international private law until 1950s.
2.2.1. Transnational commercial law (lex m ercatoria)
After the Second World War several factors were the cause for the birth of a 
new branch of international law called transnational law, which is not a branch or 
part of public international law; it derives its authority from the sovereign power of 
national law givers.There are reasons for the rise of a new age of lex mercatoria, 
as follows.
For instance see Chapter I, Section B .l (history o f LCs) above, and early efforts concerning the unification 
o f law o f bills o f exchange, promissoiy notes and cheques in 1930s.
I f  we look at the various systems o f national law, we note that they essentially consist o f two types o f legal 
rules; (1) some o f them are mandatory in cliaraclite r. such as criminal law, fam ily law and so forth, i.e. to 
be accepted by the people affected by them, whether they like them or not; and (2) the others are optional, 
for example: contract law. O f course there are maiidatoiy rules in the law o f contract, e.g. public policy, but 
it is mostly governed by the principle o f the autonomy o f the parties' w ill or as it is called the principle o f 
freedom o f contract in common law countries. However, this is the area in which a transnational law o f 
international trade has developed and can be evolved. This is essentially founded on a parallelism o f action in 
the various national legal systems. The aim o f this parallelism o f action is to facilitate the conduct o f 
international trade by establishing uniform  rules or law for it. Another aim o f this parallelism, which is o f 
great importance to international trade, is a far-reaching reduction o f the national rules o f conflict o f laws 
and their substitution by a uniform, worldwide legal system o f international trade regulation; transnational 
law o f international trade in the broadest sense has been defined by Professor Jessup as "all law that 
regulates actions or events that transcends national frontiers. [Jessup, "Transnational L a w ", 1965, p. 2; see 
also Jessup, "The concept o f transnational la w ". Columbia J. Transnational L., Vol. 3, 1964]; Schmitthoff, 
C.M., "N ature  and evolution o f the transnational law o f commercial transaction". Horn and 
Schmitthoff, supra (f.n. 4), pp. 19-31 [hereinafter referred to as Schmitthoff 1982], at p. 19 stated: "One o f 
the outstanding features o f legal development in all trading countries o f the world is the general acceptance
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2.2.1.1. Economie integration
Reconstruction plans for countries with economies and social infrastructures 
damaged as a result of the Second World War (1939-1945), economic prosperity, 
and higher oil prices are some of reasons why more contacts and co-operation 
between different states have increasingly developed In recent decades.^®
2.2.1.2. Technological advances
As a result of unprecedented progress in science and technology the world 
has become a smaller place. Mass production of Industrial and agricultural goods 
calls for larger markets and improved means of distribution. Furthermore, 
technological improvements in the field of transportation and communications, e.g.. 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) have accelerated the growth of international 
transactions in recent decades.
2.2.1.3. Birth of new states
New states have emerged as a result of independence movements in 1960s 
and 1970s; as a result, many third world countries have become responsible and 
important partners in international commerce. With the changing political map of the 
world on the one hand, and economic integration of the world on the other 
international trade has expanded to new markets. New independent states, looking
o f common principles in the law relating to international commercial transaction. This development has been 
described as the emergence o f a transnational law o f international trade, a new lex mercatoria. I have 
attempted to examine the theoritical basis o f this development in my commercial law in changing economic 
climate and the practical aspect o f it in Schm ittliofP s export trade [7th ed. X980]. the law and practice of 
international trade." [Emphasis and bracket added); Horn, supra (f.n. 4), pp. 11-16; for more details 
concerning transnational law or lex mercatoria see relevant discussion in Section B.3.1 o f the present chapter 
below.
Schmitthoff 1982, ibid., p. 20; Horn, supra (f.n. 4), at p. 4 concerning the opening o f new markets said: 
"Important new markets for technology have been opened in oil-exporting countries since the remarkable 
increase in bargaining strength and income o f the OPEC countries in the 1970s. Another remarkable 
development is in international financial markets. Starting with the rise o f the so-called eurocapital market 
in the mid-1960s, new international capital and new financial markets with their centres in Europe and, later, 
in Asia, have developed." [Emphasis added]; Langen, E., "F rom  private international law _to 
transnational commercial law ". The Comparative and International Law Journal o f Southern Africa, 1969, 
p. 314.
As to EDI and its relevant issues see Chapter IX  (above).
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for a fairer and equitable system of international trade law, and their bargaining 
power^® as well as their attitude towards playing an active role in international 
trade^® have been effective causes of changes.
2.2.1.4. Role of formulating agencies
It is not always true that differences existing in international law are 
exclusively the result of states. In many instances, divergences existing between 
different countries, at least as far as private law is concerned, have not been 
generated by the absolute character of state sovereignty but the absence of 
international institutions to co-ordinate the work of different legislators relating to 
international private law. This may be the cause of uncertainty since some national 
legislators have been unaware of each other's existence.Since the early decades 
of the current 20th century efforts have been made by governments to remove 
obstacles and prepare the way for harmonising and possibly unifying sets of 
standards regarding issues related to international private law. The establishment of
See Horn, supra (f.n. 4), at p. 5 said; "The rise o f the OPEC cartel has dramatically changed the 
bargaining power o f OPEC member countries. In this case, the old rule that a technology recipient country is 
normally in a weaker bargaining position, is no longer true. A t the same time, the banllance o f payment and 
international debt position o f many oil-importing countries has dramatically deteriorated." [Emphasis added]
"A  large number o f commercial transactions with third world countries are concluded and carried out with 
governmental agencies as parties. In many o f these countries, special legislation on foreign trade and, in 
particular, on the transfer o f technology, prescribes the precise terms o f the contracts for these transactions. 
In addition, in many cases public bidding procedures are instituted, which leave foreign contractors no 
freedom to bargain over the contractual terms. Instead, national legislation and the administrative practice o f 
the authorities involved decide on the contractual patterns, unless special circumstances lead to special 
arrangements." [Emphasis added; Horn, supra (f.n. 4), p. 6]; Wallace Jr, Don, "Tnternational agencies fo r 
the form ulation o f transnational economic law: a comment about methods and thecliniques". Horn and 
Schmitthoff, supra (f.n. 4), p. 81 [hereinafter referred to as Wallace], at p. 81 concerning the role o f states in 
modern societies stated: "As the law develops [...] the line that once existed between traditional bodies o f 
private law and public law begins to blur and vanish. The state enters the market place. In the case o f 
developing countries, the government takes a paternalistic interest in the law regulating transactions with its 
private subjects." [Emphasis added]; Dolzer, supra (f.n. 6), at p. 80, referred to the same issue; Schmitthoff 
1982, supra (f.n. 55), at p. 25 referred to the role o f states in those countries o f state-planned economy and 
stated: "They are in a stronger position than market economies to achieve the unification o f legal regulation 
because trade between them is governed by a measure o f state direction unknown in the market economy 
countries." [Emphasis added]
David, Rene', "The International Institu te o f Rome fo r the Unification o f Private L a w ". Tulane Law 
Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, December 1933, pp. 406-16 [hereinafter referred to as David], at p. 406.
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the League of Nations, and then of the United Nations®  ^ and its relevant agencies 
and organisations like the UNCITRAL®^ are good examples of the willingness and 
readiness of states for more co-operation regarding public as well as private 
international affairs. Similar efforts are being made by non-governmental 
organisations like the ICC; its work deals mainly with issues related to private 
international affairs.
2.2.1.5. Role of legal scholars
Beside organisations and institutions which are active in the field of 
international law, the role of legal scholars (lawyers and academics) should not be 
underestimated®'^ since their efforts have a decisive impact on any movement 
towards unification and codification of law at an international level, in two ways: (1) 
in the drafting and negotiating process a common understanding between legal 
experts all over the world creates a sound platform for a common international
Horn, supra (f.n. 4), at p. 18 pointed out: "A  number o f international organisations and institutions o f 
varied legal status are active today in the elaboration and definition o f uniform legal rules and patterns o f 
international commerce. These activities are aimed either at the prepration o f new international "legislation", 
such as the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale o f Goods, or are aimed at the 
promulgation o f standard rules and clauses." [Emphasis added]; Ademuni-odeke, "The United Nations 
Convention on In ternational Bills o f Exchange and Promissory Notes". JBL, May 1992, pp. 281-90 
[hereinafter referred to as Ademuni]; Lookofsky, J.M., "Loose ends and contracts in international sales; 
problems in the harmonisation o f private law ru les". The American Journal o f Comparative Law, Vol. 
39, 1991, pp. 403-416 [hereinafter referred to as Lookofsky]; Feltham, J.D., "The United Nations 
Convention on Contracts fo r the International Sale o f Goods". JBL, 1981, p. 346 [hereinafter referred to 
as Feltham]; Schlechtriem, Peter, "F rom  the Hague to Vienna- Progress in Unification o f the Law of 
In ternational Sales Contracts?". Horn and Schmitthoff, supra (f.n. 4), p. 125.
International payments is one o f the three classic topics selected by the Commission at its first session in 
1968; concerning UNCITRAL's activities concerning SLCs and BGs see relevant discussions in Sections 
A .2.1.3 (Chapter III)  and A.2 (present chapter) above.
For more details about ICC’s activities look at discussions in Chapter I I I  (above); Rowe, Micheal C., 
"The  contribution o f the ICC to the development o f international trade la w ". Horn and Schmitthoff, 
supra (f.n. 4), p. 51 [hereinafter referred to as Rowe], at p. 51 said: "The International Chamber o f 
Commerce (ICC) is a non-governmental organisation, representing business internationally. Its contribution 
to the development o f international trade law arises from three main areas o f activity: the development o f 
standard rules and procedures aimed at trade facilitation in its brodest sense; co-operation and contacts with 
other organisations interested in the same subjects; the organisation o f seminars and research projects on 
business law topics."
Lando, supra (f.n. 52), at p. 577; Garro, supra (f.n. 1), at pp. 610-11.
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understanding of legal issues and related interests; (2) once a codified text have 
been agreed upon internationally, its uniform application in practice requires another 
co-operation, namely, a common understanding of legal terms and principles 
accepted in the code. Without these elements, therefore, any efforts concerning the 
unification of international law would be futile and meaningless; as a writer has 
rightly pointed out "A common language for lawyers is needed."®® Fortunately, this 
fact has been recognised for many years and in that respect international lawyers 
have become more active and have participated effectively in a number of projects 
connected to the unification of private International law through existing international 
organisations like UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, and the ICC.
In the above circumstances, co-operation between traders have increased 
internationally and as a result a new age of lex mercatoria has begun.®® While the 
modern lex mercatoria seeks to find its place in international trade there is a 
difference between the new and old eras, namely, states play an important role for 
shaping the transnational law at present, something which cannot be denied and is 
a fact of life in modern societies. This was not so in the era of old lex mercatoria 
(15th to 18th centuries).
Parallel to the expansion of international trade in recent decades, disputes 
arise in international business relations and a need for a more unified international 
set of standards becomes obvious. Although having a completely universal or 
unified law for diverse international trade relations seems impossible, at least for the 
foreseeable future,®  ^ facts of daily life also point to the need for greater uniformity
Horn, supra (f.n. 4), at p. 18; for further details see relevant discussion in Section B.3.3 o f the present 
chapter (obstacles to unification o f law) below.
see Lando, supra (f.n. 52), at p. 578 (concerning the interest o f international arbitrators in development o f 
lex mercatoria).
David, supra (f.n. 60), at p. 406 said: "The complete and universal unification o f the laws o f the various 
nations is a vain hope which cannot, for one moment, be seriously contemplated. The civilization o f the 
different countries, their living conditions, their customs and traditions, the very ethical principles which 
social relationships have as their foundation are all diverse; and in this diversity there must correspondingly 
be as great a difference in public institutions as in the field o f private law itself." Boss, Amelia H. and Fry, 
Patricia B., "D ivergent o r parallel tracks: In ternational and domestic codification o f commercial law ". 
Business Lawyer, Vol. 47, Iss. 4, Aug. 1992 [hereinafter referred to as Boss], pp. 1505-1515.
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regarding rules of international private law;®® delay in that respect causes 
uncertainty and higher costs as serious inconveniences between parties to 
international transaction.®®
3. UNIFICATION OF LAW: MEANING; TECHNIQUES; OBSTACLES
3.1. Meaning of unification of law
Law can only exist in a society. International law or the "law of nations" is not 
an exception to a "society of nations" which exists as a prior condition to any 
discussion on international law; but having a society of nations is one condition 
among others for having a unified and codified law. In order to achieve "unification" 
or "codification" of law in any sphere of international affairs, other factors should also 
be considered. For instance, there must exist a strong feeling and desire for justice 
and equality,^® deep respect for law, order, responsibility and co-operation,^^ and a
For instance, see discussion concerning the UNCITRAL's activities in Section A o f the present chapter 
above.
For example see Kozolchyk, Boris, "Towards New Customs and Practice fo r Documentary Credits; 
The Methodology o f the Proposed Revision". Commercial Law Annual, 1993, pp. 371-408 [hereinafter 
referred to as Kozolchyk 1993], at p. 394 concerning discrepancies o f documents presented under LCs and 
the cost effect o f them said: "The growth in the number o f discrepancies is a universal phenomenon. 
SITPRO, an English trade facilitation agency, recently conducted a survey which found that as many as 50% 
o f the first tenders o f documents contained discrepancies. Similar surveys conducted by this writer among 
American and German bankers placed the percentage as high as 75%."  [Emphasis added]; and at p. 399 o f 
the same reference above pointed out: "AS a result o f the distrust created by the banking practices and 
judicia l decisions described above, the cost o f processing an ord inary documentary cred it has risen more 
than tenfold in less than 10 years in the United States."  [Emphasis added]; Buckley, supra (f.n. 37), at p. 
271 ; for other details see relevant dicussion in Section B.3.2 o f Chapter X I (below).
™ Kozolchyk, ibid., at p. 382 connecting to the role o f banks in connection to LCs said: " [d]istance between 
traders and financial intermediaries accentuates the need for cooperation, and cooperation is best insured by 
reciprocity. Accordingly, an issuing bank wishing to participate regularly in the international letter o f credit 
business must not only treat the confirming, advising and negotiating banks fairly [...] but must also be 
w illing  to advise, confirm and negotiate its correspondents' credits. Indeed, the fact that today's issuer is 
tomorrow's confirmer, adviser or negotiator reinforces the need for equal treatment." [Emphasis added]
Brierly, supra (f.n. 43), at p. 42 said: "Modern science has given us vastly increased facilities and speed o f 
communications, and modern commerce has created demands for the commodities o f other nations which 
even the extravagances o f modern economic nationalism are not able to stifle. I f  human affairs were more 
wisely ordered, and i f  men were clearer-sighted than they are in seeing their own interests, it might be that 
this interdependence o f the nations would lead to a strengthening o f their feelings o f community. [...] Some 
sentiment o f shared responsibility for the conduct o f a common life is a necessary element in any system o f 
law; and the strength o f any legal system is proportionate to the strength o f such sentiment."
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vision that order and not chaos is the governing principle of the world in which 
mankind has to live as nations and governments. It is obvious that a single world 
society or community can be at present more a dream than something that be made 
into reality. This is not the issue for consideration in the present study. The point for 
discussion is whether unification or codification of private law under the current 
situation of the world, namely, as a society of nations, is something possible and 
useful. In that respect some basic questions should be raised.
3.1.1. The practical interest of unification
Life is complicated and human foresight is limited, so it is not possible for law 
(national or international) to be complete and as a set of rules and standards. 
Human societies are moving forward and there are always new situations which fall 
outside all already formulated rules. Is there then any practical interest in talking 
about the international unification of law? Generally speaking, it is accepted by 
lawyers that law cannot and does not refuse to solve a problem simply because it is 
novel. To deal properly with new situations one way is to refer to new principles 
being outside the area of existing law, which may be denied to exist while actually 
existing. It would be, moreover, not reasonable to argue that because existing law 
needs changes it is not practical to work for the unification or codification of law. A 
first result which progressive unification of law may achieve is harmonisation and 
codification of law and of general principles for providing a background for dealing 
with future problems.^^ If no such efforts had been made in the past, and none is 
undertaken in our time, society would face more difficult situations not only in 
relation to the future but also in relation to inherited problems.^® So, a fear of 
revising law because of expectedly new situations in the future does not justify the 
claim that there is no need or practical interest to work for unification or codification
Unification and harmonisation o f law are not identical. Harmonisation is less ambitious; it aims only at the 
approximation o f the fundamental principles o f the various national law but leaves undisturbed national 
divergencies in matters not regulated by the harmonising law.
Lando, supra (f.n. 52), at pp. 574-75 (need for harmonisation o f European laws).
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of the law existing between nations for the purpose of states' mutual understanding 
for coordinated action towards more certainty, predictability, and reliability on law 
operative between parties to an international transaction/'^
The complexity and shortcomings of current private international law are due 
to a number of reasons. Firstly, mostly national legal systems exist, at present, in 
the world. They vary even if they have roots, respectively, in the same sources, for 
example, in civil law, common law, socialist law, and Islamic law. Moreover, they 
take very little notice of each other in details as well as in practice while claiming to 
share common roots and principles.^® Secondly, in international disputes it is an 
accepted procedure to use domestic tools to solve questions essentially 
international and, although complicated, foreign national law could be used. To 
apply uncritically a national system of law, however correctly interpreted by a judge, 
to an international legal relationship is not a satisfactory solution. National systems 
of law are not designed for the regulation of complex international relations. It is 
desirable that these should be governed by an international system, uniformly 
understood and applied by courts, national or international, requested to consider 
such relations.^® Thirdly, the technique normally applied by states to solve
Horn, supra (f.n. 4), at p. 4 said: "International commerce based on freely negotiated contracts is still the 
driving force o f international economic co-operation and prosprity. C la rity , stability and perhaps a 
growing degree o f un ifo rm ity  in the law and practice o f international commercial contracts are a 
prerecuisite for the functioning and further development o f international commerce." [Emphasis added]
Herrmann, Gerold, "The contribution o f U N C IT R A L  to the development o f international trade la w ". 
Horn and Schmitthoff, supra (f.n. 4), pp. 35-50 [hereinafter referred to as I-Ierrmann], at p. 42 concerning the 
role o f UNCITRAL in resolving differences exist between different legalsystems regarding the issue o f 
international payment stated: "The primaiy objective o f unification in this field is to find, or lay, some 
common ground between two major systems: the c iv il law system, as shaped by the Geneva Conventions o f 
1930 and 1931 providing Uniform Laws for Bills o f Exchange and Promissoi'y Notes (ULB) and for 
Cheques (ULC), and, on the other hand, the common law system, as represented by the United Kingdom 
Bills o f Exchange Act 1882 (BEA) and the United States Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). This is not an 
easy task i f  one looks at the basis disparities in concepts and in solutions to particular issue, for example, 
forged documents."
David, Rene’ , "T H E  L E G A L  SYSTEMS OF TH E W O RLD. T H E IR  COM PARISON AND 
U N IF IC A T IO N ". International Encyclopedia o f Comparative Law, Chapter 5, The International Unification 
o f Private Law, Vol. 2, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tubingen Mouton, the Hague, Paris, Oceana 
Publication Inc., New York, 1971 [hereinafter referred to as David's legal system 1971], at pp. 13-14 said: 
"By contrast, it would be inconvenient for each court to have to apply different sets or rules for international 
and for internal relations. [...] And to classify a relationship as international or internal is far from simple, for
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international disputes, namely conflict of law itself is a source of complexity 
because of the current state of private international law with its diversity and 
corresponding uncertainty. For instance, in any international dispute the first 
question to respond should be: what is the applicable law of transaction? The 
answer will vary from national to national law and, the same legal situation may be 
treated differently by the national laws of different states. The diversity of legal 
systems is not only complicated but may also be considered to be unjust
It is also important to remember that a mere similarity in terms is not sufficient 
for uniformity in law. Also only part of a problem may be solved by using different 
and sometimes contradictory terms about the same legal notion in different legal 
systems. The argument for the unification of private international law is that the 
same legal issue should be interpreted in a similar way by judges in different legal 
systems.
In conclusion, it is preferable to refer to private international law as a better 
source of support and solutions for parties to an international transaction instead of 
having different national laws on an issue truly international in nature; formalized 
international law or a unified worldwide accepted law should be considered. National 
judges may have truly international rules anchored in their respective languages in 
familiar terms, but based on the same principles applicable to International
not every international element can reasonably be said to require submission o f the transaction to 
International law."
Gulteridge, H.C., "A  Comparative View o f the Interpretation o f Statute L a w ". Tulane Law Review, 
Vol. 8, No. 1, 1933, pp. 1-20 [hereinafter referred to as Gutteridge 1933], at p. 2 said: "Uniform ity in law, as 
Professor Beutel has pointed out, means more than a "mere similarity o f wording." Unless unification is 
accompanied by a similarity o f judicial interpretation, it may well become a pretence and be "a mere hollow 
shell" which fails to serve any useful puipose."; in order to solve the problem o f different interpretation o f 
law by judges the same writer at p. 2 o f the same reference stated: "The task o f clearing the ground, with a 
view to scientific investigation o f this problem, involves a close consideration o f the follow ing matters: 1. An 
estimate o f the extent to which the technique o f judicia l inteipretation varies in the different legal systems; 2. 
The extent to which differences in the structure o f legal institutions may affect the wight to be attached to 
judicial interpretation in different countries; 3. The difficulties in the international sense which may arise 
from the necessity o f the enactment o f the same law in several different languages."; Beutel, "The necessitv 
o f a new Technique o f In terpre ting the N .T.L.". 6 Tulane Law Review I, 2 (1931).
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transactions/® As previously pointed out, a need is felt for the preparation of a 
uniform law about standby letters of credit (SLCs) and bank guarantees (BGs)/® A 
similar need has also emerged for rules relating to traditional letters of credit 
(LCs).®®
3.1.2. The concept of unification
What does unification mean? Different meanings can be presented.
1. A first meaning of unification is that the actual rules of law are unified 
between different countries so that the same problem can have the same solution in 
every country. This definition is widely accepted by international organisations in 
charge of the unification of law, for example, UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT. As a result 
of such an understanding different model laws or international conventions have 
been drafted. However, the methods used for them are not the only ones for the 
unification of law. Beside establishing rules other possibilities such as the 
establishment of concepts, standards, and methods exist as elements for creating 
law. For having good law it Is necessary to consider various factors such as the 
ones mentioned above. As pointed out by a writer, "to separate law from its 
"infrastructure of concept", to look at it without considering the methods which 
influence its presentation, is to lose touch with reality."®  ^ Therefore, there is the
Gutteridge 1933, ibid., at p. 15 said: "A uniform law owes its existence ex hypothesi to a desire to abolish 
differences between various systems o f municipal law." [Emphasis added]
For instance see UNCITRAL Y.B., 1989, supra (f.n. 17), at pp. 194-195, para. 122 which was pointed out: 
"The Working Group recalled the preliminary deliberations by the Commission as reflected in the report on 
the twenty-first session: "While some doubts were expressed as to the practical need and usefulness o f such a 
uniform law, there was wide support for the view that successful work in this direction was desirable in view 
o f the practical problems that could only be dealt with at the statutory level. The Commission was aware o f 
the difficulties inherent in such an effort relating to fundamental concepts o f law, such as fraud or similar 
grounds for objections, and touching upon procedural matters. Nevertheless, it was felt that, in view o f 
desirability o f legal uniform ity and certainty, a serious effort should be made,."; see also p. 200, paras. 174 
and 175 o f the same reference above.
UNCITRAL Y.B., 1989, supra (f.n. 17), at p. 195, para. 125 said; "After deliberation, the Working Group 
was agreed that the uniform law should focus on independent guarantees, including stand-by letters o f credit, 
and that it should be extended to traditional letters o f credit where that was useful in view o f their 
independent nature and the need for regulating equally relevant issues."; for more details see discussion 
about UNCITRAL's activities in Sections A.2 (present chapter) and Section A .2 .1.3 (Chapter III)  above.
David's legal systems 1971, supra (f.n. 76), p. 35, para.
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possibility of gaining a degree of unification by harmonising the concepts, methods, 
and presentation of different legal systems without adapting identical legislative 
texts in different countries. Such a broad meaning of unification has supporters and 
its advantage is its flexibility since under it just principles are agreed upon under a 
convention and states are free in implementing them in a way which seems to them 
to be formally most appropriate. Another advantage of such a formula is its simplicity 
since there is no need to find words/terms which would be identical In all legal 
systems: the same meaning would be understood by different parties to an 
international transaction governed by an international adopted convention.
Nevertheless, the disadvantage of such a method appears in its lesser 
efficiency, namely, in a dispute a concept of law described by different names could 
probably cause confusion among businessmen in their daily communications using 
different terms for the same concept of law. Therefore, beside agreeing upon the 
concept underlying a given legal rule and its relevant principles as anchored in a 
convention, it may be more preferable to agree on identical terms to prevent any 
possible confusion in daily practice.®^
2. The second meaning of unification of law concerns the question whether 
the legal rules in question have their roots in one national law in preference to other 
national laws or whether a new rule is being established to govern particular legal 
relations. In other words, whether unification of international private law means the 
unification of conflict rules or unification of substantive rules. Which one of 
these methods would have more advantages?®® Generally speaking, a direct 
agreement on the substantive rules applicable to a certain relationship instead of 
agreement on the choice of national law would offer a better solution to the problem
"Codification" o f International law involves the setting down, in a comprehensive and ordered form, o f 
rules o f existing law and the approval o f the resulting text by a law determining agency. The process in 
international relations has been carried out by international conferences and by groups o f experts whose 
drafts were the subjects o f conferences sponsored.
For details concering different types o f unification o f rules see relevant discussion in Section A .4, Chapter 
X I (below).
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of unification of law: (1) there is no need to consider in an international dispute 
which national law should be applied; (2) by applying the same rule everywhere 
judges would not face the problem of unfamiliarity of another legal system and this 
would accelerate procedures and the adoption of just conclusions; the parties would 
be more certain that their particular relations would receive the same treatment 
under different legal systems. Moreover, a judge would have a more positive 
attitude towards such a uniform law accepted as part of his national law; and (3) 
another advantage of a substantive law for international transactions would be that 
international issues could be treated open mindedly and international problems 
would be seen from an international perspective rather than from a narrow national 
view. National systems of law, by contrast, generally take little account of problems 
peculiar to international relationships. As rightly pointed out by a writer, "to require 
the application of these systems (national systems of law)- by merely unifying the 
conflict rules- is to refer to systems of law which are ill adapted to these 
transactions."®"  ^ The only difficulty is that it is not always easy, in practice, to reach 
worldwide agreement over a new set of standards, partly because of a feeling that 
the new rules may put their national interest at risk, and partly because of costs in 
terms of time and money. In conclusion, the preferable approach for the unification 
of law would be the unification of substantive rules. Insofar as such a formula is not 
possible to apply, the method, namely, the unification of conflict of laws could be 
mobilised. In order to achieve a better and more functional result in the unification of 
law, the former substantive law approach should always be complemented by the 
latter method.
3.2. Methods and techniques of unification
Once it has been accepted, in principle, that the unification of international 
private law is desirable and necessary, the question can be addressed as to what 
can be done to attain it? Methods and techniques exist and they are available for
David’s legal system 1971, supra (f.n. 76), p. 38, para. 97.
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discussion in the international community to promote progress towards the 
unification of law.
3.2.1. Legislation
One of the techniques envisaged for the unification of law in international 
affairs is Internationa! legislation. One advantage of this approach is the speed 
with which legislative provisions can modify the law, owing to the mandatory nature 
of rules which legislation makes enforceable. This may suggest giving priority to the 
legislative unification of law over other available methods.
3.2.2. Practice (freedom of contract and trade usages)
Opponents of "legislation" argue that it is not the only method for unification 
of private international law. In addition, it generates less flexible rules when revision 
is needed for improvement parallel to advancing technologies, for example, in 
transportation and communications, and new issues are to be addressed in daily 
practice. It is important to consider also other techniques for the unification of law, 
namely, practices by those involved in international transactions and trade usages. 
In other words, parties to an international contract should be free to negotiate terms 
and conditions most suitable to the needs of their respective relationships. The 
notion of freedom of contract is not a strange one and modern legal systems have 
accepted it and to some degree issues related to contracts have been left to be 
agreed by the interested parties. To what extent is the practice of contracting parties 
capable of constituting a factor tending to unify the law?
Parties to a contract are free and capable of fixing, according to their needs 
and capacity, details of their transaction, for example, prices, date and place of 
delivery, type of delivery, quality and quantity of the object(s) of the contract, 
insurance, method of payment. Other points concerning the applicable law of 
contract, appropriate forum, and methods for dispute settlement to a large extent 
are left by most legal systems to the contracting parties' agreement. All the above 
points affecting contracts are related to the rights and duties of persons parties to a 
contract; they could be the cause of disputes, confusion and uncertainty if they are
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not precisely agreed upon and included in the contractual text of the transaction. For 
resolving such disputes, normally reference is made to general principles of lavi/ and 
if the contract is not subject to any international legal rules, it is decided by the 
national law of one state in accordance with the theory of conflict of laws. The will 
of parties toÉn international transaction covers only details of the deal and is limited 
to those issues which are not affected by the rule of law and public order. This is 
valid both in international as well as internal trade relations. Diversity of practices 
and trade usages and modifications or developments may also be elements of 
instability, not favourable for the unification of law, compared with the relative 
advantages of legislation, for example, in the form of an international convention.
There are some principles of law which have originated from long term, 
popular, lawful and worldwide practice and usage in a particular trade: custom, 
accepted even in international law as a source of international law.®® Nonetheless, 
custom does not match the speed, predictability and certainty promoted by 
legislation/ codification in dealing with the problems of unifying the law. Some points 
relating to terms such as International customary Instrument and International 
legislative instrument, their advantages and disadvantages are put forward in the 
next part of the study (Chapter XI).
3.3. Obstacles to the unification of law
Although governmental and non-governmental international organisations 
have invested much effort in clarifying and improving all branches of law, there are 
still issues which cause difficulty and are to be faced when efforts are made to 
prepare a suitable atmosphere for establishing a uniform law. These obstacles put 
at risk any efforts relating to the desirable unification of international rules. Some of 
those obstacles are considered below.
3.3.1. Routine and prejudice
See Article 38 o f the Statute o f International Court o f Justice (iCJ); and Section A, Chapter X I (below).
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Merchants, manufacturers, bankers, lawyers, and judges constitute a 
principal difficulty when dealing with any projects for the unification of international 
law. For their convenience, they stick to rules and methods, for the settlement of 
disputes, which belong to the past or even may constitute a main cause for the 
disparity of international law. For instance, the theory of conflict of laws has been 
accepted as the only suitable method for solving problems posed by international 
legal relations and it is applied by those who support it. While such a method would 
not be useless, as discussed previously, in resolving an international dispute, it is 
not the most suitable method for the unification of law, because its weakness is its 
reference is to national law and cannot provide a solid rock for international law in its 
true meaning, international law and international rules should originate from an 
international rather than national interest, for safeguarding impartiality as well as 
fairness in practice.®® Routine and prejudice are thus recognised as barriers on the 
way to any projects for the international unification of law.®^
3.3.2. Different substantive rules
In international relations between individuals (private international law), states 
decide how to regulate such relations, without necessarily considering what other 
states do. The result is that the same international relationship may be treated 
differently in different states, in the light of national rules of private international law 
differing from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The substantive rules governing particular 
types of legal relations differ from country to country. Again, the question of 
unification arises in order to find proper solutions to difficulties generated by different 
substantive rules resting on different ideas of justice. Admittedly, differences 
between two substantive rules may also be purely accidental and may offer different
See relevant discussions in Sections B.3.1 o f the present chapter (above) and A.4 o f Chapter X I (below).
David's legal system 1971, supra (f.n. 76), at p. 25, para. 62 said: "For more than 100 years they have been 
used to thinking that the problems concerning international relationships between individuals should be 
regulated by means o f the conflict o f laws theory. They unhesitatingly approve all the efforts made to arrive 
at an agreement between the various states on the conflict rules to be applied in such a case. But they have 
the greatest difficulty in conceiving that the theory o f conflict o f laws might not be the only suitable method 
o f solving the problem posed by international legal relations."
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solutions. Each of them could be equally well adopted, with one country choosing 
one and another state a second. In such a situation unification may have a better 
chance while still being not easy.
3.3.3. Different techniques
Differences between legal systems are due not only to the diversity of ideas 
of justice, but are also connected with the variety of techniques, concepts, and the 
vocabulary used at lawyers' disposal.®® When considering the possibility of having 
an international unification of the law. Into account should also be taken the fact that 
the interpretation of rules by judges/lawyers and methods used by them may be 
different from legal system to legal system. The function of legislation, custom, and 
case-law are not everywhere the same.®®
3.3.4. State sovereignty
Another obstacle for the unification of law, sometimes playing a great role, is 
that states see the issue of unification of law as a threat to their sovereignty.®® This 
is, to some extent, true but what can be done when an international matter requires 
uniformity in practice? It is not, therefore, wise to suggest that states should pay no 
attention to an international problem and leave their sovereign subjects without a 
proper legal protection. So, it is more preferable that for a higher goal states should 
abandon part of their sovereign powers of making law and transfer it to an agreed 
international body in order to deal properly with the issue of law making at an 
international level.
Lando, supra (f.n. 52), at p. 575 concerning the European Communities (now Union) pointed out: "The 1 2  
Member States have nine languages and at least 13 legal systems, some o f which are very different from 
each other." [The number o f Member States is 15, at present, and it would be increased i f  the Eastern 
European countries application for jo in ing the Union w ill be accepted.]]
See discussion concerning the role o f legal scholars in unification o f international law in Section B.2 o f 
the present chapter (above).
™ Garro, supra (f.n. I), at p. 588 said: "In Latin America, efforts to deal with unification have been 
traditionally frustrated by chauvinistic perspectives o f sovereignty."; David, supra (f.n. 2), p. 414.
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CONCLUSIONS
After considering the above obstacles for unification it may be asked; how is 
it possible to find a solution to overcome the existing problems? It is important to 
remember that the purpose of unification or codification of international law is to find 
common solutions to common cross-frontiers problems. This does not, however, 
mean that all differences between different legal systems have to be overcome, 
anyhow something impossible to achieve in the foreseeable future. It may not 
happen at all. It is, therefore, vital to ask what is meant by the unification of law in 
order to avoid further confusion and be in harmony with the realities of daily affairs. 
In that respect, progress can be achieved by getting rid in the first place of routine 
and prejudice, and showing clearly that unification or codification is not an attack 
upon national sovereignty; in that respect the role of legal scholars are vital both in a 
primary process towards preparing a uniform law and after it, namely, for a common 
understanding and approach concerning the interpretation of rules and principles 
agreed upon in the uniform law.
Regarding the diversity of national economic, social, and political structures, 
and divergent ideas of justice, it could be argued that these differences do not 
prevent the existence of private legal relations at an international level, but these 
situations constitute one more reason for seeking the road to unification. A similar 
argument could be used when taking the variety of techniques and the interpretation 
of law by judges and lawyers. Furthermore, the current condition of the world of 
commerce, as considered above (Section B.2), as well as the UNCITRAL's activities 
concerning the first convention about SLCs and BGs (Section A.2 above) confirm a 
need for a more progressive unification of international trade law, in general, and of 
the law for LCs in particular. The role of states in modern societies in an era of 
economic integration and rise of transnational law (new lex mercatoria) is something 
that should not be underestimated.®^ States in our time, regardless of their political,
Horaeio A. Griger Nao'n, "The UN Convention fo r the In ternational Sale o f Goods". Horn and 
Schmitthoff, supra (f.n. 4), p. 89 [hereinafter referred to as Horae io], at p. 123 about the UN Convention on 
International Sale o f Goods (Vienna Convention, 1980) and its impact on the issue o f freedom o f contracting 
parties said: "[p]arties do not possess an unlimited metaphysical and abstract ability to regulate their
3 2 6
economic and religious differences, are under pressure from their commercial and 
banking communities to play an active role in international markets®  ^ for an 
intensive co-operation with each other in order to keep the global market open for 
easy and peaceful transfer of goods, services and technology In a fair balance of 
interests. Lastly, it is essential to involve businessmen and their trade or 
professional associations in discussions on unification while ideas are still in their 
formative stage. To consult them only when a draft set of rules has been formulated 
is too late, because by that time the ideas of the law maker may have been 
channelled down a particular track from which it would be difficult to depart.
On balance, how can a formula be agreed upon in the certainty that it will 
lead to a result of uniform situations in different legal systems? The international 
unification of law has potential objectives provided its true significance, its objects, 
and its different options are grasped by all the interested parties involved in an 
international relationship. To achieve the international unification of law is not to 
demand that two or more legal systems should be completely merged and replaced 
by a single system. Unification can be much more concrete by being capable of 
being much more modest.
As far as UCP 500 is concerned, it deals with the question of unification of 
law. In the text of UCP 500 and the concept of letters of credit, different relationships 
in transactions, and the rights and duties of parties to an international transaction, to
economic and commercial relations- this was more fittin g  in the nineteenth century fo r powerful 
merchants and businessmen who required wide freedom in their underpopulated w orld  to achieve fu ll 
exploitation o f natura l resources and development o f productive forces. The regulation devised by the 
Convention establishes clear and prudent limits to the autonomy conferred upon the contracting parties 
w ithin the general context o f international trade relations. In other words, the parties can only choose 
between the Convention's provisions and the rules made applicable by national conflicts rule." [Emphasis 
added]
Horn, supra (f.n. 4), at pp. 4-5 referred to the role o f banks in modern societies and said: "[t]he 
international banking system has substantially expanded and the banking infrustructure o f many 
developing countries has reached a level similar to that o f industrialised countries. In ternational commerce 
largely depends on the functioning o f this international banking network which provide the necessary 
payment and credit facilities." [Emphasis added]
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some extent, are considered.®® However, the relevant point about UCP 500, insofar 
as the unification of law is concerned, is its non-mandatory structure; it is in form of 
an international customary instrument.®"^
Another question concerns the reason(s) why no effort has yet been 
undertaken regarding the preparation of a uniform law about LCs. To invest effort in 
work for the unification/ codification of LCs' law in international trade corresponds to 
a marked desire by all interested parties (bankers, applicants for credits and 
beneficiaries) and international commercial communities and organisations (such as 
ICC and UNCITRAL) for having a uniform law. It is vital to deal with the (above 
mentioned) obstacles which usually prevent any movement towards unification and 
codification of any aspect of private international law. If something seems difficult 
there is no reason to turn our back on it; it is indeed a task for those who are best 
equipped to undertake such a challenge and find a proper solution for it. In that 
respect, documentary credit operations because of their central role in international 
trade require special attention, namely, they need to be governed by rules which are 
clear, certain, and predictable. This is something which seems the current existing 
laws around the world are inadequate to provide as proper response. Unification/ 
codification of law of LCs and relevant issues are considered in the next chapter 
below.
For shortcomings o f the UCP 500 see the relevant discussion in Section B.3 o f Chapter X I (below) and 
Chapters V -V III (above).
This issue is considered in more details in Section B.2 o f Chapter X I (below).
328
CHAPTER XI
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS FOR
THE UNIFICATION OF LAW OF
DOCUMENTARY LETTERS OF CREDIT
SECTION A: LEGAL INSTRUMENTS FOR UNIFICATION AT THE
LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
International conventions and international custom are two important 
sources/ among other sources of modern international law quoted in Article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).^ In the light of what has been 
said previously (Chapter X, Section B.3.2), international legislation in the form of 
conventions may still be the best formula for unification of private international law 
as an "international legislated law".
1. TECHNIQUES AVAILABLE FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION
How can international legislation be established? There are three possi­
bilities.
1.1. Supranational legislation
For providing a genuine international legislation, an international legislative 
body has to exist. It could act as supranational authority underwhich states could
' Brownlie, Ian, "PRINCTPLES OF PU B LIC  IN TE R N A TIO N A L LA W *’. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 3rd 
ed., 1979 [hereinafter referred to as Brownlie] at p. 1 said: "It is common for the writers to distinguish the 
form ai sources and the material sources o f law. The former are those legal procedures and methods for the 
creation o f rules o f general application which are legally binding on the addressees. The material sources 
provide evidence o f the existence o f rules which, when proved, have the status o f legally binding rules o f 
general application." [Emphasis added]; see also pp. 1-2 o f the same reference regarding the real meaning o f 
formal and material sources as far as international relations are concerned.
 ^ "Article 38 o f the Statute o f International Court o f Justice (ICJ) direct the Court to apply: "(a) International 
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States; 
(b) International custom, as evidence o f a general practice accepted as law; (c) The general principles o f law 
recognized by civilized nations; (d) Subject to the provisions o f Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings o f the most highly qualified publicists o f the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination o f rules o f law. [...] This provision shall not prejudice the power o f the Court to decide a case 
ex aequo et boiio. i f  the parties agree thereto." [Emphasis added]; Article 59 provides: "The decision o f the 
Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect o f that particular case."; Brierly, J.L., 
"T H E  L A W  OF NATIONS. AN  IN TR O D U C TIO N  TO THE IN T E R N A T IO N A L  L A W  OF PEACE” . 
Oxford, 6th ed., 1963 [hereinafter referred to as Brierly], at pp. 351-52 stated: "The Permanent C ourt o f 
In ternational Justice was created by a treaty, generally called the “ Statute" o f the Court, in 1921, Under 
the Charter o f the United Nations it is now replaced by the International C ourt o f Justice, but the Statute o f 
the new Court, which forms part o f the Charter, is identical with that o f the old, except for a few and very 
important changes." [Emphasis added]; Brownlie, ibid., at p. 4 said: "In general Article 38 does not rest upon 
a distinction between form al and material sources, and a system o f priority o f application depends simply 
on the order (a) to (d), and the reference to subsidiary means." [Emphasis added]
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give up their sovereignty within certain limits for the purpose of international 
legislation. They would delegate the exercise of their legislative sovereignty to 
create international rules binding upon participating states. The unification of law 
through international legislative instruments could be made upon ratification, directly 
applicable at national level. The limitations of using such an approach are obvious 
above all at a technical level. A good pioneering example for the application of the 
proposed approach is, at present, the European Union which to some degree has 
achieved the application of uniform law by the 15 member states. However, for full 
integration of laws between the member states a long way still remains to be 
covered, for while the exercise of more sovereign competencies would have to be 
given up in favour of the Union.
1.2. International Convention
The second formula available for having a unified and codified body of rules 
between different states concerns the use of an international convention.^ Under 
it states would not delegate the exercise of any of their sovereign powers to a 
supranational authority. Instead their representatives, gathered usually under 
auspices of an international governmental organisation like the agencies of the 
United Nations, and after full consideration of issues subject to inclusion in a 
convention, would prepare a draft convention for ratification by all participating 
states. In order to make the convention effective as part of the law of states 
participating in the preparation of the convention, precise agreement would be 
reached on adherence to the convention. The advantage of this second formula, 
compared with the above indicated first method, is obvious: no threat arises as to
 ^ David, Rene’ , "The legal systems o f the w orld, their comparison and un ifica tion", International 
Encyclopedia o f Comparative Law, Chapter 3, Sources o f Law, Vol. 2, London, 1984 [hereinafter referred to 
as David's legal systems 1984], at p. 159, para. 306 said: "International sources o f law are o f two kinds. The 
classic, and more usual, is the international convention, bilateral or multilateral: two or more states agree 
that a particular type o f legal relation with a foreign element and involving their nationals, w ill be regulated 
in a particular way i f  brought before their courts. These days there is also another kind, the unions [...] In the 
first case the rules governing international relationships are laid down directly by states themselves, in the 
exercise o f their sovereignty, without any transfer o f their sovereign prerogative. In the second case, on the 
other hand, certain sovereign prerogatives are transferred to the new organisation." [Emphasis added]
330
the sovereignty of states concerned. As a result governments may be inclined to 
use the method of unification through conventions. Moreover, conventions could be 
used with great flexibility, namely, as multilateral, regional or universal conventions.
1.3. Model law
A third method which may be used in the unification of parts of legal systems 
concerns the drafting is that of the model codes or laws. State representatives or 
experts would collaborate in the drafting of texts and in recommending them to 
governments to adopt them. However, this would go no further than 
recommendation. It would be for the authorities in each state to decide if and to 
what extent they would take notice of, approve and give effect to the 
recommendations.
The method of model laws offers an advantage: it does not affect the 
essence of state sovereignty. However, the method at the same time has, when 
compared with the formula of adopting conventions, an obvious weakness. Under 
the model laws states may not be under the same pressure to move towards 
unification of laws while the adoption of model laws into domestic law may be 
restored. Therefore, achieving unification of law through the method of convention 
may be more practical than theoretically ideal model laws.
1.4. Concluding remarks
For what has been said above it is clear that among the different suggested 
methods for the unification of law through international action the formula of 
international conventions may be the best practical solution for progress towards the 
unification of private international law under present circumstances in the world.
2. INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM
One argument for unification of private international law suggests that, 
instead of international legislation in the form of conventions it is more suitable to 
use another method based on international custom accepted as a source of 
international law under Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice
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(ICJ)."  ^ Regarding the point as to which method provides the best solution for the 
unification of private international law, it is necessary to consider, first of all, the 
concepts of international commercial customs and international conventions, 
then, to discuss which one of the methods would provide better conditions for 
tackling the question under consideration.
2.1. Meaning of a commercial custom
The word commercial custom means the habitual behaviour of 
businessmen in a business society or commercial community. These words in their 
legal sense require more than mere habit or usage,® namely, a habit or usage 
establishing some obligation(s) for those who follow it and, somehow, to be related 
to the idea of justice. The obligation in question originates from responsibilities 
accepted by parties involved In a business transaction. Similar rules apply at the 
level of an international commercial customs, they are practices, usages or 
standards of particular business formulated or endorsed by international agencies 
such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).® In order to have much of 
international commercial custom accepted as a source of law, mentioned previously, 
according to the meaning of the Article 38 of the Statute of ICJ several conditions 
must be met.
'' See foot note 2 (above).
 ^ Brownlie, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 5 said: "Although occasionally the terms are used interchangeably, “ custom”  
and “ usage”  are terms o f art and have different meanings. A  usage is a general practice which does not 
reflect a legal obligation, and examples are ceremonial salutes at sea and, apart from a recent convention, the 
giving o f customs exemption to the personal baggage o f diplomatic agents." [Emphasis added]
® David, Rene’ , "T H E  LE G A L  SYSTEMS OF TH E W O RLD. T H E IR  COM PARISON AND UNI-_ 
F IC A T IO N ". International Encyclopedia o f Comparative Law, Chapter 5, The International Unification o f 
Private Law, Vol. 2, J.C.B. Moher (Paul Siebeck), Tubingen Mouton, the Hague, Paris, Oceana Publication 
Inc., New York, 1971 [hereinafter referred to as David's legal system 1971], pp. 97-99; Brownlie, supra (f.n. 
1), at pp. 5-6 stated: "The material sources o f custom are very numerous and include the following: 
diplomatic conespondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinion o f o fficial legal advisors, official 
manuals on legal questions, e.g. manuals o f m iiita iy law, executive decisions and practices, orders to naval 
forces, etc., comments by governments on drafts produced by the International Law Commission, state 
legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international 
instruments, a pattern o f treaties in the same form, the practice o f international organs, and resolutions 
relating to legal questions in the United Nations General Assembly. Obviously the value o f these sources 
varies and much depends on the circumstances." [Emphasis added]
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2.2. Elements of customs
Several conditions are to be met for practices, usages or habits in a particular 
area of business to be accepted and equated to international custom and then to 
govern relations between parties participating in a transaction. Firstly, the business 
community practising a custom must consider it as a legal custom; it means that 
such a custom is compatible with the notion of justice. If a dispute arises between 
parties to an international transaction such a custom is capable of application for 
resolving the dispute.^ Secondly, a custom must not be opposed to what has been 
accepted as reasonable standards or principles. Thirdly, in order to accept a 
practice or usage as custom in international trade it is necessary that it is practised 
or used for a reasonably long period of time. Different suggestion have been 
made for the length of time necessary for a custom to become legally relevant, e.g., 
40 years. There is, however, no certainty as to the length of time; much depends on 
the importance of the practice or usage and its relation to idea of justice, its 
reasonableness, and its popularity among those dealing with it.® The element of 
duration must be supported in addition by two other elements, namely, uniformity 
and generality of the practice. Uniformity means a substantial consistency in the 
practice, and not necessarily complete uniformity; the generality of a practice means
’  Brownlie, supra (f.n. 1), at p. 8 regarding to that point stated: "The Statute o f the International Court refers 
to “ a general practice accepted as law.”  Brierly speaks o f recognition by states o f a certain practice “ as 
obligatory”  [p. 61], and Hudson requires a “ conception that the practice is required by. o r consistent 
w ith , prevailing international law.”  [Quoted in Briggs, p. 25] Some writers do not consider this 
psychological element to be a requirement for the formation o f custom, but it is in fact a necessary 
ingredient. The sense o f legal obligation, as opposed to motives o f courtesy, fairness, or morality, is real 
enough, and the practice o f states recognizes a distinction between obligation and usage." [Emphasis added]
® David’s legal system 1984, supra (f.n. 3), pp. 101-102; see the same reference that at para. 184 said: "[...] 
the custom concerned must have been followed for a particular period o f time, e.g., 40 years. In English law 
there is a rule namely a Statute o f 1265 established that, in order to have the character o f an immemorial 
custom required by the common law, and thus to be obligatory, the custom must have existed since 1189, 
when King Richard the Lionheart came to the throne o f England."; for a different view see Brownlie, supra 
(f.n. 1), at p. 6 said: "Provided the consistency and generality o f a practice are proved, no particular duration 
is required: the passage o f time w ill o f course be a part o f the evidence o f generality and consistency. A long 
practice is not necessary, and rules relating to airspace and the continental shelf have emerged fa irly quick 
maturing o f practice. The International Court does not emphasize the time element as such in its practice."
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that it is applied in a substantial number of states, without meaning universality of 
practice.
Beside the above theoretical necessities, those who allocate a particular role 
for custom in society may argue that although statutory law plays, at present, a 
leading role, it cannot always fully refer to the notion of justice; but it could be 
conferred that as a result of the complexity of modern societies custom in many 
instances is replaced by statutes which play a great role in modern societies.^ 
However, for defending custom and its importance as a source of law beside a 
desire to preserve its role it is vital to uphold the notion of justice, reasonableness of 
the custom, and practice during a period of time during which a corresponding 
custom emerged. Obviously, to preserve a custom the society too in which a custom 
is practised must also be preserved.
3. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS V  INTERNATIONAL CUS­
TOMS
In the light of what has been said above a question may arise: which of 
convention or custom is preferable for the codification/unification of private 
international law? In answering the question reasons for and against each of them 
should be considered.
3.1. Arguments for international commercial customs
Supporters of international custom argue that one of advantages of custom 
against conventions is its non-mandatory nature. It is based on the autonomy of 
parties to an international transaction; therefore, international custom applies only if 
it is agreed upon and adopted by the party interested in a contract. Another 
argument in favour of custom is that it does not affected a state's sovereignty. As
 ^ Brierly, supra (f.n. 2), at p. 58 said: "The only class o f treaties which it is admissible to treat as a source o f 
general law are those which a large number o f states have concluded for the purpose o f either o f declaring 
their understanding o f what the law is on a particular subject, or o f laying down a new general rule for future 
conduct, or o f creating some international institution. Such treaties are the substitute in the international 
system for legislation, and they are conveniently referred to as “ law making” : their number is increasing so 
rapidly the “ conventional law o f nations”  has taken its place beside the old customary law and already far 
surpasses it in volume." [Emphasis added]
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considered previously^® states are anxious not to lose their legislative powers in 
their international relations with other states, in the sphere of both public and private 
international law. Custom, therefore meets such a requirement and as a result 
meets no objection by states as well as parties to an international transaction. The 
third reason for preferring international custom instead of conventions for the 
unification of private international law is its flexibility when change is needed. With 
respect to progress in technologies and developments relevant to international 
contracts (such as multimodal transportation, communication facilities and electronic 
data interchange),^^ parties to international transactions look for provisions which 
meet the needs related to a particular type of business; custom with its non­
mandatory nature provides a good basis for flexible responses to daily problems. If it 
was not possible for international commercial communities to deal with their legal 
problems within a short time, they would suffer losses and relations in the area of 
international trade would be damaged.
in agreement with what has been said above, it seems sound to argue that, 
nonetheless international custom would not be able to satisfy all the conditions for 
which unification/ codification of international private law may be desirable. Firstly, 
practices and usages of a particular branch of business can be something less than 
custom. For the emergence of international custom it is necessary that a given 
practice or usage in a particular area of trade satisfies such conditions as 
agreement with the idea of justice and acceptance, and practise during a particular 
period of time. Therefore, it is not easy to accept any practice or usage affecting a 
particular area of business as a custom; custom should not be confounded with and 
replaced by common (non-legal) practices or usages. Moreover, it is not always 
arguable that custom is always more flexible than conventions when changes are
See Chapter X, Section B.3.3.4 (above).
"  As to EDI see Chapter IX  (above); see also Chapters I (Section B.2.1) and IV  (concerning UCP 500 and 
reasons for its revision in the past) above.
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needed/^ To review a convention and improving its contexts may sometime take 
(ess time if the conditions necessary for such a change are favourably supported by 
an international organisation enjoying the support of states and having adequate 
financial resources.
Regarding the parties' autonomy and their freedom to agree upon issues 
which concern their needs, a point should be clarified in order to avoid confusion: To 
what extent are parties to an international contract free as to the terms and 
conditions of their transaction? It is obvious that their freedom is not unconditional or 
unlimited. For instances, they are not allowed to make a transaction with the 
enemies of their countries, and they may not agree upon conditions which are 
against the public order.^®
On the other hand, when the adoption of a convention for the unification of 
law is suggested this does not mean that details of a contract should also be 
regulated by the convention and parties to an international transaction should lose 
their autonomy. It is not practical to envisage a convention dealing with all details 
related to international transactions. However, principles of law essentially for a 
more reasonable international contract may be codified. In this respect it seems that 
custom and conventions have to some extent similarities since both of them limit the 
autonomy of the parties to an international contract. The difference between them is 
that conventions are codified principles with mandatory power underlying them as a 
necessary element for the unification of private international law.^ "^  A unified law 
involves more sacrifice when individuals as well as states consider it parallel to, for
Schmitthoff, C.M., "N a ture  and evolution o f the transnational law o f commercial transaction". 
Studies in Transnational Economic Law, Vol. 2, "The transnational law o f international commercial 
transactions", edited by Norbert Horn and C.M. Schmitthoff, Kluwer, 1982 [hereinafter refened to as Horn 
and Schmitthoff], pp. 19-31 [hereinafter referred to as Schmitthoff 1982], p. 25.
For the relevant discussion see Section B.3.2.2, Chapter X  (above).
Schmitthoff 1982, supra (f.n. 12), at p. 23 said: " I f  it is intended to provide obligatoi-y rules o f 
international application, the adoption o f an international convention and its subsequent introduction into 
municipal law is the only method to give effect to measures aimed at achieving international uniform ity 
[...]." [Emphasis added]
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example, sovereignty. As already stated abo ve ,m od ern  societies with their 
complexities are different from primitive societies; they require more elaborate 
systems of law to master problems, with more certainty, predictability and uniformity. 
In that respect a customary system of law seems would never be adequate to the 
challenges of modern societies.
3.2. Arguments for international conventions
Those who favour international conventions as the best solutions for the 
unification/ codification of law in modern society argue as follows:
1. Conventions are particularly suitable to establish mandatory rules of law.^ ® 
Such mandatory rules may accelerate unification and may provide a better situation 
for co-operation between parties to an international transaction as under 
conventions individuals as well as states would have to take more responsibility in 
their conduct in accordance with more uniform standards of law as vital for modern 
societies if they are interested in improving their relations with each other.
2. Social as well as economic developments after the Second World War 
have ernphasised the importance of closer relations between states. Unprecedented 
progress in science and technology have in recent decades created a situation in 
which the world has become a smaller place and international borders so far as 
trade and commerce are concerned have become hindrances. Other conditions 
such as sharing natural resources, mass production of industrial, agricultural and 
cultural goods, communications technology, and global population increase have 
promoted closer relations between s t a t e s . A s  a result, states and their populations 
are more than ever mutually dependent and progressive integration between 
different societies has taken place. In order to prevent chaos, uncertainty and
Section B.2 o f Chapter X  (above); see also Section A .3.2 o f the present chapter (below).
Megrah, Maurice, "A  uniform  code for documentary credit practice?". International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, Vol. 8, Jan. 1959, p. 41 [hereinafter referred to as Megrah], at p. 45 said: " It is sometimes 
thought that the customs have the force o f law, but this is placing them too high." [Emphasis added]
For other details see relevant discussion in Chapter X, Section B.2 (above).
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confusion, the elaboration of law Is becoming an essential need for shaping 
international relations and safeguarding the interests of all who are parties to 
international transactions/®
3. It is rightly argued that irrespective of different political, ideological, and 
economic systems existing in different countries in our time, legal techniques used 
to solve issues related to international trade are the same everywhere. They are 
based on general principles anchored in common sense and have been recognised 
and respected by many nations.^®
4. The role of states in codifying customary law derived from the law 
merchant of the Middle ages (lex mercatoria)^® and the modern lex mercatoria^^ 
particularly from international conventions related to international sale transactions 
as well as to efforts made by the European Union are noteworthy. Regarding the 
role of states, one may rightly argue that the codification by states of old lex
Schmitthoff, C.M., "C O M M E R C IA L  LA W  TN A CHANG ING  EC O N O M IC  C L IM A T E ". Sweet &  
Maxwell, London, 2nd ed., 1981 [hereinafter referred to as Schmitthoff 1981], p. 18.
Professor A. Goldstajn said:"The law governing trade transaction is neither capitalist nor socialist; it is a 
means to an end, and therefore, the fact that the beneficiaries o f such transactions are different in this or that 
country is no obstacle to the development o f international trade. The law o f international trade is based on 
the general principles accepted in the entire world." [See Schmitthoff 1981, ibid., p. 18]
“  Schmitthoff 1981, supra (f.n. 18), at p. 2 (f.n. 3) said: "What is lex mercatoria? The law merchant o f the 
middle ages, also called the lex mercatoria, was not law in the same sense as, e.g. the law o f property or the 
rules o f equity. The ordinary courts o f the land did not normally cognisance o f it. It consisted mainly o f 
general customs and usages which more often that not were handed down by word o f mouth and implicity 
accepted by the merchants in their daily dealings, though in some instances, particularly as far as the law o f 
the sea was concerned, code existed which were not, however, formulated by authoritative bodies. Often 
these mercantile customs were vague and ill-defined. In brief, the law merchant o f the middle ages was not 
law in the formal sense, but it was law in wider sense in which the term is used here."; and at p. 5 o f the same 
reference it is said: "In France the incorporation o f the law merchant in the national law was accomplished by 
legislation, and in England by judicia l precedent."
Schmitthoff 1981, supra (f.n. 18), at p. 21 said: "The new lex mercatoria is very different from the 
medieval one. It differs, in particular, in two aspects. First, international characters to be reconciled with the 
concept o f national sovereignty on which the world order is still founded. Secondly, while the growth o f the 
medieval lex mercatoria was haphazard and unplanned, developing from usage to custom and then to law, 
the modern lex mercatoria is the deliberate creation o f formulating agencies and is expressed in international 
conventions or model laws or in documents published by such bodies as the International Chamber o f 
Commerce."; for other details concerning lex mercatoria or transnational law see relevant discussion in 
Section B.2, Chapter X  (above).
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mercatoria has put up a barrier to the integration of the law of international trade 
since the efforts of the states have been based on national rather than international 
interests.However, as pointed out previously,^® it is not reasonable based upon 
what has been said to conclude that states should not play a role in the unification of 
international law since such a suggestion does not fit with the reality of modern 
societies at present. A better argument would be to encourage states in more co­
operation with each other for further progress towards a more untfied/codified 
international law. In that respect, and from a practical.point of view, conventions 
would be better instruments for legal reform today for providing harmony between 
law and these needs of modern life, involving social responsibility, legal protection of 
the economically weaker and growing international co-operation.
There are in addition certain conditions while should also be regarded as 
important if conventions are to retain their usefulness. For instance, after adopting a 
convention it is necessary to provide for adequate control of a convention probably 
by the draftsmen of the convention. A similar concern should be prevail as regards 
the interpretation of a convention by different legislative powers in different 
countries.®^ It is not sufficient to have a binding text; it is very important how its 
effectiveness is kept through proper interpretation and application/®
4. SUBSTANTIVE UNIFICATION V  CONFLICT OF LAWS UNF 
FICATION
There are two ways of including rules on international legal relationships in a 
convention: (1) Unification of conflicts laws stating which national law, by common
Schmitthoff 1981, supra (f.n. 18), p. 6; for the relevant discussion see Chapter X  (above).
See Section B.2 o f Chapter X  (role o f states) above.
Schmitthoff 1982, supra (f.n. 12), at p. 23 said: "[t]he initial uniform ity may be lost by subsequent 
amendments which may be adopted by some states and not by others. Even i f  there are no subsequent 
amendments, the uniform character o f an international convention intended to have obligatory character in 
the legislation o f the adopting states may impaired by the general practice to allow reservations to signatory 
or acceding states."
David's legal system 1971, supra (f.n. 6), pp. 89 (para. 233) and 93 (para. 244).
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accord, would govern a particular legal relationship. This method as already stated, 
is the most favoured solution for the unification in the sphere of international law 
since it is in perfect harmony with the idea that law making is an eminently national 
phenomenon, without effects on national sovereignty. (2) The second way for 
creating a convention is to replace all national laws relevant to a certain legal 
relationship by new uniform rules. It Involves the unification of law through the 
unification of substantive law. Some of the advantages of this second method have 
been previously discussed:®® national law is frequently ill-suited to govern legal 
relationships of an international nature for the obvious reason that a state when 
laying down national rules considers national rather than international interests. 
Moreover, it is not always easy to agree over one national law for defining an 
international legal relationship. As a result of such an inherent difficulty conventions 
based on the unification of conflicts of laws have made only a slow and difficult 
contribution to the developments of international law.
When deciding which one of the above indicated methods should be 
preferably adopted one should carefully consider the circumstances of each 
particular legal relationship since both formulas have their advantages and 
disadvantages. When national views differ profoundly as to one particular issue and 
it is difficult to reach an agreement over a substantive rule, the method of unifying 
conflict of laws would be helpful. Regarding commercial issues, however, it seems 
the best method for the unification in the sphere of international law would be the 
method of unification of substantive law (for reasons pointed out above).
SECTION B: UNIFICATION OF THE LAW OF DOCUMENTARY 
LETTERS OF CREDIT
An author has rightly pointed out that "the commercial letter of credit is one of 
the most efficient and inexpensive methods that has yet been devised for facilitating 
the exchange of goods, its efficiency and economy can be retained and increased
See the discussion concerning the meaning o f unification in Section B.3.1, Chapter X (above).
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only if disputes and misunderstandings are kept to a minimum."®^ For increasing the 
sufficiency of documentary credits in international trade, standardization of forms 
and practices have long been recognised by international commercial communities 
and bankers.®® However, there are different views regarding the advantages and 
disadvantages of standardisation of points relevant to documentary credits. For 
instance, it is argued that the flexibility of documentary credits is an important 
feature of the method of payment in international trade and any type of uniformity 
which undermines it would harm the system's credibility in international trade.®® 
Harfield, in another part of his book has indicated that there are problems related to 
achieving a complete uniformity of practices dealing with documentary credits.®® In 
respect of the appropriate method for the unification of the law of documentary 
credits, Harfield concludes that "consensual regulation", for the time being, would 
provide the necessary condition for the uniformity of practices relating to 
documentary credits while at the same time safeguarding its flexibility.®  ^ Should
Harfield, H., "B ank credits and acceptance". New York, 5th ed., 1974 [hereinafter referred to as 
Harfield], p. 195.
For a historical background look at Section B .l, Chapter I (above) and Harfield, ibid., at pp. 196-202 for 
early works as well as various national regulations regarding documentai-y credits. For instances, at p. 196 o f 
that reference it is said: "The advantages to be gained from standardization have long been recognized. The 
Bankers' Magazine o f August, 1917, contained an article by J.P. Beal, which bore the title, "U til ity  o f 
Letters o f C red it in the Export Trade- a Plea fo r Standard F o rm s": and as to effect o f national 
regulation at p. 202 o f the same reference it is pointed out that: "The great importance o f the various national 
regulations lies in the fact that they opened the way by which the ultimate goal o f an international 
standardized commercial letter o f credit practice might be realized." [Emphasis added]
Harfield, supra (f.n. 27), at p. 203 said: "Clearly, the achievement o f complete uniform ity at the price o f 
substituting rig id ity for flexib ility  would do more harm than good."; Rosett, Arthur, "U n ifica tion, 
harmonisation. Restatement. Codification, and Reform in In ternational Commercial L a w " . The 
American Journal o f Comparative Law, Vol. 40, No. 3, September 1992, p. 683 [hereinafter referred to as 
Rosett].
"There are two problems [...] First, there is not, in fact, absolute uniform ity o f practice among bankers 
throughout the world or, frequently, even in a given locality. Nor is there a complete uniform ity o f the 
responsibilities which commercial credit bankers assume under the law o f various countries. [...] The second 
problem is quiet different one. This relates to the method by which the lack o f uniform ity may be dispelled. 
Here the problem focuses not so much upon agreement as to the use o f words, but upon agreement as to 
responsibilities and, even more important, as to the method by which any agreement shall be expressed." 
[Harfield, supra (f.n. 27), p. 203]
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such an argument, put forwarded many years ago, be adopted for the needs of a 
modern society? From the last quotation of the Flarfield's book (above) it becomes 
clear that the same writer was unhappy with the existing law of LCs in international 
trade and was looking forward to a day that LCs' operation governed by the same 
law worldwide. Such a desire seems, at present, stronger than 20 years ago and the 
current situation of the world of commerce, more than ever, calls for a uniform law 
concerning LCs.®® Flowever, to achieve such a goal it is important to know more 
about the only international source of law about LCs, namely, UCP 500, its legal 
nature and shortcomings as follows.®®
1  EXISTING INTERNATIONAL SOURCE ABOUT LCs
The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) lays 
down a set of standards applicable to issues related to documentary letters of credit 
(LCs) and standby letters of credit (SLCs) as the most popular methods of payment 
in international trade.®'* UCP 500 is, at present, the only existing source of 
international rules relevant to LCs and SLCs and banks in many countries handle
"[a]t least until such time as businessmen and bankers in every portion o f the world are governed by the 
same law, it seems clear that the only hope for a degree o f uniformity which w ill not interfere with the 
flex ib ility  o f the commercial credit device lies in the adoption o f consensual regulatione. Uniform ity in the 
fie ld o f commercial credits can come only through the development o f a common understanding among 
those who do the business, who commence with a broad base o f common practice and understanding, and 
who are in a position, because o f their intimate connection with and dependence upon the business, to 
expand the area o f agreement not only with respect to the existing practices, but also so as to incorporate and 
set on a firm  footing whatever sound new practices may be developed." [Emphasis added; Harfield, supra 
(f.n. 27), pp. 203-204]
See the relevant discussion in Section B.2, Chapter X  (above).
For the relevant discussion see Section B.2, Chapter I and Chapter IV  (above).
See the relevant discussions in Chapters I, III, and IV  as well as ICC Publication No. 500 (UCP 1993); 
Harfield, supra (f.n. 27), pp. 205-225 (about forms) and pp. 225-27 (about UCP), and pp. 227-28 (for 
historical background o f UCC); Kozolchyk, Boris, "Towards New Customs and Practice fo r Docu­
mentary Credits: The Methodology o f the Proposed Revision". Commercial Law Annual, 1993, pp. 371- 
408 [hereinafter referred to as Kozolchyk 1993], at p. 373 and f.n. 5 said: "The reason why the UCP inspired 
such widespread observance is not hard to surmise; It  is the living law o f documentaiy credits. By "living 
law", I mean a law that not only adjudicates disputes but also governs every aspect o f the every day "healthy" 
(unlitigated or undisputed) letter o f credit transaction. [...] The living law character o f the UCP contrasts with 
the litigational character o f Article 5 o f the United States Unifoitn Commercial Code."; as a comparison 
between UCP 500 and Article 5 o f the UCC see the relevant discussions in Chapter V  (above).
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documentary credits under it. As a document it has been subject to several revisions 
since 1933 by the international Chamber of Commerce (ICC).®® As a result of the 
popularity of UCP among business communities around the world and ICC's 
constant efforts to keep the provisions on line with latest improvements in the field of 
communication technology and transportation as well as the needs of commercial 
communities to solve problems which arise during the operation of LCs and SLCs, 
the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits has been accepted as 
the only set of standards internationally applied to documentary credits. What type 
of source of international rules is the UCP 500?
2. THE LEGAL NA TURE OF UCP 500
It is obvious, in the light of the above research, that UCP is not international 
legislation in the form of a convention or model law. Whether it is a source of 
international rules in the form of international custom has been a matter of dispute 
between writers.®®
1, One view suggests that UCP is a set of provisions based on practice and 
usages related to documentary credits. It is, therefore, not a set of international 
customary standards and should be categorised as contractual provisions agreed 
by parties to a letter of credit transaction.®^ Reasons for supporting this view are
For more details see Section B.2 o f Chapter I (above).
Dolan, John F., "W E A K E N IN G  TH E LETTERS OF C R ED IT PRODUCT: TH E  NEW  U N IFO R M  
CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR D O C U M ENTARY C R E D ITS ". RDAI/IBLJ, N. 2 ,  1994, pp. 149- 
177 [hereinafter referred to as Dolan], at p. 151 said: "It is not clear whether the Uniform Customs are in the 
nature o f a contract term or are, as their name implies, evidence o f trade usage. To some extent, the 
distinction matters. I f  the customs function as a contract temi, courts should construe them strictly against the 
bank issuers that incorporate them. I f  they are evidence o f trade usage, the party relaying on them should 
prove that they are indeed usage and not an attempt by banks to mask efforts to protect themselves at the 
expence o f commercial parties and o f the letter o f credit product itself."; see also foot notes 12 and 13 at p. 
173 o f the same reference for different views regarding the issue under consideration. It  is also pointed out 
by the same writer that: "For want o f a better description, this article differentiates the role o f Customs as one 
in the nature o f a term incorporated into the credit by the w ill o f the drafter, usually the credit issuer, (a 
"contract term") or one in the nature o f a trade usage that binds banks w ith international departments, 
members o f trade." [Dolan, the same reference above, at p. 151]
Dolan, ibid., at p. 152 said: "Formerly, the ICC made the claim that the Uniform Customs were trade 
usage. [...] UCP 500, however, eschews that claim, providing in Article 1 that the parties must incorporate 
the Uniform Customs expressly. This change may reflect the decision o f the ICC's Commission on Banking 
Technique and Practice to treat the Uniform Customs as a contract term rather than as trade usage or it may
3 4 3
several. Members of the ICC Banking Commission on Banking Technique and 
Practice as well as members of the Working Group appointed for drafting UCP 500 
are large banks with international departments.®® Moreover, it is rightly pointed out 
that beneficiaries as well as applicants for LCs do not have a fair share of 
representation, therefore, their views have received Inadequate support when 
drafting UCP."^
Another reason for supporting the above view is the non-mandatory nature of 
the UCP 500 as it provides clearly under Article 1 of its provisions: "The Uniform 
Customs and Practice [...] shall apply to all Documentary Credits [...] where they are 
incorporated into the text of the Credit. They are binding on all parties thereto, 
unless otherwise expressly stipulated in the Credit."'*® Therefore, if parties to a credit 
contract do not expressly agree upon UCP under their contract the provisions do not 
apply to their relationship. The concept of international custom, as discussed 
previously,'** concerns also trade usages and practices which can normatively lead 
to new practices and can be accepted as a source of international law with 
mandatory effects, even in the absence of an express agreement about them, and
reflect a realization that courts o f some important states w ill not treat the Uniform Customs as anything 
else."; see also foot note 18 at p. 174 o f the same reference.
Dolan, supra (f.n. 36), at p. 152 said: "Participants in the ICC Commission are generally selected by trade 
groups in states that are members o f the ICC. The U.S. representatives to the Commission are chosen by the 
U.S.C.I.B. Although there are more than 11000 commercial banks in the United States, the U.S.C.I.B. counts 
less than 400 o f them as members. Many nonmembers o f the U.S.C.I.B. issue commercial letters o f credit, 
however; and virtually every bank, large numbers o f the th rift and insurance industries, and other financial 
institutions issue standby letters o f credit, which UCP 500 purports to cover; and although the standby is 
largely a domestic product, it too finds application in international dealings. In short, the drafters o f the 
Uniform Customs represented only one segment o f the broad letter o f credit industry."; see also p. 153 o f the 
same reference for a similar point.
Buckley, Ross p., "T H E  1993 R EV IS IO N  OF TH E  U N IFO R M  CUSTOMS AND PR ACTIC E FOR 
D O C U M E NTA RY C R E D IT S ". Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. &  Econ., Vol. 28, 1995, p. 265 [hereinafter referred 
to as Buckley], at p. 267 stated: "The UCP is a set o f standard terms drafted by bankers for bankers. The 
vei-y parties that documental^ credits are designed to serve, exporters and importers, are not directly 
represented at the drafting table." [Emphasis added]; Dolan, supra (f.n. 36), pp. 154-55.
See ICC Publication No. 500 (UCP 1993).
Section A.2.1 o f the present chapter above.
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they could be recognised as enforceable with regards to relationships between 
parties to a transaction while it would be governed by them. In that respect, it is said 
that UCP 500 does not reflect such authority.'*® Moreover, the title chosen for the 
provisions by the ICC, namely, "The Uniform Customs and Practices for 
Documentary Credits" itself upholds the view that, at least, UCP is not totally 
about customs; part(s) of it are about unified practices as something different from 
customs.'*® Therefore, supporters of the above view conclude that UCP 500 should 
be treated as contractual rather than as international custom provisions.'*'*
2. As opposite view is based on the fact that UCP 600 contains the only 
provisions related to documentary credits recognised by most banking communities 
and commercial centres worldwide.'*® The popularity of the provisions beside its 
application for a long period of time, namely, more than 60 years (from 1933 when
Dolan, supra (f.n, 36), at p. 154 stated: "There is a second problem with the claim that UCP 500 is trade 
usage. Trade usage is a regularly observed practice in the trade. UCP 500 sometimes codifies such regularly 
observed practice but sometimes serves as positive law legislating new practices. To that extent, UCP 500 
does not reflect trade usage. The trade usage concept is broad enough to encompass trade codes, which can 
legislate new practices, but trade codes are only binding when they are "agreed upon by merchants."
Ellinger, E.P., "The U niform  Customs and Practice: a b rie f review o f the ir salient po in ts". JBL, 
January 1994, p. 28 [hereinafter referred to as Ellinger 1994], at p. 32 pointed out: "One interesting decision 
on documentary credits is Roval Bank o f Scotland v. Cassa di Risparmio delle Province Lom bard 
[Unreported, decision o f January 21, 1992, CA]. Here the Court o f Appeal held that a confirming bank's 
action for reimbursement ought to be instituted in New York, where reimbursement was expressly made due 
in the credit. Rejecting an argument to the effect that the specific term ought not to be considered in isolation 
but be read together with the provisions o f Article 21 o f the UCP [1983 Revision], their lordships considered 
the general question o f inconsistencies between the UCP and an express term o f contr act. M ustill L.J. pointed 
out that the UCP did not constitute an independent Code or source o f law but, merely a set o f customs and 
practice by which merchants might wish to be bound. His Lordship concluded, on this basis, that where a 
specific term, such as the place o f reimbursement, was expressly stated in the credit, there was no need to 
refer, in addition, to the UCP. In such a case, the express terra in question took precedence over the relevant 
provisions o f the UCP. [...] However, according to earlier authority, this principle applies in documentary 
credit case only where the letter o f credit manifests a clear intention to exclude the respective provision o f 
the UCP. Otherwise, the clause in question and the relevant provision o f the UCP have to be read together 
with a view to reconciling them i f  possible." [Emphasis added]; for an earlier authority see Forestall 
Mimosa Ltd. v. O riental C redit Co. [1986] 1 WLR631.
Dolan, supra (f.n. 36), p. 155.
In the USA Issues about documentary credits are gathered under Article 5 o f The Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC) which is accepted by most states in the USA and there are some distinctions between UCC and 
UCP. For more details see the relevant discussions in Chapters I (Section B.2.3) and V  (above); Harfield, 
supra (f.n. 27), pp. 227-28.
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the first revision of UCP was published by the ICC) leave no doubt that the 
provisions correspond to previously considered elements, required for an 
international custom, namely duration, popularity of a practice or trade usage 
among those who are practising them, and its relation to the idea of justice. If there 
is no reference to UCP in a documentary credit transaction or nothing opposing to 
what is expressly stipulated under the same contract, courts of different jurisdiction 
will, under proper circumstances, look at UCP as an international document which 
lays down rules of international custom as well as practices relevant to documentary 
credits.'*®
Both of the above views have supporters, hut for reasons considered 
previously it seems the former view is preferable. Nevertheless, even if it is 
accepted that UCP can stand as an international source of law in form of a 
"customary" instrument, there are other issues which undermine the creditability of 
UCP internationally as a set of standards for unification of the law of documentary 
credits.
Ellinger, E.P., "The Uniform  Customs and Practice fo r Documentary Credits- tlie  1993 Revision".
LMCLQ, Part 3, August 1994, p. 377 [hereinafter referred to as Ellinger], at pp. 382-83 said: "Article 1 
continues to treat the UCP as a set o f standard terms and conditions applicable to documentary credits and 
standby credits by incorporation. Notably, though, Gatehouse, J's decision in H arlow  and Jones L td. v. 
American Express Bank L td . [1990]2 Ll.L.R. 343, indicates that, in view o f the universal adoption o f the 
Code by banks all over the world, it would, as a matter o f business practice, apply to a documentary credit 
even i f  it was not expressly incorporated therein. I t  is true that Gatehouse, J's decision related to the Unifonn 
Rules for Collection and not the UCP. But, as the UCP has attained a considerable greater degree o f 
acceptance in international banking than the Uniform Rules for Collection, the ruling ought to apply even 
more decisively to this Code. It  can, therefore, be assumed that the UCP applies to a documentary credit 
unless expressly excluded." [Emphasis added]; Buckley, supra (f.n. 39), at p. 268 referred to this point and 
said: "The U.S. Council on International Banking has said that, "[w ]hile the UCP is partly standard contract 
language, it is also recognized by the markets and the courts throughout the world as the de facto law which 
defines and regulates the interlocking relationships [involved in documentai'y credits]." [Emphasis added]; 
and at the same page (f.n. 15) it is said: "As Professor Dolan has said, "[t]he drafters o f the Uniform Customs 
consistently have protested that the Uniform Customs are not law, but they cannot deny that the customs may 
have the force o f law."; Dolan, John F., "The law o f letters o f cred it". 2nd ed., 1991, pp. 4-19.
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3. SHORTCOMINGS OF UCP AS AN INTERNATIONAL SOURCE OF 
LAW  
3.1. Repudiating UCP
It has been from time to time queried whether UCP does not have a true 
regulatory value by setting out customary standards in international trade. Beside 
the point discussed above, it has been always argued that the ICC, as a private and 
non-governmental international organisation, has no authority to impose its own 
points of view upon any parties to an international sale transaction. Thus it is always 
possible to repudiate the provisions; such a possibility opens the door for applying 
different sets of standards for documentary credits and, as a result, uncertainty may 
arise regarding any hope for the worldwide unification of laws of documentary 
credits.'*'" The problem becomes deeper when different rules are accepted as 
appropriate solutions for issues of documentary credits under the national or federal 
laws of a country as it has happened in the USA.'*®
3.2. Bargaining power and its impact on law making
It is always important to note whether a rule or set of standards have 
originated from a notion of justice or, by contrast, it is based on safeguarding the 
interests of a particular group against the interests of another group, with an 
affecting to bargain and lay down rules or standards fit even if not always just. There 
may be reasons for doing so; a particular profession may be better equipped for 
drawing up the "law of the profession".'*® Such a danger has always been the
Megrah, supra (f.n. 16), at pp. 43-44 said; "The Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial 
Documentary Credits [...] is partly obligatory- in that no licence or discretion is allowed- and partly 
permissive. [...] (b) being partly permissive and not obligatory, does not provide that practice shall be 
uniform." j
See discussion related to Article 5 o f the UCC in the USA in Chapter V  (above); David’s legal systems 
1984, supra (f.n. 3), p. 178, para. 343.
David’s legal systems 1971, supra (f.n. 6), at p. 57, para. 145 said; "One danger in general conditions o f 
business or standard- form - contracts drawn up by trade organisations is that they might be, or risk being 
considered, "one sided bargains". There are two reasons for this. Usually, standard - form - contracts are 
drafted by professional associations o f national character, and it is to be feared that they w ill be excessively 
favourable to the trade interests o f a particular nation. It is also to be feared that they may be favourable to347
subject of discussions regarding UCP®® and the ICG's main concern, like other 
private organisations, has been to safeguard the interests of its members.®* Such a 
way of proceeding usually prevents further progress towards unification and 
codification of international law in general, and of particular rules on business 
aspects such as documentary credits.®®
The requirement that provisions related to documentary credits should be fair 
originates from the fact that issuing banks' practices are expected to be accepted by 
parties to a documentary credit transaction; those parties are other banks and third 
parties as applicants for credits or beneficiaries entrusted the bank. If they reach
the interests o f a particular group which, being more concentrated or better organised, is in a better position 
to formulate the "law  o f the profession "  as it thinks fit." [Emphasis added]
For instance see Article 7(c) o f UCP 1983 (ICC Publication No. 400) provided; "In  the absence o f such 
indication the credit shall be deemed to be revocable." That attitude raised many questions by other parties to 
a credit contract as to its justification which those objections leads, finally, to change o f Article 7(c) above 
under the new version o f UCP (Article 6(c) o f UCP 500 provides; "In the absence o f such indication the 
Credit Shall be deemed to be irrevocable."; for other examples look at the relevant discussions in Chapter IV , 
Section B .l (above); Ellinger, supra (f.n. 46), at p. 385 said: "One o f the most sensible changes in the new 
Revision is to be found in Art. 6, which has replaced Art. 7 o f the 1983 Revision. [...] Article 7(c) o f the old 
Revision, under which such a credit was deemed to be revocable, was regarded as out o f date; it was left 
unchanged in 1983 mainly due to pressure from certain isolated National Committees. The extent to which 
the old provision was out o f touch with reality is evidenced by the fact that standby credits, which did not 
incorporate the Code, and which failed to include an express indication, were usually treated by the courts as 
irrevocable."; for more details see West V irg in ia  Housing Association Development Fund v. Sroka (1976) 
415 F. Supp. 1107, Benjamin's Sale o f Goods. 4th ed., sec, 23-047, and Giddens v. Anglo Produce Co. 
L td , (1923) 14 Ll.L.R. 230.
Dolan, supra (f.n. 36), at pp. 170-71 said; "Often it makes sense for banks to fashion UCP rules in a way 
that externalizes costs. [..,] By externalizing costs they can best handle, banks do themselves no favour; they 
weaken their letter o f credit product. In UCP 500, the bankers have fashioned provisions that arguably 
respond to perceived convenience not exigency and arguably hurt rather strengthen the letter o f credit 
product. Commercial parties (buyers, sellers, lenders, and borrowers, the parties that pay banks to issue, 
advise, confirm, and execute the letter o f credit) may prove unwilling to accept such provisions. Court, 
moreover, may see them as adhesion terms in bank created rules that w ill catch commercial parties unaware. 
I f  UCP 500 is a contract term, as this paper suggests it often is, courts may well deny banks the questionable 
benefits o f some UCP provisions. Well advised commercial parties, moreover, may choose to delete 
offensive UCP provisions from the credit they purchase. The narrowing o f the estoppel provision in Article 
14(e) is one such provision."; see also pp. 171-72 o f the same reference concerning the point under 
consideration.
David's legal systems 1971, supra (f.n. 6), at p.57, para. 145 pointed out; "So, the great trade organisations 
have sometimes operated as a brake on the progress o f the international unification o f law; entirely satisfied 
with their own "clausal law", they feared that international conventions or uniform laws would threaten their 
privileges."
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conclusions that their rights would be at risk as a result of unfair provisions, they will 
stop using services provided under documentary credits/® Beside the marketplace 
fairness of provisions related to documentary credits they have to be also 
acceptable under various legal systems since bankers are subject to different legal 
systems.
Although bankers have tried not to be self-interested,®'* there are articles in 
UCP 500 that, as mentioned above, undermine the tenets accepted for 
documentary credits, namely the principle of independence, neutrality, integrity and 
care by bankers as paymaster. For instance, in respect of the principle of strict 
compliance®® it is a fact that although most of documents.presented by beneficiaries 
are not in accordance with the terms of credit contract,®® they would envisage no 
objection(s). Flowever, falling market prices of purchased goods or services provide
Kozolchyk 1993, supra (f.n. 34), at pp. 381-82 said: "In order to formulate industry-wide customary law, 
the JWD [JWD means Joint Working Groups for the preparing draft for the revision o f ICC 400] had to 
assess not only the efficiency o f the competing practice, but more importantly then fairness. I f  the issue 
were merely one o f efficiency, each type o f bank could prove that its practice entailed the highest profits and 
lowest operational costs. Fairness, on the other hand, required the acceptability o f the practice in question to 
other banks and third parties who as applicants and beneficiaries entrusted their monies, goods and services 
to the banks. [...] The need to treat the role o f key banks and third parties as interchangeable follows from an 
essential feature o f long distance trade and finance: distance between traders and financial intermediaries 
accentuates the need for cooperation, and cooperation is best insured by reciprocity. Accordingly, an issuing 
bank wishing to participate regularly in the international letter o f credit business must not only treat the 
confirming, advising and negotiating banks fa irly (in the marketplace sense o f fairness just discussed) but 
must also be w illing  to advise, confirm and negotiate its correspondents' credits. Indeed, the fact that today's 
issuer is tomorrow's confirmer, adviser or negotiator reinforces the need for equal treatment."[Emphasis and 
the meaning o f JWD are added]; see also f.n. 17 at p. 381 o f the same reference for some important articles 
about fairness and f.n. 20 at p. 384 for examples suggested for change o f the UCP 400.
"A  practice was self interested when it promoted the interest o f the issuing bank, advising, confirming, 
negotiating, remitting or paying banks over those o f the applicants and the beneficiaries." [Kozolchyk 1993, 
supra (f.n. 34), p. 388 and f.n. 27]; and at p. 389 o f the same reference it is pointed out that: "Given the 
essential role o f marketplace fairness in this revision, the only acceptable self-interested practices were those 
which banks universally regarded as essential for their ability to continue in the letter o f credit business."
See the relevant discussion in Chapters II (Section B . l)  and V I (above).
"The growth in the number o f discrepancies is a universal phenomenon. SITPRO, an English trade 
facilitation agency, recently conducted a survey which found that as many as 50% o f the first tenders o f 
documents contained discrepancies. Similar surveys conducted by this writer among American and Geiman 
bankers placed the percentage as high as 75%." [Kozolchyk 1993, supra (f.n. 34), p. 394, f.n. 31]
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a good opportunity for bankers to reject in bad faith tendered documents/^ This has 
generated distrust between bankers and other parties to a credit transaction and, as 
a result, it is said that "the cost of processing an ordinary documentary credit has 
risen more than tenfold in less than 10 years in the United States."®®
3.3. Legal issues related to documentary credits
UCP 500 deals mainly with customs and practices relevant to LCs and SLCs; 
issues like fraud,®® right of security of parties to a letter of credit,®® electronic data 
interchange (EDI),®* time of, establishment of a credit,®® conflicts of law,®® bank 
insolvency,®'* banks obligation to the applicant®® and so on,®® are not considered
About bad faith bankers see Kozolchyk 1993, supra (f.n. 34), p. 389 and f.n. 28; and at p. 395 o f the same 
reference it is said; "The need to recognise the functional equivalence o f certain documents in Equitable 
T rus t illustrates that the determination o f stiict compliance is not a mechanical process. I f  it were, we could 
do away with human document checkers; optical scanners could do a much better job o f detecting 
misspellings, transpositions o f letters or absences o f statements. Because some discrepancies are fatal and 
others are simply irrelevant, the checking o f documents calls for direction and good banking judgment." 
[Emphasis added]
Kozolchyk 1993, supra (f.n. 34), p. 399.
See Chapter V II, Section B .l (above).
Chapter V III (above).
See Section A  o f Chapter IX  (above).
Chapter V, Section B.2.2.2 (above).
As to issue o f governing law o f LCs and its potential difficulties see Buckley, supra (f.n. 39), pp. 300-301 
and Schmitthoff 1982, supra (f.n. 12), p. 22; Morse, C.G.J., "Letters o f cred it and the Rome Convention!', 
LMCLQ , 1994, p. 560 [hereinafter referred to as Morse], at p. 560 pointed out: " The Rome Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980 was implemented in the United Kingdom in the 
Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. The provisions o f the Convention apply to contracts entered into after 
1 A p ril 1991. The relatively well settled choice o f law rules for contracts which had been developed in the 
common law w ill now be increasingly supplanted by a European Community treaty. Mance, J's recent 
decision in Bank o f Baroda v. Vvsva Bank L td .[119941 2 Ll.L.R. 87] is, thus, o f more than passing interest 
in that it appears to be the first reported English decision which has had to consider the application o f the 
Convention." [Emphasis and the date o f case are added]
See Section B.2.2.5, Chapter V  (above).
Chapter V, Section B.2.2.1 (above).
For other examples see relevant discussions in Chapters IV -V III (above); Buckley, supra (f.n. 39), pp. 
297-98.
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under UCP/*' The reason for adopting such a policy by the ICC beside financial 
expenses and professional interests is the complexity of the above mentioned 
issues particularly their legal aspects®® requiring legal expertise and more co­
operation between states as well as individuals for promoting a mandatory set of 
international standards.®® For instance, as to the governing law of LCs, the ICC 
Working Group took the view that such a legal issue cannot be addressed In the 
UCP since the ICC cannot legislate national law.®^® This point was criticised by a 
writer on the ground that a choice of law provision in the UCP would be no different 
than any other express choice of law provision in any international contract/* so, it 
does not an automatic substitute for national law. Further, the UCP as pointed out 
previously,^® has been accepted as the only existing uniform rules for LCs in most 
of countries. Therefore, including provisions concerning the governing law of LCs in 
the UCP would provides more certainty as far as application of LCs is concerned. A 
different policy, in contrast, would cause confusion and uncertainty since parties to a
Rendell, Robert S., "New IC C  rules impact l e t t e r s  o f cred it". International Financial Law Review, Vo]. 
12, Iss. 11, Nov. 1993, pp. 33-35 [hereinafter referred to as Rendell], where it is emphasised while the UCP 
500 is a comprehensive set o f guidelines dealing with all aspects o f letter o f credit practice, it does not 
address every issue that may arise in a letter o f credit transaction.
Kozolchyk 1993, supra (f.n. 34), at p. 376 said; "As a rule o f traffic calculated to resolve quickly and extra 
jud ic ia lly  controversies created by the issuing and confirming bank's improper rejection. Article 16 [UCP 
1983, ICC Publication No. 400] was not able to handle questions such as "What effect does the seriousness 
or incurability o f a discrepancy have upon the bank's duty to send a notice o f dishonour to the beneficiary?" 
or "Does a beneficiary have a duty to mitigate the damages claimed from the issuing bank even though the 
claim is limited to the face amount o f the credit?" These are typically litigational questions which banks are 
neither authorised nor equipped to answer and consequently are out o f place in living law rules." [Emphasis 
added]
Kozolchyk, Boris, "Letters o f C red it". International Encyclopedia o f Comparative Law, Chapter 5, Vol. 
9, 1979 [hereinafter referred to as Kozolchyk], at p. 15 pointed out that "the draftsmen o f the UCP had a 
realistic and modest goal. The intent was not to codify all the relevant rules o f law, customai-y or othemise, 
but rather to compile international banking customs and other rules that facilitate banking functions."
™ ICC. "U C P 500 &  UCP 400 C om pared". ICC. Pub. No. 511, at p. 2.
Buckley, supra (f.n. 39), pp. 300-301.
See Section B .l o f the present chapter (above).
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credit transaction would be left defenceless^® and unsecured. Each procedure for 
revision of the UCP regardless of consuming time and money requires a certain 
period of time that commercial communities would be able to familiarise themselves 
with new provisions.^'*
For reasons already mentioned®® and because there is no indication that the 
ICC will change its policy of the last 60 years, the only proper solution for a 
unification of the law of documentary credits would be international legislation in 
the form of a convention. Flowever, several points should be taken into 
consideration:
1. Although unification or codification of the law at an international level 
would provide a better law, would remove uncertainties and fill up existing lacunae 
and, as a result, would provide a clearer and easily ascertainable set of international 
standards, it is also true that a convention like any other codes provides solutions 
only for the problems related to the subject of the convention. No code ever does or 
can attain a higher purpose for the simple reason that it is never possible to foresee 
all the situations to which a code will have to be applied. Even if there is a possibility 
of doing so there may still be reason(s) making such an approach undesirable since 
it may be assumed to be a threat to the right of freedom of parties to a contract as 
well as to national sovereignty.®®
For instance see Buckley, supra (f.n. 39), at p. 303 concerning the problem o f fraud as well as other 
shortcomings o f UCP 500 and a need for international concern stated: "The d ifficu lty w ith leaving these 
issues to national law is that, except in the United States, such cases come so rarely before the courts that 
there are very little opportunities to develop a coherent body o f rules. The Anglo-Australian common law on 
documentaiy credit fraud is sketchy at best, and yet the incidence o f fraud in credit transactions is not 
exceptionally low. The ICC International Maritime Bureau, while acknowledging the absence o f statistics on 
the problem, has stated, that "there can be little  doubt that each year [frauds] net their perpetrators hundereds 
o f m illions o f dollars.”
See Buckley, supra (f.n.39), at p. 265 said: " It has been suggested that developments in the use o f 
electronic data interchange (ED I) w ill cause the next revision to be made in less than ten years time." 
[Emphasis added]
See Sections A. 1, A .3, and B.3 o f the present chapter (above).
Brierly, supra (f.n. 2), at p. 79 said: "It would not be desirable to give the law a form so detailed and 
precise as to exclude the need for adopting it to new situations by the ordinaiy processes o f judicial 
interpretation."
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2. As considered previously/^ any process of unification or codification of the 
law at the international level will face many difficulties which must not be 
underestimated. It is important to remember that those difficulties may vary because 
of the nature of materials on which draftsmen have to work, namely, the state of the 
law before its codification. If existing international rules regarding a particular issue 
are on the whole well settled, the work of draftsmen becomes more difficult for the 
improvement of the law because of they would face a psychological barrier when 
mobilizing public opinion for supports behind proposals for international legislation. 
A good example for such a situation is the state of existing international law about 
documentary credits. While UCP 500, in the whole, is a success, and to some 
extent relevant custom and practices of documentary credits in international trade 
are unified under such provisions there are other matters about documentary credits 
that, as discussed above, require to be unified internationally. However, the success 
achieved under UCP provides a barrier to the further development of the law of 
documentary credits. Work achieved by the ICC must be appreciated but this does 
not mean that the law of documentary credits has reached to its optimum level and 
there is no room for further improvements. The present research study has tried to 
point out those areas that require more action towards unification of the law of 
documentary credit in international trade; and the ICC as ever should be ready to 
accept a greater share of responsibility and more positive and active role towards 
preparing the first draft convention on the documentary credits.^®
3. Another matter of concern is the degree of readiness of different 
governments for co-operation with each other for undertaking their share of 
responsibilities for preparing the unification of international law and implementing 
their agreements thereto. The unification or codification of international law
See Chapter X, Section B.3.3 (obstacles to unification o f law) above.
"The international codifier could not lim it his attention to the form o f the law; he would inevitably be 
concerned throughout with its substance. He would have to choose between competing rules, to f i l l  up gaps 
on which the law is uncertain or silent, and to give precision to abstract general principles o f which the 
practical application is unsettled." [Brierly, supra (f.n. 2), pp. 79-80]
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becomes a reality when political decisions can be taken by governments. This is an 
important step for any efforts made for the unification of international law. In order to 
makes governments ready to take political decisions without any hesitation it is vital 
to show them that they would gain more stability in their relations with each other as 
well as their nations would face less difficulties in their international transactions with 
each other. This is a very delicate and at the same time essential matter for any 
government to take proper decisions safeguarding its national as well as 
international interests. An inevitable task is faced by modern states because the role 
of governments as a result of new technological developments in industry and 
transport has changed and the present condition of the world is making the 
economy of eve'ry country ever more sensitive to what happens in other countries. 
The need for closer relations between different countries has greatly increased the 
sphere of state activities at the expense of that of private individuals, and this has 
involved in international business between governments much that was formerly 
only the concern of private individuals.^^
Therefore, any preparatory efforts for the unification of international law 
should provide necessary conditions so that governments do not need to fear to be 
asked to bind themselves to a rule of law which will oblige them to disagree with it 
later, or reach the conclusion that they were neglected during the preparation of the 
uniform law and their points of view were not properly noticed by the body 
established for preparatory studies.
4. There is no central organ for the enforcement of international legislation 
and the creation of any such executive power is still a very distant prospect because 
of differences exist regarding different aspects of society, namely culture, religion,
"States are no longer separate units in such matters as commerce, labour, art, morals, inventions, health; 
and slowly and as yet very imperfectly they are being compelled to recognize that they cannot be altogether 
separate units in the political or economic fields." [Briefly, supra (f.n. 2), p. 104]; for other details see the 
relevant discussion in Section B.2, Chapter X  (above).
For a recent experience concerning unification o f law at the international level see discussions relevant to 
UNCITRAL's activities in Chapters I II  (Section A.2.1.3.) and X  (Section A.2) above.
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social, economic and legal systems/^ That absence, however, should not be 
interpreted in a way that each state takes international law into its hands and acts 
irrationally and leads the rule of law in a direction it thinks fit for enforcing its own 
rights. It is, therefore, important that any International legislation provides a proper 
method for dispute settlements between the interested parties to an international 
transaction.®^
CONCLUSIONS
There are in the mind of lawyers always questions on the subject of 
unification and codification of the law of international trade; for instances, are we 
existing, at present, in a more integrated and barrier-less situation from a 
commercial, economic, and social point of view? If it is so, does such a situation 
require more co-operation between trading partners? And, how such a need should 
be dealt with? Dealing with these questions requires a good knowledge and 
understanding about the social, economic, and legal structure of modern societies 
and the role of states regarding their legislative power in such societies.
As a society becomes more complex, the legislative power of government as 
to national affairs as well as judicial decisions made by courts begin to form a legal 
system with a coherent and better known judicial practice. As a result of such a 
trend the role of custom(s) has decreased in importance as a source of law; 
however, flexibility and adaptability to circumstances are the qualities advanced in 
favour of customary law. A similar conclusions can be drawn regarding international 
communities, as a large society. The growth of a new custom is always a slow 
process, and the nature of international society makes it particularly slow in the 
international sphere. The progress of international law, on the other hand, has come
See the relevant discussion in Section A .I. 1. o f the present chapter (above).
For more information about different methods available for settlement o f a dispute in international affairs 
such as arbitration, or judicial settlement (Good offices, mediation, and conciliation) see Brierly, supra (f.n.
2), pp. 346-357.
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to be more and more bound up with that of the law-making treaty. This is an 
important development for the unification of international law and shows the desire 
of different states for more co-operation for safeguarding the interests of their 
citizens in international affairs. Nevertheless, the difference between international 
customary law and international legislation, as pointed out by a writer, "is not 
one between uncertainty and certainty in formulation, but merely between a greater 
and a lesser degree of uncertainty,"®®
The advantage of having international relationships governed by sources of 
law which are themselves of an international nature is obvious. The question for 
consideration is: can a coherent body of rules governing international trade be 
provided? The use of international conventions, under the present circumstance of 
the international community, would eliminate objections which might arise out of 
concern to preserve national sovereignty. Moreover, they provide more certainty, 
predictability, and reliability as to rules of international nature, leading to a more 
advanced and fair set of standards regarding international relations.
As to the option of regulating international private law either by the method of 
conflict of laws or by the formula of substantive law, the question contains 
considerable flexibility and both are appropriate in their own fields. The conflict of 
laws method is to be preferred in all fields where national views differ profoundly as 
to the substantive rules to be applied, but the other formula for the unification of 
international private law is more suitable in fields such as commercial law, where it 
seems conceivable that agreement might be reached on substantive rules, and in 
situations where it is often questionable whether regulation by a particular national 
law is appropriate.
In respect of the unification of the law of documentary credits, as also 
considered previously®'^, issues related to LCs and SLCs are unified, to some 
extent, under UCP 500 (non-mandatory provisions collecting custom and practices
Brierly, supra (f.n. 2), p. 62.
See Sections A .2 .1 (Chapter II) and B. I o f the present chapter (above).
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about documentary credits) by the ICC. However, a decade of active letters of credit 
litigation, conducted in many parts of the world, has exposed the weakness of the 
UCP 1983 (ICC Publication No. 400) which was led to the revision of UCP 1994 
(ICC Publication No. 500). Although the new version of UCP constitutes a much 
improved and better drafted codification of custom and practices related to 
documentary credits than any earlier version of the UCP,®® there are still issues in 
which UCP 500 requires another revision in the future.®® Moreover, the international 
credibility of UCP as a source of international customs under Article 38 of the 
Statute of International Court of Justice (ICJ) is doubtful for reasons discussed 
previously.®^ Therefore, there is a need for the unification of the law of documentary 
credits in the form of an international convention. This is due to the legal character 
of issues which are not covered under UCP, including the changing socio-economic 
conditions of nations, and need for a new lex mercatoria, all requiring more co­
operation between states.®® as well as different interested parties to a letter of credit 
transaction.®® In addition, as to harmonisation of law in international trade law, it is
For instance see Buckley, supra (f.n. 39), pp. 288-93 (changes clarifying banking practices), and p. 294 
(concerning changes in favour o f the beneficiary).
For more details look at relevant discussions in Chapters IV -V III and Section B.3.3 o f the present chapter 
above; Ellinger, supra (f.n. 46), at p. 402 referred to issues like the governing law o f LCs, arbitration that 
needs to be added in the next revision o f the UCP; Dolan, supra (f.n. 36), at p. 149 said; "[t]he latest version 
o f the Uniform Customs may contain misguided attempts to protect banks from problems in the letter o f 
credit transaction that they are better equipped to face." and the same writer at p. 155 o f the same reference 
pointed out: "UCP 500 has weakened the credit product in order to fashion rules that protect banks at the 
expense o f the commercial parties."; Buckley, supra (f.n. 39), at pp. 212-13 said: "The real weakness o f the 
UCP lies in what it  docs not address- the obligations o f confirming and advising banks to the applicant, the 
rights o f an applicant against a bank that proposes to pay on documents which are forged or otherwise 
fraudulent [...] These are some o f the issues o f real concern to international traders which, without guidance 
from the UCP, are unlikely to be resolved with sufficient certainty in the next decade." [Emphasis added]
See Sections A .3 and B.2 o f the present chapter (above).
See the relevant discussions in Section B.2 o f Chapter X  (above); Kozolchyk 1993, supra (f.n. 34), at p. 
406 referred to such important matter and said: "The time for uniform ity and standardisation could not be 
more propitious. Ours is truly a global financial marketplace. Because o f computers, telephones and artificial 
satellites, traders o f goods, services or financial undertakings can at any hour o f the day sell, buy, lease, 
assign, or borrow instantaneously to or from another trader no matter how far away. Documentary credits 
occupy an important and special corner o f this global marketplace."
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been rightly pointed out by a writer that: "Harmonization can be gained more easily if 
implemented before national rules have been set in concrete, if national rules are 
developed on the basis of the model rules, or indeed, if the model rules are adopted 
in their entirety as national rules, the opportunity to create greater commercial 
certainty across border may be easily achieved."®®
This necessity can also be supported by other international efforts made 
towards the unification of private international law, with particular reference to the 
recent United Nations Convention on International Bills o f Exchange and 
International Promissory Notes (approved by UN General Assembly, December 
9. 1988) and the UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Guaranty Letters (UN 
Document A/CN.9/372, 21, 1993 (a new regime for international independent 
guarantees and standby letters of credit)).®  ^ Moreover, national experience(s) can 
be a great help for the unification of the law of documentary credits.®  ^ For instance. 
Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the United States of America 
deserves more attention. As pointed out by a writer, "Article 5 of the UCC has three 
outstanding merits namely it is modern in spirit, pragmatic in treatment, and 
comprehensive. In addition the Code would accelerate and advance the pace 
towards international unification in four ways: (1) by reducing the traditional common 
law resistance to codification; (2) by presenting many common law principles in a
Buckley, supra (f.n. 39), at p. 267 took the view that "[t]he UCP w ill be best served in the future by a 
broader representation o f interested parties in its revision process. This view is taken with some appreciation 
o f the real difficulties inherent in securing agreement between bankers and lawyers from different nations, 
cultures and legal systems, and the understandable reluctance o f the ICC to add further parties and 
perspectives to the process."
Patrikis, Ernest T., "G loba l EFT guidelines: what they can mean to US banks". Bank Administration, 
September 1987, p. 30, at p. 31.
For relevant discussions see Chapters I I I  (Section A.2.1.3.) and X (Section A.2) above.
Documentary letters o f credit have rarely received any statutory treatment in the legislation o f countries. 
The U.K., for instance, has no specific statute on it. The only common law country that has legislative 
enactment on credits is the United States. This is contained in Article 5 o f the U.S. Unifonn Commercial 
Code (UCC). Article 5 is the only legislation which treated LCs comprehensively. For more details about 
Article 5 o f the UCC see relevant discussions in Chapters I (Section B.2.3) and V (above).
358
statutory form; (3) by formulating novel solutions to many troublesome problems in 
international trade law; and (4) by serving as an example of a successful unification 
of the laws of many different jurisdictions."®®
Lastly, courts’ decisions as well as doctrinal views should also be taken into 
account since they have been important in the development of the law of credits and 
have been influential in the formulation of the UCP. It should also be remembered 
that they play an important role in interpreting provisions in cases of confusion and 
dispute.®'  ^ Their role for a greater unification of the law of documentary credits, 
namely, in the form of an international convention are even more vital. They are a 
solid rock for efforts towards the unification of international law; without such 
elements the future of any movement in that direction would be at risk. As rightly 
stated by a writer many years ago, "so long as the juridical concepts of one country 
remain unassociated or even unaware of the jurists and customs of another country, 
no true unification can ever be effected between the legislative enactments of these 
two countries."®®
Schmitthoff 1981, supra (f.n. 18), p. 15.
For the relevant discussion (role o f lega;l scholars) see Section B.2, Chapter X  (above).
David, Rene’, "The International Institu te o f Rome fo r the Unification o f Private Law ” . Tulane Law 
Review, Vol. 8, No. 1. December 1933, pp. 406-16, at p. 415.
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CHAPTER XII
CONCLUSIONS
Letters of credit (LCs)^ and attach issues have fascinated legal scholars 
because their important rote as mechanisms of payment in international trade. 
Different questions have from time to time arisen in concerning different aspects of 
the system, namely, questions on parties to a letter of credit transaction and their 
relationships with each other, on documents and their roles in operation of the 
system, on principles and their effect upon rights and duties of contracting parties, 
and on rules and provisions related to LCs at an international level. The 
present thesis is based on an endeavour to find an answer to the last off the above 
question: a set of international standards concerning the law of LCs, which would 
respond to the needs of commercial communities throughout the world of 
commerce at present and in the future. In that respect several questions needed to 
be clarified: (1) What is the present system of law related to LCs?; (2) Would 
such a system be adequate to provide a uniform law concerning LCs?; and 
(3) If not, what would be a possible replacement for the present system?
Before considering these questions it is necessary to remind that the scope 
of the present study is limited to UCP 500 and English common law; of course, 
relevant issues in American law (like Article 5 of the UCC and case law) as well as 
Scots law are also considered.
S E C TIO N  A : LETTE R S OF C R E D IT : CURR ENT S IT U A T IO N  
1. IMPORTANCE OF LCs IN CURRENT CONDITIONS IN THE 
WORLD OF COMMERCE
Technological improvements^ and the emergence of new markets (the 
European Union, the unification of Germany, and the break up of the Soviet Union) 
in recent years, all point to increasing opportunities for international trade. In that 
respect, parties to an international sale contract (namely, seiler(s) and buyer(s)) 
need to consider the complexities of dealing with overseas trading partner(s), e.g.,
' It is also called "documentary letters o f c red it" or "banker's commercial letters o f c red it".
 ^ Developments related to the telecommunication, transportation (combined and multi-modal transporting 
o f goods), and information technology such as Autmatic Data Processing (ADP) or Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI); for further details about ADP/EDI see Section A, Chapter IX  (above).
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the mechanism of payment; this has always been treated as one of the important 
issues by all interested parties, as a proverb says: "A sale remains a gift unless it 
is paid for." A question then is: What financing methods are provided for 
controlling and monitoring international trade transactions? One of the methods of 
payment available at present® are letters of credit (LCs).
Letters of credit have been used/ to provide a fair and fast method for 
arranging the payment for goods and services purchased or sold in international as 
well as domestic trade.® The importance of LCs, mostly issued by banks®, is due to 
reducing payment risks for both importers and exporters involved in international 
trade^ ; this provide a system of payment against "document of title".® The letters 
of credit will continue to be the most important method of financing international 
trade between individual buyers and sellers, if, with objectivity and diligence, the 
parties to the international transaction can avoid the problems associated with the 
system.®
 ^ Current import-export financing methods include promissory notes and guarantees, payment against 
deliveiy o f document o f title, documentary letters o f credit, open account operates on trust, collections, 
foreign credit insurance, export factoring anangements, and cash in advance.
See history o f LCs in Chapter I, Section B .l (above).
 ^ For definition, function, and operation o f LCs in international trade see Section A, Chapter II (above).
There is a distinction between Article 2 o f the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits 
(UCP), 1993, International Chamber o f Commerce (ICC) Publication No. 500 [hereinafter refeixed to as 
UCP 500], and Section 5-102 o f Article 5 o f the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the USA [hereinafter 
referred to as UCC), which under the latter, a credit may also be issued by a person other than a bank; see 
relevant discussion in Section B .l. 1.2 o f Chapter V  (above); and for other differences between UCP 500 and 
UCC see the same chapter.
’  See Chapters 11 (Section B (principles operated under LCs)), V I (the principle o f strict compliance) and 
V II (doctrine o f autonomy); some other reasons for using LCs are: 1. In some countries (e.g. South East 
Asia countries) tradition plays a major role in business transactions. In such countries LCs may simply be 
the way business done; 2. The central bank o f the buyer's country may require that the buyer open an LC. 
This enables such a country to control their foregin exchange requirements.
® For details see relevant discussions in Chapters II (Section B .l (principle o f strict compliance)), V I, V II 
(Section A.2 (letters o f credit and carriage contract)), V III (Section A. 1.1.2 (Banks take shipping documents 
as a pledge)), and IX  (Section B .l (role o f a paper-based document in international trade)).
 ^ Some o f potential problems with LCs are delays in the honouring o f some letters by banks, revocation o f 
agreements by some banks (see articles 6 and 8 o f UCP 500), insolvency on the part o f certain banks, 
fraudulent actions by seller or invalid signatures on the necessary documents, and bankruptcy o f the buyer;
361
2. RULES AND PROVISIONS
Issues related to LCs were not discussed for the purpose of a possible 
unification or codification at international level until 1933^®. In that year, the first 
edition of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) 
was published by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) at its 7th 
Congress held in Vienna^^ ; and it has been revised five times within 60 years 
between 1933 and 1993^^. The UCP, at present, is the only body of provisions 
concerning LCs accepted at international level/® as such it is mostly accepted as
For more details see Chapters V I-V III (above) and relevant discussion in Section B o f the present chapter 
(below).
Before 1933 some individual efforts were made at national level by different countries, e.g., in 1920 the 
USA, 1923 Germany and Greece, 1924 France and Norway, 1925 Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Sweden, 1926 
Argentine, 1928 Denmark, 1930 Netherlands; Ellinger, E.P., "The U niform  Customs- the ir nature and 
the 1983 rev is ion". LMCLQ, 1984, pp. 578-606 [hereinafter referred to as Ellinger 1984]; for more details 
see Chapter I (history o f LCs) above.
”  ICC, Brochure No. 82; it is necessary to mention that there was another attempt for international 
standardisation in 1929 Congress o f the ICC, held in Amsterdam, but it was not successful; Ellinger 1984, 
ibid, p. 579.
ICC, Publications No. 151 (UCP 1951), No. 222 (UCP 1962), No. 290 (UCP 1974), No. 400 (UCP 
1983), and No. 500 (UCP 1993); some o f reasons caused for revisions above by the ICC are: to achieve 
uniformity, to improve the capability o f the UCP with regard to developments in methods o f transportation 
and communication, the need to recognize appropriate documents, and the need to accept new types o f 
credits such as standby letters o f credit and deferred payment credits. The New version o f the UCP 
published in May, 1993, but came into effect on Januaiy 1, 1994, is ICC Publication No. 500. Although the 
1983 Revision o f the UCP (ICC Publication No. 400) was, in most regards, considered satisfactoiy, the need 
for a new revision had been apparent for a number o f years. To start with, voluminous litigation in different 
parts o f the world exposed certain weaknesses in some o f the 55 articles o f UCP 400. In addition, the many 
queries referred to the Banking Commission o f the ICC by banks puzzeled by or feeling dissatisfied with 
certain provisions o f the 1983 Revision indicated that the need for further work on the Code was felt 
throughout the banking community at large. UCP 500, incoiporates a number o f important changes that w ill 
affect the way in which banks administer letters o f credit. The changes include: (1) A  presumption that 
credits are irrevocable (Article 6(c)); (2) A  new time period within which banks must examine documents 
(Article 13(b)); (3) A  new standard for examination o f documents (Article 13(A)); (4) A special rule for 
non-documentary conditions (Article 13(C)); (5) The addition o f new transportation documents (Articles 24 
(non-negotiable sea waybill), 25 (charter party b ill o f lading), 27 (air transport document), 28 (road, rail or 
inland waterway transport documents), and 30 (Transport documents issued by freight fomarders)). UCP 
500 applies to all types o f documentary credits issued by banks, including commercial letters o f credit and 
standby letters o f credit law. It reaffirms the 2 basic principles o f letters o f credit and practice, the 
independence and the principle that banks deal only with documents, not w ith underlying performance. 
UCP 500 recognises 4 different roles for banks: issuing bank, advising bank, confirming bank, and 
nominated bank; for more details regarding UCP 500 see Chapters IV -V III and Section B o f Chapter X I 
(above).
For relevant discussions see Chapters I (Section B.2), and X I (Section B . l)  above.
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being customary in nature^. There are no other rules, except UCP 500, 
internationally accepted for LCs.
In the United Kingdom (UK) the UCP, beside court c a s e s , i s  the only 
available source related to letters of credit. There Is no particular Act of Parliament 
regarding LCs.^ ® The situation is different in the United States of America (USA), 
namely, rules relating to LCs, beside court cases, were codified in Article 5 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).^^ The UCC, in contrast to the UCP which is 
customary/ contractual in nature,^®. is a legislation at national l e v e l . I t  is, 
therefore, mandatory in nature, and its rules concern mainly national rather than 
international aspects of issues related to LCs.^ ® Article 5 of the UCC, however, is 
subject to revision in order to create rules for standby letters of credits (SLCs) and 
to decide how to blend UCC provisions on letters of credit with international legal 
rules, given the widespread international use of letters of credit.®  ^ Generally
The opposite view argued that the UCP is in contractual nature rather than the customary nature; Article 1 
o f the UCP 500, the same as previous versions o f the UCP, supports the view above, namely, the UCP is 
enforceable i f  it is agreed by contracting parties; Dolan, John F., "W eakening the letters o f credit 
product: the new U niform  Customs and Practice fo r Documentary C redits". International Business 
Law Journal, No. 2, 1994, p. 149 [hereinafter referred to as Dolan]; for more details see Chapter X I, Section 
B.2 (above).
The last 10-15 years have seen an increasingly amount o f litigation regarding letters o f credit. The four 
main areas where LCs disputes are most often litigated are: (1) Wrongful dishonour, (2) Court injunctions 
and the fraud exceptions, (3) Wrongful honor, and (4) Wrongful draw claims, bankruptcy disputes, and 
presentment warranties. Wrongful dishonour disputes are those in which an issuer has examined the 
presented documents, decided that the presentment does not comply with the LCs requirements, and refused 
to pay; White, Brian, "Pain or payment- The tru th  behind letters o f credit (pa rt IVh Banking World 
(Journal), Vol. 7, Iss. 12, December 1989, p. 50.
See Section B.2.2, Chapter I (above).
Regarding Article 5 o f the UCC and its relevant points see Chapters I (Section B.2.3) and V  (above).
See Chapter XI, Section B.2 (legal nature o f UCP 500) above.
Chapter V, Section A .2,1 (above).
Section A.2.2, Chapter V (above).
In a report by a special task force on the study o f Article 5 o f the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
pointed out there has been a need and desire to revise Article 5 to accompany the increasing role o f letters o f 
credit in the world economy. Some o f proposed changes are related to wrongfull dishonour (the 
beneficiary's presented papers must strictly comply with what the letter requires), the rule o f strict 
compliance (regarding the letter's expiry deadline), and the 1990 cases involving the UCC Artic le  5-114(2) 
fraud exception (focused on the definition o f fraud); Byrne, James E, Dolan, John F., M iller, Fred H.,
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speaking, at present, a mixture of international Commercial Customs (UCP 
500) and national rules apply to LCs in international commercial transactions.
2.1. UCP 500
As pointed out above, the practical issues related to the current LCs system 
are dealt with by the ICC which, to some extent, has succeeded in unifying a part of 
customary/ contractual standards applicable to LCs in international trade under the 
UCP®® while it covers some but not all issues related to LCs such as fraud.®® As to 
the UCP 500, it contains a number of disclaimers which protect banks dealing in 
letters of credit (namely Articles 16 (disclaimer on the transmission of messages), 
and 18 (disclaimer for acts of an instructed party)). These disclaimers appear to be 
rather harsh from the point of view of the applicant.®"*
2.2. National law
Regarding issues not covered by the UCP (mostly legal in nature), there are 
no uniform rules applicable in international trade. Related issues have been treated 
under national laws (cases, (e.g. in the UK) as well as rules (like Article 5 of UCC in 
the USA), if any). As to the merits of national laws of states, the main objection to 
them is that issues of international character are considered by a national rather
Taylor, Dan, Bergsten, Eric E., Herman, Gerold, Burman, Harold S., and Wheble, Bernard, "A n  
examination o f UCC A rtic le  5 (Letters o f C red it)". Business Lawyer (BLW ), Vol. 45, June 1990, pp. 
1521-1643; for more details concerning differences between UCP 500 and Article 5 o f the UCC and 
suggestions for revision o f Article 5 see Chapter V, Section B (above).
For issues relevant to UCP 500 see Chapter IV  (above).
For other examples see above Chapters V  (Section A.2 (issues considered only under Article 5 o f the 
UCC)), V I (the principle o f strict compliance), V II (particularly Section B .l (fraud)), V III (Bank's right o f 
security under LCs), and IX  (ADP/EDI), and relevant discussions concerning a need for revision o f UCP 
500 (below).
For relevant discussions see Section B .l o f Chapter IV  (above); as to examples related to beneficiaries 
and banks see the same reference and relevant discussions about practical interests o f new system for LCs
(below).
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than an international instrument/® This situation may generate different views 
about one and the same issue related to LCs/®
In such a state of diversity a question arises: What is the future of the 
letters of credit system? Is the present system (a mixture of international 
customary/ contractual and national law) satisfactory in promoting reliability and 
legal certainty as well as coping with arising disputes at the outset of the 21st 
century: or is there a real and practical necessity for changing the present system, 
namely, by unifying issues concerning LCs and codifying them within an 
international legislative instrument in the form of a convention? It is important 
to keep in mind that a convention has also its limitations, and it is not possible or 
practical for a convention to contain all details related to LCs; there might be, 
therefore, a choice between international customs and international conventions. In 
other words, would it be in the interest of the letters of credit system itself and 
participant parties to such international transactions that the existing system 
(namely, a mixture of international customs and national law) be replaced 
with a new system (namely, a mixture of international convention and 
national law)? To answer this question the following may be said.
SECTION B: LETTERS OF CREDIT: EXISTING PROBLEMS
The present thesis pointed out that most disputes in the international arena 
are due to the reasons considered below.
1. ISSUES RELATED TO UCP 500
Lack of clarity of UCP 500 regarding the principle of strict compliance and 
doctrine of autonomy. Its meaning and exceptions,®^ particularly on fraud and 
related issues, have received much attention by courts in different jurisdictions.®® It
For more details see relevant discussions in Chapters X  (Section B.3.1 (meaning o f unification o f law)) 
and X I (Section A.3.2 (argument for international conventions)) above.
For instance, look different attitude accepted concerning the issue o f fraud in British and American legal 
systems; for further details see Section B .l o f Chapter V II (above).
See relevant discussion in Chapters V I and V III (above).
See Chapters V I and V II (above).
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is also said that the UCP 500 should be subject to further revision because it 
contains articles that would damage its reputation as a fair and just system (namely 
Articles 16 and 18)/® There are also points related to each one of parties to LCS 
(namely the applicant for a credit, the beneficiary, and banks). They should be 
clarified in a future revision of UCP 500.®°
2. UCP 500 AND ARTICLE 5 OF THE UCC: DIFFERENCES
In respect of other possible grounds for the further development of the 
international law of LCs, a comparison between Article 5 of the UCC and UCP 500 
makes obvious that the UCC's coverage of issues related to LCs would be helpful 
in providing a more clarified set of international standards concerning LCs either as 
an international customary instrument (like the UCP) or in the form of an 
international regulation (like a convention).®^ Further, differences between the UCP 
and the UCC uphold the view in favour of unification of law of LCs; so, as to the 
above mentioned sources a harmonisation between them, as a mid-term action, 
seems inevitable.®®
3. NATIONAL LAWS: DIFFERENCES
It is not difficult to show that national laws are not identical. For instance, in 
the case of LCs it becomes clear that the sources of law related to LCs are different 
both in the UK and in the USA while they share a common legal tradition (common 
law).®® This is also true regarding particular issues concerning LCs; for instance, 
fraud and related matters, namely, the scope of fraud and the beneficiary's 
knowledge of fraud committed by a third party have received different treatment by
See Chapter IV , Section B .l (above).
Look at Section B o f Chapter IV  (above) and relevant discussions about practical intersets o f new system 
o f law for LCs (below).
For details see above Chapter V, particularly Sections B.1.3 (issues concerning bank-customer 
relationships), B.2.1 (rules concerning LCs in general), and B.2.2 (rules concerning parties to a credit 
transaction such as right o f applicant for amendment o f a credit (Sub-section B.2.2.1), time o f establishment 
o f a credit (Sub-section B .2.2.2), and insolvency (Sub-section B.2.2.5)).
See the relevant discussion in Section D.2 o f the present chapter (below).
For details see Chapter I, Section B.2 (sources on standards and rules o f LCs) above.
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courts in the UK and the USA.®"* A similar conclusion could be drawn to a lesser 
degree between English and Scots law concerning the issue of the bank's right of 
security.®® Such a diversity of law of LCs exists even within a particular jurisdiction 
such as American law. For instance, as pointed out previously, UCP 500 and Article 
5 of the UCC which are two different sources of law connected to LCs (with distinct 
aspects) are applied by different states in the USA.®®
4. NEW ISSUES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE
Further, developments related to electronic data interchange (ED!)®  ^ as well 
as a draft convention suggested by the UNCITRAL regarding standby letters of 
credit (SLCs) and bank guarantees (BGs)®® open new dimensions for participants 
to a letter of credit transaction in a future system. As indicated previously, the future 
of international trade lies in closer relations between states and parties interested to 
international trade transactions since technological developments and current 
situation of the commercial world are overcoming frontiers.®®
Generally speaking, therefore, issues concerning LCs which require further 
consideration could be classified into three categories: (1) Issues covered by the 
UcpNo 2^) Issues not covered by the UCP but which could be included within
For details concerning fraud see Section B .l,  Chapter V II (above).
For relevant discussions see Chapter V III (above).
For relevant discussions see in Chapters I (Section B.2.3) and Chapter V  (above).
See Chapter IX  (above).
For issues concerning SLCs and BGs See Chapters I I I  (Section A.2.1.3) and X  (Section A.2 
(UNCITRAL's activities)) above.
For more details see Section B.2, Chapter X  (the world o f commerce condition) above.
For examples o f this type o f issues see Chapters IV  [Section B (issues related to the applicant for a credit 
such as the bank's position on transmission o f messages (Sub-section 1.1) and disclaimer for acts o f the 
issuing bank as an instructed party (Sub-section 1.2); issues concerning the beneficiary such as amendment 
or cancelation o f a revocable credit (Sub-section 2.1), late negotiation (Sub-section 2.2), and so on; and 
issues related to banks like incorporation o f the UCP in the credit (Sub-section 3.1), instructions to issue or 
amend credits (Sub-section 3.2), insolvency o f an advising bank (Sub-section 3.6), etc.)], and V [Section 
B .l (issues related to the legal nature and scope o f provisions (Sub-section 1.1), issues concerning bank- 
customer relationship (Sub-section 1.3), and issues connected to bank-beneficiaiy relationship (Sub-section 
1.4)].
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its provisions/^ and (3) Issues of particular legal complexity and needing 
expertise, deliberately kept out of the scope of the UCP by the ICC/®
it becomes obvious that the root of the problems related to LCs and the 
main reason for the existence of numerous cases should be sought in a lack of 
clarity of law on LCs in international trade, and that the UCP, as the only existing 
source of law in the form of international commercial custom, cannot accommodate 
the needs required in modern society due to an inadequacy in coping with disputes 
(in the past/® and, surely, in the future, unless something is done. Consequently, a 
need for unification/ codification of law of LCs would seem to be inevitable.'*"* 
SECTION Cl OPTIONS FOR UNIFYING THE LAW  OF LCs
In order to tackle the problem of disparity in the law of LCs at an 
international level, there are different options (considered below) for improving the 
documentary credit system.
1. REVISION OF UCP 500
Revising the UCP would make possible to respond to new situations and 
parties to LCs transactions would benefit, more than ever, when applying a 
payment system. This suggestion, based on safeguarding the present system of
For instance see Chapter V  [Section B.2 (rules concerning LCs in general like meaning o f document, list 
o f definitions, formal requirements and signing, and consideration (Sub-section 2.1), rules concerning 
parties to a credit transaction such as right o f applicant for amendment o f a credit, time o f establishment o f a 
credit, and insolvency o f each one o f parties to a letter o f credit transaction, namely, banks, beneficiaries, 
and applicants for a credit (Sub-section 2.2)].
For details see Chapters V I [Section A (legal issues related to the principle o f strict compliance), and 
Section B. 1 (exception(s) to the principle o f strict compliance)], V II [Section A  (legal issues related to the 
doctrine o f autonomy like LCs and its connection to the sale contract (Sub-section 1) as well as a carriage 
contract (Sub-section 2) and Mareva injunctions (Sub-section3)), Section B (fraud (Sub-section 1), illegality 
(Sub-section 2), and contractual agreement for unenforceability o f the doctrine o f autonomy (Sub-section
3)], V III [the bank’s right o f security under LCs against the applicant for a credit (Section A .I)  and the 
beneficiary (Section A.2)], and IX  [Section B (legal issues about EDI such as role o f a paper-based 
document in international trade (Sub-section 1), risks and liability from legal point o f view (Sub-section 2), 
fraud in EDI (Sub-section 3), and time o f establishment o f a paperless letter o f credit (Sub-section 4)].
For relevant discussions see Chapters IV -IX , X  (Section B (need for unification o f law o f LCs)), and X I 
(Sections A .3 (international conventions v. international commercial customs) and B (unification o f the law 
o f LCs)) above.
See above Chapters X  (the future o f the letters o f credit system) and X I (legal instruments for unification 
o f law o f LCs) for relevant discussions.
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LCs (mixture of international commercial customs and national law) is the easiest 
option and a short-cut solution that could be useful particularly for issues fall within 
the above mentioned first and second categories; the greater advantage of such a 
solution is that it keeps the international side of the system (UCP 500) in its place. 
Consequently, the flexibility of the system would be preserved."*® There are, 
however, disadvantages concerning the above suggestion, as follows.
Firstly, the above mentioned third type of issues (Section B.4 of the present 
chapter above), of particular importance from bankers' point of view as well as other 
parties to a letter of credit transaction"*®, would be left again at the mercy of a 
particular national law, something as considered previously, totally unjustifiable 
under the current conditions in the world of commerce,"*^ Secondly, concerning the 
two first types of issues (Section B.4 of the present chapter above), the experience 
of last 60 years (1933-1993) clearly upholds the view that the ICC, as a non­
governmental organisation financed mostly by bankers, would not show any 
interest in changing its approach to issues related to LCs, in order not to limit the 
power of banks in controlling the provisions in the foreseeable future."*® Thus, this 
solution would not provide sufficient ammunition for a sound effort towards the 
unification of law of LCs at an international level.
2. INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION IN THE FORM OF A CONVEN^ 
TION
Another option for supporters of the unification of law of LCs is a 
convention: a legislative instrument prepared by an international governmental
See relevant discussion in Section A .3.1 o f Chapter X I (arguments for international commercial customs) 
above.
See the relevant discussion in Section B.3.3 o f Chapter X I (legal issues related to LCs) and f.n. 42 o f the 
present chapter (above).
See the relevant discussion in Section B.2 o f Chapter X  (above).
In that respect see relevant discussions in Sections B.3.2 o f Chapter X I (bargaining power and its impact 
over law making) and B.3.3.1 o f Chapter X  (obstacle to unification o f lawrrutine and prejudice) above.
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organisation like UNCITRAL."*® The mandatory nature of a convention to some 
extent would generate a lesser flexibility of rules®® but its advantages, beside the 
share of responsibility and co-operation accepted by different governments, would 
be those factors which are decisive in the success of any movement for unifying the 
law of international trade in our time, since, as far as international trade is 
concerned, states play an active role either directly (by engaging themselves in 
large and important contracts connected to their national interests) or indirectly (by 
passing necessary laws in order to safeguard the interests of their subjects in 
international transactions); this is a fact, so the role of states in modern times is 
something which cannot be denied easily.®* As far as the flexibility of the system is 
concerned, techniques could be applied in order to preserve the necessity of such 
a convention, for instance, by providing adequate resources and sufficient funds for 
an intense co-operation between different participants (international organisations 
as well as individuals) and agreement to the revision of the rules (wholly or partly) 
after a certain period of time, as decisive factors which would eliminate the rigidity 
of any rules and preserve their flexibility.®®
The present option, namely, having a convention for LCs, could be achieved 
in two ways: (1) It would only cover those issues which are not covered by the 
UCP, either because of the policy by the ICC or because of the legal nature of 
them; (2) The convention would include all issues relevant to LCs, namely, issues 
considered under the UCP as well as others left undecided by the ICC, namely, 
categories 2 and 3 (Section B.4 above).
For other techniques available for international legislation like supranational legislation and model law, 
their advantages and disadvantages see relevant discussion in Chapter X I, Section A . l  (above).
See relevant discussions in Chapters V (Section A.2.2) and X I (Section A .3) above.
For the relevant discussion see Sections B.2, Chapter X  (the role o f states concerning the new age o f lex 
mercatoria) and A.3.2 o f Chapter X  (argument for international conventions) above.
See also point No. 5 in Section D.3 o f the present chapter (below).
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2.1. A convention for issues not covered by UCP 500: A narrow 
approach
This procedure would solve part of the problems under consideration and 
unify a part relevant to legal aspects of LCs; the advantage of such a narrow 
approach, mainly connected to the separation of customs and practices from legal 
issues, would gain the support of those who are advocating the importance of 
flexibility in the system and its provisions (supporters of the first option above). 
Such an approach, however, could be the cause of an immediate instability, 
namely, by creating a situation with two sets of international standards relevant to 
LCs, which might overlap, since, it is difficult to imagine that the new set of 
standards would not have any common point or similarities with the old one (UCP 
500). The situation in the USA, namely, accepting two sets of standards for LCs 
(UCP and Article 5 of the UCC) is good evidence for rejecting such an idea.®® So, 
by accepting the approach suggested above, the next step would be the point of 
selecting one of them as governing the law of LCs, something which has happened 
in the USA; the same could logically arise in the narrow approach above. This 
would mean swimming against the main stream and would damage the purpose of 
the unification of law, namely, providing a more stable, predictable, and clarified 
situation for parties to an international letter of credit transaction.
Further, the narrow approach towards a convention, as suggested here, 
would require a new effort for the harmonisation of existing sources of law.®"* This 
has been perhaps the motive behind some of the changes concerning UCP 600 
and a draft suggested for the revision of Article 5 of the UCC, namely, to provide 
more harmony between the given set of standards.®® A similar argument was
For more details concerning differences between UCP 500 and Article 5 o f the UCC see Chapter V 
(above).
For more details see Section B.3.1 o f Chapter X  (meaning o f unification o f law) above.
For instance Article 6(c) o f UCP 500 ("In the absence o f such indication the Credit shall be deemed to be 
irrevocable." and Section 5-108(b) o f the Proposed Final Draft (PFD) for revision o f Article 5 o f the UCC 
supported the view accepted under Article 13(b) o f the UCP 500 (banks "have reasonable time, not to 
exceed seven banking days follow ing the day o f receipts o f the documents") are two example in that 
direction; for more details see Chapter V, Sections B .l.2.2. (silence as to revocability and irrevocability o f a
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rightly made by the ICC concerning UNCITRAL's activities regarding a draft 
convention on standby letters of credit and bank guarantees®®, on the ground that 
a new set of standards about SLCs by UNCITRAL would lead to confusion and 
disparity of law concerning SLCs and BGs in international trade.®^
As a result of what has been said above, it seems that accepting the above 
suggestion (narrow approach) would cause uncertainty and could be a waste of 
time and resources.
2.2. A convention for all issues related to LCs: A wide approach
The above suggested second procedure, namely, providing a convention 
including all types of issues (legal, customs and practices) related to LCs, could be 
the most sensible approach for solving the problems of dis-unified law of LCs at an 
international level. Moreover, by achieving such a goal the present status of the 
international side of the system (UCP 500) as an international source of law would 
be improved from an international customary/contractual instrument to that of an 
international legislation; as a result, the existing differences of opinion regarding the 
legal nature of the UCP, from an international law point of view (namely, whether it 
is international custom or its force is derived from contractual transaction) would be 
ended.®® Another ground for supporting a convention (in a wide approach) is 
connected to the fact that the laws relevant to an international sale of goods 
contract and other mechanisms of payment, like bills of exchange, promissory 
notes, cheques, and factoring were codified in the form of convention at an 
international level;®® and as pointed out previously, the law of SLCs and BGs would 
be in the same direction (convention). Therefore, there is no justification for the
credit) and B . l.4.1 (time allowed for honour or rejection o f documents) above, and appendix 2 for the text 
o f Section 5 -108(b) below.
For more details concerning SLCs and BGs see Chapter I I I  (above).
See relevant discussions in Chapters I I I  (Section A.2.1 (historical background)) and X  (Section A.2 
(UNCITRAL's activities) and its conclusions) above.
For relevant discussion see Section B.2 o f Chapter X I (above).
See Conclusions to Chapter X I (above).
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view that LCs and their importance as mechanisms of payment in international 
trade require no uniformity in the form of a convention as far as law is concerned;®® 
no uniformity means less attention to safeguarding the interests of parties to such 
transactions; in other words, the credibility of the credits system would be 
undermined at the international level. Having a convention would lead to lesser 
disparity and divergent law, a fairer system in which the interests of the different 
parties to LCs' transactions would be more balanced,®* and the certainty and 
predictability of the system would be increased.
The wide approach above would also be in harmony with the current 
conditions of world of commerce, namely, the new age of lex mercatoria 
(international transactions). As discussed previously®^ we are living in an era where 
geographical frontiers no longer prevent the movement of goods and services 
between different parts of the globe, for reasons of technological improvements as 
well as changes related to social, economic, and political conditions in most 
countries in the last decades (particularly after the Second World War ending in 
1945).
For reasons mentioned elsewhere®® it is obvious that there is a fundamental 
distinction between the old and new ages of lex mercatoria, namely, earlier states 
and their authority as law making factors in modern times starting in the 16th-17th 
centuries). Although in the current new age of lex mercatoria geographical 
boundaries as well as race, religion, nationality, political, social, and economic 
differences are to a great extent affected, still an effective element exists which 
could prevent any efforts towards the unification of the law of international trade; it 
would be the role of states to administered necessary laws required by the interests
For further details see relevant discussion in Chapters X  (Sections B.2 and B.3.1) and X I (Section A.3.2 
(arguments for international convention)) above.
For relevant discussion see Chapter X I, Section B.3.2 (bargaining power and its impact over law making) 
above.
See relevant discussion In Section B.2, Chapter X  (above).
See Chapters X I (Section A .3 (international convention v. international customs)) and X  (Section B.2) 
above.
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of this subjects, in our case the business communities. This circumstance has 
played an important role for shaping international law, at present as well as in the 
past, and no one can deny it. A state's power of law making, with dividing 
boundaries, causes divisions and disagreements between states if applied 
improperly. In contrast, a reasonable approach towards the application of state 
authority would provide conditions for more co-operation and, as a result, 
unification of the law of international trade would be promoted as witnessed through 
some of the conventions sponsored by UNCITRAL in recent years. In that respect, 
international traders who always call for more uniformity regarding their 
international business activities could pressure their respective governments to 
play a more active role in international co-operation. The current situation leaves no 
room for a policy of non-cooperation between states and commercial communities 
throughout the world.
In order to achieve uniformity in international trade law, in general, and the 
law of LCs in particular, different views concerning the role of states in the 
unification of international law should be distinguished. There are those who are of 
the opinion that in the new age of lex mercatoria parties to an international 
transaction should be free to agree what is suitable for their contract, knowingly or 
unknowingly refusing to accept the (above mentioned) existing fact that the role of 
states in modern societies, could provide a situation indirectly the cause of non­
cooperation policies; in other words, damage the purpose of unification of the law of 
LCs at an international level. Instead, a positive approach towards the role of states 
in modern societies, namely, recognising their law making power and encouraging 
more co-operation and accepting a greater share of responsibility towards 
unification of international law, as well as law of LCs, would help remove the final 
obstacle to the unification/ codification of international law.
SECTION D: ACTIONS REOTJTRED FOR THE UNIFICATION, OF 
LAW  OF LCS
Any serious attempt for the unification/codification of law of LCs would 
require several actions, as follows.
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1. SHORT TERM ACTION: FURTHER REVISION OF UCP 500
The UCP, as a successful experience in the field of international commercial 
customs, requires further revision in order to safeguard its position as an 
international source relating to LCs. This would be done in a manner that would (1) 
restore the credibility of the provisions as a fair and just set of standards by 
changing those sections of the provisions unjustifiably supporting banker's 
interests: (2) clarify those parts of the provisions which affect the banks' relationship 
with their customers, namely, the applicant for a credit or the beneficiary (examples 
have been mentioned previously and in Chapter IV, Section B (above)).
2. MID-TERM ACTION: HARMONISATION BETWEEN THE UCP 
AND ARTICLE 5 OF THE UCC
In order to provide more harmony between existing sources of law and 
before any revision of the UCP in the future, a joint working group (selected by 
UNCITRAL/ICC) should be established in order to find grounds for more 
harmonisation between the UCP and Article 5 of the UCC. The result of such a pilot 
study would be used for the next stage of unification of the law of LCs (as 
considered below). Although separate attempts have been made by draftsmen of 
the revision of UCP 500 and Article 5 of the UCC (as mentioned previously) still 
intensive work is required in order to fill the gaps between them.®"* For instance, a 
sharp difference between the UCP and its counterpart is related to the scope of 
provisions; the UCP does not cover LCs which might be issued by other business 
institutions (like building societies) than banks. An international set of standards 
should be flexible in order to cover such types of LCs.®®
For a detailed comparative study between UCP and Article 5 o f the UCC see relevant discussions in 
Chapter V (above).
For more information concerning the point under consideration see Section A. 1.1.2 o f Chapter V; as to 
other examples such as fraud and the applicant right for amendment under the credit see Section B.2 o f the 
same chapter (above); regarding the new draft suggest for revision o f Article 5 o f the UCC particularly the 
issue o f governing law o f LCs/ choice o f law (Section 5-116 o f new draft) see appendix 2 (below).
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3. LONG TERM ACTION: A DRAFT CONVENTION FOR LCs
The next stage towards unification/ codification of law of LCs requires a wide 
range of comparative studies between different legal systems for establishing 
common grounds concerning different aspect of LCs leading to a first draft 
convention on letters of credit. A convention requires a strong political desire to 
accelerate activities towards the unification or codification of law, and it does not 
emerge unless the necessity of having a uniform set of standards concerning LCs 
at international level, its advantages and possible disadvantages are explained in 
such a manner that the interested parties to LCs transactions would reach the 
conclusion that their interests would be safeguarded better than through the 
present system (a mixture of international customs and national law). In this respect 
the following suggestions might be helpful.
1. A joint co-operation between UNCITRAL and the ICC would accelerate 
the transfer of information and prevent any diversion of the law of LCs as it would 
happen in the case of SLCs and BGs. Moreover, the ICC by offering its support, 
experience and financial resources, would play a decisive role in shaping the first 
convention about LCs, as it has done in the case of the UCP.
2. Experience connected to Article 5 of the UCC in the USA as a pilot project 
would be a great help for dealing with relevant issues as well as for preventing 
different sets of standards at international and national levels. A similar precaution 
should be taken regarding the UCP. Furthermore, as pointed out by the present 
study the UNCITRAL's stand concerning SLCs and BGs could cause uncertainty 
and would need to be revised.®®
3. UNCITRAL could start a general study in field of fraud, security, law 
governing LCs, insolvency, as done in the case of electronic data interchange 
(EDI).®  ^ Similarly, the ICC could continue its study regarding UCP 500 and highlight 
issues for revision. The present study has been limited to common law (UK and to
See Chapter X, Section A.2 (above).
See relevant discussion in Chapter IX  (above).
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some extent USA); a comparative study between common law and civil law could 
disclose more differences and a need for the unification of law of LCs.
4. After such preparatory studies, the results achieved could be consolidated 
in one code, with possible issues based on legal, customs and practices classified 
in separate sections.
5. The practical side of the system could be kept open for necessary 
revisions after a certain period of time (e.g. based on the ICC's experience after 10 
years). This would to some extent help preserve the flexibility of the new system 
and remove any objection in that respect. It would be possible since in the case of 
the UCP many of its provisions have been left unchanged or have undergone minor 
and/or stylistic ch a n g e s .T h is  could be extended to the whole system if 
necessary.
4. THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF THE NEW SYSTEM
Generally speaking, the need for unification is something that a reasonable 
lawyer would agree with; the question is how to achieve it? There is no dispute 
about the principle, but about its form. Further, having a convention would not be 
enough; it should also be supported by business communities and be workable. In 
other words, what are the practical and relevant advantage for banks, applicants for 
credits and beneficiaries to change the present system?
4.1. Common interests
Regarding the above question different benefits which could be achieved as 
a result of the unification of law of LCs would be: (1) improving the legal status of 
the law of LCs from international customs to international legislative instruments; in 
that respect, another chain in the series of conventions related to international trade 
law would be completed. This would remove at the same time the grounds for a 
distinction between national laws, on the one hand, and national and international 
existing sources of law (UCP 500 and Article 5 of the UCC) on the other; (2) 
clarification of the law would provide certainty, predictability and reliability; this 
would lead to less confusion and disputes between contracting parties and save the
See relevant discussion in Section A, Chapter IV  (above) and tables 1 and 2 (below).
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time and financial resources of individuals, private and/or public sectors; (3) the 
new system would provide a much fairer system in which interests of different 
parties (banks, applicants for credit, and beneficiaries) would be better balanced 
(for instances see below).
4.2. Particular interests
4.2.1. Applicants
Beside the above issues concerning applicants having common interests 
with other parties, there are issues particular to applicants such as: (1) revision of 
Articles 16 (as to banks' disclaimer concerning transmission of a message) and 18 
(regarding a disclaimer for acts of issuing bank as an instructed party) of UCP 500,
(2) right of applicant to amendment of a credit, (3) other possible exceptions to the 
doctrine of autonomy (like illegality and consent of parties for unenforceability of the 
doctrine), and (4) bank's insolvency. The new system would provide a fairer system 
as far as the applicants are concerned.
4.2.2. Beneficiaries
Advantages of the new system of law, compared with the present system, 
for beneficiaries beside those above common grounds, are related to: (1) 
preserving the rights of beneficiaries in connection with any amendment or 
cancellation of revocable credits by issuing banks, (2) late negotiation, (3) rectifying 
non-conforming documents, (4) meaning of "any cause beyond their control", (5) 
transferable credit, (6) bank's insolvency, and (7) exceptions to the principle of 
strict compliance (like de minimis rule, fairer interpretation of rules and customs 
approved by a respective court, waiver and ratification). Surely the beneficiaries' 
interests would be in a better balance under the new system.
4.2.3. Bankers
Banks' position related to, (1) the principle of strict compliance (its contents 
and relevant exceptions), (2) the doctrine of autonomy (its connection with 
underlying contracts such as sale and carriage contracts as well as Mareva 
injunctions, and relevant exceptions such as fraud, illegality, and consent of parties
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for unenforceability of the doctrine),®^ (3) the right of security against the applicants 
and right of recourse (as security measures) against the beneficiaries, (4) EDI and 
its impact upon their relationship with other interested parties (potential risks and 
liabilities for banks from a legal point of view, fraud in EDI, and time of 
establishment of a paperless letter of credit), (5) the insolvency of applicants and/or 
beneficiaries and how it affects the banks' interests under LCs operation, (6) the 
applicable law of LCs, (7) the method of incorporation of the UCP in the credit and 
related issues, (8) instructions concerning issue or amendment of a credit, (9) legal 
structure of a second confirmation, (10) meaning of teletransmission, (11) 
insolvency of advising bank, (12) meaning of "similar credit", and (13) assignment 
of the benefit of a credit, would be considered under the new system. In that 
regard, as submitted in the present study, bankers would stand on a more reliable 
platform, namely, facing international legislation rather than different national laws.
CONCLUSIONS
Regarding the three questions pointed out at the beginning of the present 
Chapter ((1) What is the present system of law related to LCs?; (2) Would such a 
system be adequate to provide a uniform law concerning LCs?; and (3) if not, what 
would be possible replacement for the present system?), it becomes obvious that 
the present system of LCs (a mixture of international custom and national law) 
needs to be replaced with a new system (a mixture of international convention and 
national law) in order to respond adequately to the needs of modern societies, now 
and in the future. Novelty is always difficult but it is necessary; every period requires 
solutions matching its needs. Consequently, there is no justification for a disparity in 
the laws of LCs by having different sources of law at international and national 
levels.
See Buckley, Ross P., "T H E  1993 REVIS IO N OF TH E  U N IFO R M  CUSTOMS AND PR A CTIC E 
FOR D O C U M ENTARY C R E D ITS ". The George Washington Journal o f International Law and 
Economics, Vol. 28, 1995, p. 265, at p. 309 (f.n. 312) pointed out that there was a suggestion for adding the 
issues relevant to fraud to the UCP, but it was not accepted by draftsmen o f the UCP 500. This is another 
evidence which supports the view that the ICC has no interest to consider such issue under the UCP.
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The UCP has promoted a common understanding and therewith uniformity 
in business transactions between trading states regarding International commercial 
customs and practices affecting LCs; an international commercial "legislative" text 
would also provide a greater understanding between parties involved in an 
international contract, as far as transnational legal issues of LCs are concerned. 
Similarly, as it has been sensible to have codified provisions regarding LCs and 
efforts have been made to codify customs and practices related to LCs from the 
early years of the 20th century^^ it would also be sensible, for reasons mentioned 
above in the present thesis, to have the unification of the law of LCs in the form 
of an international convention at the beginning of the 21st century.
See Chapter I, Section B .l (history o f LCs) above.
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APPENDICES
1: ARTICLE 5 OF THE UCC
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: ARTICLE 5- LETTER OF CREDIT 
Section 5-101. Short Title
This Article shall be known and may be cited as Uniform Commercial Code- 
Letters of Credit.
Section 5-102. Scope
(1) This Article applies
(a) to a credit issued by a bank if the credit requires a documentary draft or 
a documentary demand for payment; and
(b ) to a credit issued by a person other than a bank if the credit requires that 
the draft or demand for payment be accompanied by a document of title; and
(c) to a credit issued by a bank or other person if the credit is not within 
subparagraphs (a) or (b) but conspicuously states that it is a letter of credit or is 
conspicuously so entitled.
(2) Unless the engagement meets the requirements of sub- section(1), this 
Article does not apply to engagements to make advances or to honour drafts or 
demands for payment, to authorities to pay or purchase, to guarantees or the 
general agreements.
(3) This Article deals with some but not all of the rules and concepts of 
letters of credit as such rules or concepts have developed prior to this act or may 
hereafter develop. The fact that this Article states a rule does not by itself require, 
imply or negate application of the same or a converse rule to a situation not 
provided for or to a person not specified by this Article.
Section 5-103. Definition
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires
(a) "Credit" or "letter of credit" means an engagement by a bank or other 
person made at the request of a customer and of a kind within the scope of this 
Article (Section 5-102) that the issuer will honour drafts or other demands for 
payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit. A credit may 
be either revocable or irrevocable. The engagement may be either an engagement 
to honour or a statement that the bank or other person is authorised to honour.
(b) A "documentary credit" or a "documentary demand for payment" is one 
of honour of which is conditioned upon the presentation of a document or 
documents. "Document" means any paper including document of title, security, 
invoice, certificate, notice of default and the like.
(c) An "issuer" is a bank or other person issuing a credit.
(d ) A "beneficiary" of a credit is a person who is entitled under its terms to 
draw or demand payment.
(e) An "advising bank" is a bank which gives notification of the issuance of a 
credit by another bank.
(f) A "confirming bank" is a bank which engages either
that it will itself honour a credit already issued by another bank or that such a credit 
will be honoured by the issuer or a third bank.
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(g) A "customer" is a buyer or other person who causes an issuer to issue a 
credit. The term also includes a bank which procures issuance or confirmation on 
behalf of that bank's customer.
(2) Other definitions applying to this Article and the sections in which they 
appear are:
"Notation of Credit". Section 5-108.
"Presenter". Section 5-112(3). •
(3) Definitions in other Articles applying to this Article and the sections in 
which they appear are:
’Accept" or "Acceptance". Section 3-410.
"Contract for sale". Section 2-106.
"Draft". Section 3-104.
"Holder in due course". Section 3-302.
"Midnight deadline". Section 4-104.
"Security". Section 8-102.
(4) In addition, Article 1 contains general definitions and principles of 
construction and interpretation applicable throughout this Article.
Section 5-104. Forma! Requirements ; Signing
(1) Except as otherwise required in sub-section (1)(e) of section 5-102 on 
scope, no particular form of purchasing is required for a credit. A credit must be in 
writing and signed by the issuer and a confirmation must be in writing and signed 
by the confirming bank. A modification of the terms of a credit or confirmation must 
be signed by the issuer or confirming bank.
(2) A telegram may be a sufficient signed if it identifies its sender by an 
authorized authentication. The authentication may be in code and the authorized 
naming of the issuer in an advice of credit is a sufficient signing.
Section 5-105. Consideration
No consideration is necessary to establish a credit or to enlarge or otherwise 
modify its terms.
Section 5-106. Time and Effect of Establishment of Credit
(1) Unless otherwise agreed a credit is established
(a) as regards the customer as soon as a letter of credit is sent to him or the 
letter of credit or an authorized written advice of its issuance is sent to the 
beneficiary; and (b) as regards the beneficiary when he receives a letter of credit 
or an authorized written advice of its issuance.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed once an irrevocable credit is established as 
regards the customer it can be modified or revoked only with the consent of the 
customer and once it is established as regards the beneficiary it can be modified or 
revoked only with his consent.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed after a revocable credit is established it may be 
modified or revoked by the issuer without notice to or consent from the customer or 
beneficiary.
(4) Notwithstanding any modification or revocation of a revocable credit any 
person authorized to honour or negotiated under the terms of the original credit is 
entitled to reimbursement for or honour of any draft or demand for payment duly 
honoured or negotiated before receipt of notice of the modification or revocation 
and the issuer in turn is entitled to reimbursement from its customer.
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Section 5-107. Advice of Credit; Confirmation; Error in Statement of Terms
(1) Unless otherwise specified an advising bank by advising a credit issued 
by another bank does not assume any obligation to honour drafts drawn or 
demands for payment made under the credit but it does assume obligation for the 
accuracy of its own statement.
(2) A confirming bank by confirming a credit becomes directly obligated on 
the credit to the extent of its confirmation as thought it were its issuer and acquires 
the rights of an issuer.
(3) Even though an advising bank incorrectly advises the terms of a credit it 
has been authorized to advise the credit is established as against the issuer to the 
extent of its original terms.
(4) Unless otherwise specified the customer bears as against the issuer all 
risks of transmission and reasonable translation or interpretation of any message 
relating to a credit.
Section 5-108. "Notation Credit"; Exhaustation of Credit
(1) A credit which specifies that any person purchasing or paying drafts 
drawn or demands for payment made under it
must note the amount of the draft or demand on the letter or advice of credit is a 
"notation credit".
(2) Under a notation credit
(a) a person paying the beneficiary or purchasing a draft or demand for 
payment from him acquires a right to honour only if the appropriate notation is 
made and by transferring or forwarding for honour the documents under the credit 
such a person warrants to the issuer that the notation has been made; and
(b) unless the credit or a signed statement that an appropriate notation has 
been made accompanies the draft or demand for payment the issuer may delay 
honour until evidence of notation has been procured which is satisfactory to it but 
its obligation and that of its customer continue for a reasonable time not exceeding 
thirty days to obtain such evidence.
(3) If the credit is not a notation credit
(a) the issuer may honour complying drafts or demands for payment 
presented to it in the order in which they are presented and is discharged pro tanto 
by honour of any such draft or demand;
(b) as between competing good faith purchasers of complying drafts the 
person first purchasing has priority over the subsequent purchaser even though the 
later purchased draft or demand has been first honoured.
Section 5-109. Issuer's obligation to its customer
(1) An issuer's obligation to its customer includes good faith and observance 
of any general banking usage but unless otherwise agreed does not include liability 
or responsibility
(a) for performance of the underlying contract for sale or other transaction 
between the customer and the beneficiary; or
(b) for any act or omission of any person other than itself or its own branch 
or for loss or destruction of a draft, demand or document in transit or in the 
possession of others; or
(c) based on knowledge or lack of knowledge of any usage of any particular
trade.
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(2) An issuer must examine documents with care so as to ascertain that on 
their face they appear to comply with the terms of the credit but unless otherwise 
agreed assumes no liability or responsibility for the genuiness, falsification or effect 
of any document which appears on such examination to be regular on its face.
(3) A non-bank issuer is not bound by any banking usage of which it has no 
knowledge.
Section 5-110. Availability of Credit in Portions; Presenter's Reservation of 
Lien or Claim
(1) Unless otherwise specified a credit may be used in portions in the 
discretion of the beneficiary.
(2) Unless otherwise specified a person by presenting a documentary draft 
or demand for payment under a credit relinquishes upon its honour all claims to the 
documents and a person by transferring such draft or demand or causing such 
presentment authorizes such relinquishment. An explicit reservation of claim makes 
the draft or demand non-complying.
Section 5-111. Warranties on Transfer and Presentment
(1) Unless otherwise agreed the beneficiary by transferring or. presenting a 
documentary draft or demand for payment warrants to all interested parties that the 
necessary
conditions of the credit have been complied with. This is in addition to any 
warranties arising under Article 3, 4, 7, and 8.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed a negotiating, advising, confirming, collecting 
or issuing bank presenting or transferring a draft or demand for payment under a 
credit warrants only the matters warranted by a collecting bank under Article 4 and 
any such bank transferring a document warrants only the matters warranted by an 
intermediary under Article 7 and 8.
Section 5-112. Time Allowed for Honour or Rejection; Withholding Honour or 
Rejection by Consent; "Presenter"
(1) A bank to which a documentary draft or demand for payment is 
presented under a credit may without dishonour of the draft, demand or credit
(a) defer honour until the close of the third banking day following the receipt 
of the documents; and
(b) further defer honour if the presenter has expressly or impliedly consented 
thereto.
Failure to honour within the time here specified constitute dishonour of the 
draft or demand and of the credit [except as otherwise provided in subsection (4) of 
Section 5-114 on conditional payment].
Note: The bracket language in the last sentence of sub-section (1) should 
be include only if the optional provisions of Section 5-114(4) and (5) are included.
(2) Upon dishonour the bank may unless otherwise instructed fulfil its duty 
to return the draft or demand and the documents by holding them at the disposal of 
the presenter and sending him an advice to that effect.
(3) "Presenter" means any person presenting a draft or demand for a 
payment for honour under a credit even though that person is a confirming bank or 
other correspondent which is acting under an issuer's authorization.
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Section 5-113. Indemnities
(1) A bank seeking to obtain (whether for itself or another) honour, 
negotiation or reimbursement under a credit may give an indemnity to induce such 
honour, negotiation or reimbursement.
(2) An indemnity agreement inducing honour, negotiation or reimbursement
(a) unless otherwise explicitly agreed applies to defects in the documents 
but not in the goods; and
(b) unless a longer time is explicitly agreed expires at the end of ten 
business days following receipt of the documents by the ultimate customer unless 
notice of objection is sent before such expiration date. The ultimate customer may 
send notice of objection to the person from whom he received the documents and 
any bank receiving such a notice is under a duty to send notice to its transferor 
before the midnight deadline.
Section 5-114. Issuer's Duty and Privilege to Honour; Right to Reimburse­
ment
(1) An issuer must honour a draft or demand for payment which complies 
with the terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or documents 
conform to the underlying contract for sale or other contract between the customer 
and the beneficiary. The issuer is not excused from honour of such a draft or 
demand by reason of an additional general term that all documents must be 
satisfactory to the issuer, but an issuer may require that specified documents must 
be satisfactory to it.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their face to 
comply with the terms of a credit but a required document does not in fact conform 
to the warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title (Section 
7-507) or of a security (Section 8-306) or is forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in 
the transaction
(a) the issuer must honour the draft or demand for payment if honour is 
demanded by a negotiating bank or other holder of the draft or demand which has 
taken the draft or demand under the credit and under circumstances which make it 
a holder in due course (Section 3-302) and in an appropriate case would make it a 
person to whom a document of title has been duly negotiated (Section 7-502) or a 
bona fide purchaser of a security (Section 8-302); and
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good faith 
may honour the draft or demand for payment despite notification from the customer 
of fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the face of the documents but a 
court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honour.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed an issuer which has duly honoured a draft or 
demand for payment is entitled to immediate reimbursement of any payment made 
under the credit and to be put in effectively available funds not later than the day 
before maturity of any acceptance made under the credit.
[(4) When a credit provides for payment by the issuer on the receipt of notice 
that the required documents are in the possession of a correspondent or other 
agent of the issuer
(a) any payment made on receipt of such notice is conditional, and
(b) the issuer may reject documents which do not comply with the credit if it 
does so within three banking days following its receipt of the documents; and
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(c) in the event of such rejection, the issuer is entitled by charge back or 
otherwise to return of the payment made.]
[{6) In the case covered by subsection (4) failure to reject documents within 
the time specified in sub-paragraph (b) constitutes acceptance of the documents 
and makes the payment final in favour of the beneficiary.]
Note: Subsections (4) and (5) are bracketed as optional. If they are included 
the bracketed language in the last sentence of Section 5-112(1) should also be 
included.
Section 5-115. Remedy for Improper Dishonour or Anticipatory Repudiation
(1) When an issuer wrongfully dishonours a draft or demand for payment 
presented under the credit the person entitled to honour has with respect to any 
documents the rights of a person in the position of the seller (Section 2-707) and 
may recover from the issuer the face amount of the draft or demand together with 
incidental damages under Section 2-710 on seller's incidental damages and 
interest but less any amount realized by resale or other use or disposition of the 
subject matter involved in the transaction must be turned over to the issuer on 
payment of judgment.
(2) When an issuer wrongfully cancels or otherwise repudiates a credit 
before presentment of a draft or demand for payment drawn under it the beneficiary 
has the rights of a seller after anticipatory repudiation by the buyer under Section
2-610 if he learns of the repudiation in time reasonably to avoid procurement of the 
required documents. Otherwise the beneficiary has an immediate right of action for 
wrongful dishonour.
Section 5-116. Transfer and Assignment
(1) The right to draw under a credit can be transferred or assigned only 
when the credit is expressly designated as transferable or assignable.
(2) Even though the credit specifically states that it is nontransferable or 
nonassignable the beneficiary may before performance of the conditions of the 
credit assign his right to proceeds. Such an assignment is an assignment of an 
account under Article 9 on Secured Transactions and is governed by. that Article 
except that
(a) the assignment is ineffective until the letter of credit or device of credit is 
delivered to the assignee which delivery constitutes perfection of the security 
interest under Article 9; and
(b) the issuer may honour drafts or demands for payment drawn under the 
credit until it receives a notification of the assignment signed by the beneficiary 
which reasonably identifies the credit involved in the assignment and contains a 
request to pay the assignee; and
(c) after what reasonably appears to be such a notification has been 
received the issuer may without dishonour refuse to accept or pay even to a person 
otherwise entitled to honour until the letter of credit or advice of credit is exhibited to 
the issuer.
(3) Except where the beneficiary has effectively assigned his right to draw or 
his right to proceeds, nothing in this section limits his right to transfer or negotiate 
drafts or demands drawn under the credit. Amended in 1972.
See appendix for changes made in former text and the reasons for change.
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Section 5-117. Insolvency of Bank Holding Funds for Documentary Credit
(1) Where an issuer or an advising or confirming bank or a bank which has 
for a customer procured issuance of a credit by another bank becomes insolvent 
before final payment under the credit and the credit is one to which this Article is 
made applicable by paragraphs (a) or (b) of Section 5-102(1) on scope, the receipt 
or allocation of funds or collateral to secure or meet obligations under the credit 
shall have the following results:
(a) to the extent of any founds or collateral turned over after or before the 
insolvency as indemnity against or specifically for the purpose of payment of drafts 
or demands for payment drawn under the designated credit, the drafts or demands 
are entitled to payment in preference over depositors or other general creditors of 
the issuer or bank; and
(b) on expiration of the credit or surrender of the beneficiary's rights under it 
unused any person who has given such funds or collateral is similarly entitled to 
return thereof; and
(c) a charge to a general or current with a bank if specifically consented to 
for the purpose of indemnity against or payment of drafts or demands for payment 
drawn under the designated credit fails under the same rules as if the funds had 
been drawn out in cash and then turned over with specific instruction.
(2) After honour or reimbursement under this section the customer or other 
person for whose account the insolvent bank has acted is entitled to receive the 
documents involved.
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2: PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT FOR REVISION OF ARTICLE 5 OF 
THE UCC
UCC ARTICLE 5 
April 6, 1995 DRAFT
SECTION 5-101. SHORT TITLE.
This Article may be cited as Uniform Commercial Code- Letters of Credit. 
SECTION 5-102. DEFINITIONS.
(а) In this article:
(1) "Advisor" means a person who, at the request of the issuer, a confirmer, 
or another advisor, notifies or requests another adviser to notify the beneficiary that 
a letter of credit has been issued, confirmed, or amend.
(2) "Applicant" means a person at whose request or for whose account a 
letter of credit is issued. The term includes a person who requests an issuer to 
issue a letter of credit on behalf of another if the person making the request 
undertakes an obligation to reimburse the issuer.
(3) "Beneficiary" means a person who under the terms of a letter of credit is 
entitled to have its complying presentation honoured. The term includes a person to 
whom drawing rights have been transferred under a transferable letter of credit.
(4) "Confirmer" means a nominated person who undertakes, at the request 
or with the consent of the issuer, to honour a presentation under a letter of credit 
issued by another.
(5) "Dishonour" of a letter of credit means failure timely to honour or to take 
an interim action, such as acceptance of a draft, that may be required by the letter 
of credit.
(б) "Document" means a draft or other demand, document of title, 
investment security, certificate, invoice, or other record, statement, or 
representation of fact, law, right, or opinion (i) which is presented in a written or 
other medium permitted by the letter of credit or, unless prohibited by the letter of 
credit, by the standard practice referred to in Section 5-108(e) and (ii) which is 
capable of being examined for compliance with the terms and conditions of the 
letter of credit. A document may not be oral.
(7) "Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction 
concerned.
(8) "Honour" of a letter of credit means performance of the issue's 
undertaking in the letter of credit to pay or deliver an item of value. Unless the letter 
of credit otherwise provides, "honour" occurs
(i) upon payment,
(ii) if the letter of credit provides for acceptance, upon acceptance of a draft 
and, at maturity, its payment, or
(iii) if the letter of credit provides for incurring a deferred obligation, upon 
incurring the obligation and, at maturity, its performance.
(9) "issuer" means a bank or other person that issues a letter of credit, but 
does not include an individual who makes an engagement for personal, family, or 
household purposes.
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(10) "Letter of credit" means a definite undertaking that satisfies the 
requirements of Section 5-104 by an issuer to a beneficiary at the request or for the 
account of an applicant or, in the case of a financial institution, to itself or for its own 
account, to honour a documentary presentation by payment or delivery of an item 
of value.
(11) "Nominated person" means a person whom the issuer (i) designates or 
authorizes to pay, accept, negotiate, or otherwise give value under a letter of credit 
and (ii) undertakes by agreement or custom and practice to reimburse.
(12) "Presentation" means delivery of a document to an issuer or nominated 
person for honour or giving of value under a letter of credit.
(13) "Presenter" mean a person making a presentation as or on behalf of a 
beneficiary or nominated person.
(14) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium, or
that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable
form.
(15) "Successor of a beneficiary" means a person who succeeds to 
substantially all of the rights of a beneficiary by operation of law,, including a 
corporation with or into which the executor, personal representative, trustee in 
bankruptcy, debtor in possession, liquidator, and receiver.
(b) Definitions in other Articles applying to this article and the sections in 
which they appear are:
"Accept" or "Acceptance" Section 3-409
"Value" Sections 3-303, 4-211
(c) Article 1 contains certain additional general definitions and principles of 
construction and interpretation applicable throughout this article.
SECTION 5-103. SCOPE
(a) This article applies to letters of credit and to certain rights and obligations 
arising out of transaction involving letters of credit.
(b) The statement of a rule in this article does not by itself require, imply, or 
negate application of the same or a different rule to a situation not provided for, or 
to a person not specified, in this article.
(c) With the exception of this subsection, subsection (a) and (d). Sections 5- 
102(a)(9) and (10), 5-106(d), and 5-114(d), and except to the extent prohibited in 
Sections 1-102(3) and 5-117(d), the effect of this article may be varied by 
agreement or by a provision stated or incorporated by reference in an undertaking. 
A term in an agreement or undertaking generally excusing liability or generally 
limiting remedies for failure to perform obligations is not sufficient to vary obligations 
prescribed by this article.
(d) Rights and obligations of an issuer to a beneficiary or a nominated 
person under a letter of credit are independent of the existence, performance, or 
nonperformance of a contract or arrangement out of which the letter of credit arises 
or which underlies It, including contracts or arrangements between the issuer and 
the applicant and between the applicant and the beneficiary.
SECTION 5-104. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS.
A letter of credit, confirmation, advice, transfer, amendment, or cancellation 
may be issued in any form that is a record and is authenticated (i) by a signature or
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(ii) in accordance with the agreement of the parties or the standard practice referred 
to in Section 5-108(e).
SECTION 5-105. CONSIDERATION.
Consideration is not required to issue, amend, transfer, or cancel a letter of 
credit, advice, or confirmation.
SECTION 5-106. ISSUANCE, AMENDMENT, CANCELLATION, AND DURA­
TION.
(a) A letter of credit is issued and becomes enforceable according to its 
terms against the issuer when the issuer sends or otherwise transmits it to the 
person requested to advise or to the beneficiary. A letter of credit is revocable only 
if it so provides.
(b) After a letter of credit is issued, rights and obligations of a beneficiary, 
applicant, confirmer, and issuer are not affected by an amendment or cancellation 
to which that person has not consented except to the extent the letter of credit 
provided that it is revocable or that the issuer may amend or cancel the letter of 
credit without that consent.
(c) If there is no stated expiration date or other provisions that determines its 
duration, a letter of credit expires one tear after its stated date of issuance or, if 
none is stated, after that date on which it is issued.
(d) A letter of credit that states that it is perpetual expires five years after its 
stated date of issuance, or if none is stated, after the date on which it is Issued. 
SECTION 5-107. CONFIRMER, NOMINATED PERSON, AND ADVISER.
(a) A confirmer is directly obliged on a letter of credit and has the rights and 
obligations of an issuer to the extent of its confirmation. The confirmer also has 
rights against and obligations to the issuer as if the issuer were an applicant and 
the confirmer had issued the letter of credit at the request and for the account of the 
issuer.
(b) A nominated person who is not a confirmer is not obliged to honour or 
otherwise give value for a presentation.
(c) A person requested to advise may decline to act as an adviser. An 
adviser that is not a confirmer is not obliged to honour or give value for a 
presentation. An advisor undertakes to the issuer and to the beneficiary accurately 
to advise the terms of the letter of credit, confirmation, amendment, or advice 
received by that person and undertakes to the beneficiary to check the apparent 
authenticity of the request to advise. Even if the advice is inaccurate, the letter of 
credit, confirmation, or amendment is enforceable as issued.
(d) A person who notifies a transferee beneficiary of the terms of a letter of 
credit, confirmation, amendment, or advice has the rights and obligations of an 
adviser under subsection (c). The terms in the notice to the transferee beneficiary 
may differ from the terms in any notice to the transferor beneficiary to the extent 
permitted by the letter of credit, confirmation, amendment, or advice received by the 
person who so notifies.
SECTION 5-108. ISSUER’S RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 5-109, an issuer shall honour a 
presentation that, as determined by the standard practice referred to in subsection
(e), appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and conditions of the letter 
of credit. Except as otherwise provided in Section 5-113 and unless otherwise
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agreed with the applicant, an issuer shall dishonour a presentation that does not 
appear so to comply.
(b) An issuer has a reasonable time after presentation, but not beyond the 
end of the seventh business day of the issuer after the day of the its receipt of 
documents:
(1) to honour,
(2) if the letter of credit provides for honour to be completed more than 
seven business days after presentation, to accept a draft or incur a deferred 
obligation, or
(3) to give notice to the presenter of discrepancies in the presentation.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), an issuer is precluded 
from asserting as a basis for dishonour any discrepancy if timely notice is not given, 
or any discrepancy not stated in the notice if timely notice is given.
(d) Failure to give the notice specified in subsection (b) or to mention fraud, 
forgery, or expiration in the notice does not preclude the issuer from asserting as a 
basis for dishonour fraud or forgery as described in Section 5-109(a) or expiration 
of the letter of credit before presentation.
(e) An issuer shall observe standard practice of financial institutions that 
regularly issues letters of credit. Determination of the issuer's observance of the 
standard practice is a matter of interpretation for the court. The court shall offer the 
parties a reasonable opportunity to present evidence of the standard practice.
(f) An issuer is not responsible for:
(1) the performance or nonperformance of the underlying contract, 
arrangement, or transaction,
(2) an act or omission of others, or
(3) observance or knowledge of the usage of a particular trade other than 
the standard practice referred to in subsection (e).
(g) If an undertaking constituting a letter of credit under Section 5- 
102(a)(b)(10) contains nondocumentary conditions, an issuer shall disregard the 
nondocumentary conditions and treat them as if they were not stated.
(h) An issuer that has dishonoured a presentation shall return the 
documents or hold them at the disposal of, and send advice to that effect to, the 
presenter.
(i) An issuer that has honoured a presentation as permitted or required by 
this article:
(1) is entitled to be reimbursed by the applicant in immediately available 
funds not later than the date of its payment of funds;
(2) takes the documents free of claims of the beneficiary or presenter;
(3) is precluded from asserting a right of recourse on a draft under Sections
3-414 and 3-415;
(4) except as otherwise provided in Section 5-110 and 5-117, is precluded 
from restitution of money paid or other value given by mistake to the extent the 
mistake concerns discrepancies in the documents or tender which are apparent on 
the face of the presentation; and
(5) is discharged to the extent of its performance under the letter of credit 
unless the issuer honoured a presentation in which a required signature of a 
beneficiary was forged.
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SECTION 5-109. FRAUD AND FORGERY.
(a) If a presentation is made that appears on its face strictly to comply with 
the terms and conditions of the letter of credit, but a required document is forged or 
materially fraudulent, or honour of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud 
by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant:
(1) the issuer shall honour the presentation, if honour is demanded by (i) a 
nominated person who has given value in good faith and without notice of forgery 
or material fraud, (ii) a confirmer who has honoured its confirmation in good faith,
(iii) a holder in due course of a draft drawn under the letter of credit which was 
taken after acceptance by the issuer or nominated person, or (iv) an assignee of 
the issuer's or nominated person's deferred obligation that was taken for value and 
without notice of forgery or material fraud after the obligation was incurred by the 
issuer or nominated person; and
(2) the issuer, acting in good faith, may honour or dishonour the presentation 
in any other case.
(b) If an applicant claims that a required document is forged or materially 
fraudulent or that honour of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the 
beneficiary on the issuer or applicant, a court of competent jurisdiction may 
temporarily or permanently enjoin the issuer from honouring a presentation or grant 
similar relief against the issuer or other persons only if the court finds that:
(1) the relief is not prohibited under the law applicable to an accepted draft 
or deferred obligation incurred by the issuer;
(2) a beneficiary, issuer, or nominated person who may be adversely 
affected is adequately protected against loss that it may suffer because the relief is 
granted;
(3) ail of the conditions to entitle a person to the relief under the law of this 
state have been met; and
(4) on the basis of the information submitted to the court, the applicant is 
more likely than not to succeed under its claim of forgery or material fraud and the 
person demanding honour does not qualify for protection under subsection (a)(1). 
SECTION 5-110. WARRANTIES.
(a) If its presentation is honoured, the beneficiary warrants:
(1) to the issuer, any other person to whom presentation is made, and the 
applicant that there is no fraud or forgery of the kind described in Section 5-109(a); 
and
(2) to the applicant that the drawing does not violate any agreement 
between the applicant and beneficiary or any other agreement intended by them to 
the augmented by the letter of credit.
(b) The warranties in subsection (a) are in addition to warranties arising 
under Articles 3, 4, 7, and 8 because of the presentation or transfer of documents 
covered by any of those articles,
SECTION 5-111. REMEDIES.
(a) if an issuer wrongfully dishonour or repudiates its obligation to pay 
money under a letter of credit before presentation, the beneficiary, successor, or 
nominated person presenting on its own behalf may recover from the issuer the 
amount that is the subject of the dishonour or repudiation. If the issuer's obligation 
under the letter of credit is not for the payment of money, the claimant may obtain
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specific performance or, at the claimant's election, recover an amount equal to the 
value of performance from the issuer. In either case, the claimant may also recover 
incidental but not consequential damages. [*] The claimant is not obliged to take 
action to avoid damages that might be due from the issuer under this subsection. If, 
although not obliged to do so, the claimant avoids damages, the claimant's 
recovery from the issuer must be reduced by the amount of damages avoided. The 
issuer has the burden of proving the amount of damages avoided. In the case of 
repudiation the claimant need not present any document.
(b) If an issuer wrongfully dishonours a draft or demand for payment 
presented under a letter of credit or honours a draft or demand in breach of its 
obligation to the applicant, the applicant may recover damages resulting from the 
breach, including incidental but not consequential damages [*], less any amount 
saved as a result of the breach.
(c) If an adviser or nominated person other than a confirmer breached an 
obligation under this article or an issuer breaches an obligation not covered in 
subsection (a) or (b), a person to whom the obligation is owed may recover 
damaged resulting from the breach, including incidental but not consequential 
damages, less any amount saved as a result of the breach. To the extent of the 
confirmation, a confirmer has the liability of an issuer specified in this subsection 
and subsections (a) and (b).
(d) An issuer, nominated person, or adviser who is found liable under 
subsection (a), (b), or (c) shall pay interest on the amount owed thereunder from 
the date of wrongful dishonour or other appropriate date.
(e) Reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation may [**] be 
awarded to the prevailing party in an action in which a remedy is sought under this 
article.
(f) Damages that would otherwise be payable by a party for breach of an 
obligation under this article may be liquidated by agreement or undertaking, but 
only in an amount or by a formula that is reasonable in light of the harm anticipated.
n  At its meeting on October 21, 1994, the ALI Council voted to disapprove 
this provision disallowing consequential damages. At its meeting on May 15, 1995, 
the Council will consider a recommendation by its ad hoc Committee that it reverse 
that position and accept the text recommended by the Drafting Committee.
[**] The ALI Council's ad hoc Committee strongly recommended to the 
Drafting Committee that "may" be changed to "must". The Drafting Committee has 
agreed to propose to the Nation Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws that "may" be changed to "must". The Executive Committee of 
NCCUSL has so recommended to the Commissioners.
SECTION 5-112. TRANSFER OF LETTER OF CREDIT.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 5-113, unless a letter of credit 
provides that it is transferable, the right of a beneficiary to draw or otherwise 
demand performance under a letter of credit may not be transferred.
(b) Even if a letter of credit provides that it is transferable, the issuer may 
refuse to recognize or carry out a transfer if:
(1) the transfer would violate applicable law; or
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(2) the transferor or transferee has failed to comply with any requirement 
stated in the letter of credit or any other within the standard practice referred to in 
Section 5-108(e) or is otherwise reasonable under the circumstances.
SECTION 5-113. TRANSFER BY OPERATION OF LAW.
(a) A successor of a beneficiary may consent to amendments, sign and 
present documents, and receive payment or other items of value in the name of the 
beneficiary without disclosing its statute as a successor.
(b) A successor of a beneficiary may consent to amendments, sign and 
present documents, and receive payment or other items of value in its own name 
as the disclosed successor of the beneficiary. Except as otherwise provided in 
subsection (e), an issuer shall recognize a disclosed successor of a beneficiary as 
beneficiary in full substitution for its predecessor upon compliance with the 
requirements for its predecessor upon compliance with the requirements for 
recognition by the issuer of a transfer of drawing rights by operation of law under 
the standard practice referred to in Section 5-108(e) or, in the absence of such a 
practice, compliance with other reasonable procedures sufficient to protect the 
issuer.
(c) An issuer is not obliged to determine whether a purported successor is a 
successor of a beneficiary or whether the signature of a purported successor is 
genuine or authorized.
(d) Honour of a purported successor's apparently complying presentation 
under subsection (a) or (b) has the consequences specified in Section 5-108(i) 
even if the purported successor is not the successor of a beneficiary. Documents 7 
signed in the name of the beneficiary or of a disclosed successor by a person who 
is neither the beneficiary nor the successor of the beneficiary are forged documents 
for the purposes of Section 5-109.
(e) An issuer whose rights of reimbursement are not covered by subsection
(d) or substantially similar law and any confirmer or nominated person may decline 
to recognize a presentation under subsection (b).
(f) A beneficiary whose name is changed after the issuance of a letter of 
credit has the same rights and obligations as a successor of a beneficiary under 
this section.
SECTION 114. ASSIGNMENT OF PROCEEDS.
(a) In this section, "proceeds of a letter of credit" means the cash, check, 
accepted draft, or other item of value paid or delivered upon honour or giving of 
value by the issuer or any nominated person under the letter of credit. The term 
does not include a beneficiary's drawing rights or documents presented by the 
beneficiary.
(b) A beneficiary may assign its rights to part or all of the proceeds of a letter 
of credit. The beneficiary may do so before presentation as a present assignment t
of its right to receive proceeds contingent upon its compliance with the terms and t
conditions of the letter of credit.
(c) An issuer or nominated person need not recognize an assignment of 
proceeds of a letter of credit until it consents to the assignment.
(d) An issuer or nominated person has no obligation to give or withhold its 
consent to an assignment of proceeds, but consent may not be unreasonably
•é:
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withheld if the assignee possesses and exhibits the letter of credit an presentation 
of the letter of credit is a condition to honour.
(e) Rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person are independent 
of the beneficiary's assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit and are superior 
to the assignee's right to the proceeds.
(f) Neither the rights recognised by this section between an assignee and an 
issuer, transferee beneficiary, or nominated person nor the issuer's or nominated 
person's payment of proceeds to an assignee or a third person affect the rights 
between the assignee and any person other than the issuer, transferee beneficiary, 
or nominated person. The mode of creating and perfecting a security Interest in or 
granting an assignment of a beneficiary's rights to proceeds is governed by Article 
9 or other law. Against persons other than the issuer, transferee beneficiary, or 
nominated person, the rights and obligations arising upon the creation of a security 
interest or other assignment of a beneficiary's right to proceeds and its perfection 
are governed by Article 9 or other law.
SECTION 5-115. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
An action to enforce a right or obligation arising under this article must be 
commenced within one year after the expiration date of the relevant letter of credit 
or one year after the [claim for relief] [cause of action] accrues, whichever occurs 
later. A [claim for relief] [cause of action] accrues when the breach occurs, 
regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach.
SECTION 5-116. CHOICE OF LAW.
(a) The liability of an issuer, nominated person, or adviser for action or 
omission is governed by the law of the jurisdiction chosen by an agreement in the 
form of a record signed or otherwise authenticated by the affected parties in the 
manner provided in Section 5-104 or by a provision in the person's jurisdiction 
whose law is chosen need not bear any relation to the transaction.
(b) Unless subsection (a) applies, the liability of an issuer, nominated 
person, or adviser for action or omission is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in 
which the person is located. The person is considered to be located at the address 
is indicated in the person's undertaking. If more than one address indicated, the 
person is considered to be located at the address from which the person's 
undertaking was issued. For the purpose of jurisdiction, choice of law, and 
recognition of interbranch letters of credit, but not enforcement of a judgment, all 
branches of a bank are considered separate judicial entities and a bank is 
considered to be located at the place where its relevant branch is considered to be 
located under this subsection.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the liability of an issuer, 
nominated person, or adviser is governed by any rules of custom or practice, such 
as the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, to which the letter 
of credit, confirmation, or other undertaking is expressly made subject. If (i) this 
article would govern the liability of an issuer, nominated person, or adviser under 
subsection (a) or (b), (ii) the relevant undertaking incorporates rules of custom or 
practice, and (iii) there is conflict between this article and those rules as applied to 
that undertaking, those rules govern except to the extent of any conflict with the 
nonvariable provisions specified in Section 5-103(c).
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(d) If there is conflict between this article and Article 3, 4, 4A, or 9, this article 
governs.
(e) The forum for settling disputes arising out of an undertaking within this 
article may be chosen in the manner and with the binding effect that governing law 
may be chosen in accordance with subsection (a).
SECTION 5-117. SUBROGATION OF ISSUER, APPLICANT, AND NOMINATED 
PERSON.
(a) An issuer that honours a beneficiary's presentation is subrogated to the 
rights of the beneficiary to the same extent as if the issuer were a secondary obligor 
of the underlying obligation owed to the beneficiary and of the applicant to the 
same extend as if the issuer were the secondary obligor of the underlying obligation 
owed to the applicant.
(b) An applicant that reimburses an issuer is subrogated to the rights of the 
issuer against any beneficiary, presenter, or nominated person to the same extent 
as if the applicant were the secondary obligor of the obligation owed to the issuer 
and has the rights of subrogation of the issuer to the rights of the beneficiaiy stated 
in subsection (a).
(c) A nominated person who pays or gives value against a draft or demand 
presented under a letter of credit is subrogated to the rights of :
(1) the issuer against the applicant to the same extent as if the nominated 
person were a secondary obligor of the obligation owed to the issuer by the 
applicant;
(2) the beneficiary to the same extent as if the nominated person were a 
secondary obligor of the underlying obligation owed to the beneficiary; and
(3) the applicant to the same extent as if the nominated person were a 
secondary obligor of the underlying obligation owed to the applicant.
(d) Notwithstanding any agreement or term to the contrary, the rights of 
subrogation stated in subsections (a) and (b) do not arise until the issuer honours 
the letter of credit or otherwise pays and the rights in subsection (c) do not arise 
until the nominated person pays or otherwise gives value. Until then, the issuer, 
nominated person, and the applicant do not derive under this section present or 
prospective rights forming the basis of a claim, defense, or excuse.
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TABLES
1. TABLES RELATED TO THE UCP 500
1.1. TABLE OF CONCORDANCE BETWEEN UCP 500 AND UCP 400
UCP 500 UCP 400 UCP 500 UCP 400
1 1 26 25
2 2 27 NEW
3 3,6 28 NEW
4 4 29 30
5 5,13,22(a) 30 25(d),26(c)
6 7 31 28,32,33
7 8 32 34
8 9 33 31
9 10 34 35,36,37
10 11 35 38,40
11 12 36 39
12 14 37 41
13 15,16(c) 38 42
14 16(a,b,c) 39 43
15 17 40 44
16 18 41 45
17 19 42 46
18 20 43 47
19 21 44 48
20 22 45 49
21 23 46 50
22 24 47 51,52,53
23 25,26,27,28 48 54
24 NEW 49 55
25 25(c),26(c)
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1.2. TABLE OF CONCORDANCE BETWEEN UCP 400 AND UCP 500
UCP 400 UCP 500 UCP 400 UCP 500
1 1 29 23(b-d)
2 2 30 29
3 3(a) 31 33
4 4 32 31 (ii)
5 5(a) 33 31 (ii)
6 3(b) 34 32
7 6 35 34
8 7(a) 36 34(e)
9 8 37 34(f)
10 9 38 35{a,b)
11 10 39 36
12 11 40 35(c)
13 5(a.ii) 41 37
14 12 42 38
15 13 43 39
16 13,14 44 40
17 15 45 41
18 16 46 42
19 17 47 43
20 18 48 44
21 19 49 45
22 5(b),20 50 46
23 21 51 47(a,b)
24 22 52 47(c)
26 23,26,30 53 47(d)
26 23 54 48
27 23(a.ii) 55 49
28 31
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2; TABLE RELATED TO THE ARTICLE 5 OF THE UCC
2.1. TABLE OF DISPOSITION OF SECTIONS IN FORMER ARTICLE 5
ARTICLE 6 SECTION REVISED ARTICLE 5 SECTION
5-101 5-101
5102(1) 5-103(a)
5-102(2) Omitted (inherent in 5-103(a) and 
definitions)
5-103(3) 5-103(b)(first sentence omitted)
5-103(1)(a) 5-102(a)(10): 5-106(a): 5-102(a)(8)
5-103(1)(b) 5-102(a)(6) ("Document"); 5-102(a)(14) 
("Record"); "Documentary" draft or 
demand not used
6-103(1 )(c) 5-102(a)(9)
5-103(1 )(d) 5-102(a)(3)
5-103(1 )(e) 5-102(a)(1)
5-103(1 )(f) 5-102(a)(4)
5-103(1 )(g) 5-102(a)(2) ("Applicant" rather than 
"Customer")
5-103(2) Omitted as not applicable
5-103(3) 5-102(b)
5-103(4) 5-102(c)
5-104 5-104 and 5-102(6) and (14)
5-105 5-105
5-106(1) 5-106(a)
5-106(2) 5-106(b)
5-106(3) 5-106(b)
5-106(4) 5-106(b)
5-107(1) 5-107(c)
5-107(2) 5-107(a)
5-107(3) 5-107(c)
5-107(4) Omitted as inadvisable default rule
5-108 Omitted (as outdated)
5-109(1) 5-108
5-109(2) 5-108
5-109(3) Omitted (all issuers required to
observe standard practices)
5-110(1) Omitted (covered in definitions 
and comments)
5-110(2) Omitted (covered in definitions 
and comments)
(Continue-next page)
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ARTICLE 5 SECTION REVISED ARTICLE 5 SECTION
5-111(1) 5-110(a)
5-111(2) 5-110(b)
5-112(1) 5-108(b) and (c)
5-112(2) 5-108(h)
5-112(3) 5-102(a)(12)
5-113 Omitted (covered by other contract law)
5-114(1) 5-108(a)
5-114(2)(a) 5-109(a)(1)
5-114(2)(b) 5-109(a)(2)
5-114(3) 5-108(i)
5-114(4), (5) Omitted, were optional
5-115(1) 5-111
5-115(2) 5-111
5-116(1) 5-112
5-116(2) 5-114
5-116(3) 5-113, 5-114
5-117 Omitted (covered by other law)
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2.1. TABLE OF NEW PROVISIONS
(Provisions which were not included in former Article 5 and subjects not 
addressed in former Article 5)
SUBJECTS REVISED ARTICLES 
SECTION
"Successor to a beneficiary" 5-102(15)
Non-variable terms 5-103(c)
Independent principle 5-103(d)
Unstated expiry date 5-106(c)
Perpetual letter of credit 5-106(d)
Preclusion of unstated deficiencies 5-108(c)
Standard of practice 5-108(e)
Independence of obligation 5-108(1)
Non-documentary condition 5-108(g)
Standards for issuing injunction 5-109(b)
Transfer by operation of law 5-113
Statute of Limitation 5-115
Choice of law 5-116
Subrogation 5-117
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